

Utilitarian and Ideological Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigration: Germany Before and After the “Migration Crisis”*

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Abstract

Explanations of attitudes towards immigration include those that take a utilitarian perspective, focusing on immigration’s real-world impacts, and others that look at immigration attitudes from the point of view of ideological affiliation. Focusing on the German “migration crisis” as a case study, this paper seeks to disentangle the roles of these types of explanation, placing an emphasis on possible connections between them. Specifically, the paper studies whether and to what extent perceptions of immigration impacts are related to people’s ideological position through identity-protective cognition, implying an indirect channel through which ideology may shape attitudes toward immigration policies. Using data for 2014–2018, the paper finds that attitudes toward immigration were more strongly related to immigration’s perceived economic and cultural impacts than to ideological position, even accounting for dependence of perceptions on ideology. Ideology-dependence of impact perceptions existed with respect to both economic and cultural impacts but was stronger with respect to the latter than the former. After the migration crisis, perceptions of economic impacts became less important in shaping immigration attitudes relative to perceptions of cultural impacts, and the latter became more ideology-dependent.

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1. Introduction

Immigration has routinely appeared near the top of public policy concerns in Europe, but the salience of immigration in the public and political sphere has been particularly strong during the so-called migration crisis after large inflows of in-

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dividuals from the Middle East and North Africa into Europe in 2015. Concern over immigration was particularly important in Germany: While the proportion of EU citizens who considered immigration to be the most important national concern amounted to 36 percent in November 2015, the corresponding number was twice as large in Germany than in the EU overall (European Commission 2015). In addition, while anti-immigration attitudes have long been a defining issue for far-right political parties (e. g., van der Brug, Fennema, and Tillie 2000) and concerns over immigration greatly contributed to their electoral support (e. g., Arzheimer 2009; Dancygier 2010; Georgiadou, Rori, and Roumanias 2018; Goerres, Spies, and Kumlin 2018), right-wing parties experienced an especially strong boost in approval with the large-scale immigration of 2015. In Germany, the proportion of people for whom the far-right *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* was the party they felt closest to more than doubled from 2014 to 2016 (European Social Survey 2014; 2016). In 2018, the migration issue was referred to by the Federal Minister of the Interior as “the mother of all political troubles” (Deutsche Presse-Agentur (dpa) 2018).

This paper studies the factors that shaped German citizens’ attitudes toward immigration between 2014 and 2018. As will be detailed below, explanations of immigration attitudes include those that take a utilitarian perspective, focusing on individuals’ perceptions of impacts of immigration, both economic and cultural (e. g., MaCurdy, Nechyha, and Bhattacharya 1998; Borjas 1999; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006; Dustman and Preston 2007; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Rustenbach 2010; Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012; Borjas 2014), and others that look at immigration attitudes from the point of view of ideological affiliation, focusing on broad political norms and values (e. g., Kriesi, Grande, and Lachat 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Dalton 2010). What has received little attention so far is the possibility that the two explanations are connected to each other. The idea that such a connection may exist relies on an emergent literature in cognitive psychology which found that decision-relevant cognition depends on individuals’ norms and values which constitute their political identity. In a nutshell, the theory and evidence on politically motivated cognition maintains that people form identity-protective beliefs in order to avoid a tension between their world-views and their personal and/or social identities (Sherman and Cohen 2002; 2006; Kahan 2015; 2017).

Tying in with this latter literature, the present paper sets out to disentangle the role of utilitarian (impact-related) and ideological (identity-related) explanations of immigration attitudes by focusing on possible connections between them. Specifically, the paper studies whether and to what extent individuals’ perceptions of the impacts of immigration are related to their ideological affiliation, a relationship that – if present – implies an indirect channel through which ideological factors may shape attitudes toward immigration policies.

Given the particular salience of the immigration issue in German politics, the paper focuses on Germany in 2014–2018 as a case study. It finds that attitudes toward immigration were more strongly related to immigration’s perceived economic and

cultural impacts than to ideological position, even accounting for dependence of perceptions on ideology. Ideological position was more important with respect to immigrants of a different race or ethnic group than the majority and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe than with respect to immigrants of the same race or ethnic group. Ideology-dependence of impact perceptions existed with respect to both economic and cultural impacts but was stronger with respect to the latter than the former. During the migration crisis, perceptions of economic impacts became less important in shaping immigration attitudes relative to perceptions of cultural impacts, and the latter became more ideology-dependent.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background on the German *migration crisis* and reviews the literature. Section 3 presents the data and descriptive background. Section 4 presents the analytical framework and results. Section 5 concludes.

2. Background and Literature

2.1 The German “Migration Crisis”

The so-called migration (or refugee) crisis in Germany involved a drastic increase in the number of immigrants in the wake of escalating wars in Syria and Iraq in 2015. During that year, the inflow of registered immigrants increased steadily from 32,229 in January to 104,460 in August. After the decision by the German Government on September 5 to allow refugees *stranded* in Hungary to come to Germany, the number skyrocketed to 206,101 in November 2015 while dropping thereafter and stabilizing at less than 20,000 per month after March 2016 (Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung 2018).

In parallel with these developments, immigration increasingly became a dominant concern in public discourse. The proportion of the German population who considered immigration to be the most important national concern amounted to 37 percent in November 2014, 76 percent in November 2015 and 56 percent in May 2016 (European Commission 2014; 2015; 2016). Based on a specific survey, Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2017) found that public acceptance of immigrants from Arab or African countries dropped drastically after a number of sexual assaults on New Year’s Eve 2015/2016 committed by immigrants from these regions, an event that received massive media coverage for several weeks. At the same time, war refugees continued to be highly accepted.¹

¹ Sustained reported acceptance of war refugees in spite of decreased acceptance of immigrants from Arab or African countries seems to involve some inconsistency since most refugees come from these countries. Possible, though speculative, explanations may involve that survey respondents were either unaware of refugees’ origin (which seems unlikely) or that they responded to the refugee question in a way they felt to be socially desired.

