# A Simple Test of the Efficiency Wage Hypothesis A Note 

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#### Abstract

Numerous ways for efficiency wages affecting productivity have been suggested in the literature, the empirical investigations of the effects remain inconclusive, however. The basic idea of the proposed test of the efficiency wage hypothesis is, that wage premiums, i.e. the residuals of wage equations, predict which workers will be reluctant to quit, are not strictly supervised and work at jobs which are not monotonous and require their participation in decision-making.


The efficiency wage hypothesis states that when productivity of observably similar workers depends on wages, firms will set the wage per worker to minimize the wage per efficiency unit of labor. Numerous ways for wages affecting productivity have been suggested in the literature: wage premiums may (1) enhance the cost of losing a job for workers dismissed because of low effort (Shapiro/Stiglitz 1984); (2) decrease turnover (Schlicht 1978); (3) reduce the rate of absenteeism (Barmby/ Sessions/Treble 1992); (4) augment the level of unobservable human capital (Weiss 1991); and (5) raise the probability that workers perceive their wages as fair and, thus, increase satisfaction and morale (Akerlof 1982).

The empirical literature on efficiency wages can be summarized under three headings: findings on wage differentials, time series evidence, evidence using data of firms.
Persistent wage differentials between industries, occupations, and firms are found that cannot be explained by compensating differences or human capital endowments (Dickens/Katz 1987; Krueger/Summers 1988; Hübler/Gerlach 1989, 1990; Gerlach/Schmidt 1990; Schmidt 1992; Wagner 1991). Efficiency wages differ from compensating wage differentials because wage premiums paid as an incentive exceed the differentials required to compensate for negative job attributes. The empirical findings can be interpreted in the light of the efficiency wage hypothesis, but they do not constitute a direct test of efficiency wages.

Gahlen / Ramser (1987) investigate whether changes in labor productivity vary positively with increases of the wage drift and unemployment.

[^0]They always obtain positive and generally significant signs for the coefficients of both independent variables in the regressions equations with annual data (1960-1982) for four industrial sectors. This finding, although in accordance with the efficiency wage hypothesis, is again an indirect test of efficiency wages, since a positive correlation between growth of labor productivity and changes in the rate of unemployment may be due to the sorting process in the labor market (Franz 1991).

Empirical studies of the efficiency wage hypothesis using data of firms have produced mixed results. Holzer (1989) found that high wage firms had lower turnover, vacancy rates, and training costs than their low wage counterparts. According to Wadhwani/Wall (1988) firms that increase their average wage level tend to increase productivity. However, Leonard (1987) obtains the result that controlling for occupations firms which pay high relative wages apparently do not have higher productivity than low-wage firms.

Summarizing, empirical investigations of efficiency wages are inconclusive, and direct and indirect tests of the underlying hypotheses are rare.

One measure of wage premiums can be obtained by first estimating a wage equation with control for demographic and human capital variables such as education, work experience, tenure, and nationality. The residuals of this equation are then interpreted as wage premiums. Workers with large wage premiums in the wage equation are more highly remunerated than workers with otherwise comparable human capital and demographic characteristics. The basic idea of the proposed test of the efficiency wage hypothesis is that these wage premiums predict which workers will be reluctant to quit and thus are more satisfied with their jobs, are not strictly supervised and work at jobs which are not monotonous and require their participation in decision-making. Two specification of the wage equation are used:

$$
\begin{align*}
L N Y=\beta_{o} & +\beta_{1} S+\beta_{2} E X P+\beta_{3} E X P S Q+\beta_{4} T E N \\
& +\beta_{6} W T I M E+\beta_{7} N A T+\beta_{8} S \cdot N A T+u  \tag{1}\\
L N Y=\beta_{o} & +\beta_{1} S+\beta_{2} E X P+\beta_{3} E X P S Q+\beta_{4} T E N \\
& +\beta_{6} \text { WTIME }+\beta_{7} N A T+\beta_{8} S \cdot N A T  \tag{2}\\
& +\beta_{7} S E C W A G E+\beta_{8} \text { FIRMWAGE }+u
\end{align*}
$$

with: LNY - log of Monthly Gross Wages; $S$ - Schooling (years); EXP Potential Work Experience (years); EXSQ - Square of EXP; TEN - Tenure; WTIME - Weekly Working Time; NAT - German or Foreign Na-
tionality; SECWAGE - Average Sectoral Wages; FIRMWAGE - Average Wages in four Firm Size Classes.

