



Christin Pschichholz (Ed.)

The First World War as a Caesura?

Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, and Genocide
in the Late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Spheres

Duncker & Humblot • Berlin

CHRISTIN PSCHICHHOLZ (Ed.)

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The First World War as a Caesura?

Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, and Genocide in the Late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Spheres

Introduction

By *Christin Pschichholz*

Was the First World War a caesura regarding demographic concepts, population policy, and genocide?¹ Given the millions of civilian casualties, the answer is immediate. The politics of ethnic violence attained new dimensions during the First World War. Not only were crimes committed against the ‘enemy’ population by foreign armies; violence initiated by state authorities directed towards sections of their own populations involved unprecedented dimensions of demographic engineering. The post-war period was thus left with the ideal of a purportedly homogenous nationalistic people.

Only with the advent of the Second World War could the First World War be identified as the great seminal catastrophe (*Urkatastrophe*). George F. Kennan’s term articulated the connection between the two world wars and has strongly influenced the search for possible continuities between them. Extensive research in recent years, however, has allowed scholars to grasp the significance of the First World War in its own right and to embed the years 1914–1918 in the history of violence in the twentieth century more profoundly than ever before. This also means that the conflict of 1914–1918 is no longer understood as a kind of trial run for genocide and radicalization of military violence in the 20th century. Moreover, research on conflict and violence has given much greater weight to the events of 1914–1918.² The various wars that took place shortly before the Great War already anticipated the ethnic conflicts and violence that occurred periodically throughout the twentieth century. Thus, forced as well as negotiated population shifts were administered and executed during the Balkan wars of 1912–13. The competition and alliances between the Great Powers, and the crisis in the Ottoman Empire, which emerged clearly during the Italo-Turkish War, confirmed to the Balkan states that national claims were militarily en-

¹ The present volume is the result of the conference “Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, Genocide – The First World War as a Caesura?” (September 29 and October 1, 2016). About thirty international experts gathered in Potsdam, Germany, in order to discuss demographic policies in the time period of World War I. The conference was jointly organized by the Lepsiushaus Potsdam and the University of Potsdam.

² Förster, p. 19.

forceable. These developments had thus already transformed the international system before 1914.³ With its transformation of warfare due to dimension of industrialization, however, the First World War brought about decisive changes, not only on the Western Front in the emblematic form of trench warfare but also in the border regions of the multi-ethnic empires, especially in the phases of mobile warfare – and thus also among the very heterogeneous population in the border regions.⁴ During the First World War, the Habsburg military took action in the frontline areas of Galicia against its own Ukrainian population as well as in the Balkans against its own Serb populations, who found themselves suspected of disloyalty. In Russia, expulsions and deportations from different territories were aimed especially against the Jewish and Muslim sectors of the population, and, in the course of the war, against Poles and Ukrainians too. In the Ottoman Empire the Armenian genocide was embedded in an extensive population policy that affected both the *Rûm millet* (of Greek-Orthodox creed), the Arab, and the Kurdish population.

Scholarship on the First World War as well as on the politics of ethnicity and mass violence in the late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg empires has established two of the most exciting fields within both European and Middle Eastern history in recent memory.⁵ This anthology seeks to combine both of these fields. Although the magnitude of radical population policy during the First World War, with its precursors in the Balkan wars, in the post-war struggles in the Ottoman Empire, as well as in Russia appears obvious, surprisingly little has been undertaken to view it from a comparative perspective,⁶ although doing so could help to clear up many questions: If the First World War was a turning point, how can it be described? Did the war, which was perceived as a struggle for survival, turn regional conflicts into global ones, thus radicalizing them? Or did certain states exploit the state of war within a global conflagration to solve regional conflicts quickly and in a radical way? Were radical population policies observed and utilized to create a model for other countries' own population policies? In what way were military plans and domestic measures intertwined? To what degree did state authorities that undertook and organized population policies before the war still play a part during and after the war? And what factors distinguished the Ottoman Empire from other multi-ethnic empires such that the most radical population policy was implemented there, setting genocidal processes in motion?

In 1915, and in the wake of an unsuccessful offensive against Russia, the Central Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) organized the deportation of Armenians from the area of the Caucasus and Persian military fronts to the Syrian desert. Official

³ Geppert/Mulligan/Rose, p. 17.

⁴ Überegger, „Verbrannte Erde“, 241–278.

⁵ Campos; Chokobaeva; Provence; Dornik/Walleczek-Fritz/Wedrac; Gingeras; Kirmse; Robson; Reynolds.

⁶ Comparative aspects also showed in a wider time frame Barkey/Von Hagen; Barkey; Reynolds.

military reasons were cited: It was assumed that the Armenians were planning an uprising in order to support the Russian forces from behind the Turkish lines. The deportations were soon extended to all Armenians living in Asia Minor. More than a million would die during the years 1915–1917.⁷

The struggle for the adequate remembrance and recognition of the Armenian genocide still affects relations between numerous states even today. The Caucasus region, the closed border between Armenia and Turkey, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as well as internal Turkish conflicts serve as examples in this regard. The complicated and tense (geo-) political situation in various conflict regions has prevented a frank and open discussion of a blatant atrocity as a case of genocide. Turkey, as the successor-state to the Ottoman Empire, has struggled to cope with the profound moral distress and the loss of authority arising from its association with a crime against humanity. Scarcely any other issue clarifies the significance of national narratives and the complexities involved in the mutual understanding of historical interpretation as much as the recognition of the genocide against the Armenian people: Contrasting interpretations of the event have become deeply rooted and have come to comprise a fundamental component of national identity. Over the last twenty years, however, the topic of the Armenian genocide has undergone a process of normalization in the intellectual debate, with positive results. Within this context, two aspects should be highlighted that have improved the research and academic discourse on the Armenian genocide. First, more differentiated empirical research has emerged from the academic community, yielding many new findings. Second, the research itself has become more international.⁸ The intensive studies on the Armenian genocide that have been conducted over recent years have mainly challenged older national narratives and paradigmatic reductions. The obsessive search for the “smoking gun” in the face of Turkish denialism continues to exist. At the same time, the younger generation of scholars in particular has broken with one-dimensional explanatory patterns.⁹ This new research has centered on empirical results in the context of social, economic, geo-political and demographic decision-making processes, and on understanding the Armenian genocide as a part of the wider CUP programme.¹⁰ By contrast, the focus of relevant academic works that have been written in the 1980s and 1990s was less on the contextualization than on the proof of intent, and thus on the justification of the term genocide. This focus culminated in a comparison with the Nazi crimes and, as in the case of Vahakn N. Dadrian, in an additional analogy between the Jewish population in the German Reich and the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire.¹¹ Understandably, the comparison was intended to serve the necessary

⁷ The number of victims cited in the literature and the controversy regarding this see *Bijak/Lubman*, 26–43.

⁸ For recent trends see in detail: *Der Matossian; Pschichholz*, p. 15, 25–31.

⁹ Completely against the recent trend: *Morris/Dror Ze’evi*.

¹⁰ E.g. *Erol*, Macedonian Question; *Üngör*, Fresh Understandings; *Kaiser*, Armenian Property; *Üngör/Polatel*.

¹¹ *Dadrian*, *The Convergent*, p. 151-169.

and laudable purpose of raising awareness of the atrocity. From a scholarly perspective, however, the gain in knowledge remained limited.

These kinds of comparisons, as well as the many variations in the definitions of genocide, lead to the question of the extent to which the concept of genocide is helpful for historical analysis and whether it should not simply be omitted because of its instrumentalization as a “*politischer Kampfbegriff*” (for the purposes of intervention, media attention or unanimous condemnation).¹² But the term genocide is indeed meaningful when phenomena of violence are seen closely in their historical context and in comparison with mass violence that took place in the respective temporal, political and military contexts. It is not a matter of describing other forms of mass violence as “only” ethnic cleansing, ethnic tensions or pogroms of short duration, and thus using them as a yardstick for a hierarchy of cruelty, but rather to obtain, through the comparative perspective, starting points for determining exactly what led to mass violence and what circumstances weakened or promoted the process leading up to genocide.

Only in comparison to mass violence that did not end as radically as the Armenian case, does the specifically genocidal dimension in the context of the First World War become clear, for in other border regions the conditions of the conflicts are not dissimilar. It is precisely by means of juxtaposition with non-genocides that the concept of genocide can find a place in empirical historiography, whose greater contextualization promises a much more far-reaching analysis than any reference to the violent crimes of the Second World War could provide.

The following essays combine different aspects of and perspectives on the demographic policies before, during, and after World War I. Precisely because of the differences between the examined cases, the similarities presented appear even more interesting. The most striking example is perhaps the significant degree of internal conflict experienced by many states, and the extent to which this affected their external policies. The first three essays deal with the core questions from a transnational perspective. Ronald G. Suny and Mark Levene approach the topic by treating the developments during the war as a European intertwined history of ethnic violence, and by examining the Young Turkish elite in the Ottoman Empire in the context of the Europe-wide debates about nationalization, ethnic homogenization, and the radicalization of violence. Arno Barth’s contribution presents methodological considerations for further analysing early twentieth century population policy. For this purpose, he uses insights drawn from both psychology and political science.

The following essays then take a geographical focus. Hans-Lukas Kieser looks at the Ottoman Empire, giving an affirmative answer to the question of whether the First World War constitutes a caesura in modern history concerning the practice of demographic engineering. In doing so, however, he departs from the customary chronology, addressing not only the First World War of 1914–18, but the decade of 1912–22

¹² *Gerlach*, p. 455–471.

that saw the Ottoman Empire embroiled in a range of military conflicts, from the Balkan Wars to the war for Asia Minor. In their studies on the Zor district during the initial months of 1915, on the Special Organization (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*), and on population policy regarding the Arab population in the Syrian province, Hilmar Kaiser and Oktay Özel demonstrate the processual development of demographic engineering in the Ottoman Empire and make it clear that the CUP can be seen as a unit only to a limited extent.

Hannes Leidinger introduces the essays on Austria-Hungary and analyses the dangers of escalation and genocidal violence in Habsburg warfare during the First World War. Framing his analysis according to the opposing concepts of ‘order’ and ‘chaos’, he attempts to identify the general dynamics and systematic structures behind the fluctuations of violence in Habsburg warfare during the First World War. In addressing the question of whether the First World War, and in particular the Imperial and Royal Military Governorate-General established in Montenegro by the occupying Habsburg forces, does mark a caesura, Heiko Brendel explores the population policy in the Prince-Bishopric, the Principality, and the Kingdom of Montenegro from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of Montenegrin independence in November 1918. His article focusses on the years from the Balkan Wars until the end of the First World War, and especially on the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Montenegro from January 1916 to November 1918.

In a direct comparison, Serhiy Choliy examines the population policy from the Galician perspective, focusing on the similar approaches adopted by rival imperial forces – the Habsburgs and the Romanovs – on the contested borderlands of Galicia, highlighting the role of mass population displacement as a decisive and novel military technique in the First World War. The displacement of thousands by the Habsburg and Romanov regimes during the conflict proved to be a highly effective political strategy, both locally and internationally, that would be frequently emulated in future conflicts. Konrad Zieliński describes the rise of anti-Semitism and the stereotype of “Jewish-Communism” (Polish *żydokomuna*) in Polish-Jewish relations during the 1910s until the advent of World War II, while focusing on the years 1917 to 1918 as well as the first years of independent Poland. Fears of an “international Jewish conspiracy” and other tropes gained a new dimension after 1917, following the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. From the interwar year to the period following the Second World War, of ‘Jewish Communism’ and Judeophobia exerted a crucial influence on Polish-Jewish relations. As Zieliński argues, however, the emergence of these phenomena can be traced back to the revolutionary period of 1905 and 1906, and especially to the final years of the First World War and the Polish-Bolshevik War. In the concluding essay, Peter Holquist focuses on the Soviet Policy of De-cossackization during the Russian Civil War (1919). His essay begins, however, with general reflections on questions that arise throughout the volume and which are relevant for a variety of geographical regions. He asks whether the focus on the war might not lead to us overlooking other processes at work independent of the conflict itself, including the growing importance of popular sovereignty as a principle of political legitimacy, and

the influence of the social sciences. The Russian case presents a significant example of this quandary: Were the revolution and civil war simply the product of the First World War, or were they also shaped by forces that predated and were distinct from it?

This brief introduction should be also used to express my gratitude. Thanks are due to all of the contributors who have worked with great patience since the conference at the University of Potsdam and the Lepsiushaus Potsdam in Autumn 2016, to bring this volume to fruition. I would also like to thank the series editors for including this anthology in the series 'Gewaltpolitik und Menschenrechte'.

Imperial Choices: Perceiving Threats and the Descent to Genocide

By Ronald Grigor Suny

The cataclysm of the Great War inaugurated what the late Eric Hobsbawm called the ‘Age of Extremes’¹ and what other historians have labeled a second (or third) “Thirty Years’ War” and a near century of “international civil war.”² This last formulation seems to me to be particularly fruitful. It gives us a lens through which to organize diverse historical processes that led to unprecedented demographic, personal, and political disasters, among which we must count the Armenian Genocide; the Russian Civil War; the horrors of Stalinism (the *Holodomor*, forced collectivization, mass deportations of Soviet peasants and non-Russian peoples, the Great Terror); the Spanish Civil War; the two global conflicts (World War I and II and their massive movements of peoples and the deliberate destruction of millions, the Holocaust); the massacres and destruction of European colonialism; the wars of the West, particularly the United States, against national liberation struggles and against Communist movements and states (in Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa); the excesses of Communist modernization (think of the Great Leap Forward and the famine in China); the fallout from the collapse of the Soviet Union and state socialist regimes in East Central Europe; and the ongoing conflicts in the Middle East.

Was World War I a caesura? The international civil war involved both wars between states and wars within states. It pitted revolution against reaction, the defenders of the Enlightenment against its enemies, and marked a radical transformation of warfare between states into a conflict between peoples, nations and civilizations. The law of war, the *Jus in bello*, was forgotten; combatants no longer respected one another as legitimate but as targets without restriction. Wars targeted civilians even more than the military. Beginning with the German violation of Belgian and Luxembourg neutrality, and continuing with the violation of the neutrality of the sea, the Entente’s blockade of the Central Powers, and the aerial bombing of towns and cities, the mass internment and forced deportation of civilians became a normal means of war that would never be reversed.³ The genie was out of the bottle. States became something different from classic states as they were no longer able to impose a monopoly of violence. Whereas classical warfare in most cases up to 1914 had meant that a war would be concluded by a peace between adversaries who were considered

¹ Hobsbawm.

² See, for examples, *Losurdo*, and *Traverso*.

³ *Traverso*, p. 69–70.

legitimate, the new condition was total war “in which armies destroyed civilian populations and where there were quite simply no longer any rules but that of the complete destruction of the enemy.”⁴ In a civil war, the historian Enzo Traverso contends, violence “is never purely instrumental. It takes on a strong symbolic dimension, feeds on itself and acquires its own dynamic, eventually becoming an end in itself. In other words, extreme violence converts into cruelty.”⁵ Law is suspended; charismatic authority reigns; dictatorships are established; and terror is justified as a necessary means to restore the sovereign power of one side over another. The state of exception became a permanent norm.⁶ Genocide and the expulsion of peoples became possible, first at Europe’s geographic margins with the Armenians, and then in the continent that declared itself the epicenter of civilization: “The European civil war created a series of conditions without which the Holocaust could have been neither conceived nor perpetrated.”⁷

Even before the Great War and the civil wars to which it gave birth in Europe, many intellectuals and political actors had rejected the liberal, democratic, and humanist traditions identified with the French Revolution. This tendency continued through the devastation of the war into the interwar period. Goebbels confidently proclaimed, “1789 will be erased from history.”⁸ Opposed both by the Leninist Left and the fascist and ultranationalist Right, liberal democracy appeared too weak to confront either revolution or what Mussolini characterized as “the ‘revolution against revolution.’”⁹ The exercise of raw state power was praised by the much-touted Carl Schmitt as “the suspension of the legal state, accompanied by restrictions on personal freedom and the removal of certain fundamental rights.”¹⁰ On the other side of the barricades, Walter Benjamin proposed “the establishment of a ‘real state of emergency’, the only one capable of waging properly ‘the struggle against Fascism’ – in other words, the revolutionary interruption of the course of the world.”¹¹ Leon Trotsky des-

⁴ Traverso, p. 71, 75, 167.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 86.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 260.

⁹ Fascist Italy presented an example of nation-state imperialism and colonialism both inside and outside of Europe. Although the numbers affected by Italian atrocities pale before those of the Ottomans, the Nazis, and the Soviets, and have not been integrated into larger histories of genocides, the costs of Rome’s ambition to create a *spazio vitale* are shocking. Historian Tobias Hof, reports: “In Abyssinia, the ‘pearl of the Empire’ (Mussolini), Italians killed between 180,000 and 250,000 people before British troops liberated the country in 1941. When in September 1943 Marshall Pietro Badoglio signed the armistice, Italians were responsible for the deaths of approximately 250,000 people in former Yugoslavia. The Great Famine in Greece, aggravated by Italian and German exploitation of raw materials as well as the confiscation of industries and means of transportation, claimed the life of up to 450,000 people between May 1941 and April 1943.” [*Hof*, *Legionnaires*, p. 97–98].

¹⁰ Traverso, 238.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 245.

perately justified the revolutionary in terms of the violence of a Thermidorian power of Bolshevism in the Russian Civil war, of which he himself had been a major author, while condemning Stalinist violence in the absence of actual war.

With the Spanish Civil War, the triangular opposition – fascism, communism, liberalism – was rapidly reduced to a binary conflict between the radical Right and the anti-fascist Left. A number of left-leaning historians have recently noted that the history of the anti-fascist coalition that was key to the defeat of fascism has been either forgotten or distorted. For the Right, and in much of present-day liberal and conservative historiography, anti-fascism has either been effaced or conflated with Communism. In fact, however, anti-fascism, though it certainly included Communists and the USSR, had a profile distinct from Communism; moreover, at an intellectual level, it was hardly a child of Communism, predating the Comintern's adoption of the Popular Front policy. Far broader than Leninism or Stalinism, anti-fascism resisted war but was willing to fight; it was cosmopolitan, opposed to the mysticism and magic messiness of nationalism and defended "the principles of equality, democracy, liberty and citizenship [against] the reactionary values of authority, hierarchy and race."¹² Anti-fascism, both in culture and the political movements that culminated in the Resistance, was, along with the Red Army, the organized defense of Enlightenment values and democracy against the most vicious counter-revolutionary force, racism, and colonialism that had ever existed in Europe. Anti-fascists realized that communists and the Soviets were essential to their cause; fascism could not be combatted without them, so the Left did not confront the Soviet regime, and in its complacency at times looked at Stalinism with blind admiration. The Left repressed what it was unable to admit. No "mass mobilization against the Nazi menace would have occurred under the leadership of the old liberal elites. The struggle against fascism needed a hope, a message of universal emancipation, which it seemed at this time could be offered only by the country of the October Revolution."¹³

Forged when the Nazis came to power and consolidated during the Spanish Civil War and in the Resistance of World War II, anti-fascist unity began to break up with the Cold war, the division of Germany in 1949, and ultimately collapsed with the Soviet military intervention in Hungary in 1956. Some anti-fascists resolved to remain neutral and not choose between the USSR and the "free world," but in an ideologically polarized world they soon became politically irrelevant. Liberals donned "the guise of anti-totalitarianism, which meant anti-Communism," and identified anti-fascism in ideological terms with Communism.¹⁴ Western intellectual Marxism gravitated toward the pessimism observed most acutely by Perry Anderson.¹⁵ It was difficult to believe in grand narratives infused with an idea of progress after Auschwitz, which Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno saw as the symbol of a "self-destruct-

¹² *Traverso*, p. 263.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 270.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 271.

¹⁵ *Anderson*.

tion of rationalism.”¹⁶ “Nazism had already changed the face of the century and the image of man. For [Adorno and Horkheimer], recognition of Auschwitz as a rupture in civilization was indissociable from a radical challenge to the idea of progress. If Nazism had tried to wipe out the legacy of the Enlightenment, it had also to be understood dialectically as a product of civilization itself, with its technical and instrumental rationality now released from an emancipatory aim and reduced to a project of domination.”¹⁷ The despair that characterizes the revolutionary tradition after both world wars, Western Marxism in particular, only intensified with the collapse of actually-existing socialism, as ambiguous and contradictory as that experience was as an effort to build an egalitarian society based on democratic choice, the empowerment of working people, and social justice.

The rupture between the imagined world of the century-long peace after the Congress of Vienna and the Belle Époque and the post-1914 world – this caesura – involved not only Europe, the continental catalyst that thrust the world into unprecedented violence, and civilizational progress into decline, but also was reflected globally in the great conflict between imperialism and anti-colonialism that half a century later brought down the great European overseas empires.

The Great War and the Clash of Empires

Let me now narrow my focus to the years of the Great War and the consequences of the clash of empires and nations.¹⁸ Even if one does not buy into the Leninist concept of World War I as an ‘imperialist war’, it appears evident that it was a war of empires. On the Eastern and Caucasian fronts, the war was begun by four empires and a cluster of smaller nation-states, but concluded with the emergence of more than a dozen new nation-states, some for the first time in history, a few that would not survive the final post-war settlement. As Lenin had predicted, empires fell apart, and the imperialist war metastasized into civil wars. But coincident with a rise of social and class conflicts in the belligerent states, competitive nationalist movements undermined the efforts of liberals, conservatives, and socialists to hold the old empires together, albeit with a new political order.

At a macro-historical level, World War I was the moment when inter-imperial rivalries led to the collapse of continental empires in Europe. (World War II would have a similar effect on overseas empires.) Within each of the warring empires, subject peoples found opportunities to act independently, to make choices about loyalties and identities, either cleaving to the imperial polities in which they had lived or following nationalist intellectuals and activists into uncharted national waters. Imperial regimes failed to domesticate nationalism even though they resorted to the most brutal forms of ‘pacification’ – deportations, ethnic cleansing, and genocide. Empires

¹⁶ *Adorno/Horkheimer*, p. xvii.

¹⁷ *Traverso*, p. 275.

¹⁸ *In the following referring to Suny*, *Bringing Empire Back*, p. 1–7.

attempted to manipulate, even encouraged, rather than simply repress, the aspirations of ethnicities. Nationalities – Jews, Poles, Armenians, Ukrainians, and Romanian-speakers – straddled imperial borders and presented special problems of shifting loyalty and identification.

Following the collapse of empires and the foundation of new nation-states, the principal explanation for the rapid transformation of European geography borrowed from the inevitabilist teleology of the nationalists and depicted the triumph of nations as an irresistible assertion of a natural process. Nations were modern, empires antiquated, and the two were incompatible, indeed deeply inimical. Empires, rather than consistently repressing nationalist impulses, often contributed to these intentionally during the ferocious bloodletting of the world war and were not about to give in to nationalism but were determined to use such sentiments instrumentally to further their own imperial projects. As we all know, the long disputed and unresolved Eastern Question was the trigger that upset the balance of power in Europe – the war began in the Balkans around an issue left over from the retreating Ottoman Empire – and ambitious politicians and warriors anxious to fight looked toward their neighbors hungrily. Central Europeans considered Russia, as well as the Ottoman Empire, to be so sickly that healthier and more vigorous powers could take advantage. Not only imperial governments but also famished nationalists prepared for what they hoped would be a banquet of spoils.