At the level of politics, the famous dictum by Chancellor Merkel “We will manage this” and the ensuing opening of the German border were criticized by many commentators and politicians as constituting an invitation to flee to Germany and as a violation of established EU norms (Pries 2020). In terms of party affiliation, the proportion of people for whom the far-right and explicitly anti-immigration *Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)* was the party they felt closest to sharply increased from 3 percent in 2014 to 6.9 percent in 2016 (European Social Survey 2014; 2016). These anti-immigration sentiments stood in sharp contrast to views held in business circles that immigration is necessary to countervail the demography-related decline of the labor force.

2.2 Conceptual Background

As mentioned in the introduction, explanations of attitudes toward immigration include those that take a utilitarian perspective and others that look at immigration attitudes from the point of view of ideological and political orientation. It is useful to clarify these concepts before reviewing the pertinent literature.

Utilitarian explanations of immigration attitudes refer to the (perceived) consequences or impacts of immigration and the evaluation of those impacts from the point of view of interests. I explicitly conceptualize not only economic concerns but concerns over immigration’s cultural and social impacts as a utilitarian factor. Following, for example, Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012), relevant economic impacts of immigration include those on wages and salaries, the availability of jobs for natives, impacts on health and welfare benefits, prospects of the poor and, on the positive side, reducing shortages of workers and increasing tax revenues, whereas cultural impacts refer to impacts on “compositional amenities” in terms of shared beliefs, language, traditions and customs and, on the positive side, a greater variety of food, music and artistic activities, among others. The set of utilitarian factors is thus broader than those related to competition over economic resources featured in what has been labeled the political economy approach to immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins 2014).

Ideological explanations of immigration attitudes may involve several notions, including party affiliation, policy attitudes, and political self-identity, and the various aspects may be more or less tied to norms and values. A broad measure often used to describe individuals’ ideological position is the left-right scale (Benoit and Laver 2006).² The left-right scale involves two domains of norms and values, economy-related and culture-related ones (Bornschieer 2010), where the former (in particular, equity and solidarity) are more important on the left side of the spectrum while the latter (in particular, national pride and patriotism) are more important on the right side

² For critical discussions see Bauer *et al.* (2017) and Zuell and Scholz (2019).

(Lachat 2018).³ This implies that the right is expected to be more anti-immigration than the left.

Endorsement of norms and values that define ideological position is part of an individual's social identity and fairly stable over the life cycle (e.g., Haidt 2012; Kahana 2017). I therefore refer to ideological explanations of immigration attitudes as identity-related.

2.3 Existing Evidence on Sources of Immigration Attitudes

While economists have traditionally focused on the role of (perceived) economic impacts of immigration (as described above) in shaping attitudes towards it (e.g., MaCurdy, Nechyha, and Bhattacharya 1998; Borjas 1999; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Hanson, Scheve, and Slaughter 2007; Borjas 2014), political scientists have typically found a linkage between anti-immigration attitudes and ideological orientation towards the right (e.g., Kriesi, Grande, and Lachat 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009; Dalton 2010).

The evidence on the importance of economic concerns is mixed, ranging from studies that found fears about increased labor market competition to strongly shape individuals' attitudes toward immigrants (e.g., Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Mayda 2006) to others that found no or only weak evidence for this effect (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2010; Rustenbach 2010; O'Connell 2011; Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012). The focus on economic impacts has recently been complemented by the consideration of cultural impacts. Mayda (2006) found immigration attitudes to be correlated to perceived cultural impacts of immigration in addition to economic concerns, whereas Card, Dustmann, and Preston (2012) found concerns over cultural impacts of immigration to be more important in explaining variation in individual attitudes toward immigration than concerns over wages, jobs, taxes and benefits.

While impact-related and ideological factors have partly been studied separately, a number of studies have considered them jointly. Mayda (2006) studied the role of political affiliation with the right as well as patriotic and nationalist identity, in addition to perceived economic and cultural impacts, and found attitudes in favor of immigration to be negatively related to right-leaning, patriotic and nationalist identity. Consistent with Mayda (2006), O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) found that attitudes towards immigration are not a function of economic interests alone but are driven by patriotism and chauvinism.⁴ Rustenbach (2010) tested several explanations of im-

³ The latter norms and values are referred to in the literature as culture-related. They should not be confused with immigration's perceived cultural impacts. Cp. Footnote 5.

⁴ Both Mayda (2006) and O'Rourke and Sinnott (2006) refer to patriotism and nationalism/ chauvinism as "cultural factors." In spite of this terminology, they fall into the category of ideological rather than impact-related (utilitarian) explanations of immigration attitudes. For instance, Mayda (2006) operationalizes nationalism as "national pride," measured by items

migration attitudes and found anti-immigration sentiment to be negatively associated with a left leaning political orientation whereas economic competition explanations found mixed support in her study.

Overall, the literature has studied both immigration's economic and/or cultural impacts and political identity as explanations of attitudes towards immigration. However, none of the papers was concerned with connections between these two groups of explanation, specifically the possibility that perceptions of immigration's impacts may depend on political identity.

2.4 Identity-Protective Cognition

The proposition that people with different ideological orientations may have different perceptions of the impacts of immigration ties in with the proposition studied by cognitive psychologists that perceptions of truth often depend more on emotions and cultural and political ties than on objective facts. With respect to politically contested issues, a tendency was found towards identity-protecting cognition, that is the perception of reality in patterns that reflects people's commitment to their cultural or political affinity groups (Sherman and Cohen 2002; 2006). The mechanisms involved in such adjustments of cognition to identity include the acquisition (through selective exposure or avoidance) and the processing (through motivated reasoning) of information (e. g., Garrett, Carnahan, and Lynch 2011; Kahan 2013, respectively).

Salient examples of identity-protective cognition refer to the risks associated with horizontal oil and gas drilling (fracking), climate change, and private gun possession. With respect to these issues, conservative US citizens not only display more favorable (fracking) or unfavorable (climate change mitigation and gun control) attitudes (i. e., preferences) than do liberals; they also perceive fracking, climate change and gun possession to be significantly less risky than do liberals (Kahan 2015; 2017; Kahan *et al.* 2012). Similar ideology-dependence of climate change cognition was found in an international data set (Hornsey, Harris, and Fielding 2018).