Average sectoral and average wages in four firm size classes are incorporated in equation (2) to capture the effect on individual wages stemming from sectoral or firm-size affiliation of workers and to take into account efficiency wage payments at the sectoral and firm level. The wage premiums are computed by taking into account the predicted $L N Y$ and the actual $L N Y$; thus wage premium $=\exp$ $(L N Y-L \hat{N} Y)=\exp (\hat{u})$. If, for example, the wage premium takes the value 1.25 the worker obtains 125 percent of his predicted wage rate. The wage premiums are used as independent variables in Ordered Probit-estimations with dependent variables that can be interpreted in the light of the efficiency wage hypothesis. The residuals are considered as measures of wage premiums controlling for human capital endowments, working time, nationality, and in equation (2) additionally for sectoral and firm-size affiliation of workers. The wage premiums are, thus, a measure of a substantial part of a worker's cost of losing his job if the worker's opportunity wage is equal to what a worker with similar endowment could earn in the labor market. This procedure, evidently, is subject to an omitted variable problem since additional firm or sector specific variables might have an impact on wages. The results, therefore, have to be interpreted with some caution.

The data are from the German Socio-Eocnomic Panel (Hanefeld 1987). They refer to male workers in the years 1985, 1987, and 1989, excluding the public service and agriculture. The three years were selected since only the surveys of these years include the information interpretable in the sense of the efficiency wage hypothesis. The analysis is restricted to male workers, since the estimations of wage functions for female workers requires elaborate specifications of variables like work experience and tenure due to withdrawal from the work force and additional corrections for sample selection.

Table 1 presents the wage equations (1) and (2) for 1985, 1987, and 1989. The results are in accordance with past research on wages in Germany (Franz 1991). ${ }^{1}$ The residuals are significantly correlated with monthly gross income which implies that workers with high wages are more likely to obtain a high wage premium. The residuals vary between

[^1]
## Table 1

Wage Equitations (OLS)
Dependent Variable: Logarithm of Monthly Gross Income Estimated Coefficients and $|t|$-values (in Parentheses)

|  | 1985 <br> Model I | 1985 <br> Model II | 1987 <br> Model I | 1987 <br> Model II | 1989 <br> Model I | 1989 <br> Model II |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| Constant |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  | 6.288 | -2.937 | 6.224 | -3.812 | 6.440 | -3.394 |
| Schooling | $(89.67)$ | $(4.18)$ | $(85.54)$ | $(5.32)$ | $(103.24)$ | $(5.26)$ |
|  | 0.077 | 0.067 | 0.076 | 0.066 | 0.076 | 0.065 |
| Work Experience | $(19.73)$ | $(17.83)$ | $(18.89)$ | $(17.04)$ | $(21.12)$ | $(18.79)$ |
|  | 0.028 | 0.025 | 0.030 | 0.027 | 0.027 | 0.025 |
| Work Experience squared | $(12.28)$ | $(11.50)$ | $(11.70)$ | $(11.42)$ | $(11.75)$ | $(11.28)$ |
|  | -0.0005 | -0.0005 | -0.0005 | -0.0005 | -0.0005 | -0.0004 |
|  | $(10.50)$ | $(9.81)$ | $(10.00)$ | $(9.75)$ | $(9.93)$ | $(9.36)$ |
| Tenure | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.005 | 0.004 | 0.006 | 0.005 |
|  | $(6.13)$ | $(5.42)$ | $(5.01)$ | $(4.18)$ | $(6.72)$ | $(5.80)$ |
| Weekly Working Time | 0.011 | 0.013 | 0.014 | 0.016 | 0.011 | 0.014 |
|  | $(10.43)$ | $(12.59)$ | $(12.27)$ | $(14.58)$ | $(11.72)$ | $(15.02)$ |
| Nationality | 0.673 | 0.567 | 0.667 | 0.572 | 0.596 | 0.500 |
|  | $(10.62)$ | $(9.33)$ | $(9.79)$ | $(8.85)$ | $(9.47)$ | $(8.44)$ |
| Nationality * Schooling | -0.067 | -0.057 | -0.068 | -0.059 | -0.061 | -0.052 |
|  | $(12.86)$ | $(11.37)$ | $(12.21)$ | $(11.19)$ | $(11.62)$ | $(10.57)$ |
| Average Sector Wage |  | 0.566 |  | 0.590 |  | 0.442 |
|  |  | $(8.80)$ |  | $(9.24)$ |  | $(6.78)$ |
| Average Wage in four Firm Size Classes |  | 0.596 |  | 0.663 |  | 0.773 |
|  |  | $(7.47)$ |  | $(8.35)$ |  | $(11.98)$ |