At the imperial level the war might be imagined as sibling rivalries, a brutal contest of cousins, but a slight change of focus from the ministries of foreign affairs and war to the movements of ordinary people reveals that more subterranean processes were at work that would ultimately undermine the existing state structures. Beyond the walls of diplomatic salons were the mobile worlds of food supply, labor migration, and the intricate interconnections of what had already become a globalized capitalist economy. All that was solid was melting into air once again. Some analysts believed that integrated markets would render war impossible, but others, like Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg, were convinced that the current stage of capitalism would make conflict all but inevitable.

The prewar years, and even more so the war years themselves, were moments when reimagining maps was in the air. Borders were both sacred and manipulable. New homelands were being conceived for ‘nations’ that were still cohering around national myths, common languages, and articulated histories. Empires were rethinking how they might prosper in a fluid and unpredictable world. The question on the agenda was survival in a fiercely winner-take-all, zero-sum-game competition. Peoples who were in the way had to be removed – Jews, Avars and Armenians – and running roughshod over them was justified by new ‘science’ that confidently asserted that some races were superior to others. Existing nation-states and stateless nations had their own ambitions – to expand their territory, regain ancient lands, or even the capital, Constantinople or Vilnius, of a long deceased imperial state. On the Left, socialist internationalism collapsed in 1914 in the face of patriotic concerns, with no-

table exceptions – the martyred Jean Jaures in France, the Bolsheviks and internationalist Social Democrats in Russia, and the Bulgarian ‘Narrows’ – who would have to wait until war weariness would resurrect transnational class affinities. Religion as well, Christianity and Islam alike, failed to transcend national boundaries, and coreligionists inspired by God and Country killed each other with a sense of just cause.

Notoriously, empires did not limit their borders to the national composition of desired territories. They were promiscuous in expanding for whatever reason seemed appropriate. Sometimes strategic concerns were paramount; at other times consolidation of the ‘nation’ might be deployed. Russian rulers, who thought of Ukrainians as ‘Little Russians’ and therefore an integral part of the Russian people, were anxious (in the words of Russian General Aleksei Brusilov) to “take back” Galicia, “which despite its being a constituent part of Austria-Hungary is a Russian land, populated, after all, by Russian people. (*russkim zhe narodom*)”¹⁹ Here an empire justified its expansion in the name of the national principle, recovery of the territory of its own *Herrenvolk*. The Ottomans did the same in their campaigns into Caucasia, discovering the Turkic connection with the local ‘Tatars’ (Azerbaijanis). When convenient, however, the imperialist claims could be made on religious or state security grounds.

Nationalists, who at the time were neither as powerful nor as numerous as most subsequent histories would claim, saw empires as the destroyer of nations and ignored the constitutive effects of imperial rule on nation-building, which were particularly visible through the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The wartime policies of the great landed empires of Europe generated nationalisms not so much because of ill treatment of other peoples but by positive promotion of any nationalism that opposed the overlordship of an enemy state. Wilhelmine Germany and its Austrian allies promoted the fortunes of Ukrainians in a move to detach the western borderlands of the Romanov Empire from the tsar’s domain. The Ottomans encouraged Caucasian Muslims to declare an independent Azerbaijan. The Central Powers recruited prisoners of war as potential nationalist opponents of imperial Russian rule, while the Russian General Staff permitted the organization of Slavic POWs from Austria-Hungary into armed units. In a clear case of unintended consequences, the formation of a Czechoslovak Legion under one Russian government led to events a few years later that helped to initiate the Russian Civil War against another. Future leaders of Eastern European states, among them Josef Pilsudski and Josef Broz Tito, served time in Russian military camps.

Nationalists also worked with empires opportunistically, attempting to exploit the rivalry between Germany and Russia. Poles dreamed of war between the powers that had partitioned their country over a century before. Georgian nationalists sought German assistance in their drive for independence, and even some moderate socialists flirted with a German orientation. Nation-states proliferated late in the war and at its conclusion but, as many historians and political scientists have pointed out, not

¹⁹ *Von Hagen*, p. 19.

as ethnically homogeneous entities as proposed in the slogan of national self-determination, but as ‘new multinational states’, little empires determined to assimilate ‘minorities’ or ‘ethnically cleanse’ them from their territory. Ironically, national liberation culminated in the formation of mini-empires disguised as nation-states. Certainly in postwar Poland, with its inclusion of vast lands in which Ukrainians, Belarussians, Germans, and Jews lived, ‘making’ a Polish nation meant assimilation of some, e. g., the Slavic peoples, and the exclusion of others, e. g., Jews and Germans. Forced assimilation and exclusion can be seen as aspects of both nation-making and imperial rule.

War and the undulations of the fronts meant the weakening of state power in the peripheries of the empire. Precisely where the national composition of the population was least like that of the central parts of the warring states, there the imperial powers had the least dominion over their subjects. This was most evident in the Polish lands and Right Bank Ukraine, in Galicia, and in eastern Anatolia. Once the revolution brought down the Romanov Empire, the South Caucasus, Finland, Ukraine, and the Baltic region rapidly slipped from under central Russian authority, and the ground was sown for civil and ethnic war.

World War I and Ethnicity

World War I profoundly affected people’s identities, in some cases imposing or reinforcing ethnic identifications, in other cases creating new identities like ‘refugees’.²⁰ Ethnicity could be advantageous in some instances, as when one sought help from a ‘national’ committee, but a dangerous disadvantage at other times, for example, when a new occupying power appeared that saw you as a disloyal foreign national. In the first year of fighting the Russian military expelled half a million Jews from lands it had occupied and stood by while Cossacks and Poles looted the stores and homes of Jews. Tens of thousands of Germans living in Russian Poland suffered the same fate, and as a result they were compelled to identify more intensely as Germans than as the Russian subjects they had been. Such permissive violence and enforced discrimination only sharpened the lines between religions and ethnic groups, particularly in the shatter zone of Russia’s western borderlands. The lands contested by rival empires had been battlefields on which differences of all kind and presumptions of entitlement were fought over long before they became the ‘Bloodlands’ that some have argued were the result of particular dictatorial regimes.²¹ The Great War

²⁰ See *Marrus*.

²¹ See *Bartov/Weitz*. In a host of ways this fine collection of two dozen articles is the antidote to Timothy Snyder popular *Bloodlands*. Whereas the earlier book makes a relatively straightforward argument attributing the massive violence and killing of the 1930s and 1940s in Eastern Europe to the persons and personalities of Hitler and Stalin, *Shatterzone of Empires* takes a more contextual and even environmental approach to the contest of empires and nationalist movements and states, broadening the chronological sweep to nearly two centuries and the geographical frame to include the all-important case of the Ottoman Empire. The

was an imperial, even a colonizing, war that previewed what Hitler and the Nazis would attempt to do more ruthlessly twenty years later: the creation of a German-dominated *Neues Europa* which in fact conceals nothing more than a German reign of terror.

It was at the same time an early instance of decolonization and anti-imperialism. Those who proclaimed the right of national self-determination, like Lenin, hoped that the great imperial state would somehow hang together as the continent moved from capitalism to socialism. War and revolution, however, led to new forms of imperial power, and in the vast landscape of Central Asia a colonial counterrevolution was carried out by Russian settlers. The struggle for food and social order pitted Muslims who favored greater autonomy against Soviet forces that promoted subordination to the center. Tashkent Communists fiercely fought against various Muslim forces, in one case in alliance with Armenian nationalists. Alliances formed and were broken between 'bandits' and Reds, but ultimately Moscow considered the Turkestan Muslims too unreliable to be granted significant local authority.

Many historians, following Richard Pipes, see the Russian ethno-civil war of 1918–1921 as a series of conquests by the Bolsheviks of national regions, with nationalism as the legitimate and natural preference of most non-Russians, while Communism is depicted as an artificial imposition.²² Taking into consideration the civil, class, city-versus-country factors in the Civil War, instead of privileging the role of the nationalists, the final disposition of Russia's border territories, in fact, was decided more by expedience, opportunity, and physical force than by decisions made by nationalized majorities or Moscow Communists. Bessarabians, for example, at first identified primarily with the Russian Empire in which they had lived for over a century. In the year of revolution, 1917–1918, when socialists dominated local politics, national activists sought autonomy within a federal democratic state. But with the Bolshevik victory in Petrograd and the collapse of the Russian economy, nationalists made a desperate choice to unite with the Romanian state. Lithuanians were torn between a Russian and a German orientation. Their principal enemy, the Poles, dominated Vilnius and other cities and had ambitions to include the traditional Lithuanian capital in their resurrected state. After losing Vilnius to Poland in 1920, Lithuanian nationalism focused on recovering the treasured city, even though its population was heavily Polish and Jewish. The Soviets returned Vilnius to Lithuania in 1939 but at a high price – occupation.²³

Ukraine secured its independence from Russia by subordinating the new republic to the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk, the first treaty of the end of war settlement. Bolsheviks were driven out of Ukraine, and German and Austrian soldiers guaranteed

principal cause of violence was not specific tyrants or political systems but the complex interbetweenness of the region, caught in the vortex of empires and nation-states with modernizing and nationalizing ambitions.

²² Pipes, *Russian Revolution*.

²³ *Mačiulis/Staliūnas*.

the country's limited sovereignty. Now that the nationalists had a Ukraine, they had to make more complete Ukrainians – to promote the Ukrainian language and integrate the Russian-speaking cities into the new Ukrainian state. Under the Ukrainian parliament, the Rada, as well as under the Hetmanate and the Austrian-sponsored 'Red Prince', Wilhelm von Habsburg, moderate programs of Ukrainization were carried out, laying a foundation for later Soviet indigenization policies. For some Ukrainian historians, the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was a positive step in the history of Ukrainian state building. For Russian nationalists (and for Vladimir Putin today) Brest-Litovsk was an act of treason by the fledgling Bolshevik regime. For Moscow the Treaty is still seen as proof that European imperialism has always been anxious to weaken Russia by stripping it of its borderlands.

Russian Communists were not the only major party that was determined to hold as much of the old empire together as was possible in the raging storm of foreign intervention, peasant rebellion, and nationalist fervor. Russian liberals fretted over the question of how imperial continuity might be reconciled with national self-determination. Liberal intellectuals, most notably the leader of the Kadet Party, Pavl Miliukov, generally supported the war aims of the Russian Empire. Miliukov advocated expansion of the empire to include all of Poland and the eastern provinces of Ottoman Anatolia in order to form coherent national autonomies of Poles and Armenians under the scepter of the tsar. But he not only linked empire to nation in his design but also favored Russian conquest of Constantinople and the Straits as essential for the empire's future. Other visions for maintaining Russia as an empire came from Russians' familiarity with British historical writing on the British Empire. Former Social Democrat turned liberal Peter Struve and Maxim Kovalevskii, a principal leader of the Progressivist Bloc, saw the British Empire (or at least a well-scrubbed idealized version of that empire) as a model for Russia.

It may be that Lenin will still have the last word. If Struve learned about empire from J. R. Seeley, Lenin acknowledged that he learned about imperialism, a newly coined word, from J. A. Hobson. Appalled by the ferocity as well as the stupidity of the war, he tried desperately to understand it from his Marxist perspective. The war was imperialist – annexationist, predatory, plunderous, a war for the redivision of the world, the partition and reparation of colonies, spheres of influence, and of finance capital. Today we would use different words and phrases, but the sanguinary engagement of empire and nations that brought down centuries old monarchies and established vulnerable successor states remains a legacy that haunts us today and defies indifference.

The Armenian Genocide

In my own research in recent years, I have been concerned with the imperial regimes in tsarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Soviet Union. I have been most troubled by the failure of the current governments – and to a large degree, societies –

in both Russia and Turkey to deal effectively with their dark, poisonous pasts. The words ‘civil war’ have been used perniciously by those who would deny that a Genocide took place in 1915. They argue that Armenians resisted Ottoman authority at a time of mortal danger to the empire, that they collaborated with the Russians invading Ottoman lands on the Caucasian Front, and that they planned once the empire was defeated to establish an independent Armenian state in eastern Anatolia under Russian protection.

How does the concept of an international civil war work in the case of the last years of the Ottoman Empire, the Armenian Genocide, and the formation of the Kemalist Republic of Turkey? I will argue that these events occurred within the context of the international civil war but not in the way a civil war in the form of an Armenian insurrection and a legitimate Ottoman state response has proposed.

In much of the recent scholarly literature on the Genocide a rough consensus has been reached that has brought new understanding of 1915 to anyone who takes the time to consider honestly the events that have been deliberately obscured and rendered ‘controversial’ by governments and pseudo-scholars. To summarize some of the major findings of that scholarship:

The first major finding is that hundreds of thousands of Armenians and Assyrians perished because of policies of the Young Turk government. The principal architect of the Armenian deportations, Minister of the Interior Talaat Pasha, compiled his own record book calculating the number and location of the Ottoman Armenians. Not trusting the official Ottoman count of 1,300,000, Talaat estimated that the more accurate number was 1,500,000.²⁴ This number fell between the official Ottoman figure of 1,251,785, and the figure given by the Armenian Patriarchate of 1,915,858. Demographic historian Fuat Dündar holds that the number of 1,500,000 is the best and most reliable number of Ottoman Armenians on the eve of the Genocide that we have.²⁵ His own estimates are that around 300,000 Armenians survived the deportation and the settlement areas. Another 255,000 fled abroad, primarily to Russia and that 836,000 Ottoman Armenians survived the Genocide. By the end of the war in 1918 approximately 664,000 had perished.²⁶ Taner Akçam also uses the numbers given in Talaat’s ‘black book’, where the minister of the interior counted 924,158 Armenians deported. Since Talaat had not included more than a dozen locations in his calculations, Akçam estimates the total number of Armenians deported to have been closer to 1,200,000, a figure that corresponds to the early estimates of Arnold Toynbee (1.2 million) and Johannes Lepsius (1.3 million).²⁷ Raymond Kévorkian has used the statistics gathered by the Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul, now housed in the Saint James Monastery in Jerusalem, and estimates that there were just

²⁴ *Dündar, Crime*, p. 3; *Bardakçi*.

²⁵ *Bardakçi*, p. 149.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 150–151.

²⁷ *Akçam, Young Turks*, p. 258; *Bardakçi*, p. 109; *Bryce/Toynbee* (2000), p. 646; *Lepsius*, p. lxx.

under two million Armenians in the Ottoman lands on the eve of World War I.²⁸ His detailed account concludes that 850,000 Armenians were deported in 1915–1916, of whom 300,000 had perished by the winter of 1915–1916 and 500,000 survived until the last round of massacres in the winter and spring of 1916. “[B]y late 1916 the number of those who had perished exceeded 600,000.”²⁹ People continued to die from hunger, disease, and arbitrary and sporadic violence.

Further losses occurred in the half decade after the war when Armenians fought the nationalist Turks, were driven out of Cilicia, Izmir, and elsewhere. The twentieth century had not yet witnessed such a colossal loss of life directed at a particular people by a government. Mass killing of this magnitude made the unthinkable thinkable, and the political engineers that emerged from the Great War were able to calculate higher human costs as their population policies reshaped whole societies.

The purpose of the Genocide was to eliminate the perceived threat of the Armenians within the Ottoman Empire by reducing their numbers and scattering them in isolated, distant places. The destruction of the *Ermeni milleti* was carried out in three different but related ways: dispersion, massacre, and assimilation by conversion to Islam. A perfectly rational (and rationalist) explanation, then, for the Genocide appears to be adequate: a strategic goal to secure the empire by elimination of an existential threat to the state and the Turkish (or Islamic) people. But before the strategic goal and the ‘rational’ choices of instruments to be used can be considered, it is necessary to explain how the existential threat was imagined; how the Armenian and Assyrian enemy was historically and culturally constructed; and what cognitive and emotional processes shaped the affective disposition of the perpetrators that compelled them to carry out massive uprooting and murder of specifically targeted peoples and to believe that such actions were justified, because the process of genocide begins not with primordial nations inevitably confronting one another and contesting sovereignty over a disputed land, but with the accelerating construction of different ethnoreligious communities within the complex context of an empire with its possibilities of multiple and hybrid identities and coexistence. The hierarchies, inequities, institutionalized differences, and repressions that characterized imperial life and rule had for centuries allowed people of different religions, cultures, and languages to live together. Armenians and others acquiesced to their position in the imperial hierarchy and even developed some affection for the polity in which they lived. Shared experiences as Ottomans in some cases led to material prosperity and cultural hybridity, but always under conditions of insecurity and often capricious governance. The imperial paradigm met its greatest challenges from what might be lumped together under the concept of ‘progress’, that is the technological and industrial advancement of the capitalist West, which rendered the Ottoman Empire relatively ‘backward’ in the internationally competitive marketplace; as well as the differentiated and unequal development of the various peoples of the Ottoman realm. Religion, language, and

²⁸ *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, p. 265–278.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 693.

culture distinguished the *millets* – the Muslim, Armenian, Greek, Catholic, Protestant, Assyrian, and Jewish – one from another, yet members of all of them could aspire to be Ottoman and participate in the cultural, social, and even political life of the empire without ever achieving full equality with the ruling institution.

From abroad, two powerful influences shaped the evolution of the various Ottoman peoples: the increasingly hegemonic discourse of the nation, which redefined the nature of political communities and legitimized culture as the basis of sovereignty and possession of a ‘homeland’; and the imperial ambitions of European powers, who repeatedly intervened in Ottoman politics, hiving off parts of the empire’s territory, hollowing out the sultan’s sovereignty, and insisting on protection of his Christian subjects. Migration of some peoples out of the empire and others into it, competition over land, particularly in eastern Anatolia, Armenian resistance to old forms of ‘feudal’ subjugation to the Kurds – all contributed to structural and dynamic influences that generated a mental world of opposition and hostility among the *millets*.

Determined to save their empire, the Young Turks came to power at a moment of radical disintegration of their state, threatened in their minds both by the great European powers and the non-Turkic peoples (not only by Balkan Christians, Armenians, and Greeks, but Muslim Kurds, Albanians, and Arabs as well). Their ‘nation’ within that empire was still in the process of being imagined, neither effectively Ottoman, Islamic nor ethnically Turkish. The nation lay in the future, and the turn of the century was a period of intense and passionate debate about the nature of ‘Turkish’ national formation. How would the community be conceived: as a nation of ethnic Turks, with Turks defined as a race or a linguistic group; or as a supranation of Ottomans of various religions, ethnicities, and languages, perhaps with Turks (however defined) as the dominant group; or in the minds of some, as a pan-Turkic or pan-Islamic community that stretched into the Caucasus and Central Asia or into the Arab lands to include people of the same linguistic family or religion? What was clear to those Young Turks who eventually won the political contest by 1914 was that ‘Turks’ would dominate in one way or another, and that this imperial community would not be one of civic equality. It would, in other words, neither be an ethnically homogeneous nation-state like the paradigmatic states of Western Europe nor a multinational state of diverse peoples equal under the law. It would remain an empire with some peoples dominant over others.³⁰ As one of the most radical of the Turkish nationalists, Ziya Gökalp, put it: “The people is like a garden. We are supposed to be its gardeners! First the bad shoots are to be cut. And then the scion is to be grafted.”³¹ Here, perhaps most succinctly, Gökalp expresses a view of demographic engineering that corresponds with the humanism of the Enlightenment that represented one side of the international civil war. The Young Turks, Ottomanist in their inception –, became over time national imperialists prepared to take the most desperate and drastic

³⁰ On the conceptual difference between empire and nation-state, see *Suny*, *Empire Strikes Out*; and *Suny/Kivelson*, chapter III.

³¹ *Gökalp*, p. 50; cited in *Jongerden*, *Elite Encounters*, p. 80.

measures to homogenize their state while promoting some peoples over others and annihilating still others.

In this sense, the Genocide was not planned long in advance but was a contingent reaction to a moment of crisis that grew more radical over time. The Genocide should be distinguished from the earlier episodes of conservative restoration of order by repression, as in the Hamidian massacres of the mid-1890s, or urban ethnic violence, as in the pogrom in Adana in 1909. Though there were similarities with the brutal policies of massacre and deportation that earlier regimes used to keep order, the very scale of the Armenian Genocide and its intended effects – to rid eastern Anatolia of a whole people – make it a far more radical, indeed revolutionary, transformation of the imperial setup. My argument is that the Genocide was neither religiously motivated nor a struggle between two contending nationalisms, one of which destroyed the other, but rather the pathological response of desperate leaders who sought security against a people they had both constructed as enemies and driven into radical opposition to the regime under which they had lived for centuries.

While an anti-Armenian disposition existed and grew more virulent within the Ottoman elite long before the war, and some extremists contemplated radical solutions to the Armenian Question, particularly after the Balkan Wars, the world war not only presented an opportunity for carrying out the most revolutionary program against the Armenians, but provided the particular conjuncture that convinced the Young Turk triumvirate to deploy ethnic cleansing and genocide against the Armenians. The moment at which disposition became action occurred after the outbreak of war when the leaders' feared that their rule was in peril focused on the Armenians as the wedge that the Russians and other powers could use to pry apart their empire. The European-imposed reform program of 1914 was the immediate manifestation of the Ottomans' fears that their sovereignty over their realm was being compromised and that the European support of the Armenians presented a danger to their state's future.

Had there been no World War there would have been no genocide, not only because there would have been no 'fog of war' to cover up the events but because the radical sense of endangerment among Turks would not have been as acute. Without the war there would have been less motivation for a revolutionary solution and more political opportunities for negotiation and compromise. 'Ethnic cleansing' – the forcible removal of the Armenians because the regime wanted the land but not the people on it – might have been a disastrous but not quite genocidal choice of the Young Turks.

On the eve of the Ottoman declaration of war on Russia, the government engaged in negotiations with the leading Armenian political party, the Dashnaksutyun, to secure their support in subverting the Russian Empire from within using Russian Armenians. The Dashnaks sensibly refused, precipitating the conclusion on the part of leading Young Turks that Armenians were treacherous internal enemies. Young Turks considered a variety of political options short of genocide, but the inner core of the CUP resolved on the most radical and destructive resolution to the 'Ar-

menian Question'. When it came, the Armenian Genocide was the result of long-term, deep-seated elite and popular hatreds, resentments, and fears intensified by war and defeat – an affective disposition in which Armenians were perceived as irredeemable enemies of Muslims – that in turn shaped the Committee of Union and Progress' strategic considerations as to the most effective ways to save the empire. As spring approached in 1915, the governing few believed that the circumstances were propitious to remove the Armenians. Parliament had been shut down; the state appeared to be at risk from the British navy and Russian armies; and the Armenians could be linked to the Russian advance as collaborators.