With respect to immigration, the theory and evidence on identity-protective cognition would predict that ideological positions that are associated with anti-immigration (pro-immigration) attitudes are associated with more negative (more positive) perceptions of immigration's impacts. Specifically, a more right-leaning (left-leaning) political position is expected to be associated with more negative (positive) perceptions of immigration's economic and cultural impacts.

such as "feeling close to own country," "rather be citizen of own country" and "own country better than others." These are conceptually different from cultural impacts, that is impacts on "compositional amenities" in terms of shared beliefs, language, traditions and customs (Card, Dustmann, and Preston 2012).

2.5 Guiding Assumptions

The literature reviewed suggests a set of guiding assumptions for the empirical analysis. The first is that people's policy preferences concerning immigration are shaped by both their perceptions of immigration's economic and cultural impacts and their ideological affiliation. The second is that the two sets of explanation are related to each other as ideological position may shape the perception of impacts, thus creating an indirect channel through which ideology may affect immigration attitudes.

3. Data and Descriptive Background

3.1 Data Sources and Definition of Variables

I use survey data for Germany from the seventh (2014), eighth (2016) and ninth (2018) rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a repeated cross-sectional bi-annual survey.⁵ ESS data are obtained using random (probability) samples, where the sampling strategies are designed to ensure representativeness and comparability across European countries. The ESS routinely asks individuals to state their attitudes towards immigration policy, their perceptions as to the consequences of immigration, and their ideological position.

The seventh round of the German survey was fielded from August 18, 2014 to February 5, 2015, that is before the peak of immigration to Germany in late 2015, whereas the eighth and ninth rounds were fielded from August 23, 2016 to March 26, 2017, and from August 29, 2018 to March 3, 2019, respectively, that is after the peak. The data set involves 3045 observations for 2014, 2852 observations for 2016, and 2354 observations for 2018. Due to item non-response, the number of observations used in econometric analysis is somewhat smaller (depending on the variables included in various specifications).

Immigration Attitudes

The dependent variables are indicators of attitudes towards immigration policy (immigration attitude – *IA*) of people of the same race or ethnic group as the majority (*IA-Same*), different race or ethnic group than the majority (*IA-Diff*) and from poorer countries outside Europe (*IA-Poor*). The respective indicators are based on the following questions.

IA-Same: *Now, using this card, to what extent do you think your country should allow people of the same race or ethnic group as most people in this country to come and live here? Allow many to come and live here = 1; Allow some = 2; Allow a few = 3; Allow none = 4.*

⁵ See www.europeansocialsurvey.org for more information.

IA-Diff: *How about people of a different race or ethnic group from most people in this country? Still use this card. Allow many to come and live here = 1; Allow some = 2; Allow a few = 3; Allow none = 4.*

IA-Poor: *How about people from the poorer countries outside Europe? Use the same card. Allow many to come and live here = 1; Allow some = 2; Allow a few = 3; Allow none = 4.*

While it may be assumed that in 2014 to 2018 the group of “people from poorer countries outside Europe” may include more refugees than the other two categories, the ESS provides no specific information on attitudes towards refugees.

Perceived Consequences

Questions concerning the perceived consequences (*PC*) of immigration refer to economic consequences (*PC-Econ*) and cultural consequences (*PC-Cult*). The respective indicators are based on the following questions.

PC-Econ: *Would you say it is generally bad or good for Germany’s economy that people come to live here from other countries? Please use this card. Bad for the economy = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Good for the economy = 10.*

PC-Cult: *And, using this card, would you say that Germany’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries? Cultural life undermined = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, Cultural life enriched = 10.*

Ideological Position

Ideological position on the left-right scale (*IP-Right*) is obtained from the following question.

IP-Right: *In politics people sometimes talk of “left” and “right.” Where would you place yourself on this scale, where 0 means the left and 10 means the right?*

Control Variables

In addition to the perceived consequences of immigration and the ideological position, the set of independent variables includes socio-demographic and socio-economic control variables that were used in previous research (e. g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007): age (years), gender (female = 1, male = 0), highest level of education (not completed primary education = 0, completed primary education = 1, ..., doctoral degree = 6), household’s total net income (1st decile = 1, ..., 10th decile = 10), and unemployed status (actively looking for job = 1, other = 0). A further control, included in robustness checks, is whether or not respondents are themselves immigrants (dummy variable). Inclusion/omission of this variable has no appreciable effect on any of the results.

3.2 Sample Characteristics

Table 1 describes the dependent and independent variables, differentiated by 2014, 2016 and 2018. With respect to the variable IA-Same, the (relative) majority of respondents say that “some” immigrants should be allowed to come to the country whereas those who think that “none” should be allowed constitute a small minority of less than 2 percent. With respect to IA-Diff, the proportion of respondents saying that “none” should be allowed to come is larger, amounting to 4.1 percent in 2014 and 4.4 percent in 2016 and 2018. The increase of this category goes with a decrease in pro-immigration attitudes (“allow many”, “allow some”). With respect to IA-Poor, the proportion saying that “none” should be allowed to come is larger than with respect to IA-Same and IA-Diff, but that proportion has *decreased* after 2014 (from 7.4 to 5.7 percent in 2016 and 6.3 percent in 2018), as has the proportion saying that “few” should be allowed (from 28.1 to 26.1 and 26.8 percent). On the other hand, the proportions saying that “some” as well as “many” should be allowed to come increased. Though the mean values of IA-Diff and IA-Poor changed somewhat from 2014 to 2016 and 2018, these changes were not statistically significant. With respect to “immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe,” though not necessarily identical with refugees, absence of a statistically different change is consistent with the finding of Czymara and Schmidt-Catran (2017) of a non-decreasing acceptance of refugees in 2015/2016. Absence of a statistically significant change in immigration attitudes in Germany is also consistent with the finding of Stockemer *et al.* (2020) that the migration crisis did not increase anti-immigration sentiment in Europe overall. Comparing the different groups of immigrants, the level of anti-immigration sentiment in Germany is larger in the cases of IA-Diff and IA-Poor than IA-Same.