0.24 (Wage Premium 1, 1989) and 4,53 (Wage Premium 2, 1987). It should be stressed that the impact of firm size on wages has increased strongly between 1985 and 1989 (from 0.596 to 0.773 ). This accords well with the finding by Levy/Murnane (1992), that wage differentials paid by different firms to workers with the same observed characteristics have grown substantially during the eighties in the US.

Table 2 and 3 contain the core results. In Table 2 three dependent variables that shed light on the efficiency wage hypothesis are regressed against wage premium 1 and 2, the residuals from Table 1 (model 1 and 2). The most striking result is that most coefficients in 1987 and 1989 have the negative signs predicted by the efficiency wage hypothesis and most of them are statistically significant at conventional levels (the computation of robust $t$-values does not change this result). Specifically, workers with high wage premiums exhibit lower probabilities to search for a new job, to expect a new career in a different occupation or to exit from the labor force than their colleagues with low wage premiums. This is in accordance with the turnover variant of the efficiency wage hypothesis. Interestingly, there is much less support for efficiency wages in

## Table 2

Probit Estimations of the Effects of Efficiency Wages
Dependent Variables: Expected Search, Expected Career, Expected Exit
Estimated Coefficients and $|t|$-values (in Parentheses)
Response in the questionnaire: absolutely unlikely, unlikely, likely, certain

|  | $\begin{gathered} 1985 \\ \text { Model I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1985 \\ \text { Model II } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1987 \\ \text { Model I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1987 \\ \text { Model II } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1989 \\ \text { Model I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1989 \\ \text { Model II } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Expected Search for New Job |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{gathered} -0.341 \\ (3.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.368 \\ (3.10) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.064 \\ (0.58) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.052 \\ & (0.44) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.009 \\ (0.08) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.044 \\ (0.38) \end{gathered}$ |
| Premium 1 | $\begin{gathered} -0.104 \\ (0.98) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.276 \\ (2.70) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.259 \\ & (2.53) \end{aligned}$ |  |
| Pemium 2 |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.078 \\ (0.70) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.289 \\ & (2.65) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & -0.226 \\ & (2.07) \end{aligned}$ |
| Threshold 1 | $\begin{array}{r} 0.775 \\ (24.85) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.775 \\ (24.85) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.800 \\ (25.14) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.800 \\ (25.13) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.843 \\ (27.07) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.842 \\ (27.07) \end{array}$ |
| Threshold 2 | $\begin{array}{r} 1.378 \\ (27.67) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.378 \\ (27.67) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.478 \\ (28.16) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.478 \\ (28.14) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.557 \\ (30.06) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.556 \\ (30.05) \end{array}$ |
| LR-Test | 249.8 | 249.4 | 157.2 | 157.0 | 106.4 | 104.2 |
| Expected Career in a Different Occupation |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Constant | $\begin{array}{r} -0.487 \\ (3.85) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} -0.559 \\ (4.26) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} -0.235 \\ (1.90) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.213 \\ & (1.62) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.276 \\ & (2.21) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.268 \\ & (2.02) \end{aligned}$ |
| Premium 1 | $\begin{aligned} & -0.264 \\ & (2.22) \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.436 \\ (3.75) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{array}{r} -0.419 \\ (3.52) \end{array}$ |  |
| Pemium 2 |  | $\begin{array}{r} -0.193 \\ (1.56) \end{array}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.459 \\ (3.68) \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} -0.428 \\ (3.38) \end{gathered}$ |
| Threshold 1 | $\begin{array}{r} 0.763 \\ (19.38) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.761 \\ (19.38) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.888 \\ (20.44) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.887 \\ (20.45) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.823 \\ (20.49) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.822 \\ (20.49) \end{array}$ |
| Threshold 2 | $\begin{array}{r} 1.534 \\ (19.13) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.531 \\ (19.12) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.701 \\ (18.76) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.699 \\ (18.75) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.614 \\ (19.64) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 1.613 \\ (19.64) \end{array}$ |
| LR-Test | 620.6 | 618.0 | 495.0 | 494.6 | 556.0 | 554.5 |