In a real sense the civil war was between different visions held by Ottoman leaders and peoples, different national visions. Various imagined 'national' communities overlapped, competed, and succeeded one another in the roughly one hundred years from Tanzimat to Kemalism. In late Ottoman history the efforts of Ottomanist reformers to form an Ottoman 'national' community might be considered a form of ecumenical or civic nationalism, a project applauded by European liberals. That effort can be contrasted with Sultan Abdül Hamid II's project to link Kurds and Turks together in a new 'national' synthesis, a form of Islamic 'nationality'. At the turn of the twentieth century, genuine ethnic nationalists proposed a greater infusion of Turkic elements into state governance and social arrangements, including the foundation of a Turkic-Muslim 'national economy'. Meanwhile Balkan Christian peoples, and Muslim Albanians, expressed their own nationalist aspirations to realize what they believed to be their historical right to nationhood and territorial independence. The Young Turks, humiliated by defeat in the Balkan Wars, adopted a more radical nationalist rhetoric of revenge and Turkification of the population, yet all the while attempting to maintain a multinational empire that included the Arab Middle East and parts of Caucasia. Finally, the Kemalists adopted a form of organic, integral ethnonationalism, based on European models, to forge through state action a homogeneous Turkish nation stretching from Rumelia through Anatolia.

War and social disintegration, the invasion of the Russians and the British, and the defection of some Armenians to the Russian side moved the leaders of the Ottoman state to embark on the most vicious form of 'securitization' and social engineering: the massive deportation and massacre of hundreds of thousands of their Armenian and Assyrian subjects.³² Ziya Gökalp, who like so many others saw the Genocide as necessary or even forced on the Ottomans, could with confidence write, "There was no Armenian massacre, there was a Turkish-Armenian arrangement. They stabbed us in the back, we stabbed them back."³³ What was done had to be done in the name of national security, they argue, and so a kind of lawful lawlessness was permitted.

³² In constructivist international relations theory, securitization is an extreme version of politicization that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name of security. See *Buzan et al.*, p. 25; *Williams*, p. 512; *Buzan*, *People, States and Fear*.

³³ *Jongerden*, *Elite Encounters*, p. 72.

The choice of genocide was not inevitable. Predicated on long standing and ever more extreme affective dispositions and attitudes that had demonized the Armenians as a threat that needed to be dealt with, the ultimate choice was made by specific leaders at a particular historical conjuncture when the threat seemed to them most palatable and opportunity presented itself. The Young Turks' sense of their own vulnerability – combined with resentment at what they took to be Armenians' privileged status, Armenian dominance over Muslims in some spheres of life, and the preference of many Armenians for Christian Russia – fed a fantasy that the Armenians presented an existential threat to Turks. Threat is a perception, in this case the perception that one of the empire's subject peoples was as great a danger as invading armies. Threat must be understood not only as an immediate menace but as perception of future peril.

Reversing an older image of ethnic violence as bubbling up from the masses below, my argument locates the initiative and initiation of Genocide in the highest levels of the state. The decisions, permission, and encouragement of a few in power provoked and stoked emotional resonance below. It turns out that a few killers can cause enormous destruction. Thugs, sadists, fanatics, and opportunists can with modern weaponry (or even with axes, clubs, and daggers) slaughter thousands with little more than acquiescence from the surrounding population.³⁴ They in turn can inspire or let loose the rage of thousands of others who will carry out even greater destruction. Genocide in particular is an event of mass killing, with massive numbers of victims but not necessarily of massive numbers of killers. The thugs, set loose by the political elite, create a climate of violence that radicalizes a population, renders political moderates less relevant, and convinces people of the need to support the more extremist leaders. The context of war, with its added burdens and accompanying social disintegration, hardens hostile group identities, “making it rational to fear the other group and see its members as dangerous threats.”³⁵ Added to that, thugs and ordinary people use the opportunities offered by state-permitted lawlessness to settle other accounts with neighbours, take revenge, or simply grab what they can.³⁶

Some of the killers in 1915 simply obeyed orders; others were motivated by much more mundane feelings than duty or considered ideological preferences. Social and economic inequalities when combined with ethnic and religious distinctions bred resentment at those who received more than they deserved from those who had received less. Fear of the other and the future; anger at what had been done to oneself and one's

³⁴ Reviewing six case studies by other authors that examine ethnic violence from Northern Ireland, India, Sudan, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, and the Balkans, James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin make this point graphically: “Indeed, based on these studies, one might conjecture that a necessary condition for sustained ‘ethnic violence’ is the availability of thugs (in most cases young men who are ill-educated, unemployed or underemployed, and from small towns) who can be mobilized by nationalist ideologues, who themselves, university educated would shy away from killing their neighbors with machetes.” *Fearon/Laitin*, p. 869.

³⁵ *Fearon/Laitin*, p. 871.

³⁶ On the variety of killers, see *Mann*, especially chapter 2.

compatriots; simple ambition and careerism all could be found among those who murdered Armenians. Fear, anger, and resentment metastasized into hatred, the emotion that saw the other as the essential cause of one's own misery. Hatred required that the other be eliminated.³⁷ Violence then beget violence and counter-violence. Killing became familiar and justifiable for reasons of self-defense. A cumulative radicalization moved inexorably forward: sporadic, uncoordinated massacres along the eastern frontier gave way to planned deportations, first from frontline areas and then throughout the empire; deportations were accompanied with massacres and death marches; finally, at the end of the road, those who had reached the deserts were starved to death or brutally murdered. If the Genocide is thought of as civil war, it was one of radical imbalance: a powerful, militarized government and mobilized Turkic and Kurdish population against a largely defenseless Armenian and Assyrian population able to resist in only a few instances.

Within the Ottoman imaginary Armenians became the victims of both their success within the *millet* system and their exposure as religiously marked, largely unarmed subjects. Armenians tried but were unable to dispel the perception that they were alien to the Ottomans and a menace that when given an opportunity would reveal its real intent. The multitude of determining factors – the overdetermination of what would ultimately be genocide – combined to form an affective disposition both at the top of Ottoman society, among the rulers in the Hamidian period and the Young Turk opposition, and among ordinary Muslims that targeted the Armenians particularly and envisioned them as foreign, subversive, devious, and, eventually, an existential threat to the unity and security of the empire and the Muslims within it. The Balkan wars of 1912–1913 exacerbated and intensified hatred of Christians in general and heightened feelings of vengeance against those who had humiliated and tormented Balkan Muslims. The imposition of the 1914 reforms, which established European inspectors in the 'Armenian provinces', was a final blow to Ottoman pride and a confirmation of the treacherous connection between Europe and the Armenians.

Those who perpetrated genocide operated within their own delusional rationality.³⁸ The Young Turks acted on fears and resentments that had been generated over time and directed their efforts to resolve their anxieties by dealing with those they perceived to threaten their survival – not with their external enemies but an internal enemy they saw allied to the Entente – the Armenians. What to denialists and their

³⁷ As Jan Elster notes, "Emotions, like desires and beliefs, are intentional: they are *about* something. They differ in this respect from other visceral feelings, such as pain, drowsiness, nausea, and vertigo." He goes on: "Emotions tend to be associated with specific action tendencies. Guilt induces tendencies to make repairs, to confess, or to punish oneself. The action tendency of shame is to disappear or to hide oneself, and in extreme cases to commit suicide. The action tendency of envy is to destroy the envied object or its possessor. Anger induces a tendency to harm the person who harms one. The action tendency of hatred is to make the object of the emotion disappear from the face of the earth." *Elster*, p. 35, 38–39.

³⁸ The words 'delusional rationality' comes from *Turkyilmaz*, who writes: "These 'rationalities' have no basis in reason, and yet become a powerful motor for killing on a mass scale." *Turkyilmaz*, *Rethinking Genocide*, p. 43.

sympathizers appears to be a rational and justified strategic choice to eliminate a rebellious and seditious population, in this account is seen as the outcome of the Young Turk leaders' pathological construction of the Armenian enemy.³⁹ The actions that the Young Turks decided upon were based in an emotional disposition that led to distorted interpretations of social reality and exaggerated estimations of threats.⁴⁰ The conviction that Armenians desired to form an independent state was a fantasy of the Young Turks and a few Armenian extremists. The great majority of Armenians had been willing to live within the Ottoman Empire if their lives and property could be secured. They clung to the belief that a future was possible within the empire long after many thought reasonable. Still, they had been socialized as Ottomans; this was their home and what they knew. Only when their own government once again turned them into pariahs did some of them defect or resist.

The very word 'genocide' conjures images of the most horrendous crimes committed by states against designated peoples. So powerful is the term itself – as a concept in international law, a claim by governments of their own victimization, and as powerful sources of national identification – that the term 'genocide' has been extended to involve almost all instances of mass killing in our world. While some historians, journalists, and jurists have defined genocide so narrowly that the term can be applied only in the case of intended total destruction, as in the Jewish Holocaust, others have stretched it so broadly that any mass killing or even ethnic cleansing – the expulsion of the Greeks from Anatolia or Palestinian Arabs from Mandate Palestine, the Ukrainian *Holodomor* [Death Famine], or Stalin's Great Purges – becomes a genocide. Sadly, it seems that nowadays in order to be a full-fledged nation-state one not only needs a flag, a national anthem, and an opera house, but also a genocide. Such a broad usage makes it impossible to single out those instances of state-initiated violence that qualify in a clear way with the original meaning of genocide, the killing of a people, and that can be analyzed comparatively as to their etiology and effects. In this work I employ the word genocide in a specific way to designate what in German is called *Völkermord*, the murder of a people, and in Turkish *soykırım* or Armenian *tseghaspanutiun* (killing of an ethnicity or, in an older understanding, 'race').

Mass murder in and of itself does not a genocide make. Although legal definitions do not capture the full range of historical examples, there is utility in restricting the term 'genocide' to what might more accurately be referred to as 'ethnocide', that is the deliberate attempt to eliminate a designated group defined by the cultural characteristics – language, imagined biological origins ('race'), religion – that have historically bound them together as a community and appear to distinguish that people

³⁹ The argument from state security was made repeatedly by the Young Turk leaders and was reproduced in the first major collection of materials issued by the Ottoman government on the Armenian deportations, *Dahiliye*.

⁴⁰ For interpretations of the Genocide that are compatible, though not identical, with my own analysis, see, for example, the thoughtful essay by *Astourian*, p. 111–160; *Mann*; *Levene*, *Crisis*, vol. 2; *Valentino*; *Bloxham*.

from others.⁴¹ While other forms of mass killing – war, massacres, induced famines, the Great Purges – involve death on a horrendous scale, the motivations and intentions of the perpetrators are different enough from ethnocides that they require distinct explanations. Genocide is not the murder of people but the murder of a people.

The genocidal elimination need not be total, but it should render the ‘people’ impotent, politically and possibly culturally. Few modern mass killings or even genocides have resulted in the total liquidation of a people, and both the Armenian Genocide and the Shoah resulted in new states being formed and populated with survivors and their descendants. But the mass of Armenians never returned to the historic homeland in Anatolia that they had inhabited for three thousand years, and the Jews, while hardly totally erased, never reconstituted the vibrant Yiddish culture that they had evolved over many centuries in Central and Eastern Europe. Those genocides had results; they were genocidal in the physical, political, and cultural sense.

The Armenian Genocide preceded and made possible the formation in the post-war years of a relatively homogeneous Turkish national state and a homogeneous Armenian state neighboring it. Since empires and migrations, along with global capitalism, move people about and mix populations, such homogenization required policies and programs of assimilation or deliberate expulsion. The world war left a legacy of national self-determination that included ethnic cleansing and genocide. Victims would become perpetrators, and perpetrators victims.

Mass murder in the context of world war in which killing had become habitual and unrestrained by humanistic or legal cautions was meant to save an empire only to contribute to its fall and the emergence of nation-states. That example would be repeated elsewhere in the twentieth century, on a smaller scale in the Middle East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans and on a colossal scale in the Second World War in the Nazis’ effort to cleanse and colonize Eastern Europe and Russia. Ultimately, at enormous cost, the resistance of the anti-fascist and anti-colonialist movements would defeat many of these efforts. Today we continue to witness ongoing struggles, like the Kurdish resistance to Turkish repression and denial of their nationhood, or on a less violent level the conflict between the humanist, cosmopolitan impulses to accept refugees and tolerate difference and the xenophobic and racist impulses to preserve an imaginary purified Europe and America – the perverse fantasy of Muslims

⁴¹ The term ‘ethnocide’ is here used synonymously with ‘genocide’, but scholars also make an important and useful distinction that ethnocide is the destruction of a culture while genocide is the physical destruction of a people. See, for example, *Clastres*, p. xiv, 3–4, 101–110, who writes: “If the term genocide recalls the idea of ‘race’ and the will to exterminate a racial minority, the term ethnocide gestures not toward the physical destruction of people... but towards the destruction of their culture. Ethnocide moves then toward the destruction of their culture. Ethnocide is the systematic destruction of modes of life and of thought of different peoples (...) To sum up, genocide murders the bodies of peoples, ethnocide kills their spirit. In either case, it is always a question of death, but of a different kind of death.” (p. 102; my translation) In my definition, genocide involves both the physical and the cultural extermination of a people.

coming over the borders destroying our civilization. Every one of us has to remind ourselves every day, which side are we on and what can we do about this. Indifference, ignorance, and despair can lead to inaction. Awareness of what has happened in the past and the need for resistance to the darkness at least gives us tools to prevent the worst and find ways to preserve and protect the values that make it possible for us to live together in a peaceful, progressive, just world.

Deadly Geopolitics, Ethnic Mobilisations, and the Vulnerability of Peoples, 1914–18

By *Mark Levene*

Examining the counterpoint between two celebrated historical studies can often illustrate critical issues of historical interpretation rather better than having to write a poor third. Timothy Snyder's *Bloodlands*¹ will need little introduction. Examining Nazi and Stalinist mega-violence together and, more crucially, the murderous interplay between them, Snyder significantly succeeded where others failed in puncturing a conventional wisdom which laid the worst of European mid-century mass murder at Hitler's door *alone*, while at the same time resurrecting a human geographical framework – 'the Lands Between' – in a terminology which made some sense of how fourteen million people, over and beyond those directly killed in World War Two military engagement, violently perished.

Compare and contrast this with the work of a once equally if not more lauded historical polymath with a reach of humanity's entire global, civilizational record: Arnold Toynbee's *The Western Question in Greece and Turkey*² is also about a zone of violence in which millions perish. However, the title self-evidently offers a spatial focus distinct from Snyder's as it also predates his temporal framework. If Snyder's political geography is actually that of the once imperial Austro-German-Russian borderlands, Toynbee's is that of Ottoman Asia Minor. And while Snyder's destructive phase is centred on 1933–1945, Toynbee's main sequence effectively runs from the Balkan wars of 1912, when the Ottoman empire looked as if it was finished, to its phoenix-like resurrection, albeit in residual nation-state form as the Kemalist-led republic of Turkey in 1923. Indeed, at the heart of Toynbee's argument is 'the political idea of nationality' – though with the acerbic twist that this had precisely nothing to do with the historical, indigenous make-up of Near-Eastern *societies* but was none other than an alien implant imported from the West. Toynbee thus makes it crystal-clear from the outset that the first cause of the violent demographic recasting of Ottomania through ethnic cleansing and mass compulsory deportation – with the Greco-Turkish war of 1919–1923 at the epicentre of his analysis – could not in any sense be ascribed to some deep-set internal malaise but was instead the result of the radical destabilisation of the region from the outside. In short, what westerners

¹ *Snyder.*

² *Toynbee.*

might repeatedly and conveniently dub the ‘Eastern Question’, was in Toynbee’s book none other than a *Western Question*.³

In contrast to the Snyder analysis, which, *pace* the introduction of Stalinism, still anchors the worst of twentieth century European mass murder in the totalitarian turn, Toynbee’s focus forces us to reconsider it in terms of an already in-built toxicity which came out of the collapse and then *national* reconfiguration of what I would designate the *entire* imperial rimlands – the Eurasian swathe of territories on the literal rim between European metropolitan West and imperial semi-periphery⁴. In other words, it is in the context of much broader, competing relationships in the emergence of the modern hegemonic international system that we can discern a ‘deadly geo-politics’ as it impacted on the most vulnerable of ethno-religious communities. Yet Toynbee clearly goes one step further beyond the standard comfort zone (as also underpinned in some sense by a Holocaust benchmark) in the way he refuses to accept a standard juxtaposition between monstrous perpetrators on the one hand and virtuous victims on the other. Instead, Toynbee reads the deadly geopolitics of the *Western Question* through the prism of an interplay between great powers and would-be national supplicants.

There is of course one event from the Great War which is acknowledged by most historians as genocide. Contemporary knowledge of the Ottoman -Armenian catastrophe – the *Medz Yeghern* – owes not a little to Toynbee, who along with the German pastor, Johannes Lepsius, compiled the first major critical analysis of these events. Reading Toynbee’s account⁵ would indeed confirm – over and beyond his scrupulous cross-referencing of witness accounts – that what took place under the aegis of the Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP), the driving force behind the 1908 ‘Young Turk’ revolution, was a systematic empire-wide state onslaught on a two-million or more ethno-religious community which left the majority of them dead, most of the remainder displaced, penniless refugees, and their east Anatolian heartlands and hence habitus devastated beyond recovery. While the term genocide would await a further thirty years for its Lemkinian enunciation there can be no doubt, reading Toynbee, that what he was describing is exactly, unequivocally, that. But what about history, what indeed about historical truth? The fact that there was no general Armenian insurrection does not amount to there being no Armenian actors.

In fact, my interest in this essay is in the fomenters of deadly geo-politics: the range of Great Power players themselves, each of which were ultimately focused on their own survival in this zero-sum, life and death struggle. It is concerned with how the Great Powers were prepared to expose ethnic communities to acute danger, *regardless of the consequences*.

³ Toynbee, p. 15.

⁴ Levene, *Crisis of Genocide*, vol. 1 p. 5–8.

⁵ Bryce/Toynbee (1916).

The lesser part however – again following Toynbee’s prescript – is concerned with how self-proclaimed and increasingly radicalised national elites were themselves prepared to play these high-risk games in order to achieve their own state-orientated goals. In this respect, Armenian national behaviour was no more, nor less consistent with that of other aspirants. Where the Armenian detail departs radically from the macro-picture is in the extremity of the CUP-led state response, as it was also informed by *prior* state calculations geared towards Armenian ‘relocation’ (sic.), as these also collided with the politico-military contingencies of spring 1915. The genocidal outcome extended beyond the Armenians to embrace various other Syriac communities in eastern Anatolia. Even so, both *Medz Yeghern* and *Seyfo* – the specifically Syriac genocide⁶ – are on a spectrum of Great War violence committed by the Great Powers against alleged collective communal enemies both within or without, setting in turn a precedent for the entirely unforgiving climate of the victorious Allies-endorsed, post-war ‘New Europe’.

The Great War and ‘National’ Peoples

The implication thus far is that the most vulnerable communities exposed to this collision of forces were in the eastern imperial rimlands: in ‘the Lands Between’, the Balkans, Anatolia and the Caucasus. Yet before we more keenly pursue this tack let’s offer a brief counter-intuitive example from western Europe. Here advanced, powerful, already well-established, and cohesive *nation*-states should have made the prospect of fifth columns or Trojan horses operating on behalf of wartime adversaries remote. Until the Irish events of Easter 1916.

The Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) insurrection has some salience by way of Armenian comparison and contrasts. The IRB were *not* the nationalist mainstream but – like those who broke away in 1914 from the Armenian Dashnaksutun to fight for the Russians – a small splinter-group who rejected the prospect of autonomy (in Ireland: Home Rule) and decided on a high-risk bid to go for all-out independence, effectively throwing in their lot with the Germans. Before 1916, few Irish Catholic nationalists would have had any sympathy at all with this proposition. Vast swathes of their menfolk were fighting as volunteers in the British army, not least hoping that this would cement the case for Home Rule. This evolutionary scenario was swept away almost overnight by the ferocity and brutality with which the British army put down the Dublin-centred Easter Uprising, One should note that the German ‘mobilising’ component in this particular equation was minor. But after Easter nearly all nationalist Irish opinion was for outright independence even as it further hardened Ulster Protestant sentiment towards resisting exactly that⁷.

What is the significance of the Irish example? Amongst other things it may suggest that the mere fact of a supposedly liberal civil society bound by democratic in-

⁶ Gaunt, Massacres.

⁷ Townshend, Easter 1916.

stitutions and the rule of law could not prevent latent, often racially underpinned fears and anxieties leading to a rapid polarisation between state and community or communities. The conceit of *Union sacrée* shared by all belligerents at the 1914 onset of war – and thus of everybody in a state-society being in the same boat together – was proved, even in a ‘homogenous’ Britain composed in practice of different cultural and ethnic elements (including some recent immigrant Germans and Russian Jews), to be paper thin. To be sure, Ireland was in key respects a special, arguably ‘colonial’ case⁸. That aside, what matters for us here is how the role of agency and state responses to that agency could change a situation almost overnight; the Easter caesura determining an accelerating trajectory towards the 1919–23 ‘troubles’ in which British-Irish and inter-Irish relations rapidly descended into extreme even potentially genocidal violence⁹.

How much *more* so was this the case in the genuinely multi-ethnic Habsburg, Romanov and Ottomans empires? Proclamations of Russian *Union sacrée*, as for instance declared by political spokesmen from across the Duma’s ethnic spectrum in August 1914, thus sit uncomfortably with the comments to a German newspaper the previous year of the ex-chief minister, and decidedly anti-war, Count Witte that “out of the fifty million of Russia’s non-Russian subjects thirty million would render espionage service to the attackers, and would start a civil war inside the country.”¹⁰ Yet what is so interesting about Witte’s assessment is the degree to which it spoke for the worst fears of almost the entirety of Russia’s political and military establishment. Military academicians certainly had a penchant for compiling alarming demographic statistics, but they were not alone in their already conceived verdict, especially on the ethnic populations of the western and Caucasian rimlands¹¹. Caucasus viceroy Count Vorontsov-Dashkov’s proposal to the Council of Ministers early in the war to strip *all* Muslims from the region of Russian citizenship and then deport them beyond the Urals on grounds of their alleged collective ‘collaboration’ with the enemy may have been rejected on grounds that it would lead to a tit for tat retribution by the Porte, possibly involving expelling millions of non-Muslim Ottoman subjects across the border into Russia but, it hardly prevented Vorontsov-Dashkov, of his own volition, from incarcerating thousands of Adzhars – Georgian-speaking Muslims of Russian citizenship – and Ottoman Laz, who found themselves on the wrong side of a porous border, on an island in the Caspian¹². Nor, in apparently complete contradiction to the Council of Ministers’ strictures, from also sending a proclamation through the Russian based Catholicos to the Armenians, informing them of their ‘brilliant future’¹³.

⁸ Howe.

⁹ Townshend, *The Republic*.

¹⁰ Katkov.

¹¹ Holquist, *To Count*, p. 112–116.

¹² Lohr, *Nationalising*, p. 111, 151–160.

¹³ Sonyel, p. 82.

It would be convenient at this point to dismiss Vorontsov-Dashkov as a loose canon. Yet the source of his hardly coded message to the Catholicos was none other than the tsar. With that knowledge we get to the nub of the pathological schizophrenia which infected all parties. Once the war of attrition had set in and it became self-evident that a clear outcome determined by the military victory of one side or the other was a distant or non-existent prospect, all of the main players went down the same path of seeking to mobilise ethnic groups on the enemy side as potential allies. This was in whatever capacity that could be dreamt up: direct military assistance, sabotage behind the lines, or just plain dissent. It was also in the full cognisance that the other side was doing exactly the same with regard to one's own purportedly troublesome *ethnies* and in complete cynical disregard to the potential consequences for those communities – not in the capacity of specific combatants to the conflict – but as *whole* communities.