Table 1

Sample Characteristics (Percentage Distributions and Summary Statistics)

	IA-Same (Immigrants of the same race or ethnic group)			IA-Diff (Immigrants of a different race or ethnic group)			IA-Poor (Immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe)		
	2014	2016	2018	2014	2016	2018	2014	2016	2018
1 Allow many	42.5	41.3	41.8	23.1	21.9	22.0	19.7	21.3	20.6
2 Allow some	47.1	49.3	47.0	51.5	49.4	48.9	44.8	46.8	46.3
3 Allow a few	8.9	8.3	9.8	21.3	24.3	24.7	28.1	26.1	26.8
4 Allow none	1.5	1.2	1.4	4.1	4.4	4.4	7.4	5.7	6.3
Mean	1.69	1.69	1.71	2.06	2.11	2.12	2.23	2.16	2.19
SD	0.69	0.67	0.70	0.78	0.79	0.79	0.85	0.82	0.83

	PC-Econ (Perceived economic consequences)			PC-Cult (Perceived cultural consequences)			IP-Right (Placement on left-right scale)		
	2014	2016	2018	2016	2014	2018	2016	2014	2018
Code	Immigration bad for the economy (= 0)			Cultural life undermined by immigrants (= 0)			Left (= 0)		
0	3.5	3.0	3.1	2.6	2.9	3.6	3.6	3.8	4.4
1	1.7	1.6	2.1	1.6	2.4	2.9	2.2	2.1	3.1
2	4.5	4.0	4.0	3.5	4.2	5.2	6.7	7.7	8.1
3	8.0	7.1	5.7	6.2	7.0	7.1	13.5	14.2	14.3
4	7.9	7.6	6.4	7.4	7.8	7.0	12.3	13.0	12.6
5	22.2	21.8	20.8	19.0	18.7	16.9	38.2	38.2	37.7
6	12.6	12.1	10.9	10.2	11.9	11.1	10.8	8.4	8.4
7	15.9	17.4	18.2	16.9	15.4	15.6	6.7	7.4	5.8
8	15.3	15.4	16.3	18.1	16.0	15.2	3.3	3.6	3.5
9	3.8	4.7	5.9	6.8	5.4	7.4	1.0	0.6	0.6
10	4.7	5.3	6.5	7.7	8.4	7.9	1.7	1.0	1.4
	Immigration good for the economy (= 10)			Cultural life enriched by immigrants (= 10)			Right (= 10)		
Mean	5.67	5.83	5.98	6.14	5.96	5.91	4.60	4.49	4.40
SD	2.33	2.31	2.38	2.38	2.46	2.58	1.90	1.86	1.94

Turning to the perceived consequences of immigration, the relative majority views immigration as being neither bad nor good for the economy (variable PC-Econ)

whereas the perceptions of immigration's consequences for cultural life (variable PC-Cult) tend to be somewhat more positive near the top of the scale. The mean value of PC-Econ steadily increased after 2014 whereas the mean value of PC-Cult steadily decreased, but those changes (relative to 2014) are not statistically significant.

With respect to the position on the left-right scale (variable IP-Right), most respondents take moderate positions. The proportion of the three rightmost categories is considerably smaller than that of the three leftmost categories. The distribution of ideological orientations saw no statistically significant change after 2014, consistent with the stability of the norms and values that characterize those orientations (Haidt 2012).

Table A1 in the appendix shows bivariate correlations. The anti-immigration attitudes are moderately negatively related to immigration's favorable economic and cultural consequences (between $r = -0.39$ and $r = -0.54$) and weakly related to a more right-leaning ideological orientation (between $r = 0.11$ and $r = 0.27$). Perceptions of favorable consequences and ideological position are also weakly related to each other (between $r = -0.10$ and $r = -0.29$). The correlations changed somewhat over time. In particular, there was a steady increase in the correlation between right-leaning ideology and the attitude against immigrants from a different culture (from $r = 0.21$ in 2014 to $r = 0.27$ in 2018) and between ideology and perceptions of favorable economic and cultural consequences (from -0.10 to -0.17 and from -0.20 to -0.29 , respectively).

4. Analytical Framework and Results

This section presents the model and empirical approach (4.1), the main estimation results (4.2), robustness checks (4.3), and a summary of main findings (4.4).

4.1 Model and Empirical Approach

The empirical analysis draws on the findings reviewed above on the identity-related (i.e., ideological) and impact-related (i.e., utilitarian) sources of immigration attitudes and on the insights on the possible identity-dependence of perceptions of impacts. With respect to identity-dependence, I hypothesize that a more right-leaning (left-leaning) political orientation is associated with more negative (positive) perceptions of immigration's effects on the economy and/or cultural life.

The dependence of attitude-relevant perceptions on ideological affiliation or identity creates an indirect channel through which ideological factors may shape immigration attitudes. The following model accounts for the ideological and impact-related sources of immigration attitudes, including both a direct and an indirect channel of the ideology-attitude relationship.

Equation (1) captures the association between individuals' immigration attitudes and their ideological position, their perception of immigration's economic and cultural consequences, and socio-demographic control variables:

$$IA_i = a_0 + a_1*PC-Econ_i + a_2*PC-Cult_i + a_3*IP-Right_i + a_4 *D2016*PC-Econ_i + a_5*D2016*PC-Cult_i + a_6*D2016*IP-Right_i + a_7 *D2018*PC-Econ_i + a_8*D2018*PC-Cult_i + a_9*D2018*IP-Right_i + a_{10}*D2016 + a_{11}*D2018 + a_{12}*Controls_i + u_i \quad (1)$$

In this formulation, IA_i denotes indicators of individual i 's degree of *anti-immigration* sentiment towards various groups of immigrants (*IA-Same*, *IA-Diff*, *IA-Poor*, see subsection 3.1). *PC-Econ_i* and *PC-Cult_i* are the individual's perceptions of the degree to which immigration is good for the economy and for cultural life, respectively. *IP-Right_i* denotes the degree to which an individual places herself towards the right on the left-right scale. *D2016* and *D2018* are dummy variables for the years 2016 and 2018, respectively. *Controls* is the vector of socio-demographic controls (subsection 3.1),⁶ u_i is the error term. The previous literature suggests that a_1 and a_2 are negative whereas a_3 is expected to be positive. The coefficients on the interaction terms with *D2016* and *D2018* measure the difference of the respective relationships in 2016 and 2018 in comparison to 2014.

On the presumption that perceptions of consequences depend on ideological position, equation (1) measures solely a direct association between immigration attitudes and ideological position through parameter a_1 , disregarding the possibility of an indirect channel of the attitude-ideology nexus through ideology-dependence of perceptions.