Expected Exit from the Labor Force

| Constant | -1.310 | -1.307 | -0.756 | -0.698 | -0.841 | -0.860 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
|  | $(8.87)$ | $(8.41)$ | $(5.69)$ | $(4.95)$ | $(5.79)$ | $(5.59)$ |
| Premium 1 | 0.108 |  | -0.272 |  | -0.237 |  |
|  | $(0.79)$ |  | $(2.17)$ |  | $(1.72)$ |  |
| Pemium 2 |  | 0.106 |  | -0.331 |  | -0.219 |
|  |  | $(0.73)$ |  | $(2.47)$ |  | $(2.49)$ |
| Threshold 1 | 0.642 | 0.641 | 0.705 | 0.706 | 0.717 | 0.716 |
|  | $(15.481)$ | $(15.48)$ | $(17.14)$ | $(17.14)$ | $(17.64)$ | $(17.64)$ |
| Threshold 2 | 1.011 | 1.011 | 1.130 | 1.131 | 1.087 | 1.086 |
|  | $(16.21)$ | $(16.21)$ | $(17.84)$ | $(17.85)$ | $(18.20)$ | $(18.20)$ |
| LR-Test | 1231.4 | 1231.3 | 958.7 | 960.1 | 1077.5 | 1076.8 |
|  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|  |  | 1704 | 1704 | 1623 | 1623 | 1718 |
| Number of Observations |  |  |  |  | 1718 |  |

Table 3
Kendall's and Spearman's correlation coefficients
Coefficients and level of significance (in Parentheses)
Response in the questionnaire: not true, partially true, true

|  | $\begin{gathered} 1985 \\ \text { Prenium I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1985 \\ \text { Premium II } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1987 \\ \text { Premuium I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1987 \\ \text { Prenuium II } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1989 \\ \text { Prenium I } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 1989 \\ \text { Premium II } \end{gathered}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Kendall's correlation coefficients |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Job includes a variety of tasks | $\begin{gathered} 0.074 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.085 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.062 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.080 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.086 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.105 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Job is characterized by freedom to organize work | $\begin{gathered} 0.089 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.089 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.093 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.101 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.109 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.129 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ |
| Working time according to changing work loads | $\begin{aligned} & 0.047 \\ & (0.01) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.020 \\ (0.16) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.036 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.056 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.061 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Job is characterized by stringent control and supervision | $\begin{gathered} -0.091 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.100 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.074 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.104 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.032 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.076 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ |
| Worker's participation in job related decisions | $\begin{array}{r} 0.210 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.222 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.215 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.226 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.218 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.231 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ |
| Spearman's correlation coefficients |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Job includes a variety of tasks | $\begin{array}{r} 0.090 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.102 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.075 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.097 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.105 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.127 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Job is characterized by freedom to organize work | $\begin{array}{r} 0.109 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.109 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.1155 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.124 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.133 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{aligned} & 0.156 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ |
| Working time according to changing work loads | $\begin{gathered} 0.058 \\ (0.01) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.084 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.024 \\ (0.17) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.043 \\ (0.04) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.069 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.076 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Job is characterized by stringent control and supervision | $\begin{aligned} & -0.110 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.122 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.090 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.126 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.040 \\ & (0.05) \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & -0.093 \\ & (0.00) \end{aligned}$ |
| Worker's participation in job related decisions | $\begin{gathered} 0.247 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{array}{r} 0.260 \\ (0.00) \end{array}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.251 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.265 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.255 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} 0.269 \\ (0.00) \end{gathered}$ |
| Number of Observations | 1704 | 1704 | 1623 | 1623 | 1718 | 1718 |