Granted, it took time for the process to be officially, publicly articulated. German Empire's Chancellor Bethman-Hollweg's Reichstag speech of April 1916, in which he appeared to offer German support for the self-determination of all those encompassed within what he called the 'League of Russia's Foreign Peoples' was clearly for propaganda purposes, though also significant in that it came almost two years prior to Wilson's 14 points.¹⁴ As a general rule, the willingness to ratchet up ethnic tension became more pronounced as leading belligerents, notably Germany and Britain became more desperate in their efforts to win through. The German decision to create a puppet Kingdom of Poland in November 1916 was one indication of how seriously by then Berlin was willing to play this card. Yet in setting up Polish military units in the Austrian army from the very beginning of the war, the Central Powers had already thrown caution to the wind in exciting national aspirations which they had no precise idea how they would actually address or, for that matter, master. With the Allies clearly competing for the same ethnic groups – the Austrian-sponsored Pilsudski-led legion offset by the French-based Polish volunteer army under General Haller from June 1917, or for that matter the Russian sponsorship of Czech units which grew into a Czech legion, in both instances, primarily through the induction of POWs into these formations – the stage was already set at war's end for national armies, potentially off the leash and out of control of any dominant Great Power, to promote their own territorial agendas, regardless of what that might mean for other ethnic communities who might inhabit the same rimlands' soil.

But if this was a case of the major belligerents opening up a Pandora's box for the future, there was also the more immediate playing with fire in the simple act of creating ethnic military formations in the first place. POWs turned traitors might themselves be half-protected through wearing the 'legitimate' uniform of the opposing side. But one could hardly say the same about their un-uniformed wives, children, parents and communities back home. Certainly, there was Great Power lip-service to the proposition, enshrined in the Rousseau-Portalis maxim that it was forbidden

¹⁴ Fischer, p. 237–238.

to states at war to massacre the enemy's civilians¹⁵. But if their active menfolk were already acting as an overt military adversary how could one discount the possibility that their kin – womenfolk included – would not similarly covertly take up arms while operating in the rear? The spectre of the franc-tireur – or even more precisely, the gendered nightmare of the female turned insurgent – had already reared its ugly head in August 1914, when German troops from von Bulow's Second Army, advancing through Belgium, had repeatedly lined up and then slaughtered swathes of women, children and men on the justification that they were a fanatically dangerous, cunning and 'illegitimate' 'enemy' who dissembled their hostility by pretending to be civilian non-combatants.

The German high command-authorized violence visited on the innocents of the Wallon town Dinant and scores of other towns and villages had its dubious origins in soldiers' panicked anxieties at being secretly fired upon by an invisible enemy which then metamorphosed into an almost wholesale fantasy conviction that this was the truth¹⁶. Almost simultaneously, Austrian and Hungarian troops in their advance against Serbia did not wait for such justifications but simply began massacring Serb civilians on *both* sides of the Austrian Serb international border¹⁷. No wonder that when Belgrade's state-military resistance was finally crushed towards the end of the following year, an already typhus-ridden population did not wait to find out what occupation might entail but fled en masse across the Albanian mountains alongside its retreating army, resulting in a massacre-strewn flight whose suffering and death tolls were arguably comparable with that of the Armenian death marches¹⁸.

It would seem obvious that the worst military excesses against civilian populations – as in Serbia, or for that matter the Russian-Ottoman Caucasus front – would occur in the most heavily and bitterly contested theatres of war. Doubly so where an ethnic population was already the butt of state hostilities or uncertainty about its supposed loyalty and allegiance. In Galicia, another bitterly fought-over rimlands' zone where the Austrian Ministry of Interior had initially branded the entire Ukrainian peasantry there as – by implication Russophile – traitors, summary justice become so commonplace that Alexander Prusin estimates that some 30,000 civilians including women and children were either executed or sent to concentration camps before 1917¹⁹. But then, paradoxically, neither Russians nor Austrians, as they struggled to control this classically mixed region, could quite decide whether it was the Ukrainians, the Poles or the Jews who were the most suspect population or their most loyal, Austria eventually opting to radically expand the tentative but tiny special crack unit of Ukrainian sharpshooters founded at the war's outset.

¹⁵ *Best*, p. 56–59, 96–97.

¹⁶ *Horne/Kramer*.

¹⁷ *Reed*, p. 41–50.

¹⁸ *Caddick-Adams*, p. 126.

¹⁹ *Prusin*, *Lands Between* p. 43–44.

Did this mean that the Austrians, at this juncture, were offering a coded political message to Ukrainian national aspirations in return for military support? Or grounds for Ukrainians on the Russian side of the border to make common cause with their Austrian brethren? The fact is that such nebulous overtures, almost two a penny as they were as the war reached its final paroxysm, proved almost entirely worthless in undermining the enemy's ability to wage war, if not downright futile inasmuch as the one thing they did help sow was the seeds of imperial destruction²⁰. Yet state foregrounding of ethnicity also unleashed, in terms of latent societal hatreds, something much more immediate.

It was no accident that the moment when this became manifest was spring 1915, when for the first genuine time in the war, not just partial defeat but military near-catastrophe offered the first serious indicators of possible total state breakdown. These indicators were sharpest in Ottomania, faced in April 1915 with what seemed like a final imperial foreclosure, and within weeks in Russia, reeling as it was from the haemorrhaging of its Polish and Baltic territories. The former precipitated a CUP strike at, and decapitation of, the capital's leading Armenians. In the latter, visceral emotional release in Moscow against the nearest scapegoat at hand came not from on high but from the *demos* below. Indeed, though undoubtedly fuelled by nationalist groups, the massive anti-German pogrom in Moscow in May, at the height of the Russian Great Retreat, caught the regime entirely unawares²¹. It also helped precipitate anti-German riots in Britain dubbed by one historian "as the most widespread in its entire history."²² Significantly, however, in both Russia and Britain the physical violence welled up on top of a spy fever and hysteria about the purported role of the Jews. Indeed, in Britain accusations began flying thick and fast about some Hidden – Jewish – Hand, which was sabotaging His Majesty's Government entire war effort²³.

Blaming the Jews: A Special Case

In medieval times, the Jews (ubiquitous in European mindsets if not always in their direct presence) were blamed for just about every societal misfortune and woe. That they came to play a very particular role at centre stage of Great War scapegoating however has been rather overlooked by dint of the European catastrophe which overcame them a world war later. What here concerns us is the way these tendencies intermeshed with the wider urges to ethnic mobilisation in the western rimlands' parts of the Russian empire – still in 1914 the Jewish heartland – and the light this throws by way of comparison and contrast with the synchronous fate of the Armenians.

²⁰ *Roshwald*.

²¹ *Lohr*, Nationalising, ch. 2.

²² *Panayi*, p. 234.

²³ *Panayi*, p. 175–177.

Extreme Jewish vulnerability to the danger of Russian statist backlash came with the very first shots of the war when the German and Austrian high commands issued proclamations which, while deleting their original explicit calls for Jewish insurrection, nevertheless proclaimed the imminent liberation of Russian Jewry from tsarist antisemitism. Aided and abetted by leading German and Austrian Jews, one might discern that the damage was already done when a German Jewish led Committee for the Liberation of Russian Jewry – working alongside the high commands – toned down its name to the more neutral sounding Committee for the East²⁴.

Does this mean that Russian Jewry were already *ipso facto* German proxies? Or, when Jews acquiesced or even fraternised with German troops in captured territory, proof that they preferred a victory for the Kaiser? By the same token, were Armenians collectively guilty by dint of the fact that many would have probably preferred an Allied victory? Does silence confer guilt? At least one could say unequivocally that there were no Russian Jewish volunteer units on the Central Powers' side as there were Armenian *druzhiny* on the Russian. But that hardly seemed to prevent Stavka, the Russian military command, conjuring up every conceivable, not to say lurid accusation imaginable of Jewish military and extra-military sabotage.

Stavka needed no German goading to see Jews everywhere and in everything: it was infused through and through with phobic antisemitism²⁵. But then German incitement could hardly have helped. Perhaps it was exactly in this gap between belligerent aspirations and the reality of communal quiescence that the potential for paranoid projection was at its greatest. The first of many military pogroms by Russian troops when they took Austrian Lemberg – today's Ukrainian Lviv – in September 1914, is as good an indicator as any. There was no evidence that Jewish non-combatants fired upon Russian soldiers or that any shots were fired at all. But that did not prevent a panicked self-suggestion almost identical with that which afflicted German troops on Belgian soil the previous month.²⁶ Nevertheless, the Lemberg affair, sparking off as it did a repeated Russian tendency in occupied Galicia to rampage through Jewish districts, was as nothing compared with the behaviour of its military in the face of the great Austro-German advance the following spring. Closely synchronous with the beginnings of the Armenian genocide, Stavka deported not just huge numbers of ethnic Germans but up to three quarters of a million Jews eastwards from all along the front from Bessarabia in the south to the Baltic in the north, between late spring and mid-summer 1915.²⁷ Certainly, one key difference compared with the Armenian deportations was that the Jews were not evicted to some desert 'nowhere' but eastwards towards Russia *integrale*. However, this carried its own acute danger. Beyond the Pale of Settlement – where most Jews in Russia were not legally entitled to reside – a huge question mark hung over what would happen to them should they

²⁴ Zechlin, p. 116–125.

²⁵ Lohr, 1915 p. 48.

²⁶ Prusin, Nationalising ch. 5.

²⁷ Lohr, Russian Army.

attempt to cross the threshold. The crisis uncannily foreshadows a key moment in the Nazi destruction of European Jews twenty-six years later, in 1941, when SS men, faced with a deportation logjam – in that case involving the first German Jews arriving at the same or similar rail termini of Riga, Minsk and Kaunas – resorted to their immediate extermination²⁸.

Left to its own devices, might Stavka – with its extraordinary and total powers of martial law over a vast swathe of western Russia – have resorted to such a drastic recourse? True, it lacked any blueprint for such an eventuality. Actual genocides, however, are rarely the product of some coherent plan, but more likely to develop and accelerate through a toxic mix of default, contingency and emergency. What we can say held Stavka in check at this critical point was the intervention of the Council of Ministers, itself responding to discrete and very timely British intercession.²⁹ That would suggest simple humanitarianism at work mixed with some good common sense. Yet Whitehall's behaviour actually points in a very different direction.

British official reasoning did not dispute their Russian ally's absolute conviction that its entire population of Jews supported the Germans. Sir George Buchanan, the British ambassador, for instance, wrote home: "There cannot be the slightest doubt that a very large number of Jews have been in German pay and have acted as spies during the campaigns in Poland. Nearly every Russian officer who returns from the front has stories to tell on the subject."³⁰ Nor were British observers deflected in their view of Jewish malevolence when an investigation by the Duma delegates of a supposed Jewish ambush of Russian troops at Kuzhi, in Kovno, was shown to be a complete Stavka fabrication. Instead, the explanation for the British intervention is pithily summed up by a leading, liberal member of the British administration, Lord Robert Cecil, when he minuted: "Antisemitism makes Jewish financial assistance to the Allies very difficult to obtain and this war may well turn on finance."³¹ In other words, not only did British officialdom, like its Russian counterpart, have its own obsessive *idée fixe* about an international Jewish power, but in its case also a utilitarian, if otherwise utterly dubious, reasoning for dissuading its Russian allies from resorting to mass anti-Jewish violence. As the most powerful of the Russian Jewish co-religionists were – according to this logic – in New York banking houses, purportedly with direct influence over a still neutral White House, any mass assault on Russian Jews, at least in 1915, was considered counterproductive. Or, to return to the Armenian comparison, while they were slaughtered because they had no geopolitical weight with which to give them protection against the entirely confabulated charge of *collective* treachery, Russian Jews charged with the same thing had exactly that prophylactic, not because they tangibly possessed it but because all the Great Powers, Britain included, believed – often in the most phobic and paranoid terms – that they did.

²⁸ Levene, *The Crisis of Genocide*, vol. 2, p. 107–111.

²⁹ Cherniavsky, p. 60–1; Levene, *War, Jews*, p. 60–61.

³⁰ Levene, *War, Jews*, p. 51.

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 59.

This would make the Russian Jewish and Ottoman Armenian cases, so similar in terms of their 1915 trajectories, almost at opposite ends of the spectrum in terms of outcome. We will return in our concluding remarks to that rather strange and ugly paradox – what we might here in shorthand describe as the difference between ‘extermination immediate’ and ‘extermination delayed’. But having raised the British role in the Russian Jewish saga, this might offer an opportunity to explore a little further Britain’s broader involvement in Great War ethnic mobilisations, and more precisely with regard to the Ottoman empire.

Perfidious Albion?

One might propose that British behaviour, far from consciously seeking to destabilise Ottomania, was essentially a reactive, emergency response to the wartime actions of others. It was, after all, the goading of the Porte by the German government on Ottomania’s entry into the war on its side which led to the Sheik ul-Islam declaring jihad, in turn focusing British colonial minds on the potential for Muslim insurrection in British India, Egypt and beyond. It was this which led Cairo, rather than London, towards initial feelers aimed at ‘turning’ the Arab Hashemites in the British interest.³² And it was Petrograd, not London, which seemed more initially willing to play overt ‘clash of civilisation’ games in the Caucasus region: arming Ottoman as well as Persian Nestorians and overtly backing the calls of the Tiflis-based Armenian National Bureau to Armenians on the Ottoman side of the border to take up arms against the Porte, offering blandishments to various Kurdish tribes to also rise up³³. If any of the three 1914 Allies thus precipitated the collective guilt by association connections made by CUP against Armenian and Syriac communities, the Russians must take the greatest share of the blame. Russian cynicism on the fate of the Armenians is particularly well documented. It is brutally exemplified through the manner with which extensive and far-reaching Stavka projections for the re-settlement of much of the post-genocide Armenian heartlands was earmarked for the benefit of ‘loyal’ and ‘reliable’ Cossacks, Ossetians, even Muslim Lezgins and Circassians, the only option allowed to Armenian returnee survivors being to lease back their *own* land from a Russian military administration³⁴.

But Britain was equally ready to use and abuse Armenians and others, not least once they and the French had committed themselves and then failed in their direct assault on the Dardanelles in 1915. One might protest that it was not the British fault that their second April attempt to break through to Constantinople precipitated the CUP round-ups of the leading Armenians there – now commonly regarded as the first shots in the genocide. Yet this would be to ignore the prior British military planning for landing in Gallipoli, which had included the idea of a secondary feint along

³² *Fromkin*, ch. 10.

³³ *Reynolds*, p. 115–7, 142–3.

³⁴ *Somakian*, p. 102–107.

the Cilician coast using Armenian volunteers recruited with the aid of diaspora groups in Egypt and elsewhere. Indeed, in the overwrought atmosphere of spring 1915, it was not just Turks who were imagining armies of irregular Armenians striking at the Ottoman centre. Somehow out of the Cilicia scenario, the British managed to confabulate into existence an irregular force of 15,000 Armenian Zeitonlis pinning down the Turkish rear³⁵.

Had the British thought through the dangers implicit in these plans to non-combatant Armenians not just in Cilicia but throughout the empire? Was the failure to do so simply a case of the military and politicians not engaging in some joined up thinking? What might we also have to say about the Armenian groups who were so enthusiastic to lend themselves to this venture? Though the Cilicia operation was aborted, the truth of the matter is that once the Gallipoli landings had so clearly turned into a military quagmire, the British were prepared to run with any number of fantasy schemes involving ethnic auxiliaries. Like dragons' teeth from something out of Jason and the Argonauts, thousands of Ottoman Greek insurgents were imagined into this winning frame. And then, when a deserting Ottoman Arab officer from the Gallipoli front, the famous or possibly infamous Muhammed al Faruqi, presented himself in the autumn as a spokesman for Arab secret societies in Damascus, British military intelligence in Cairo thought they had unlocked the key to how perhaps hundreds of thousands more Arab soldiers were going to turn their guns on their Ottoman officers and so set the empire ablaze.³⁶

These grand notions certainly tell us much more about the desperation of British imaginings than about any actual insurrectionary potential on the ground. What we can say is that once the Allies had coaxed the much more tangible Greek state factor into play, the danger to Asia Minor Greeks exponentially increased in the direction of what had already engulfed the Armenians, as in large part was borne out from 1916 onwards.³⁷ Meanwhile, in the Arab case, simply because there was a genuine Hashemite-led revolt in the desert – though nothing on the scale that the British had envisaged by way of al Faruqi – a draconian Ottoman response, led by CUP co-leader Jemal, in his capacity as governor of Syria, proved equally inevitable. At this point, we might speculate on how far he was prepared to go to crush incipient Syrian support for that revolt when ostensibly he was protecting Armenian survivors in the region from his CUP triumvirate partners, Talaat and Enver, and – hardly coincidentally – making discrete overtures to the western Allies.³⁸ Would atrocity have extended to an ever-greater range of the Arab population had the latter two taken full control of Syria too? All we can say with certainty is that CUP violence against the Arme-

³⁵ Bloxham, p. 80–81.

³⁶ Bloxham, p. 81; Fromkin, p. 176–178.

³⁷ Bjørnlund *et al.*

³⁸ Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 681–685.

nians proved – through its combination of ethnic cleansing *and* direct physical annihilation – to be in a class of its own.³⁹

That dubious distinction certainly demands deeper questions about the deteriorating nature of internal Armenian-Turkish relations in the Ottoman twilight years and the degree to which that differentiates them from other pre-war imperial state-communal conflicts such as between the Austrians and Czechs, or Russians and Poles. However, the domestic aspect can hardly be divorced from a wartime geopolitical context in which communal groups were seen by the Great Powers as possessing collective, even monolithic ‘national’ attributes and hence, in this capacity, as pawns to be utilised and then jettisoned as circumstances warranted. From this perspective, the way the British treated Armenians, Arabs, Asia Minor Greeks, or for that matter Jews, as part of some great strategic game, itself requires brief further examination.

In the British case the mentality can best be summed up in a single potent name, Sir Mark Sykes. It was Sykes who acted for the British in the eponymously named Sykes-Picot – originally Sykes-Picot-Sazonov – secret arrangement, hammered out in Petrograd in March 1916 with a view to carving up the Ottoman empire between the three allies on the war’s successful conclusion. Carve-ups of such nature were again two a penny in the context of the war. At the very beginning of the war, in September 1914, the German chancellor, Bethmann-Hollweg, had composed a secret programme earmarking *Mittleuropa* and indeed *Mittelafrika* as regions effectively to be brought under Berlin’s control.⁴⁰ As the purpose of the Petrograd treaty was to agree a three-way division of the Middle East, Sykes’ role was to ensure that Britain got as much of the cake as it felt it was entitled. That’s where the bit players came into the picture as something more than simply notional insurgent assets. Each might provide the bona fides, or the pretext, for one’s own less than honourable intentions against the equally less than honourable intentions of one’s supposed allies. But then if Sykes, the classic aristocratic amateur with all the hubris of his class – not least a claim to Middle Eastern knowledge based on little more than some holiday trips to Ottomanian – had some grand ideas of his own, who were the supplicants to turn him down?⁴¹

Sykes’ ‘big idea’ was that Armenians, Jews and Arabs could all be combined into a grand, British sponsored, anti-Ottoman alliance, each supposedly acting in consort under the benign aegis of His Majesty’s Government. Sykes did have some initial success making linkage between London Armenians and Zionists.⁴² However, it should have been rather obvious that any Arab-Zionist understanding was bound to fail once the contradictions in the British proposals to Hussein bin Ali, Sharif of Mecca, on the one hand, and to the Zionist Chaim Weizmann, on the other, had

³⁹ Bloxham, p. 69.

⁴⁰ Fischer.

⁴¹ Adelson.

⁴² Schneer, p. 174–176.

become apparent.⁴³ One irony is that Sykes – like a great many of his equally obsessed Whitehall colleagues – was much less interested in any Jewish support role *in* the Middle East and much more with the notion that their alleged international power could somehow stave off Russia’s revolution-led exit from the war. Sykes indeed was a fervent believer in the idea that if you could turn ‘great Jewry’ – the Russian Jewish revolutionaries included – towards Palestine, which they supposedly really wanted in their national capacity, the German moves in 1917 to decouple Russia by way of the Bolsheviks could be null and voided.⁴⁴

Making international, yet ‘national’ Jewry part of the wartime geopolitical equation in this way, and in the process getting it as he did so utterly, completely, fabulously wrong, in effect means that our great gentlemen player holds major responsibilities not only for today’s Sykes-Picot disruptive legacies, but also for the Balfour declaration. But then, for a power like the British, however much they messed up, they could still walk away from the worst consequences of their actions, even if in the case of Palestine that would not be until 1948. For those on the other side of the state-communal divide the risks were altogether higher.

National Actors: Vision and Hubris

One might, for instance, ask how close did Weizmann’s pro-British manoeuvres bring the *yishuv*, the Jewish community in Palestine, to a potentially Armenian-style denouement? By breaking with the Zionist Copenhagen Bureau’s stance of strict neutrality and entering into open alliance with the British – as if he were speaking not just on behalf of some Zionists but all Jews everywhere – Weizmann vastly raised the stakes on the CUP treating the Jews in Palestine as yet another Trojan Horse. Some pro-Weizmannite activists there who were genuinely willing to spy on behalf of the British, paid for it with their lives.⁴⁵ Yet, this was the nature of nationalist sacrifice. The prize was ‘the land’ and if getting there involved collateral damage, or telling the British a slew of stories confirming their worst fears about international Jewish power, regardless of the evidence to the contrary, or – for that matter – rubbishing all other diverse Jewish contenders who offered a rather different narrative, that’s what one did for *sacro egoismo*, as a matter of ‘national’ necessity. And what worked for Weizmann, also worked for Hussein and his sons, Faysal and Abdullah, regardless of the fact that their claim to speak as if they were true representatives of a unified Arab cause was, to put it mildly, being economical with the truth, regardless too of the fact that their actions made the possibilities of CUP mass reprisal against the peoples of the Mashriq all the more palpable.

But then the imperative of the nationalist supplicant had to be premised on a very particular wartime sophistry, namely the existence of national aggregates who exist-

⁴³ *Kedourie*.

⁴⁴ *Levene*, Balfour Declaration.

⁴⁵ *Auron*, ch. 4.

ed in some approximately coherent, equally national territorial space (or in the Zionist case, could be demonstrated to do so in the not too distant future) and who were also in some shape or form mobilisable by a major – usually enemy belligerent – player as political, diplomatic and above all military assets. The fact that throughout the rimlands this remit was entirely at odds with the human ethnographic realities of mixed, pluralist, multiethnicity was an inconvenient truth which nationalists had to suffocate or elide at all costs. As was that other glaringly inconvenient fact that the vast majority of the ordinary people of the rimlands identified themselves in terms of place, family, clan, community or religion but very rarely in terms of nation. Those who did so were invariably by definition elite, urban, urbane, well-educated, professional avant-gardists: lawyers, scientists, intellectuals, artists and miscellaneous other dreamers of dreams but also, as the war progressed, increasingly hard-headed political schemers who recognised that if you wanted to make a breakthrough to your potential patron, whether Berlin or London, Paris or Constantinople, you had to tell them what they wanted to hear: that your national committee was at the head of a nation in waiting; that you spoke with one voice as preferably led by a single national leader; that you could deliver menfolk (cannon fodder) from your nation into volunteer military formations; and that your national aspirations carried additional weight in terms of their immediate propaganda value to the belligerent and its longer-term, post-war geo-strategic calculations. All of this implicitly presupposed you were ready to make national sacrifices, whether in the cohort of your young men killed or mutilated, or for that matter, the misery and potential martyrdom of your people back home.