Equations (2a) and (2b) specify the association between perceived economic and cultural consequences and ideological position, using the same set of controls as above:

$$PC-Econ_i = b_0 + b_1*IP-Right_i + b_2*D2016*IP-Right_i + b_3*D2018*IP-Right_i + b_4*D2016 + b_5*D2018 + b_6*Controls_i + v_i \quad (2a)$$

$$PC-Cult_i = c_0 + c_1*IP-Right_i + c_2*D2016*IP-Right_i + c_3*D2018*IP-Right_i + c_4*D2016 + c_5*D2018 + c_6*Controls_i + w_i \quad (2b)$$

,where v_i and w_i are error terms.

In this formulation, b_1 and c_1 are expected to be negative: a more right-leaning position is associated with less favorable perceptions of immigration impacts. Referring to equation (1) in a stylized fashion as $IA = f(PC, IP)$ and to (2a) and (2b) as

⁶ In addition to the control variables mentioned in subsection 3.1, the seventh round of the ESS (2014) offers information on how many people of a minority race or ethnic group live in one's neighborhood. According to the ethnic threat theory and the contact hypothesis (Allport 1954), this could affect attitudes towards immigration. I experimented with including this variable as an additional control and found it to be insignificant and not affecting the other results.

$PC = g(IP)$, there are indirect relationships between immigration attitudes and ideological position given by $\partial f / \partial PC * \partial g / \partial IP$. The indirect relationships are expected to be positive: anti-immigration sentiments are related to more right-leaning positions through more negative perceptions of immigration's impacts.

The system of equations (1), (2a), and (2b) represents a typical mediation model, as defined by Baron and Kenny (1986), in which the perceptions (*PC-Econ* and *PC-Cult*) act as mediators in the relationship between ideological affiliation (*Right*) and attitudes toward immigration. To accommodate criticism of the Baron-Kenny methodology based on correlation of errors across equations, the state-of-the art method is to estimate the equations as a recursive system of seemingly unrelated regressions (Gatignon [2003] 2014, chapter 11), using a bootstrap procedure (5000 replications) to estimate the indirect effects.

4.2 Main Estimation Results

Table 2 displays the estimation results for the attitude equations (1) in columns 1 to 3. With respect to the explanatory power, the coefficient of determination (R^2) is greater in the case of IA-Diff and IA-Poor than in the case of IA-Same. Attitudes towards immigration are thus more “noisy” with respect to immigrants of the same race or ethnicity as the majority than with respect to the other groups of immigrants.

Table 2

Main Regression Results

	1 IA-Same	2 IA-Diff	3 IA-Poor	4 PC-Econ	5 PC-Cult
PC-Econ	-0.08*** (12.63)	-0.09*** (14.11)	-0.11*** (15.10)		
PC-Econ *D2016	0.02** (2.27)	0.01 (1.03)	0.06 (0.61)		
PC-Econ *D2018	0.02** (2.06)	0.01 (0.96)	0.03*** (2.69)		
PC-Cult	-0.07*** (10.73)	-0.11*** (16.51)	-0.11*** (14.41)		
PC-Cult *D2016	0.01 (1.07)	0.01 (1.06)	0.01 (0.99)		
PC-Cult *D2018	0.01 (0.97)	0.02** (2.03)	0.01 (0.91)		
IP-Right	0.02*** (2.62)	0.04*** (6.48)	0.05*** (6.69)	-0.13*** (5.66)	-0.22*** (9.62)
IP-Right *D2016	-0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (1.11)	-0.01 (1.01)	-0.04 (1.21)	-0.11*** (2.93)
IP-Right *D2018	-0.02*** (2.62)	0.01 (0.98)	-0.01 (1.25)	-0.10*** (2.84)	-0.15*** (4.20)
D2016	-0.13 (0.13)	-0.03 (0.04)	-0.26 (0.22)	1.35 (0.41)	0.84 (0.24)
D2018	-0.10 (0.15)	-0.03 (0.05)	-0.34 (0.16)	1.18 (0.81)	0.71 (0.27)
Female	0.01 (0.33)	-0.04 (0.86)	-0.03 (1.61)	-0.31*** (3.08)	0.15 (1.52)
Age	-0.01 (1.64)	0.01*** (4.89)	0.01*** (5.69)	0.01 (1.45)	-0.01 (1.63)
Education	-0.03*** (3.72)	-0.04*** (4.05)	-0.01 (1.51)	0.28*** (8.52)	0.29*** (8.44)
Income	-0.02*** (3.84)	-0.03*** (4.08)	-0.02*** (3.37)	0.07*** (4.41)	0.05*** (2.61)
Unemployed	0.08 (1.48)	0.06 (0.82)	0.02 (0.30)	-0.69*** (2.62)	-0.47 (1.52)
Constant	2.80	3.09	3.32	4.69	5.60
N	6871	6860	6854	6934	6963
Adj. R ²	0.219	0.358	0.331	0.087	0.115

Note: The dependent variables IA-Same, IA-Diff and IA-Poor measure respondents' opinion as to how many immigrants of the same race or ethnic group (IA-Same), a different race or ethnic group (IA-Diff) and from poorer countries outside Europe (IA-Poor) should be allowed to come to Germany (1 = many, 2 = some, 3 = a few, 4 = none). PC-Econ indicates respondents' perceptions as to immigration's impacts on the economy (0 = bad, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = good). PC-Cult indicates respondents' perceptions as to immigrations' impact on cultural life (0 = cultural life undermined, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = cultural life enriched). IP-Right indicates respondents' self-placement on the left-right scale (0 = left, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 = right).

t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05. ***p<0.01.

With respect to the socio-demographic controls, anti-immigration attitudes are significantly negatively related to income and – except for IA-Poor – the level of education. Anti-immigration sentiment is not significantly related to age in the case of IA-Same and significantly increasing in age with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor. There is no significant relationship with gender and with unemployed status. The

results are consistent with previous findings for many countries (e. g. Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007), which justifies some confidence as to the quality of the data.⁷

Turning to the variables of main interest, all qualitative results correspond to expectation: anti-immigration attitudes are significantly negatively related to the perception of favorable economic and cultural impacts of immigration and significantly positively related to a more right-leaning ideological position. As indicated by the interaction terms with the 2016-dummy, the coefficients on the impact and ideological variables are not different in 2016 than in 2014 with one exception: the coefficient on PC-Econ*D2016 in the IA-Same equation is significantly positive. This means that favorable perceptions as to the economic impact of immigrants of the same culture were less effective in attenuating anti-immigration sentiment in 2016 than in 2014, and this continued to be so in 2018 (see PC-Econ*D2018).