1985. It can be supposed that in a period of high unemployment firms are more reluctant to pay efficiency wages.
In the same vein, the correlation coefficients ${ }^{2}$ in Table 3 demonstrate that workers with high wage premiums tend to be employed in jobs characterized by a variety of tasks, freedom to organize their own work, lenient control and supervision, working time according to changing work loads, and participation in job related decisions. This could be interpreted in the sense that firms tend to pay high wage premiums if monitoring of workers is expensive and difficult.

Two critical arguments must be considered. First, it might be argued that the correlation coefficients of Table 3 are indicative of compensating differences. Although this interpretation cannot be ruled out entirely, the signs of the correlation coefficients are not easily reconcilable with the theoretical concept of compensating differentials. The second argument asserts that the unobserved heterogeneity of workers

[^2]might have an impact on wage residuals, quitting behavior and characteristics of the job. The validity of this argument is tested in the following way. For the endogenous variables in Table 2 Fixed-Effects Logit and Random-Effects Probit models (balanced panel design) are estimated. The idea is that an increased wage premium should have a negative impact on expected quit and search behavior. The coefficients have the expected signs, but not all of them are statistically significant. Although some impact of unobserved heterogeneity is detected, the support for the efficiency wage hypothesis remains fairly strong.

Evidently, more research in this realm is needed. With the data from the Socio-Economic Panel we find evidence that contrary to the predictions of human capital theory and, implicitly, to the theory of compensating wage differentials good and bad jobs coexist. In good jobs workers receive wage premiums, are less likely to quit and exit from the labor market and perform in more autonomous work settings. In spite of these findings in favor of the efficiency wage hypothesis it remains to be investigated that the documented effects have an impact on labor productivity which is large enough to justify the payment of wage premiums.


#### Abstract

The basic idea of the proposed test of the efficiency wage hypothesis is, that wage premiums, i.e. the residuals of the wage equations, predict which workers will be reluctant to quit, are not strictly supervised and work at jobs which are not monotonous and require their participation in decision-making. With the data from the German-Socio-Economic Panel evidence is found that workers who receive wage premiums are less likely to quit and exit from the labor market and are more likely to perform in autonomous work settings. This is in accordance with the efficiency wage hypothesis.


## Zusammenfassung

Der vorgeschlagene Test der Effizienzlohnhypothese beruht auf dem Grundgedanken, daß Lohnzuschläge (d.h. die Residuen aus Lohngleichungen) prognostizieren können, welche Arbeitnehmer mit einer geringeren Wahrscheinlichkeit aus Eigeninitiative kündigen und welche Arbeitsplätze mit genauer Kontrolle und geringer Entscheidungsmitwirkung assoziiert sind. Eine Untersuchung mit den Daten des Sozio-Ökonomischen Panels führt zu den folgenden empirischen Resultaten: Arbeitnehmer, die Lohnzuschläge erhalten, sind weniger als ihre Kollegen bereit zu kündigen und den Arbeitsplatz zu verlassen und arbeiten häufiger mit einem gewissen Entscheidungsspielraum. Diese Ergebnisse sind mit der Effizienzlohntheorie vereinbar.

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[^1]:    1 Computations of heteroskedastic-resistent t-values (White 1980) do not lead to different results. The Jaque-Bera test for normality of the residual and the Reset-test for functional form are rejected at conventional levels of significance. This is, however, a typical result encountered in the estimation of wage functions (Lorenz/Wagner 1988). Again, due to the omitted variable problem and due to functional form specification problems the results have to be interpreted carefully.

[^2]:    2 For the computation of the correlation coefficients the residuals are grouped in intervals of 0.1.