A range of charismatic, compelling, or persuasive figures rose to the challenge. In addition to Weizmann or Faysal, we might think of Tomas Masaryk, Jozef Pilsudski and Roman Dmowski, the latter two all the more successful because they could play both belligerent camps against each other to further the Polish cause – certainly Nikola Pasic in his Yugoslav ambitions and Eleftherios Venizelos as chief advocate of the *Megali Idea*, the vision of a ‘Greater Greece’. But what of the Armenian nationalists? Dashnaktsutyun, the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, and its Hunchakian (Armenian Social Democratic Party) rivals, despite their confrontational, revolutionary background, were slow to move in the direction of outright secession from Ottomanism. With the Great Power-endorsed reform package for eastern Anatolia and with it the likelihood of Armenian autonomy on the verge of implementation at the outbreak of war, only a fraction of the Dashnak’s summer 1914 congress in Erzurum appear to have opted for making common cause with Russia.⁴⁶ But then this was entirely consistent with similar national movements elsewhere in the rimlands. The 1914 radicals who threw in their lot with the enemy side were the exception, not the rule, the haemorrhage only becoming a flood when the changed situation of 1917 – with the US entry into the war and Russian potential revolutionary exit – carried more persistent signals that the main belligerents, especially Britain and France,

⁴⁶ *Somakian*, p. 72–3.

might genuinely entertain the creation of a 'New Europe'. It was the Armenian national misfortune that the CUP got in its mass, genocidal retaliation first. Therein lies the exceptionality: not in the wartime sequence whereby national groups became vociferous in their clamour for independence, nor on the obverse side, the willingness of Great Powers to listen to or even court them.

The degree to which Boghos Nubar, head of the Armenian National Delegation and thus leading international spokesmen for the Armenian cause, was as charismatic or effective as some other comparable national leaders is certainly discussible.⁴⁷ Even so, he was certainly prepared to make overtures to the Allies which by implication exposed Armenians to danger. He was a key player in the British 1915 Cilicia plan. And he was also involved towards the end of the war in the creation of the Légion Arménienne, as part of the proposed French Légion d'Orient, a post-war occupation force for Syria and Cilicia. That at least offered a possible route to the implementation of a localised autonomy which some Légion Arménienne units incidentally attempted to carry through with their own slew of anti-Turkish atrocities⁴⁸. The paradox was that by that time Ottoman Armenian destruction had reached such an optimal level, nationalists might claim they had no other choice but to go for broke.

By the same token, international awareness of the emerging range of atrocities was something which had a potential to be capitalised on, not least as it offered first-rate anti-Central Powers propaganda, especially in the US. Was thus the Allies 'May 1915 declaration promising to hold the Ottoman government to account for their crimes against 'humanity and civilisation' an element in the Armenian national calculus? The cause had undoubtedly been furthered at key points, especially in the 1890s, by western public outrage at Ottoman mass violence against Christians. The problem with hindsight is that it cost the Allies nothing to issue wartime humanitarian declarations which they could always renege upon, just as equally as it cost the French nothing to make meretricious promises to Nubar, not just of Cilician but east Anatolian autonomy, which they had no intention of honouring⁴⁹.

'Minorities': The Fateful Legacy of the Great War

The fact is that the danger of dependency on the Allies became only too apparent when the post-war geo-political situation changed yet again. At the Treaty of Sèvres (1920), it appeared that the Allies would honour their support for the Armenian cause by backing an Armenian state alongside a possible Kurdish statelet in eastern Anatolia. Their strategic purpose, of course, was to keep a potentially rump Ottomania in political and military check in the east while the western Anatolia littoral was handed over to the Greeks. But in the ensuing struggle between Greeks and Kemalist Turks, it soon became apparent that the former's position was untenable. The ultimate 1922

⁴⁷ *Ghazarian*.

⁴⁸ *Bloxham*, p. 140–141, 151–153.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 136–137, 141.

denouement was Greek defeat, their wholesale abandonment by the Allies, leading in turn to the mass ethnic cleansing of not only Asia Minor Greeks but also Armenians, the nadir of which was the catastrophe of Smyrna.⁵⁰ But already two years earlier the writing was on the wall, when in the face of Turkish resistance, the French left the Légion Arménienne to its Cilician fate accompanied by renewed Armenian massacres. With Sèvres discarded, and thus thrown back on their own devices, the Dashnak attempt to create a state on the Russian side of the international border was doomed to Kemalist obliteration had it not been for a violent Bolshevik intervention which ‘saved’ the residual entity within the Soviet constellation.⁵¹

Minus the security of true independence, the only remaining protection for those Armenians still in Turkey would at this point seem to have rested on the Allies’ Minorities Treaties enacted at Versailles applying there too. But the system was in large part an ad hoc Western response to the phantom fear of a transnational Jewish power disrupting the homogenising drives of the ‘New Europe.’ Its lack of efficacy where it was most needed, moreover, was demonstrated in Ukraine, when White Russian generals in the context of the Russian civil war (1917–1922), attempted what they had failed to do in 1915: revenging themselves on the Jewish enemy within.⁵² In the post-war world, assurances of minority protection or, for that matter, internationally supported trials of *génocidaires*, counted for nought without Allied military will to enforce them. Glaringly one key legacy of the Great War destruction of empires was the effective international repudiation of any middle ground in which heterogeneous ethno-religious communities might have operated autonomously within the interstices of the state. How final that legacy was, was abundantly demonstrated in the final text of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne between the Allies and a now duly recognised sovereign Turkey. Containing neither the words Armenia nor Armenian, it was as “if the Armenian Question or the Armenian people themselves had ceased to exist.”⁵³

To what extent Armenian nationalists laid fellow Armenians open to danger by their wartime willingness to act as tools of others’ geo-political stratagems may be endlessly debated. What we can with certainty say is that in 1915 there was no general Armenian uprising excepting the one which took place in the CUP’s heads. What, however, cannot be gainsaid with regard to the Armenians, as so many other disparate, multifaceted imperial rimlands’ peoples, is the manner in which the Great Powers sought to reify them into monolithic aggregates to be used, abused and discarded. Toynbee’s portrayal of the cynicism and betrayals of the Western Allies in particular may be utterly shocking, but it is also devastatingly accurate.

⁵⁰ *Housepian*.

⁵¹ *Reynolds*, p. 257.

⁵² *Rosenberg*, p. 34.

⁵³ *Hovannisian*, *Historical Dimensions* p. 37.

The Securitization of Minorities as a Bedrock of Population Policy

By Arno Barth

A number of articles in this book¹ deal with increased violence against ethnic groups (including non-combatants like children, women, and older people) as one of the substantial shifts triggered by World War I. The analyses typically point to a broad range of perpetrators' reasons and motives as clues to understanding general developments, such as the transformation from dynastic empires into modern national states. A common thread in this regard appears to be the perception of certain groups within a state as a latent source of trouble – a diagnosis which applies both to decaying empires and to emerging national states in the wake of the war. But what was the underlying trigger for such a mechanism? Why did it work consistently across several regions, different state forms and even opposing political camps and ideologies?

This article offers an explanation for this mechanism that goes beyond any specific background, for it is aimed at developing a general theoretical tool for further analyzing population policy of the early twentieth century. For this purpose, it avails of insights drawn from both psychology and political science. Though the applied methods thus proceed from distinct specialist backgrounds, they are based on a common approach. Constructivist in nature, both assume that the question of whether or not something (or someone) constitutes a threat is less as a matter of objective facts than the result of individual perceptions and social dynamics.

Psychological Approach (Affect Heuristics)

The concept of affect heuristics draws to a large extent on analyses of the Decision Research Institute in Eugene, Oregon – particularly on the broad research of its founder and President Paul Slovic. Proceeding from the empirical finding that the risk appraisals of so-called experts tend to differ dramatically from those of laypersons, decision research focuses on the non-fact-based component of decisions. Slovic and his colleagues assume an unconscious biasing effect that precedes rational assessment. In a situation of decision, they assume an inner system which “automatically searches its memory banks for related events [...]. If the activated feelings are pleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to reproduce the feelings. If

¹ Cf. in particular *Levene* and *Suny*.

the feelings are unpleasant, they motivate actions and thoughts anticipated to avoid the feelings.”²

This method is by no means limited to laypersons or everyday life. Even the decision-making processes of governments and international conferences are substantially influenced by affect heuristics – especially in cases where, though various experts are involved (often disagreeing with each other), in the end only one or a few persons have to decide. Despite, or perhaps even because of the “highly sophisticated methods at their disposal for gathering information about problems,”³ policy makers then tend to rely on gut feeling: “When it comes to making decisions, however, they typically fall back on the technique that has been relied upon since antiquity – intuition.”⁴

Affect heuristics exert a particularly strong influence in the area of fear and risk calculation. A striking example of this is the overestimation of fire, murder or natural disasters as causes of death, in contrast to less spectacular killers such as disease. Slovic *et al* point to an empirically proven tendency among human beings as the underlying source of such misjudgements: the more easily examples of an incident can be remembered or just imagined, the more dangerous this very event will be considered.⁵ Mental images in particular transport affect heuristics, regardless of whether they are based on actual experiences or originate from other sources (such as contemporary broadcast media and the internet). The impact of this mechanism is not restricted to the question of whether something *is* perceived as a threat, but also influences the process of assessment, i. e. the question of *how* likely the respective threat is rated. “This heuristic involves judging the probability or frequency of an event by the ease with which relevant instances are imagined or by the number of such instances that are readily retrieved from memory.”⁶ Experience and imagination (and even imagined experience) are thus powerful tools of risk calculation, as they provide an emotional default setting. Each stimulus that increases the visual imagination of an instance of possible harm (e. g. to a specific group of people) unconsciously pre-determines each subsequent assessment. Hence, the mere discussion of a threat is sufficient to increase its perceived probability – by triggering the imagination and a mental search run on the subject. These findings should by no means be taken to suggest that rational arguments are of no importance in risk calculation. In fact, the relation of reason to emotion turns out to be rather complex. Affective impacts have the privilege of quickness: “Although analysis is certainly important in some decision-making circumstances, reliance on affect and emotion is a quicker, easier and more efficient way to navigate in a complex, uncertain and sometimes dangerous

² Epstein, p. 716.

³ Slovic *et al.*, Cognitive Processes, p. 32.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Cf. Jungermann/Slovic, Psychologie, p. 188.

⁶ Slovic *et al.*, Cognitive Processes, p. 37.

world.”⁷ The first, and quickest, impression determines the analyses that follow, i. e. who will be consulted as an expert and who will not, which figures will be accepted as evidence and which will be doubted – and ultimately which potential risk will be rated as worth taking due to an apparently predominant benefit. Nonetheless, an opposite effect of interference is also possible: rational analysis and statistical evidence for their part have a potential to shift emotional biases. At base, (political) decisions are highly intermingled with affective impacts. Against this background, the generation, elimination and not least exploitation of affect heuristics provides a playground of political agitation. The psychological approach should therefore be supplemented by political science to improve our analysis of the risk factors ascribed to ethnic groups.⁸

Political Science Approach (Securitization)

Security has long been a central concern of political sciences, but it was only after the Cold War that the constructivist approach to this question began to receive broad attention. Its originators and best-known exponents worked at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, for which reason the general approach came to be known as the Copenhagen School. Its key protagonists, first and foremost the local scientist Ole Wæver and his British-Canadian colleague Barry Buzan, generated a model for tracking how a given political issue is transformed into a security matter. This process, which they named securitization, dramatically changes a given setting. A successful instance of securitization legitimizes so-called extraordinary measures, i. e. emergency actions that under normal circumstances would be deemed inappropriate. Wæver and Buzan distinguish between three main components required for securitization. A securitizing actor, a functional actor or actors and a reference object. While reference objects are “things that are seen to be existentially threatened and that have a legitimate claim to survival”⁹ and functional actors contribute as part of the setting to the dynamic of the situation in one way or another, it is up to the securitizing actors to carry out the securitization. Due to their intention to implement a policy which, under normal circumstances, would not be accepted, they have to convince the audience (another central, but in the original conception, rather neglected group) that the reference object is both existentially threatened and worth protecting. According to the Copenhagen School, securitizing actors convince their audience via a so-called speech act. In applying the term speech act, the Copenhagen School refers to the British philosopher John Austin, who interprets speaking not as a matter of describing action, but as the action itself: “According to Austin, performative utterances do not just describe but have the potential to create (new) real-

⁷ Slovic *et al.*, Risk, p. 23.

⁸ The social sciences themselves are devoting increased attention to risk management – a promising development, which is unfortunately beyond the scope of this article. Cf. Mohun.

⁹ Buzan *et al.*, p. 36.

ity.”¹⁰ Buzan and Wæver transfer this model to their approach, defining a security speech act. To be successful, a security speech act has to narrate a story that includes the following components:

- Naming the reference object
- Declaring that and why it is threatened
- Explaining why the normal measures to deal with are not sufficient
- Introducing the intended extraordinary measure

In the twenty years since the first presentation of this approach, a range of authors have suggested amendments and improvements to it. New regional think tanks for security studies, such as the Paris School around Didier Bigo and Thierry Balzacq, have adopted a broader approach to security. Following their compatriot Pierre Bourdieu, Balzacq, Bigo and others (e. g. Holger Stritzel) include praxeology in their analysis, that means reconstructing the meaning that the actors under inquiry themselves ascribe to their experiences, inasmuch as they interpret routinized operations (like border control or camera surveillance) in particular as securitization. Generally, proposals for adjustments of the Copenhagen approach tend towards a more process-orientated view instead of focusing on one purely linguistic and somewhat magical moment of securitization. This method seems particularly suitable for historians, as historical change hardly results from one single move, but “evolve[s] sequentially over long periods of time, consisting of more complex configurations which stem from various influences.”¹¹ It may thus also be prudent to follow Stitzel’s terminology and define securitization as “a process of articulations creating sequentially a threat text.”¹²

As part of this process-oriented revision, the critical reworking of the primary Copenhagen approach aims at widening its focus: “First, an effective securitization is highly context-dependent. Second, an effective securitization is audience-centred. Third, securitization dynamics are power-laden.”¹³ It is for this reason that the Paris School attaches greater importance to intuition, while the Copenhagen School narrows matters down to what they call the grammar of security – a rulebook for how to perform a speech act independent of context and audience. Balzacq develops what he calls the pragmatic method, taking into account the factors of audience, context and agency. As the pragmatic method stresses, it is not possible to securitize everything at any given time. The securitizing actor rather has to connect with already existing discourses, or more generally with the spirit of the time metaphorically speaking, what is decisive is recognizing the oncoming wave and being able riding it. A successful securitization thus requires an actor endowed with a good instinct for

¹⁰ *Stritzel*, p. 361.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 374.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 377.

¹³ *Balzacq*, p. 179.

“how a given community perceives and symbolizes urgency, [and for] the kind of language likely to induce an audience to change its ideas on a subject and convey political immediacy.”¹⁴ It is for this reason that the Paris School attaches greater importance to intuition, while the Copenhagen School instead focuses on what they call the grammar of security – a rulebook for how to perform a speech act independent of context and audience.

Securitization will succeed “when the securitization agent and the audience reach a common structured perception of an ominous development.”¹⁵ To reach this end, the actor has to meet certain criteria. Here the question of power comes into play, but not exclusively. Of greater importance than the formal position of a person who tries to securitize is the question of whether the audience takes that actor to be trustworthy and competent. “[T]he power to persuade rests with the assumption that a given securitization actor knows what is going on, and works for common interests.”¹⁶ Beyond these basics, the concrete utterance needs to meet two criteria: emotional intensity and logical coherence. The securitizing actor has to convincingly demonstrate how critical a threat is, which drastic consequences it might have and how the respective audience could be personally affected. This case should be presented in a manner likely to trigger fear, or, to put it in Slovic’s words, to perform affect heuristics. It is the combination of these influencing factors that in the end shapes securitization:

The better the compatibility of the articulated text / textual structure and the existing discourse [...] and the better the positional power of securitization actors, the easier it is for them to establish their preferred individual text as a dominant narrative for a larger collective.¹⁷

Securitization of Minorities during World War One

In the wake of the Great War one can perceive a development towards ethnic violence and even genocide. Policies of this nature were employed in Russian warfare on the Caucasian front and in the western Russian regions; in the form of the genocidal policy targeting Armenians within the Ottoman Empire; and as part of the Austrian occupation of Serbia. These examples document a dramatically increasing fear concerning minorities and thus provide empirical examples of the practical securitization of these minorities. The present article will thus concentrate on the accompanying discursive developments, not without stressing that these must be considered in conjunction with the practical measures that were actually implemented. Since, at this early stage in the war, so many different parties were already implementing practical measures targeting ethnic groups, it is perhaps not surprising that a wide range of actors was also involved in the textual counterpart of this activity. Not only citizens of

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 186.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 181.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 191.

¹⁷ *Stritzel*, p. 370.

the Central Powers, but also those of the Entente and neutral countries made recommendations for the post-war settlement that included population exchanges or even expulsions. Moreover, these authors belonged to a range of ideological groups including leftwing and liberal parties. The variety of actors supporting such highly contentious methods suggests that an underlying development served as the foundation of such proposals. In the following pages, a selection of these proposals and the arguments made in support of them in this context shall be introduced by way of example, providing an opportunity to test some of the tools provided by the securitization approach.

Siegfried Lichtenstaedter (Central Powers)

To begin with Germany, a nation which had already implemented and was planning policies of ethnic cleansing and even genocide (especially in Southwest Africa and, in terms of planning, in the so-called ‘Ober Ost’ territories of north-eastern Europe¹⁸): it was not only the ‘usual suspects’, such as the pan-Germanic *Alldeutscher Verband* that made the case for population transfers. Liberal-humanitarian voices also argued in favour of what at the time was called ‘unmixing’. Admittedly, the most elaborate German proposals on this matter hailed from a somewhat bizarre figure: Siegfried Lichtenstaedter (born in 1865), who began in the field of oriental studies before graduating in law and going on to work in the audit office of the Bavarian Monarchy. Despite this bureaucratic career, Lichtenstaedter privately remained a passionate observer and student of misjudgements South-East Europe and the Ottoman Empire, living a “double life –bureaucrat by day, polemicist and writer by night.”¹⁹ Perhaps in order to enhance his credibility as an Orient expert, he resorted to the pseudonym Dr. Mehemed Emin Effendi. It was in 1898 that Emin Effendi aka Lichtenstaedter published what Matthew Frank refers to as “the foundational document on modern population transfer”²⁰: in his book *Die Zukunft der Türkei (The Future of Turkey)*, Lichtenstaedter proposed a population exchange between Greece and Turkey that bore similarities to the one actually carried out in 1923. With the advent of World War I, he felt confirmed in his view – both by the war’s outbreak, which was associated with (Serbian as well as general) irredentism, and by the course that it took, with its increasing turn towards ethnic violence. This interpretation of events led Lichtenstaedter to propose a further “unmixing” after the war, greater both in regional scope and comprehensiveness. In his book *Nationalitätenprinzip und Bevölkerungsaustausch. Eine Studie für den Friedensschluss (Principle of Nationalities and Population Exchange. A Study for the Conclusion of Peace)* of 1917, again as Dr. Mehemed Emin Effendi, he argues in a manner which corresponds precisely to a securitizing text. His reference object – in the Copenhagen School sense of the term – is the hoped-for conclusion of peace, or to be more precise, a lasting future

¹⁸ Cf. *Jureit*, p. 161 ff.

¹⁹ *Frank*, p. 18.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

peace. For one of several examples of how to reach this goal, he drew on a contemporary debate within the German Empire as to whether and how parts of the former Russian Poland (usually referred to in Germany as ‘Congress Poland’, having been created by the Congress of Vienna in 1814/15) could be annexed after a victorious war in the east. Lichtenstaedter warns against carrying out such an annexation without a complementary strategy for altering the territory’s population structure. With regard to the Polish minorities already living in the eastern provinces of Prussia, this annexation would lead to

Grenzmarken mit 12 Millionen polnischer Bewohner, die vom glühenden Hass gegen ihr [...] Deutsches Reich [...] erfüllt wären – dazu noch als Grenznachbar ein Riese, der als Stammverwandter die unterdrückten Polen ohne Unterlass locken und umwerben würde²¹.

Yet the ostensible alternative – refraining from the proposed expansion and establishing an independent Polish state – is also seen as a menace. However grateful for such a measure the Polish people might initially be, in the long run their independence would fuel an irredentist campaign targeting East German regions: “Dass ein polnischer Staat die polnisch bevölkerten Provinzen der Nachbarstaaten anziehen wird wie ein Magnet das Eisen, ist zweifellos.”²² [“It is beyond question that a Polish state would attract the Polish populated provinces of neighbouring states like a magnet.”]

Sooner or later, no people would be able resist uniting with those who they perceived as their kinsfolk. Hence, this logic was clearly not limited to the German-Polish case. In fact, from this perspective, any settlement neglecting irredentist potential could not constitute a viable long-term solution. Border alteration alone would not solve this problem, as the Polish example also illustrated. Lichtenstaedter thus introduces a threat by using provocative language suitable for triggering affect heuristics in Slovic’s sense. He then dismisses possible alternatives (“normal measures”) for reducing the threat as impracticable, clearing the way for the introduction of extraordinary measures: “[S]o bleibt offenbar nur ein Ausweg: die Berichtigung der Nationalitäts-(Sprach-)Grenzen, die Anpassung der Sprach- an die Staatsgrenzen.”²³ [“Thus, there is clearly only one way out: the rectification of the borders of nationality and language, the adjustment of the linguistic borders to match the national borders.”] Lichtenstaedter formulates this claim to refer to the religious Peace of Augsburg: “Cujus regio, ejus lingua”²⁴. Translated into early twentieth century terms: the linguistic allegiance of a government/state and of (preferably all) citizens should be identical. If these do not match, any remedial measure should be generally applicable – including population exchange. In order to forestall humanitarian doubts relating to

²¹ *Enim Effendi*, Nationalitätenprinzip, p. 9. Border regions with 12 Million Polish residents with a fierce hatred against their German Empire – in addition to which, a giant as a neighbouring state, who, as a kinsman, would continuously woo the oppressed Poles.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 13.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 39.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 46.

this harsh method, he argues that population transfer was less brutal than the war itself. Moreover, he cites the Russian population policy already being implemented²⁵ as both a justification and role model. Lichtenstaedter finally raises the stakes with a rhetorical flourish, demanding that statesmen “zur Erreichung eines großen, heiligen Zieles lieber eine kleine Härte an[zu]wenden, als den Zweck zu verfehlen,”²⁶ [“in order to achieve a great and holy objective, apply a little severity rather than miss the target”] recommending “einen harten, dornenvollen Weg [...], der zum Ziel führt, statt einen angenehmen, aber trügerischen Pfad.”²⁷ [“a hard and thorny way that leads to the objective, instead of a comfortable but deceptive path”] Thus, a securitization plot was narrated, consisting of objects to safeguard, a threat, the exclusion of alternatives, dramatization and extraordinary escape.