Other changes from 2014 to 2018 are that the relationships between (i) ideology and IA-Same, (ii) perceived cultural consequences and IA-Diff, and (iii) perceived economic consequences and IA-Poor all became significantly weaker. As regards (i), the negative coefficient on IP-Right*D2018 has the same magnitude as the positive coefficient on the un-interacted IP-Right variable, suggesting that there was no appreciable relationship between ideological position and IA-Same by 2018. The years 2014 to 2018 thus saw a decreasing importance for IA-Same of ideological relative to utilitarian factors.

As regards (ii) and (iii), considering that these relationships did not differ significantly between 2016 and 2014, findings (ii) and (iii) suggest a smaller influence of the utilitarian factors on IA-Diff and IA-Poor in 2018 than previously. The influence of ideological position on IA-Diff and IA-Poor, conversely, did not change from 2014 to 2018. The years 2014 to 2018 thus saw a decrease in the relative importance of utilitarian as opposed to ideological determinants of the sentiment towards immigrants of a different culture or from poor countries.

Comparing the coefficients of economic and cultural impacts, cultural concerns are more important than economic concerns with respect to IA-Diff ($t = 2.16$) while not being (significantly) different with respect to IA-Same and IA-Poor. While the coefficients on both types of impact do not differ much across the various types of immigrants, this is different with respect to the coefficients on ideological position. Comparing the different groups of immigrants, ideology is at least twice more important with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor than with respect to IA-Same.

Since the ideological position and perceived impacts are both measured on an 11-point scale, it is possible to make a preliminary comparison of the magnitudes

⁷ The result that anti-immigration sentiment is not significantly related to age in the case of IA-Same and significantly positively related to age with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor is broadly consistent with the finding of Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007, Table 4) that the age-attitude relationship is three times smaller in the case of immigrants from richer European countries than with respect to immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe.

involved (see below for more detailed quantifications). With respect to all groups of immigrants the coefficients on ideological position are of a much smaller (and statistically different) magnitude than those on the perceived impacts. However, the difference in magnitudes is larger with respect to IA-Same than with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor. Relative to the impact-related factors, ideological position is thus more important with respect to immigrants of a different race or ethnic group and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe than with respect to immigrants of the same race or ethnic group as the majority.

The results for the impact perception equations (2a) and (2b) are shown in columns 4 and 5 of Table 2. With respect to the controls, better educated and wealthier people hold significantly more positive views of immigration's economic and cultural impacts than less educated and less wealthy individuals. The unemployed have more negative perceptions than others with respect to the economic impacts whereas perceptions of cultural impacts are not statistically related to unemployed status. There is no significant relationship between impact perceptions and gender and age except that women hold significantly more negative views of economic impacts than men. The results concerning economic impacts are consistent with the idea that less educated and less wealthy as well as unemployed individuals feel more exposed to labor market competition by immigrants.⁸

Controlling for these socio-demographic factors, favorable perceptions of both economic and cultural impacts of immigration are significantly negatively related to a more right-leaning ideological orientation, as expected. The magnitude of the ideology-perceptions relationship is far greater with respect to cultural than economic impacts. As indicated by the interaction terms with the 2016-dummy, the relationship between perceived cultural impacts and ideological position was significantly stronger (by 50 percent) in 2016 than in 2014, whereas the relationship between ideology and perceived economic impacts changed non-significantly. By 2018, however, the relationship between ideology and both economic and cultural impact perceptions was significantly stronger than in 2014 (by about two thirds).

4.3 Alternative Ideology Indicator

As discussed above, the left-right scale involves two domains characterized, respectively, by endorsement of equity and solidarity norms on the left (economic domain) and national identity and homogeneity norms on the right (cultural domain). It is therefore useful to check whether the importance attached to equity/solidarity

⁸ The finding that unemployed individuals have more negative perceptions of economic impacts while not having significantly different opinions on how many immigrants should be allowed to come to Germany when impact perceptions are controlled for (as reported in the first three columns of Table 2) suggests the absence of an effect of unemployed status on these opinions other than through perceived economic impacts.

affects immigration attitudes differently than the position on the overall left-right scale.

Endorsement of equity and solidarity can be captured by the following item from the ESS: *The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. Agree strongly = 1, 2, 3, 4, Disagree strongly = 5.* We refer to this variable as IP-NoRedist. It is a measure of economic, as opposed to cultural, conservatism. IP-NoRedist is correlated with IP-Right at $r = 0.148$. The overall left-right position is thus moderately related to economic conservatism.

Table 3 reports versions of the immigration attitude equation (1) in which IP-Right is replaced with IP-NoRedist. This has no appreciable effect on the coefficients on PC-Econ and PC-Cult. Similar to IP-Right, IP-NoRedist attracts negative coefficients for IA-Same and IA-Diff, but they are only significant at the 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively; the coefficient on IP-NoRedist in the IA-Poor equation is insignificant. As indicated by the interaction terms, the role of IP-NoRedist did not significantly change from 2014 to 2016 but it changed from 2014 to 2018 in the IA-Same and IA-Diff equations. Specifically, the interactions with the 2018-dummy are significantly positive and of the same magnitude as the positive coefficient on the un-interacted IP-NoRedist variable. Overall, it can thus be stated that, irrespective of immigrants' origin, anti-immigration sentiment was unrelated to economic conservatism by 2018.