Buxton Brothers (Entente)

In the United Kingdom, voices in favour of population transfers were not in the majority. However, they were raised by politicians of good reputation hailing from different political camps, from the conservative Geographer Alfred Mackinder to the left-wing Liberals Noel Edward and Charles Roden Buxton. The latter were two brothers who both held seats in the House of Commons. At the time, both Buxtons belonged to the political group within the Liberal Party that still supported Prime Minister Herbert Henry Asquith. (Charles Roden Buxton would later join the Labour Party). Noel Buxton was also the originator and current chairman of the Balkan Committee, a pressure group with considerable influence in British foreign affairs dedicated to promoting the cause of the Balkan peoples and freeing them from Ottoman rule.²⁸ After a long sojourn in the Balkans, including its already belligerent parts as well as regions still outside the war, in 1915 the two brothers published a memoir. Large parts of this book, *The War and the Balkans*, deal with suggestions as to how the countries in the region could be induced to join the Entente. Another of its concerns was the question of how a future peace could be secured, for “if the Great War is to end, not in a temporary triumph, but in a resettlement of Europe upon more solid foundations, then it is necessary [...] to ensure that the materials for future conflict are not allowed to remain in existence.”²⁹ According to the authors, this goal was most strongly challenged at the south eastern periphery of Europe, where “men do not look upon their frontiers and future of their nation, even the existence of their nation, as things established and secure.”³⁰ The Buxtons perceived this prevailing attitude as a threat to international security in general. This is reflected in the following reference to the former Secretary of State Henry Petty Fitzmaurice, 5th

²⁵ Cf. *Holquist*, *Forms of Violence*, *Lohr*, *Nationalizing*.

²⁶ *Enim Effendi*, *Nationalitätenprinzip*, p. 45

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 51 ff.

²⁸ Cf. *Conwell-Evans*.

²⁹ *Buxton/Buxton*, p. 19 ff.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

Marquess of Lansdowne: naming Macedonia, but certainly implying the Balkans in general, the authors stress that here “the uncertainty of the future allocation of territory [...] rose to the highest point. For thirty years it has been, in Lord Lansdowne’s phrase, a standing menace to European peace.”³¹

Thus, an appropriate settlement of this region was not only a matter of concern for Greeks, Bulgarians, and southern Slavs; it was, to use a modern term, an issue of collective security. The future peace conference would therefore have to tackle the ethnic conflicts in the Balkans in order to provide the chance of a lasting European peace: “If we win, it means the possibility of settling the Balkan problem on the basis of nationality and of building up in that distracted region a permanent fabric of peace.”³² This statement’s evident faith in a state order based on nationality was typical for the time, though it did not go unchallenged.³³ How did the Buxtons aim to reach this settlement? In the first place, they called for the traditional approach of drawing new borders “which would leave no injustices of sufficient magnitude to provide the basis of agitation or lead to war.”³⁴ Yet the authors surmise that after this rectification there would be some

scattered remnants, living under government which they regard as alien [...]. Populations are so intermingled that this cannot possibly avoided. The remedy, however, is to be found in an organised system of intermigration [...] There is no reason why the exchange of populations should not be arranged by international commissions, charged with the duty of valuing the properties concerned, and of facilitating the transport of their present occupiers.³⁵

This proposal was indeed a paradigmatic change: it had long been unthinkable in western politics to make the case for population transfers within Europe. Yet, amid the crisis of the Great War even Liberal MPs did exactly that. Even though they also proposed border rectification and minority protection so that – as argued – the actual number of migrants would not have been excessive, the essential point of their argument was that their portfolio included those “extraordinary measures“. As decisive as this inclusion itself was its justification. Again, the entire peace order was portrayed as depending on a de-escalation of ethnic conflicts which was only attainable with the help of population transfers.

Georges Montandon (Neutral Countries)

The most comprehensive plan for reorganizing Europe (partly) by population transfers was developed by an actor neither from the Central Powers nor the Entente. The programmatically-titled monograph “Frontières Nationales. Détermination ob-

³¹ Ibid., p. 12.

³² Ibid., p. 16.

³³ Cf. *Barth*.

³⁴ *Buxton/Buxton*, Balkans, p. 92.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 97.

jective de la condition primordiale nécessaire à l'obtention d'une paix durable" (National Borders. Objective determination of the first necessary condition for an enduring peace) was written by the anthropologist George Montandon, who was born in Neuchâtel in the French speaking part of Switzerland. In this work, which, like the Buxtons' book, was published in 1915, Montandon argues that the achievement of an envisaged long-term solution – which he even refers to as eternal peace – would involve unavoidable cruelty. But in a striking similarity to Lichtenstaedt, he insists that those hardships would be “moins cruelle en tout [...] que la guerre elle-meme”³⁶ [“less cruel than the war itself”]. For Montandon, the redrawing of state borders after the war could be carried out consensually – as long as it was determined by geographical factors. Objections would only be triggered when populations entered the stage, especially when they functioned as the seeds of irredentism. “L]a mère-patrie va incue aura la nostalgie des terres irredente où habitent ces nationaux.”³⁷ [“The mother country will always have nostalgic feelings about the irredentist territory where its compatriots live.”] Hence, state borders that did not follow the ethnic structure of a region – though they might provide military advantages – would always include hazards, for the states concerned and for the settlement as a whole. Montandon thus securitizes minorities with adjacent kin states, portraying them as “raison profonde de plus d'un grand conflit”³⁸ [“underlying reasons for a great conflict”]. In keeping with this argument, irredentist settlement structures would have to disappear in order to avoid a repetition of the Great War. Montandon then suggests a radical measure for this purpose:

Comment donc les supprimer? Après la fixation d'une frontière (si possible) naturelle, par la transplantation massive, au delà de la frontière, des non-nationaux [...] puis par l'interdiction du droit de propriété ou même du droit de séjour pour l'étrangers dans les provinces-frontière.³⁹

Concerning the details of such an operation (the surgical term “transplantation massive” was quite typical for the diction of the time), Montandon advocated the highest flexibility. He exhibited openness to compensation, leaving for another day the question of whether this would be granted on an individual or collective basis, and whether the funding would be imposed on the old or the new state of the migrants etc. “Ce ne sont que modalités.” [“These are mere modalities”]⁴⁰ The decisive point for him was in fact the broad acceptance of the intermigration itself. As his line of argument shows, Montandon seemed to be aware of the inherent provocation of such a suggestion.

³⁶ Montandon, p. 5.

³⁷ Ibid, p. 9.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Ibid. “How to remove them? After the fixing of an (if possible) natural border, by the massive transplantation beyond the border and by the prohibition of the right to property or even of residence for foreigners in the border regions.”

⁴⁰ Ibid.

Perhaps to prove the feasibility of his proposal, Montandon attached a map to his book, illustrating the postwar settlement he had in mind. It assumed a victory of the Entente as it was constituted in 1915 (i. e. including Russia) and attempted to combine the inevitable spoils of war (“le minimum de ce que les Alliés pleinement victorieux exigeraient”⁴¹ [“the minimum of what the completely victorious Allies would demand”]) with what the author deemed appropriate national boundaries. The map showed several population transfers, the conditions of which remained vague. But as simple lines on a map, they suggested both legitimacy and feasibility. Among the transfers illustrated in this way was the re-annexation of Alsace-Lorraine by France with a one-sided expulsion of the Germans (without defining, however, who exactly this should be in this bilingual and dialect-heavy area). Meanwhile, the border between the German and the Russian Empire would be broadly shifted to the west with an exchange of German remnants east of this new border for Slavic ethnic groups within what remained of Germany (e. g. Kashubians, Masurians, or Poles from Upper Silesia). Austria-Hungary was pictured as divided into its components – above all, the two parts of the dual monarchy. Austria would have had to cede Bohemia and Moravia, mainly to the newly invented Czechoslovak state. A transfer of some regions with a predominantly German speaking population (later known as the “Sudetenland”) to the German Empire – was actually to take place, under greatly different circumstances, in 1938. Given the fact that Montandon pictured Germany as a defeated power, it was anything but usual to propose this territorial gain for the German Empire. For the purpose of stabilizing this new border dividing historical Bohemia, Montandon also envisaged a population exchange. Other population transfers suggested by the map include a one-way movement from a coastal strip along the Adriatic Sea that would remain with Austria to what Montandon imagined as “Greater Serbia”, and a two-way resettlement between Hungary and Rumania. Montandon thus provides both a speech act of securitization and an attempt to present visual evidence of the possibility of “his” extraordinary measure.

Summary

These brief examples provide us with insight into a process that legitimized and eventually helped to trigger the forced migrations of the twentieth century, particularly with regard to the contribution of Western democracies in this regard. The fact that these texts were written (in the case of Montandon and Lichtenstaedter) by marginal and somewhat bizarre figures – so that they might have lacked what the Paris School refers to as perceived competence and reliability – should not mislead readers into interpreting their content as equally marginal. These and other utterances of the time rather functioned as vehicles of an overall development. They simultaneously reflected and increased the perception of ethnic minorities (in particular those with alleged irredentist potential) as a threat not to their home state alone, but to the entire

⁴¹ *Montandon*, p. 9.

order of states, and even to a peaceful coexistence of states in general – a perception which was constantly fuelled by the actual irredentist claims of several national states and of nationalist movements. A genuine core of irredentist risks to the order of states actually did exist, but the threat was projected onto the minorities themselves, regardless how many of them actually participated in irredentist agitation or at least showed disloyalty towards their home states. Affect heuristics targeting (South-) Slavic peoples⁴² accounted for a large proportion of this projection: consistent with the decision research approach outlined in section one of this chapter, it was the first and quickest input – the perceived threat of Slavic irredentism – which determined the analyses that followed.

Early examples of such analyses are presented in this article. In referring to them, we can apply the political approaches of securitization introduced above in section two. Utterances of the kind made by the Buxtons, Siegfried Lichtenstaedter and George Montandon exemplify the contemporary securitization of minorities. The empirical record thus provides support for the pragmatic method of the Paris School, despite a lack of (direct) agency in the case of at least Montandon and Lichtenstaedter. Each of the authors apply the other two factors of the Paris School, i. e. context and audience. Their writings were published at a time when an arrangement facilitating exactly the kind of plan the authors were arguing for had already been concluded: the 1913 Treaty of Adrianople regulated population exchange between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. Although this was limited to a small strip of only fifteen kilometres either side of the new border, it was explicitly voluntary and almost exclusively affected persons who had already fled (and were thus not actively uprooted through the agreement), the impact of this first bilateral agreement relating to population exchange should not be underestimated. Had the Great War not prevented its conclusion, a second treaty in this vein would have followed immediately: in the spring of 1914, the Ottoman Empire and Greece conducted negotiations on the exchange of the Greek population living in western Anatolia and the Muslims of Macedonia (possibly including Thrace).⁴³ Beyond this legal background, the authors' suggestions for "unmixing" were made at a time when several parties to the war were carrying out ethnic policy in the absence of a legal framework (something that had already happened in the previous two Balkan Wars). Thus, in 1915 or 1917, writings that presented elaborate arguments for a legalized and structured population exchange were very much in harmony with the prevailing *Zeitgeist*. Moreover, each of the securitizing actors presented in this chapter demonstrated a keen sense for those inhibitions which would additionally disappear throughout the course of war, with its unprecedented destruction and brutality. In Paris School terms, they proved to be capable of recognizing and riding the oncoming wave. To put it in Thierry Balzacq's words: the authors and an increasing share of policy makers (and advisors) reached a common structured perception of minorities and the threat originating from them. In addition

⁴² Cf. *Todorova*.

⁴³ Cf. *Frank*, p. 32 ff.

to exhibiting this consistency with the analyses of the Paris School, each of the examples also provide empirical support to the Copenhagen approach. The three arguments included the naming of a threatened reference object worth safeguarding with all available means; in each case this was the (future) peace order, whose value had increased against the terrible background of the current war. Minorities and the states (the ethnic state as well as home state) serve as the functional actors. The books then perform the speech act: they narrate the story of a fundamental threat emerging from irredentism (which allegedly had already triggered the recent war), stressing that, based on this assumption, the disentanglement of ethnic groups was an indispensable requirement for a lasting peace. With several dramatic reformulations of this assertion, they then introduce ‘their’ extraordinary measure: the proposal to put (only vaguely defined) pressure on people to make them leave their homes. At the end of this narrative, population transfer seems – and is overtly considered – to be much less cruel than the new war which would inevitably ensue in the absence of such “unmixing”.

Outlook

It is because of their argumentative affect that voices like these were more than a mere reflection of political developments. Even if one does not go as far as Matthew Frank, who refers to Lichtenstaedter and Montandon as “the two ‘founding fathers’ of population transfer,”⁴⁴ it seems reasonable to assume that the discourse analysed in this article had a real impact on events that followed it. At this early stage, their proposals may only have “act[ed] as a counterpart to mainstream thinking.”⁴⁵ Yet they would soon find their way into this very mainstream. Already during the peace planning phase, Western experts and statesmen at least included back doors for population transfer,⁴⁶ some of which were opened slightly during the Peace Conference after World War One: In July 1919, the Greek prime minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who was already deeply involved in the initiation of the failed Greek-Turkish “unmixing” of 1914, offered a voluntary migration between his country and several of its neighbours. The Committee on New States, an institution of the peace conference established to provide advice regarding minority questions, reacted this proposal by declaring that

[T]he general conception is one which might with advantage be extended to all Balkan countries, and [] it should not be limited to the inhabitants of territories transferred by the present peace, but to all inhabitants of any one of the Balkan States who wish to transfer their place of residence to some other Balkan State. [...].⁴⁷

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 31.

⁴⁶ Cf. *Barth*.

⁴⁷ The National Archives, Records Created or Inherited by the Foreign Office (FO), Doc. 608/150/2.

The decision-making Supreme Council failed to follow this advice and limited the exchange to Greece and Bulgaria, who actually concluded a bilateral treaty on voluntary intermigration beyond the new borders – which they explicitly linked to the peace contract of Neuilly, and thus to the Paris peace order. Nonetheless, the official involvement of Western allies in a settlement incorporating measures of ‘unmixing’ (a second feature of which was the so-called ‘option right’ added to each treaty on minority protection concluded on Paris⁴⁸), served as a considerable boost to the perceived legitimacy of such measures. Henceforth, migration – as *ultima ratio* even taking the form of forced migration – became part of a joint system of what Eric Weitz has called population policy.⁴⁹ The actors used population policy as a conceptual toolkit from which they chose particular instruments for each given situation. The US representative in the Paris Committee on New States, Manley Oswald Hudson, commented in 1921 on the minority policy:

Such a programme for protecting minorities does not take care of all the difficulties, however. [...] This is particularly true in the Balkan peninsula, and it let Mr. Venizelos to propose one of the most interesting innovations attempted at Paris, a scheme for facilitating the intermigration of dissatisfied peoples across the new national frontiers. [...] The success of this experiment in Balkan polity is to be awaited with greatest interest.⁵⁰

Without the involvement of the United States, but with the participation of the British and French governments (along with the already fascist Italy) and the League of Nations, this ‘innovation’ was indeed applied on a broad scale not even two years later. On Tuesday 30 January 1923, the *Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations* was signed in Lausanne,⁵¹ as part of the peace treaty between the Entente and the new national state of Turkey founded by Mustafa Kemal. The *Convention* specified that any persons of Greek Orthodox faith would have to leave all parts of Turkey except Istanbul. In return, Greece received the permission to banish all Muslims from her remaining territory (with the sole exception of Western Thrace). The result was the expulsion of more than one million Christians from Asia Minor and Eastern Thrace and of 400,000 Muslims from Greece (mainly Greek Macedonia). Both groups had lived there for centuries, more than a few did not even speak the language of their new home state and did not know anyone there. Not only did the liberal Western Powers give their approval to this most illiberal policy, the High Commissioner for Refugees of the League of Nations (Fridtjof Nansen) was also chief negotiator in the initial phase of the policy’s implementation. Within the League, Nansen worked closely together with the Leagues’ leader of the Minority Section Erik Colban, who even served as author of the first draft of the *Convention*. Thus, the men whose task it was to protect minorities and to help refugees turned out to be main initiators of their expulsion. These are circumstances which cannot be ex-

⁴⁸ Cf. *Fink*, p. 133 ff., for its actual application see p. 267 ff.

⁴⁹ Cf. on Population Policy in this sense *Weitz*.

⁵⁰ *Hudson*, p. 222.

⁵¹ Cf. on the population exchange of Lausanne *Clark; Hirschon; Özsu, Frank*, p. 50 ff.

plained without analysing the preceding process as one of securitization in particular and without assessing the First World War as a caesura in respect of minority policy in general.

Empire Overstretched Nation-state Enforced: The Young Turks Inaugurated the Europe of Extremes

By *Hans-Lukas Kieser*

Introduction: The Threshold of 1913

This chapter answers positively the question of whether the First World War was a caesura with regard to demographic engineering in modern history. The Young Turks inaugurated the Europe of dictators, genocide, and demographic engineering. This historical approach opts for a non-traditional chronology in emphasising not the First World War of 1914–18 alone, but the whole long Ottoman war decade, lasting from the Balkan Wars to the war for Asia Minor (1912–22).¹ This whole decade is relevant for our question, although the main events of a domestic genocide of unseen dimension – the Armenian Genocide in 1915–16 – in fact took place during the World War.

By the same token, this article's focus is greater Europe (Europe, Russia and the late Ottoman Empire). It takes this Europe as a strongly interconnected historical space that informed the European zeitgeist, politics and their actors. This concentration on Europe is intended to serve precision and the goal of taking seriously the unprecedented intensity of violence during the World Wars. It is not to underestimate the weight of a long European, including British, tradition of racial thought and violent colonial coercion, which all form a larger determining context of the extreme violence in the first half of the twentieth century, when Europe's modern expansion had come to its end. Exhausted, the political resources not only of Europe's dynastic multi-ethnic empires, but also of its modern, largely constitutional, but imperial nation-states then failed to peacefully meet the challenges of more egalitarian regional and global futures beyond imperial constraints.

The imperial Young Turk regime of the 1910s is an extreme and precocious case in point. It mirrored and interacted with an early twentieth century Europe marked by imperial bias and that therefore failed to meet the challenges both of peaceful domestic policies *and* an international system of equal partners. The Balkan Wars and the establishment of a revanchist Young Turk's single-party rule formed the matrix for

¹ Although this long war decade started already with the Italian invasion into Ottoman Libya, the Balkan Wars are the decisive turning point for our topic. – This chapter reproduces passages from my article *Kieser*, Minorities. It also integrates insights from my recent biography of Mehmed Talaat, the then most influential Ottoman politician *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, and from my earlier work *Kieser*, Der verpasste Friede.

Ottoman total war externally and internally, including demographic engineering and genocide. The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) was the main party of a broad Young Turk movement that started in late nineteenth century.

Allied to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), the CUP organised the so-called Young Turk revolution in July 1908. Though completely abandoned by the main CUP leaders from the eve of the First Balkan War from October 1912–March 1913, the declared goal of this constitutional revolution was constitutional rule, that is, rule of law and more democracy and equality in the multi-religious, polyethnic Ottoman world. It may sound provocative, because hitherto unusual, but is nevertheless true to say that the CUP established in 1913 the twentieth century's first instance of single-party rule, which inaugurated what in retrospect has been called the Europe of extremes and dictators.² One of the salient and seminal extremes in that era was forcible mass displacement of entire populations, including genocide.

The First Balkan War had emerged from unresolved problems in Ottoman Macedonia and irredentist post-Ottoman Balkan states that had formed a coalition in spring 1912. The CUP in temporary opposition on the other side strongly pushed for war in early autumn 1912, when its strongmen came out as radical nationalists and warmongers, with party boss Mehmed Talaat leading the way. The First Balkan War was catastrophically lost, which in turn contributed to the CUP's successful coup d'état of January 1913 against the hapless liberal-conservative government. As a consequence of the lost war, of the loss of territory and of anti-Muslim ethnic cleansing by the victors, the self-declared revolutionaries of the CUP embraced a sweeping revanchist agenda against not only foreign "Christian" powers and neighbour states, principally Greece, but also domestic Christians and Ottoman liberals. From 1913, they followed an ambitious nationalist *and* imperialist agenda of making Asia Minor (Anatolia) a Turkish national home in demographic, economic and cultural terms *and* restoring, even expanding the Empire.

In this way and with this strained agenda, the CUP Yung Turks started the European era of dictatorship, genocide and demographic engineering. This essay frames the 1912–1922 period as destructive for the plurality of the Ottoman population *and* constitutive with regard to a Turkish-Muslim nation-state (as well as for a Jewish nation-state in Palestine, something which is not a main topic here). Before focusing on its main topic – formative demographic engineering – it introduces the late Ottoman Empire, its population groups and relevant political developments.

Late Ottoman Background

A dynastic, patrilineal Muslim state which had adopted Sunni Hanefi Islam in the sixteenth century, the Ottoman Empire ruled over an ethnically and religiously diverse population in the Balkans, Asia Minor, Iraq, Syria, the Arab peninsula and

² *Hobsbawm; Wiskemann.*

Northern Africa. Its large communities of Christians and small groups of Jews enjoyed the status of autonomous *millet* (communities or “nations”). In the Koranic tradition they were protégés who had to pay additional poll taxes. Ottoman agreements with European powers since the sixteenth century, the so-called Capitulations, privileged members of the *millet* insofar as in late Ottoman times a significant number of them enrolled as European nationals and thus enjoyed liberation from Ottoman taxes and jurisdiction.

The *millet* communities were called “minorities” in Western terminology, as well as in the Lausanne Treaty of 1923 which laid down the post-Ottoman order in the Middle East. However, since there was no clear ethno-religious majority even in the imperial core region, the term “population group” is more accurate; the Ottomans themselves used the word *unsur* (“element”). Non-Sunni groups without *millet* status were more or less tolerated in the late Ottoman era, although they remained marginalised and were targeted under Sultan Abdulhamid II (1842–1918, r. 1876–1909) by a policy of coercive conversion. Such groups included the Alevis of Anatolia, the Yezidis of Northern Iraq and the Shiites of Southern Iraq, the Alawites of Syria and particular Alevi groups, often categorised as Kurds, in the mountains of Dersim (eastern Anatolia) which was partly autonomous until 1937. Although nominally Muslim, the Sinti and Roma (“Gypsies”) in the Balkans and Western Anatolia were also marginalised. Though heterodox, the Druze were, by contrast, able to defend some regional autonomy in Lebanon. Beside the *millet* communities and the century-old heterodox groups, a new element, the Zionist *Yishuv* (Jewish settlement) emerged in Palestine, beginning in the late nineteenth century in addition to the older *Yishuv*.

Reform in the mid-nineteenth century called for equality for all Ottoman subjects. It also endorsed and for the first time codified *millet* autonomy, which was a-territorial and concerned civil matters. The Reform Edict of 1856 obliged the *millet* to constitute themselves as quasi-democratic entities with a constitution (*nizâmnâme*) and an elected assembly. This concerned the *Rûm millet* (of Greek-Orthodox creed) including Greek, Arabic and Turkish speakers; the Armenian *millet*; the Protestant *millet* composed mostly of Armenians; the Catholic *millet*; as well as the Jewish *millet*. The Nestorian Syriacs (*Asuri*) – tribes living in the southern part of the eastern provinces whose patriarch did not reside in the capital – as well as other Syriac Christians (*Sûryani*) in villages and towns were not full partners in these reforms (today, the generic term “Assyrian” is often used for all these groups whose traditional liturgic language is Syriac).