Table 3
Alternative Ideology Indicator

	1 IA-Same	2 IA-Diff	3 IA-Poor	4 PC-Econ	5 PC-Cult
PC-Econ	-0.08*** (12.95)	-0.09*** (14.10)	-0.11*** (15.22)		
PC-Econ *D2016	0.01 (1.08)	0.01 (1.03)	0.03*** (2.80)		
PC-Econ *D2018	0.02*** (3.00)	0.01 (0.74)	0.02* (1.79)		
PC-Cult	-0.07*** (11.84)	-0.12*** (18.32)	-0.11*** (15.64)		
PC-Cult *D2016	0.01 (1.17)	0.01 (1.07)	0.01 (0.98)		
PC-Cult *D2018	0.01 (0.57)	0.02** (2.08)	0.01 (0.63)		
IP-NoRedist	-0.03** (2.37)	-0.02* (1.75)	0.02 (1.43)	0.08* (1.86)	-0.03 (0.60)
IP-NoRedist *D2016	0.02 (0.83)	0.04 (0.86)	0.01 (0.51)	-0.25*** (3.99)	-0.12* (1.71)
IP-NoRedist *D2018	0.03** (2.38)	0.02* (1.76)	0.01 (0.38)	-0.16** (2.30)	-0.08 (1.05)
D2016	-0.25 (0.13)	-0.10 (0.04)	-0.47 (0.22)	1.66 (0.52)	0.74 (0.21)
D2018	-0.24 (0.16)	0.10 (0.04)	-0.43 (0.16)	1.31 (0.90)	0.52 (0.24)
Demographics	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Constant	2.95	3.37	3.52	3.88	4.46
N	7062	7045	7044	7134	7151
Adj. R ²	0.225	0.351	0.303	0.072	0.061

Note: See notes for Table 2 for the definition of the variables IA-Same, IA-Diff, IA-Poor, PC-Econ and PC-Cult. IP-Redist measures respondents' position towards income redistribution, based on the question "The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels. 1 = Agree strongly, 2, 3, 4, 5 = Disagree strongly"

Demographic controls included are gender, age, education level, income, and unemployed status. t-statistics in parentheses. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01.

In comparing the regressions involving the overall left-right position (Table 2) to those involving only the economic domain of ideological position, it can be noted that the former exhibits highly robust (that is, significant) relationships to immigration attitudes throughout, whereas the relationships between economic ideological orientation and immigration attitudes are more fragile or entirely lacking. On the presumption that the left-right scale involves economy-related and culture-related norms, it is thus mainly the cultural element of the left-right position (relating to national identity and homogeneity) that shapes attitudes towards immigration.

Column 4 of Table 3 shows that perceptions of favorable economic consequences of immigration were (weakly) significantly positively related to economic conservatism before the "migration crisis," but the relationship changed to negative afterwards. Column 5 shows that perceptions of favorable cultural consequences of

immigration were not significantly or weakly significantly negatively related to economic conservatism.

4.4. Summary of Main Empirical Findings

Table 4 provides an overview of the quantitative relationships between attitudes towards immigration and the perceived impacts of immigration (utilitarian factors) on the one hand and the position on the left-right scale (ideological factor) on the other. The association between immigration attitudes (coded as anti-immigration attitude) and perceived impacts is differentiated into impacts on the economy and impacts on cultural life. The association between immigration attitudes and the ideological position is differentiated into a direct channel, which involves compatibility/incompatibility of immigration with ideology-specific norms and values, and an indirect channel, which involves the dependence of perceived impacts on ideological position. The entries in Table 4 are based on the estimation results presented in Table 2, where the unstandardized coefficients were replaced with the respective standardized coefficients, that is, unstandardized coefficients multiplied by the standard deviation (SD) of the respective independent variables and divided by the SD of the dependent variables. The entries of Table 4 thus show by how many SD a dependent variable changes if an independent variable increases by one SD.

Table 4
Overview of Quantitative Results

	IA-Same (Immigrants of the same race or ethnic group)			IA-Diff (Immigrants of a different race or ethnic group)			IA-Poor (Immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe)		
	2014	2016	2018	2014	2016	2018	2014	2016	2018
Utilitarian									
1 Perceived Economic Impacts (PEI)	-0.29	-0.26	-0.21	-0.30	-0.30	-0.29	-0.28	-0.28	-0.24
2 Perceived Cultural Impacts (PCI)	-0.24	-0.24	-0.24	-0.30	-0.30	-0.29	-0.29	-0.29	.029
3 PEI/PCI	1.21	1.08	0.88	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.97	0.97	0.83
Ideological									
4 Direct	0.02	0.02	0.01	0.11	0.11	0.11	0.12	0.12	0.12
5 Indirect via PEI	0.023	0.021	0.040	0.024	0.024	0.055	0.022	0.022	0.046
6 Indirect via PCI	0.029	0.044	0.067	0.036	0.054	0.081	0.035	0.053	0.081
7 Indirect via PEI / Indirect via PCI	0.79	0.48	0.60	0.67	0.44	0.68	0.63	0.42	0.57
8 Indirect = Indirect via PEI + Indirect via PCI	0.052	0.065	0.107	0.060	0.078	0.136	0.057	0.075	0.127
9 Direct / Indirect	0.38	0.31	0.09	1.83	1.41	0.81	2.11	1.60	0.94
10 Ideology = Direct + Indirect	0.072	0.085	0.117	0.178	0.188	0.246	0.177	0.195	0.247

Note: IA-Same, IA-Diff and IA-Poor are coded as anti-immigration attitude; see notes for Table 2 for definitions. Entries show by how many standard deviations (SD) immigration attitudes change when perceptions of immigration’s positive economic impacts, cultural impacts and ideological inclination towards the right rises by 1 SD. Entries are based on Table 2 (significant coefficients only).

Utilitarian vs. Ideological Factors

Attitudes toward immigration are more strongly related to immigration’s perceived impacts than to ideological position on the left-right scale, even accounting for dependence of perceptions on ideology. This is particularly so for immigrants of the same race or ethnic group (IA-Same). For immigrants of a different race or ethnic

group (IA-Diff) and immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe (IA-Poor), the dominance of utilitarian concerns over ideological position is weaker. The importance of utilitarian factors was rather constant over time whereas the importance of the ideological factor via impact perceptions (indirect channel) steadily increased over time.

Utilitarian Factors

With respect to immigration's perceived consequences, the following findings stand out:

Type of impact: With respect to IA-Same, there is a stronger role for perceived economic impacts (PEI) than for perceived cultural impacts (PCI). With respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor, PEI and PCI are of about equal importance. The importance of economic impacts decreased over time whereas the importance of cultural impacts was rather stable.

Type of immigrant: There is a stronger role for PCI with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor than with respect to IA-Same. The role of PEI displays less dispersion across the three groups of immigrants.

Ideological Factors

With respect to the ideological factors, the following findings stand out.

Channel of influence: The direct ideology-attitude channel was less important than the indirect channel with respect to IA-Same, whereas it was more important than the indirect channel with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor. The importance of the direct channel was rather constant whereas the importance of the indirect channel increased over time.

Indirect channel: The indirect channel via PCI is more important than the indirect channel via PEI, particularly so with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor.

Type of immigrant: The role of ideological orientation is stronger with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor than with respect to IA-Same. This applies to both the direct and indirect ideology-attitude nexus. The role of the indirect channel via PEI does not differ much across the types of immigrants, whereas the role of the indirect channel via PCI is larger with respect to IA-Diff and IA-Poor than with respect to IA-Same.

5. Discussion and Conclusions

Motivated by the inflow of a large number of individuals into Germany in 2015 and heated debates on immigration following it, this paper has studied how attitudes towards immigration were shaped by perceptions of immigrations' economic and cultural impacts and by ideological affiliation. While impact-related and ideology-related sources of immigration attitudes have typically been considered to be sepa-

rable from each other, the paper has studied connections between ideological position and the perception of consequences. Based on the theory and evidence on identity-protective cognition, the paper studied whether an ideological position that enhances anti-immigration (pro-immigration) attitudes is associated with more negative (more positive) perceptions of immigration's impacts, creating an indirect channel through which immigration attitudes are related to ideological position.

A major finding of the analysis is that perceptions of economic and cultural impacts of immigration are each more important in explaining attitudes towards immigration than is ideological orientation, even accounting for perceptions' dependence on ideological position. Ideology-dependence of impact perceptions was found with respect to both economic and cultural impacts, but it was stronger with respect to the latter than the former. Moreover, perceptions of cultural impacts became more ideology-dependent after the migration crisis.

With respect to economic concerns, it turned out that their importance does not differ systematically by whether immigrants are of the same or a different race or ethnic group than the majority, nor by whether immigrants come from poor countries or not. Considering that immigrants of the same ethnicity coming from more developed countries with better education systems may be viewed as competitors in the labor market, whereas immigrants of a different ethnicity coming from poorer countries may be viewed as a burden on the welfare system, this finding is consistent with the idea that, on average, people's immigration-related economic concerns relate to a similar extent to impacts on the labor market and impacts on the welfare state. In contrast to economic concerns, the importance of cultural concerns differs by type of immigrant, being particularly large in the case of immigrants of a different race or ethnic group and somewhat smaller in the case of immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, while being less important in the case of immigrants of the same race or ethnic group.

Overall, in spite of the dominance of utilitarian over ideological factors, the immigration crisis saw an increasing role of ideological identity through ideology-dependent cognition of immigration's impact on cultural life. Moreover, results suggest that it is mainly the national identity/homogeneity dimension of ideological position that shapes Germans' attitudes towards immigration. The equity/solidarity dimension plays a lesser role.

A strength of the data used in this paper is their ability to capture individuals' attitudes towards immigration from different origins, their beliefs concerning immigration's economic and cultural consequences, and their ideological position. However, the data also carry limitations. While they permit to formally capture ideologically motivated reasoning through a mediation model, the substantive argument that ideology drives cognitive processes so that the evidence gathering and evidence processing differ by ideological position cannot directly be tested with the data at hand. The results from the mediation model are consistent with but not a proof of such mechanisms being at work.

Relatedly, the nature of the data – repeated cross-sections – implies that they reflect cross-sectional correlations. While the setup assumes that immigration attitudes are driven by assertions of immigration’s consequences and by ideological position, one could posit that immigration attitudes themselves drive beliefs about consequences. Similarly, even individuals’ placement in ideological space may be affected by their attitude towards immigration, particularly as immigration has become one of the most identifiable issues of parties on the right.

Overall, the data used do not permit to disentangle the extent to which perceived consequences and ideological position are causing attitudes towards immigration, attitudes are causing perceptions, or whether they influence each other in a dynamic fashion. Yet the results are *consistent* with expectations on the role of utilitarian and ideological factors that derive from the literature. In addition, the results are consistent with the notion established with respect to other policy relevant cognitions that perceptions of immigration’s impacts may be shaped by identity-protective mechanisms.

From the point of view of policy implications (limitations notwithstanding), the importance of impact-related factors in shaping attitudes towards immigration suggests that rational discourse on the advantages and disadvantages of immigration may be an important element of immigration policy (as a complement, not a substitute for human rights considerations). By providing credible information on the real-world consequences of immigration, ideology-driven perceptions of immigration’s consequences should be countervailed. This, however, seems less likely to be successful with respect to cultural than with respect to economic impacts, since it is mainly the perception of the former that depends on ideological identity, and increasingly so. Thus, even if there is little evidence that cultural life is actually “undermined” by immigration, revising such views may be costly to people who hold them in terms of material and moral support by the individual’s identity-defining affinity group. Migration is therefore likely to remain a contested issue, even after the number of immigrants has returned to normal levels.

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Appendix

Table A1
Correlations

2014	IA-Same	IA-Diff	IA-Poor	PC-Econ	PC-Cult
IA-Diff	0.66				
IA-Poor	0.50	0.70			
PC-Econ	-0.45	-0.50	-0.50		
PC-Cult	-0.42	-0.53	-0.50	0.57	
IP-Right	0.11	0.21	0.20	-0.10	-0.20

2016	IA-Same	IA-Diff	IA-Poor	PC-Econ	PC-Cult
IA-Diff	0.62				
IA-Poor	0.48	0.70			
PC-Econ	-0.39	-0.47	-0.40		
PC-Cult	-0.39	-0.50	-0.46	0.59	
IP-Right	0.12	0.24	0.26	-0.15	-0.26

2018	IA-Same	IA-Diff	IA-Poor	PC-Econ	PC-Cult
IA-Diff	0.64				
IA-Poor	0.52	0.72			
PC-Econ	-0.39	-0.50	-0.45		
PC-Cult	-0.42	-0.54	-0.51	0.61	
IP-Right	0.12	0.27	0.24	-0.17	-0.29