The coexistence of legal equality and ethno-religious plurality, conferring autonomy on the non-Muslim *millet*, remained largely a utopian ideal. Many Sunnis who were members of the ruling imperial class feared becoming the losers of the reform process. They included Muslim refugees (*muhacir*) from the Caucasus and the Balkans as well as Kurds in the eastern provinces from whom the centralizing state of the second quarter of the nineteenth century had taken away centuries-old regional autonomy. Some Alevi tribes near Dersim (today’s Tunceli), on the other hand,

tried to become members of the Protestant *millet*, thus escaping their social marginality and, like the Christian *millets*, connected with missionary and diplomatic representatives of Great Britain and the USA. Shiites in Iraq, as well as the less numerous Yezidis in Northern Mesopotamia and the Nusayri-Alawites in Syria, felt excluded both from the Sunni-based Ottoman system and from the reform dynamics of the nineteenth century.

Conflicts in the Balkans and the consequent Ottoman-Russian War of 1877–1888 led to dramatic territorial losses for the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans, the Caucasus and the entirety of Cyprus, all sealed in the Treaty concluded at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. As a consequence, Abdulhamid considered the political principles of the preceding reform period a failure, suspended the Ottoman constitution of 1876 and implemented coercive policies designed to empower the (Sunni) Muslims and to assimilate the Alevis, Yezidis and Shiites. He and his circles increasingly considered Asia Minor the imperial core land, given the territorial losses of previous decades.

Reforms and Social Revolution Versus Reactionary Violence and Restored Empire

Article 61 of the Berlin Treaty stipulated protective reforms for Armenians; article 62 promised full religious freedom as well as equality of religious belonging before the law and regarding public employment. These stipulations clashed, however, with Abdulhamid's politics of imperial Islamic unity, that is, his Islamism from above, which aimed at a new imperial configuration based on the Islamic solidarity of Turks, Arabs, Kurds and other Muslim groups of the empire. His administration successfully obstructed internationally promoted reforms, thus ensuring that they would never materialize.

Against this background, educated young Armenians founded revolutionary parties. The program of the Armenian party then most committed to revolutionary action, the Hntchaks, advocated an independent socialist Armenia for all inhabitants in the predominantly Kurdo-Armenian eastern provinces. The Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF) or Dashnak Party, which prevailed after the 1890s, pushed for an Armenian future within a reformed Ottoman state. Both championed rural armed self-defence and activism informed by social-revolutionary ideas and directed against Ottoman authorities and Armenian notables seen as part of an oppressive Ottoman establishment.

The massacres of approximately 100.000 mostly male Armenians in Eastern Asia Minor took place in this context in autumn 1895. They were a reaction against a concrete reform plan finally initiated by European diplomacy after a massacre of Armenians in Sasun who had resisted double taxation by the central state and regional lords. Violence went hand in hand with dispossession. Kurds and other local Muslims seized Armenian land and property, leading to the notorious Kurdish-Armenian agrarian question and the crucial Armenian postulate that land be restored. The res-

olution of this issue on a legal basis in favour of the weaker part and not by the rule of local Muslim force, became in Armenian eyes a litmus test for collaboration with the CUP after 1908. Starting in the late nineteenth century, the land question prefigured locally what a few decades later became an empire-wide policy of ethno-religious cleansing and dispossessing.³

In 1889, Muslim students at the Military Medical School in Istanbul founded a secret revolutionary network in opposition to Abdulhamid, soon to be called the CUP. Members of this network, allied to the ARF as a junior partner, staged a revolution in 1908 to restore the constitution of 1876. Ottoman citizens throughout the empire rallied to this revolution and re-elected a parliament. Reform-oriented groups and populations as diverse as the Young Turks in the broad sense (including the CUP and liberals), the Armenians, the Zionist *Yishuv* and American missionaries all voiced hopes that a constitutional Ottoman Empire would frame the future of the Middle East. The Armenians were largely seen as one of the elements most loyal to the constitution and the CUP, as long as this dominant party behaved constitutionally.

Parliamentary rule, however, proved difficult and ineffective, while external and internal pressure increased. Muslim and some Jewish spokesmen targeted nominal Christians in- and outside the Empire as the main agents of imperial evil, using religious language or the new vocabulary of (ethno-religious) class struggle.⁴ The common enthusiasm of 1908 thus was soon followed by boycott movements and press campaigns against not only foreign states, but also Ottoman Christians. While reactionary and conservative forces had always remained attached to Abdulhamid's Islamic reconfiguration of the Empire, others joined them now more and more openly, united in a common mistrust of Christians. The CUP led this turn in late 1912 and in 1913 during the First Balkan War, when it started to establish dictatorial power after its putsch in January 1913.

In 1912–14, the CUP's ideologues enhanced the Hamidian Islamism with the ideology of Islamic pan-Turkism. This was a modernist political messianism that exalted the mythic motherland of Turan as its abstract messiah (mahdi). An explosive syncretism, it spread quickly among educational élites, particularly among young military officers, and offered the self-declared revolutionaries at the reins of imperial power compelling ideologemes. Though new and radical, Turkism was not violent initially, when it became a movement organised in Turkish Home/ Hearth Societies (*Türk Yurdu/ Türk Ocağı*) in 1911. These opened branches in most provincial towns and in major European university towns. Many writings, chiefly in the movement's main organ, the journal *Türk Yurdu*, focused on social-revolutionary change through empowerment of Turks by education.⁵

³ *Kaligian; Miller; Kieser, Réformes ottomanes.*

⁴ *Risal*, p. 350–53. On the Istanbul-based Russian-German socialist and CUP sympathizer Parvus, who published in *Türk Yurdu*, see *Kieser, World War.*

⁵ *Kieser, Türklüğe İhtida.*

Most prominent figures of the CUP sponsored the *Türk Yurdu/Türk Ocağı* movement and had declared themselves to be its members by the eve of the First World War. Under the wing of publicist and sociologist Ziya Gökalp Turkism gained seminal influence and developed strongly political and instrumental. He was its main voice and prophet during the 1910s and since then has widely been recognised as the spiritual father of Turkish nationalism also for the Kemalists, Atatürk personally, and especially for right-wing nationalism since the era of Kemalist single-party rule. Gökalp was a close party friend of Talaat, sitting together with him in the CUP's central committee from 1909 to 1918. Born and raised in Diyarbakir, Gökalp was from his youth acquainted with, and partly involved in urban anti-reform activism whose self-declared revolutionary, but in fact reactionary leaders had organised the anti-Armenian pogroms in 1895. They also led the CUP's anti-Armenian/ anti-reform turn of 1912–13 in the eastern provinces and fully cooperated in the genocide in 1915 as well as in Kemal Pasha's (the later Atatürk's) re-organisation of Muslim power after 1918. They saw themselves awarded with highest state offices and parliamentary seats even beyond the first half of the twentieth century.⁶

Ideological Radicalisation and Large-scale Demographic Engineering

The constitutional Ottoman reform programme of 1908 had depended on cooperation between the ARF and the CUP and, in particular, the establishment of security and a solution to the agrarian question in the eastern provinces. As this did not transpire, the ARF announced the end of its alliance with the CUP in August 1912, shortly after the coup d'état by a group of military officers in July 1912, that put the CUP in opposition and to the underground. At the end of the same year, Armenian representatives contacted foreign diplomats to press for reforms. As the result of the January 1913 putsch, the CUP established dictatorial single-party power and marginalised any possible political opposition. The repression targeted in particular the liberal group of Mehmed Sabahaddin (1879–1948), also known as Prince Sabahaddin, who advocated a decentralized empire and private (in contrast to central state) initiative. He was the Ottoman-Muslim leader who stood closest to the Armenians.

CUP members had signalled to Armenian representatives that by broaching the issue of reform internationally, they had crossed a red line with regard to building a common future within the Ottoman state. In addition, as a consequence of the Balkan Wars, the CUP now considered the *Rûm* to be a disloyal element close to the Balkan states' nominally Christian enemies, one which drew even closer after Greece conquered the islands of Chios and Mytilene. The CUP began to conceive of *Rûm* villages and towns on the Aegean coast as places from where hundreds of thousands of members of a "fifth column" were to be displaced and where hundreds of thousands of *muhacir* from the Balkans could be settled. Overall, the CUP's demographic policy considered Turkish-speaking Muslims to be the most reliable core element of a

⁶ Üngör, *The Making*; Kieser, *Violence et dissidence*.

future Turkey and that other Muslim groups, if sufficiently dispersed among Turks, could be assimilated. This vision stood in stark contrast to the reform principles.

Like Abdulhamid's government two decades earlier, the CUP government was finally, on 8 February 1914, constrained to sign a reform plan based on article 61 of the Berlin Treaty. The reform plan divided seven eastern provinces into northern and southern parts; put them under the control of two European inspectors to be selected from neutral countries; prescribed publication of laws and official pronouncements in local languages; provided for an adequate proportion of Muslims and Christians in councils and police; and transformed the *Hamidiye*, an irregular Kurdish cavalry, into cavalry reserves. No less than Abdulhamid, the CUP rulers resented these reforms. After Macedonia had been lost during the Balkan Wars, they viewed Asia Minor even more as the Muslim and Turkish core of the Ottoman Empire, to be transformed to a "national home" (Türk Yurdu) under unrestricted political, cultural and economic dominance of Muslim Turks.

The immediate aftermath of the Balkan Wars saw important steps toward population exchanges of the Ottoman state with its Bulgarian and Greek neighbours. These exchanges were voluntary, to be regulated by treaties. Yet they were strongly underpinned by experiences related to the forcible demographic transformations during the Balkan Wars and the idea of unitary, ethno-religiously homogenous states.⁷ In early 1914, CUP ousted Ottoman Christians first in Thrace, then, in late spring, on the western coast of Asia Minor. The paramilitaries of its newly founded Special Organisation expelled some 200,000 *Rûm* from Thrace and the Aegean littoral. When the Ottoman Parliament discussed the expulsions on 6 July 1914, Minister of Interior Talaat emphasised the need to settle Muslim refugees from the Balkans in those emptied villages. The *Rûm* deputies were left alone to face an increasingly authoritarian government and its acolytes. Other deputies questioned or belittled the expulsion and forceful expropriation, unwilling to listen to the *Rûm* CUP deputy Emanuel Emanuelidis' solemn plea for rule of law. The censored press covered Talaat's multiple denials of any wrongdoing.⁸ Less than a year later, in spring and summer 1915, the parliament was closed, and any diverging public opinion completely censored.

Revanchist-minded because of defeat and loss since the Italian usurpation of Ottoman Libya in 1911 and the subsequent Balkan wars, Young Turk leaders saw Europe's July Crisis and the outbreak of the First World War as an opportunity to forge a new deal internally and externally. The international crisis of July 1914 saved the CUP government from diplomatic backlash against the ousting of *Rûm* and a possible premature war with Greece (the main CUP leaders wanted war to reconquer lost islands, but only once they had armed up the navy). Most importantly, the crisis gave a core group in the CUP central committee the opportunity to proactively forge a war alliance with Germany and Austria that was concluded on 2 August

⁷ Özsu, p. 53–56.

⁸ *Meclis-i Mebusan*, meeting of 6 July 1914 (23 Haziran 1330); *Le Jeune-Turc* 8 July 1914, p. 1.

1914. Strong pan-Turkist and pan-Islamist propaganda appeared in the Ottoman press from early August 1914, which alienated and intimidated non-Muslims right from the start.⁹

Under the shield of its alliance with Germany and in the shadow of the war, the Young Turk regime began to implement its domestic agenda. In August-September 1914, this consisted in suspending (finally annulling) the Reform Agreement of 8 February and in abolishing the Capitulations. On 6 August 1914, Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim, the German ambassador to Istanbul, accepted six new Ottoman proposals, among them “a small correction of her [Turkey’s] eastern border which shall place Turkey into direct contact with the Moslems of Russia.”¹⁰ This gravely concerned the Armenians since their main settlement area was located between the Turkish-speaking Muslims in Asia Minor and the Caucasus, in the Ottoman and the Russian Empires. Also, by early August 1914, the CUP invited the ARF to lead an anti-Russian guerrilla war in the Caucasus, aimed at preparing a future Ottoman conquest. The ARF, however, balked at these plans, which would have set the Caucasian Armenians at risk of retaliation, and stated that all Armenians should remain loyal to the country in which they lived.

Ottoman attempts at insurrection and sabotage in the Russian Caucasus with German support, but without the ARF, began nevertheless in August 1914. With exuberant rhetoric, Gökalp and other authors promoted the conquest of the Caucasus and the “liberation” of Russia’s “Turks” (Muslims) in Istanbul’s press. “Russia will collapse and be ruined / Turkey will expand and be Turan!”¹¹ Many young CUP members and army officers became excited pan-Turkists as for example Rahmi Apak confessed in his memoirs. He added that at the time of this writing, in the second half of the twentieth century, almost nobody still believed and grasped the extent and intensity of the expansive pan-Turkism of those days. He himself had joined as a young officer the elite division created in autumn 1914 for the conquest of the Caucasus and beyond, toward “Turan”.¹²

Although the Ottoman Empire officially entered the First World War only in November 1914, the Ottoman army had already begun to mobilize and requisition to an unprecedented degree in August. Requisitions hit non-Muslims in the eastern provinces disproportionately. Led by CUP luminary Dr. Bahaeddin Şakir, a fanatical pan-Islamic and pan-Turkish hardliner, the Special Organisation set up paramilitary units including Kurdish tribal forces. Before Ottoman troops were involved in large number at the eastern front, these units started raids against Christian villages beyond the Russian and Persian frontier. Christians on the Ottoman and the Iranian sides of the frontier looked to Russia for protection. Beginning in August 1914, Russia built up a

⁹ *Köroğlu*, Propaganda or Culture War; *Köroğlu*, Ottoman Propaganda.

¹⁰ Wangenheim to Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office), 6 August 1914, PA-AA (Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts)/R 1913.

¹¹ *Birgen*, p. 382.

¹² *Apak*, p. 95.

local Iranian Christian militia based on Christian Armenian-Syriac (Assyrian) solidarity.

Started after official entry into war, a large-scale Ottoman military campaign into the Russian Caucasus failed catastrophically in the snowy mountains of Sarikamış near Kars during the first days of 1915. As a result, at least half of the 120.000 soldiers perished, and disease began to spread among the survivors and throughout the whole region. Smaller campaigns with irregular forces were led by Ismail Enver Pasha's brother-in-law Tahir Cevdet and his uncle, General Halil Kut Pasha, in Northern Persia. They damaged Armenian and Syriac villages, but again failed in their military objectives. The Ottoman forces were decisively defeated in the battle of Dilman in mid-April, in which a Russian-army Armenian volunteer brigade led by General Andranik Ozanian participated. As a consequence of these defeats at Sarikamış and Dilman, the pan-Turkist dream, which had spurred the mobilization in August 1914, turned to trauma and resentful frustration in winter 1915.

As a result of the warmongering since August 1914, the long eastern front was brutalized and religiously polarized from late 1914. Irregulars and regulars, militias and forces of self-defence were engaged in low-intensity warfare that took a heavy toll on civilians. Many Armenians fled to Russian Armenia, among them several thousand young Armenians who became volunteers in the Russian army. Christians, where possible, tried to rely on Russian help. The best-known Russian effort was the relief of the Armenians in Van in mid-May 1915. Beginning on 20 April, after massacres in Armenian villages and the murder of Armenian individuals from Van, Armenian activists started armed resistance against Cevdet's repression. Once relieved by Russia, however, they mistreated and killed Muslim civilians, thereby contributing to the flight of large numbers of inhabitants from Van.

The failed Ottoman campaigns and the chaotic situation at the eastern front frustrated CUP leaders and made the local Armenian and Syriac Christians an easy target for the propaganda of jihad. All this prepared the ground for willing local collaborators in the ensuing genocidal removal of Christians. Not only failure in the east, but also the British advance in Southern Iraq and Cemal Pasha's failed attempt at reconquering Egypt seriously depressed, and almost paralysed, the CUP's top leaders in the capital in early 1915. Only the victory against the Entente attempt at breaking through the Dardanelles on 18 March changed their mood. This coincided with Ba-haeddin Şakir's return from the north-eastern front to report to this party friends on the situation there.

Germany was keen to win over neutral Greece and insisted that its Ottoman ally avoid acts of violence against the *Rûm*, but approved another removal of *Rûm* from settlements near the endangered Dardanelles. Approximately 300.000 *Rûm* were removed from different coastal regions to the interior during the First World War. However, while some of the deportees suffered violent attacks and harsh circumstances, they were neither systematically massacred nor sent into the desert. In contrast, the government's comprehensive anti-Armenian policy starting in April 1915 became

tantamount to extermination. It crystallised when the dominant minister of interior and party boss Talaat met with his friends of the central committee, including Şakir, and received radical suggestions from his ministry's governors in the eastern provinces.

Genocide

Talaat coordinated his developing anti-Armenian policy in three main phases: first the arrest of Armenian political, religious and intellectual leaders in April and May 1915; second, from late May to autumn, the removal of the Armenian population of Anatolia and European Turkey to camps in the Syrian desert east of Aleppo, excluding Armenian men in eastern Anatolia who were systematically massacred on the spot; third and finally, the starvation to death of most of those in the camps and the final massacre of those who still survived.

In two seminal ciphered telegrams of 24 April to the provincial governors and the army, with reference to Van and a few other places, Talaat defined the situation in Asia Minor as that of a general Armenian rebellion; of Armenians helping the enemy's war efforts; and of revolutionary committees that had long since wished to establish Armenian self-determination and now believed they could achieve it as a result of the war. Provincial and military authorities, and in particular special CUP commissaries sent to the provinces, henceforth spread propaganda throughout Anatolia of treacherous Armenian neighbours who stabbed Muslims in the back. On the night of 24 to 25 April 1915, only a few hours before allied forces landed on Gallipoli, security forces began to arrest Armenian elites throughout Anatolia, starting in Istanbul, and to question, torture and murder most of them. Various Ottoman army sources of spring 1915 from the provinces certainly *do not* support the claim of a general uprising, although there were instances of sabotage and some resistance to oppression as well as many desertions of both Muslims and non-Muslims.

On the same day, 24 April, a telegram from Talaat to Ahmed Cemal Pasha, governor of Syria, announced that henceforth Armenians should be deported not to Konya, as had been the limited number of Armenians expelled from Cilician Zeytun in March, but to northern Syria. After the attack on the Armenian elite, Talaat prepared the main act: to send an entire people group into the desert in Syria. On 26 May, Talaat delivered a long letter to Grand Vizier Said Halim, a CUP member but less influential than Talaat and Enver, that presents the evacuation of the Armenians as a comprehensive and definitive solution of a vital question for the Ottoman state. Urged on by Enver and Talaat, the cabinet decreed a "provisional law" (the parliament had been closed on 13 March) on 27 May that permitted the army to "crush any opposition" and, in case of suspicion, to "dispatch individually or collectively, and to resettle elsewhere, the inhabitants of villages and towns." It did not name

the Armenian target, in contrast to a much more detailed decree of 30 May. This decree again bore Talaat's mark and repeated whole passages from his 26 May letter.¹³

Talaat acted in defiance of the Entente declaration on 24 May 1915, which warned the members of the Ottoman government that they would be held personally responsible for "crimes against humanity."¹⁴ He reacted to this international admonition by extending the responsibility to the whole cabinet, thus producing a fundamental communion in crime, and seeking and obtaining German approval for the project to temporarily "evacuate a few subversive families from centres of insurrection."¹⁵ German officials did not anticipate or counter the risk of an Empire-wide extermination of Armenians. On the contrary, their approval was a decisive breakthrough for a regime which a few months previously had found itself strictly bound to implement, jointly backed by Germany, a monitored coexistence of Christians and Muslims, Armenians, Syrians, Kurds and Turks in Eastern Asia Minor according to the Reform Agreement. Further decrees contradicted first promises of full compensation and/or return in decrees of May-June. By early November 1915, they regulated the almost complete dispossession of the Ottoman Armenian community and excluded a return of the removed people to their homes and properties.

The removal of the Armenians from eastern Asia Minor mainly took place from May to September and from western Anatolia and the province of Edirne in Thrace from July to October 1915. In eastern Anatolia, men and boys were mostly massacred on the spot; those in the army were separated into unarmed labour battalions, exhausted by hard labour and harsh conditions, and finally slaughtered. At the Dardanelles and in Arabia, Armenian soldiers continued to fight in the Ottoman army. In the west, men were also forcibly removed and some of the deportees left by train in cattle wagons. Women and children from central and eastern Asia Minor endured starvation, mass rape and enslavement on their marches. In certain places, in particular the province of Diyarbekir under Governor Dr. Mehmed Reşid (1873–1919), removal amounted to the massacre of men, women and children. Reşid treated all Christians in a similarly murderous manner.

Extermination and robbery therefore struck more than half of Diyarbekir's Assyrian (Syriac) Christians and, in mid-June 1915, tens of thousands of Assyrians in the province of Bitlis. Altogether, Hakkâri included, about a quarter of a million died as victims of the Seyfo, the Assyrian genocide. As early as 26 October 1914, Talaat had

¹³ *Başkanlığı* 1: p. 424–25; *Directorate of Ottoman Archives* p. 34–35; Talaat (from the Interior Ministry's Directorate for Resettlement of Tribes and Migrants) to the grand vizier, 26 May 1915, BOA, BEO. 4357–326758; "Deportation Law" published on 1 June 1915 in the official gazette (*Takvim-i Vekayi*); in French on 2 June in *La Turquie*, reproduced in *Beylerian*, p. 40–41.

¹⁴ This is the first time the term was used in high politics. Contemporary English version in *Saraftian*, *Records Armenian Genocide*, p. 29.

¹⁵ Wangenheim to Auswärtiges Amt (Foreign Office), Berlin, 31 May 1915, PA-AA/R 14086. Most German documents concerning the Armenians during World War I are accessible online, ed. Wolfgang Gust, <http://www.armenocide.de>.

ordered the governor of Van to remove the Assyrian population in Hakkâri near the Persian border. He could not, however, implement this early policy of removal and dispersal in late 1914 and never did transform it into a general, countrywide policy of removal and extermination, as he did in the case of the Armenians. In June 1915 a policy of destruction was nevertheless applied against the Syriac enclave in Hakkâri. In the case of the region of Hakkâri, two-thirds of about one hundred thousand Syrians perished, while the others managed to escape to Russian-held territory.¹⁶

Several hundred thousand destitute Armenian deportees arrived in Syria in the summer and autumn of 1915. Most of them were not resettled, as had been promised, but isolated in camps and starved to death according to rules that their local or regional demographic proportion must not exceed a few percentage points. Those who nevertheless survived were massacred in 1916. Only recently have scholars published witness accounts of the extreme horror of this second phase of the genocide and studies on limited efforts to help the victims. The major group of survivors in Syria were about 150,000 Armenians who Cemal Pasha settled in southern Syria, converting them formally to Islam.¹⁷

The main phase of destruction of the Ottoman Armenian community was completed in August 1916, when the Armenian *nizâmname* of 1863 was entirely revised, the Armenian Assembly abolished, a new Ottoman Armenian Patriarchate established in Jerusalem, and the Patriarch exiled from Istanbul to Baghdad. With the genocide and these changes, the 1856 Tanzimat reform principle of equality-cum-plurality, including a-territorial democratic *millet* autonomy, had died and Ottomanism was killed for good. In contrast to the massacres in the 1890s, conversion only warranted survival in 1915–16 if the Ministry of Interior permitted it as an exception. Conversion of religious identity and confession of faith was secondary to the latter's demographic rationale; or, as the governor of Trabzon put it at the beginning of July 1915, "an Armenian converted to Islam will be expelled as a Muslim Armenian."¹⁸ This policy was a break with imperial tradition.

Besides "Cemal's Armenians" and those going into hiding in Aleppo and Mosul, few deportees had been able to escape. Most important was the earlier escape to Erzinçan and Erzerum, occupied by the Russian army in 1916. Thousands of Armenians had found refuge among the Alevis in mountainous Dersim in 1915 and were able to cross the Russian lines in 1916. Others had fled beyond the eastern front and returned with the advancing Russian army, which however retreated after the October Revolution in November 1917. The only refuge for persecuted Christians in, or hav-

¹⁶ Gaunt, *Relations*, p. 263; Gaunt, *Massacres*, p. 188; Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 379–80. For a sober, but moving, eyewitness account of the Bitlis killings from the diary of an officer on the Ottoman side, see Nogales, *Vier Jahre* p. 89–90.

¹⁷ The most recent research is by Khatchig Mouradian. See his PhD thesis *Mouradian, Genocide and Humanitarian Assistance*, and *Mouradian, The Very Limit*.

¹⁸ German consul in Trabzon, Bergfeld, to the Reichskanzler on July 9, 1915, PA-AA/R 14086.

ing made it to, Mesopotamia was the mountainous Sinjar inhabited by Yezidis. In contrast, Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq, namely the powerful Shammar, participated in massacring and robbing the ostracised Christians.¹⁹

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk of 3 March 1918 allowed the re-launch of pan-Turkist schemes and raised the spectre of further Armenian extermination. Russia lost a huge part of her western empire to Germany, but also, as stipulated in Article 4, the north-eastern corner of Asia Minor that it had acquired in the Berlin Treaty in 1878. The German Foreign Office confirmed in June 1918 the advance of Ottoman troops far beyond the agreement of Brest-Litovsk. More than 1 million people were in danger of extermination according to Matthias Erzberger (1875–1921), a leader of the democratic opposition in the Reichstag.²⁰ What fed, but did not cause, anti-Armenian hate was the fact that in early 1918, Armenian militias on the retreat, who could not stop the return of CUP rule, had committed massacres against Muslims and Alevis in the provinces of Erzurum and Erzincan.

General Otto von Lossow, military attaché at the German embassy in Istanbul, reported in late May 1918 that “the aim of Turkish policy is the permanent occupation of the Armenian districts and the extermination of the Armenians. All of Talaat’s and Enver’s assurances to the contrary are lies. In Constantinople, the extreme anti-Armenian trend has gained the upper hand.”²¹ In an ultimate effort, Armenian forces defended the newly founded Republic of Armenia against Ottoman invaders in early June, and the resolution of the war on the other fronts ultimately prevented a further Ottoman advance in the Caucasus.

The most reliable of the widely varying figures for the death toll is that a half or more of the nearly two million Ottoman Armenians alive in 1914 (the figure of two million comes from the statistics of the Armenian Patriarchate) were killed in 1915–1916. An important contribution to the discussion on the extent of the killings was the publication in 2008 of Talaat’s notebook, complete with demographic figures. Talaat considered the Ottoman Armenian population in pre-1915 Asia Minor to be 1.5 million, of which he claimed to have removed more than 1.1 million.²² A partly Islamised remnant endured.

Removal of Muslims and Jews

From spring 1916 onwards, hundreds of thousands of Kurds were deported from eastern areas near the front and dispersed by settlement in western Anatolia. The deportations were conducted by the same Interior Ministry that had orchestrated the

¹⁹ *Ternon*, p. 230–36.

²⁰ *Matthias*; Cf. *Kieser*, Matthias.

²¹ In Bernstorff to Foreign Office, 23 May 1918, PA-AA/R 14100, English translation from www.armenocide.de.

²² *Bardakçı*, Talât Paşa’nın, p. 109; *Kévorkian*, *The Extermination*.

Armenian removal through the Office of Tribal and Immigrant Settlement. The specific goals of the policies were different from those implemented against Armenians: in this case, forcible assimilation at the point of relocation. While the death toll was nevertheless high due to logistical issues, the Kurds were neither deported to areas where life was impossible nor attacked en route. Like the Kurds, but with no more than a few thousands per group, Albanians, Arabs, Bosniaks, Laz and Muslim Georgians were also resettled and dispersed in Anatolia far from their places of origin. The removal of Arabs targeted a major group of families considered to be separatists. Side by side with others, including refugees from Libya, they were dispersed and resettled in parts of Anatolia from which Christians had been removed.²³

In contrast to all these Muslim groups, the CUP judged Jews in Palestine, like Christians in Asia Minor, as a whole to be unreliable, possibly separatist and non-assimilable to Turkishness. According to CUP logic, members of the Yishuv had to be removed to other places within the Empire and at least all Zionists be expelled. 10,000 Jews were in fact resettled by the end of 1915, while a smaller group of Zionist foreign nationals were expelled. Yet, although many Jews feared being treated like the Armenians, there was never a plan to do so in the Ottoman capital, and there were compelling internal and external reasons for this fact.

Talaat knew that the Jews depended on Ottoman goodwill even for a decidedly modest project of establishing a religious “Jewish centre in Palestine by means of a well-organized immigration and colonization.”²⁴ He, in turn, came under sustained German and US pressure to protect the Jews. Also, with the international outcry because of the Armenians, he pushed for pro-Turkish coverage in the international press through his Jewish interlocutors – something which he largely received. He could certainly not afford another international scandal, this time related to the Jews, but most importantly, his transformative domestic agenda focused on Anatolia, not Palestine. The Jews in Palestine and the Christian natives of Greater Syria were therefore never targeted in a way that could be equated with the treatment of the Christians, especially Armenians, in Asia Minor.²⁵

Conclusion: The Lausanne Treaty Endorsed Extremes and Abandoned Minorities

Macedonia, the southernmost Balkan regions and Asia Minor, which formed historically and in the minds of late Ottoman elites the territorial core of the empire, housed large groups of Christians and a significant number of Jews. Religious diversity characterised the core regions of the empire. The Ottoman Empire had for centuries been the most religiously diverse empire. In stark contrast to this historical re-

²³ *Dündar*, İttihat, p. 92–107, p. 139–55; *Dündar*, *Modern Türkiye'nin* p. 462–95.

²⁴ Draft communiqué about Talaat's meeting with Jewish representatives in Istanbul on 14 July 1918, reproduced in *Friedman*, p. 427–28.

²⁵ *Kieser*, Talaat, p. 295–314.

ality, after the Balkan Wars, the Young Turk single-party rulers started pioneering a comprehensive policy of “un-mixing peoples” that was primarily based upon belief in Islamic social coherence and the distinction between Muslims and non-Muslims. Thus, they decisively radicalised the politics of Islamic unity initiated by Sultan Abdulhamid.

Struck by an existential crisis beginning in the late eighteenth century, the Ottoman state had undertaken reforms and declared the equality of its subjects. It had willingly maintained its diversity and even institutionalised the cultural and religious autonomies it had granted to its Christian and Jewish communities in premodern times. The Ottoman state, however, repeatedly failed to defend its territory and sovereignty. Since constitutional rule in a reduced territory was no option for the Empire’s final rulers, who embraced an ambitious national *and* imperial agenda, they came to radically reject Ottoman diversity, opting for violent means to reach their goals. Their primary goal was not a (perhaps smaller) country in peace, but to restore the state’s power, sovereignty and territory, and with this to firmly establish their position at the reins of a centralised Empire.

In terms of international law, Turkish-Muslim sovereignty in the Ottoman Empire was restricted by the Capitulations, the Reform Agreement of February 1914 (based on the 1878 Berlin Treaty) and, finally, the stipulations of the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres – almost all, for Turkish-Muslim minds, gravely biased in favour of Ottoman Christians. These, however, insisted on internationally warranted rights and protection. The CUP and their immediate successors therefore judged anti-Christian demographic engineering necessary to reach their political goals. From 1913, the CUP party regime established a policy of national homogenisation in Asia Minor, which it carried out in 1914–1918, and in whose footsteps the Kemalists, almost all of them ex-CUP members, followed during the war for Anatolia (1919–22) and the Interwar period. They all classified the Ottoman populations and dealt with them through resettlement and dispersion, expulsion and destruction, privileging or discrimination – depending on the populations’ alleged assimilability into a Turkish-Muslim nation. They judged the Muslims, in particular the Kurds, assimilable if by coercion, but the Christian groups non-assimilable.

Whereas the ousting of ca. 200.000 Rûm in the first half of 1914 resulted from targeted terror and coercion, but went on without mass violence, the context of total war from August 1914 made demographic engineering genocidal. The CUP’s frustrated pursuit of chimeric expansive goals in the Caucasus, Egypt and the Balkans went hand in hand with its murderous radicalism against targeted domestic groups. Ziya Gökalp’s Islamic pan-Turkism largely informed the total-war mentality among élites close to the CUP. “Total war” in the late Ottoman context meant that the CUP regime and its immediate successors fought the wars in 1914–1922 both externally *and* internally. In order to win its “war at home,” the CUP implemented genocide in a critical phase of World War, when Entente forces landed on Gallipoli

and the Russian army had reversed the attempted Ottoman invasion into the Southern Caucasus.

The main target of the genocide was the Ottoman Armenians, i. e. Christians who had strongly been involved in Ottoman politics, in particular after the constitutional revolution of 1908, but who by no means shared the CUP's war aims. Also, they could not easily be expelled to another state like *Rûm*. The anti-Christian stance among governors and the Muslim populace in the eastern provinces also made the Christian Assyrians victims of regional (not empire-wide, central state-led) genocide. In addition, the Ottoman *Rûm* were targeted by a first wave of expulsion to Greece in late spring 1914, whereas the large majority, nearly 1.5 million, of Ottoman *Rûm* were expelled from Anatolia towards the end of the war from 1919–1922. In this war for Asia Minor, Turkish-Muslim forces led by former CUP officers prevailed against Armenians, Alevi Kurds and, mainly, the invading Greek army. A population exchange between Greece and Turkey agreed upon in the 1923 Lausanne Treaty consisted largely in approving *ex post facto* the previous ethno-religious cleansings, including the murderous destruction of Izmir's native Christians in September 1922 and, implicitly, the genocide of 1915–16.

The population exchange agreed upon at the Near East Peace Conference in Lausanne accomplished Asia Minor's demographic de-Christianisation on the highest diplomatic level. The Lausanne Treaty thus not only shaped the post-Ottoman Middle East to this day, but also established a seminal international paradigm of ethno-religious "conflict resolution". This paradigm consisted in forcibly "un-mixing peoples" for the sake of unitary authoritarian ethnic nation states. The stipulations agreed upon at Lausanne— in contrast to the previous ones of the Sèvres Treaty – erased accountability for mass crimes. This fundamentally undermined the issue of human rights in the juridical system of the post-Ottoman states right from the start, since mass crime had manifestly been rewarded, as everybody in these countries knew. This fact also inspired and encouraged emulation in other parts of greater Europe, as the recipe to un-mix peoples had manifestly been successful – including ultimately, in the area of diplomacy. Admiration for the successful revisionism and radical "national revolution" of the Kemalists loomed large particularly in interwar Germany.²⁶ For Turkey and its neighbours, the Lausanne Treaty programmed grave minority problems for the century to come, namely the Kurdish issue. Large-scale uprising of Kurds started in the immediate aftermath of 1923.

²⁶ *Ihrig*, Atatürk; *Ihrig*, Justifying Genocide.

The Role of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* (Special Organization) in the Armenian Genocide

By Oktay Özel

1914 was a crucial year for the Ottoman government under the leading political organization of the revolutionary Young Turks, the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP).¹ Ever since the consolidating their power as a de-facto dictatorship by a military coup of January 1913 (*Bâbüâli Baskını*), they started to pursue a radical policy towards the recovery of the territories lost in the Balkans during the years following the 1908 revolution – the area symbolically synonymous with the ‘Macedonian Question’. Edirne, the most important city of Ottoman Thrace, which had been under a Bulgarian siege nearly for a year, was liberated on late July 1913. This was followed by a series of operations to harass the Ottoman Greek and Bulgarian population, which was now perceived as harmful and treacherous in the remaining lands of the empire. Accordingly, as a countermeasure for the policies of ethnic cleansing previously practiced during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 against the Muslim population in the lost territories, the CUP as both a revolutionary committee and the ruling party undertook clandestine paramilitary operations in the Western provinces and Thrace. The Macedonian Question was, thus, transferred to Asiatic Turkey with all its historical baggage and practices of violence.²

These peacetime operations against civilians were undertaken by militant CUP members and *fedais*³, who were mostly zealous Young Turkish officers experienced in guerrilla warfare (*komitacılık / çetecilik*).⁴ This was the first major operation carried out in Anatolian provinces by the operatives of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* or Special Organization (SO), which had appeared under this name for the first time during the Balkan Wars, representing the multi-ethnic tradition of paramilitary guerrilla warfare in the Ottoman Balkans. It undertook this operation with the active participation of certain prominent members of the CUP, including Talaat Bey as the Minister of In-

¹ I am grateful to my colleagues Hilmar Kaiser, Taner Akçam, Owen Miller and Ümit Kurt who have read drafts of this essay – longer or shorter versions – and generously shared with me their expertise on Armenian genocide through valuable suggestions as well as making me avoid some factual errors. I also appreciate the meticulous reading and comments by Nahide Işık Demirakın, Abdürrahim Özer and Fuat Dündar towards the finalization of the manuscript.

² See *Zürcher*, Macedonians in Anatolia. p. 960–975.

³ Also used by the Armenian revolutionary organizations, the term *fedai* denotes those Young Turk officers who were ready to sacrifice themselves for their cause and the Committee.

⁴ As first-hand memoirs, see *Martı; Fikri*. Compare Sahara, p. 492–517.

terior. As a result, some 150.000 Greeks, all Ottoman subjects, of the Aegean provinces and Thrace were forced to flee from their homelands.⁵ The idea of a Greek-Turkish exchange of population, which had been entertained by the Greek authorities for the first time in November 1913 but had remained unapplied, returned to the agenda for the second time in May 1914.⁶

Such developments came with modern demographic engineering policies experienced through wars and politicized violence. Thus, homogenization and nationalization of the territory defined as motherland (*vatan*) increasingly became an integral part of the dominant politics as radical nationalist discourses were increasing everywhere within the empire and in its surrounding areas.⁷ Regarding our discussion, this was just a beginning; a follow up of a higher degree of violence was to come later, during the First World War.

After February 1914, with the CUP's reluctant signing of the reform plan of the Great Powers for the Ottoman Armenians, the Macedonian fear was transplanted further to the Eastern Anatolian provinces.⁸ The Ottomans had been on the losing side in Macedonia. Seeking radical policies and experimenting with nationalist ideas to revive the shattered Empire in its largest historical region, imperial government under CUP rule was now firmly conscious of not losing out on the "Armenian Question."⁹ In their eyes, the Eastern Question at large had, with the latest developments, already compressed into the Eastern provinces of the empire, thus, becoming one and the same with the Armenian Question.

The reform plan of the Eastern provinces, signed on 8 February 1914 under the pressure primarily from Russia, but also supported by other Powers as well, was a comprehensive scheme, and a kind of revival of the earlier ones developed during the time of sultan Abdülhamid II. It mandated the proportional representation of the Armenian subjects in local councils (*meclises*) in provinces, which were to be governed in large autonomy under the administration of two European Inspectors General.¹⁰ The plan was imposed at a time when even Tashnaksutiun or the Armenian Revolutionary Organization (ARF, hereafter Tashnak), which was the most powerful political organization of the Armenians and an erstwhile ally of the CUP both in government and parliament, gave up any hope from the CUP leadership. Disillusioned by the failure of their partners in government to provide justice to the Armenians of the

⁵ For the terror aspect of this operation, see *Arar* (ed.), p. 165–166. Also see *Zürcher*, Greek and Turkish Refugees. Compare *Efiloğlu*, Exodus of Thracian Greeks, p. 330–370; *Erol*, Ottoman Crisis, see particularly Chapter 5.

⁶ *Aktar/Demirözü*, p. 85–98; *Dündar*, Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi, p. 194–197; *Efiloğlu*, 1914 Yunan Nüfus p. 47–70.

⁷ *Dündar*, Modern Türkiye'nin Şifresi; *Şeker*, p. 461–474; *Zürcher*, Demographic Engineering, p. 530–544.

⁸ *Erol*, Makedonya Sorunu'nun, p. 58–65.

⁹ *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 156.

¹⁰ *Kieser* notes that the reform plan in fact covered seven provinces instead of six, including the province of Trabzon. See *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 163.

region particularly in terms of the land issue, the radical wing of the Tashnak aligned itself to the policies of the Great Powers regarding the solution of the Armenian Question. For the CUP leadership, this changed radically the entire political equation and turned the whole issue once more into an issue of the survival of the empire.¹¹ With the outbreak of World War I, the enthusiastic efforts of the CUP to explore all possibilities for an alliance with one of the warring parties from the August of 1914 was nothing but a manifestation of this psychology of panic.¹²

CUP, *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* and the War

Under such circumstances, the SO came to the fore again. This time the targeted area was the Eastern Provinces of the Empire. The target group was the Ottoman Armenians concentrated in these provinces. The SO was a relic of the paramilitary practice of Rumelia and the Macedonian mountains and it was still alive in the veins of the CUP. Through its leading *fedais*, the Ittihadist committee reintroduced the SO primarily to the Eastern provinces of the empire.

Upon the start of the war, the Central Committee (*Merkez-i Umumi*) of the CUP, practically acting as the core of the Ottoman government's decision-making body,¹³ decided to pursue a diplomacy of armed neutrality (*müsellâh bîtarafılık*). Simultaneously with national mobilization, calling to arms its available human sources, the Committee also took a decision to reactivate the SO as a counterinsurgency organization for the war.¹⁴ The SO operatives were sent to the eastern front in August to undertake secret counterinsurgency operations to incite a rising among the Muslim population of Russia in the Caucasus. The second aim was to contain and annihilate any kinds of Armenian political and military activities in the Eastern provinces under Tashnak as well as Hinchak, another influential revolutionary Armenian organization, along the line of Russian war strategy. From September 1914 to March 1915, the SO guerrilla units (militias or *müfrezes*) and bands (*çetes*) also participated actively in the war along the Russian border.¹⁵

Their operations to annihilate (*imha* in Turkish) the political leadership of the Tashnak and Hinchak in the area of their operations in Eastern provinces¹⁶ assumed

¹¹ For a context and some details of the reform program, *Arar*, p. 167–176. Compare *Aksakal*, p. 72 ff.

¹² *Dündar*, Crime of Numbers, p. 51 ff. Compare *Aksakal*.

¹³ For the structure of CUP decision-making, see *Vardar*, p. 87–89. See also *Zürcher*, Young Turk Decision Making Patterns, p. 15–32.

¹⁴ *Safi*, Ottoman Special Organization p. 270; *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 15–16.

¹⁵ See *Cemil*.

¹⁶ The word “*imha*” was extensively used by the members of the SO in the context of the elimination of the leadership of the principal Armenian organizations, namely Tashnak and Hinchak. As will be seen below, when the process evolved into the “*tehcir*” or deportation after the Sarikamış disaster the same people used the same term, this time, for the whole Armenians comfortably. I have thus preferred to employ the same terminology, the terminology of the

a new intensity and expanded in scope when the Ottomans entered the war in early November.¹⁷ The operations were also directed at the Armenian villages on both sides of the border, thus, targeting the civilian population with atrocities reported by many Muslim and non-Muslim observers.¹⁸ During the first two months of the actual deportations, in April and May 1915, the SO-related atrocities continued. According to Ebulhindili Cafer Bey, who was one of the central figures of the SO in the Erzurum region and personally initiated massacres against Armenian convoys during the deportation with his own paramilitary band or *çete*,¹⁹ the SO was formed from the outset for the “annihilation of the Armenian committees and bands, which had committed so much harm” inside and outside of the empire. He continues: “This Special Organization established in the provinces was directly linked to the CUP Central Committee.”²⁰

The micro (immediate) context of the SO’s targeting the civilian Armenians of the Eastern provinces was, however, the Sarıkamış disaster of January 1915 and the events that followed, including the strong Armenian resistance in Van.²¹ The violence inflicted and the massacres committed against the Armenians on the other side of the border now changed direction towards those inside the empire. They continued through coordinated massacres until the start of de facto *tehcir* or deportation in April, and accelerated until 27 May, when the “Law of Deportation” was issued by the government.²²

Some Armenian groups or individuals, mostly deserters from the army and/or from labour battalions and assisting the advancing Russian forces, also began sabotaging the Ottoman armies with activities such as cutting the telegram lines along the border regions of Erzurum, Van and Bitlis.²³ In addition, there were four Armenian volunteer regiments among the Russian forces fighting against the Ottoman army, and some of their fighters were Ottoman subjects. Amid such an atmosphere of panic and anger, the CUP government used these events as a pretext for an all-out retaliation by using all available means of propaganda through an extensive media campaign in Istanbul and in diplomatic circles. The critical point here is that these

perpetrators, throughout the study since it, I believe, accurately describes what actually happened.

¹⁷ *Kaiser*, Tahsin Uzer, p. 93–115.

¹⁸ *Badem*, particularly Chapter 7. Compare *Dadrian*, Role of the Special Organization p. 62–63; *Gust*. See also, *Morgenthau*, p. 67–91.

¹⁹ See *Kaiser*, Financing the Ruling Party, p. 22–23.

²⁰ *Ilgaz/Birinci*, p. 44–45.

²¹ For a detailed account of these crucial months, see *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime, p. 157 ff; *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 208–210, 219–220. For a most recent and insightful analysis of this crucial series of events, and of Van resistance in particular, see *Türkyılmaz*, Rethinking Genocide. Also compare *Türkyılmaz*, Devrim İçinde Devrim, p. 324–352.

²² *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, p. 225–259.

²³ *Kaiser*, Tahsin Uzer, p. 105–106, 108; *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime, p. 142–143.

events were presented as signs of a “general rebellion.”²⁴ Supporting its case through references to certain secret correspondences among some operatives of Tashnak and Hınchak, acquired by the Ottoman authorities, what the CUP headquarter was doing, in fact, was making the Armenians pay the price for all their military failures, including the Sarıkamış disaster. Presented also as “traitors,” they were a perfect scape-goat.²⁵

Teheir and the Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa

Acting upon the fear that British and French activities in the Eastern Mediterranean coasts would incite a rebellion based upon Armenian organizations in Cilicia, the small-scale deportation of local Armenians had already been undertaken in February and March 1915. This was the deportation that took place on the initiative of local authorities, both military and administrative, from the region of Dörtöyl-Zeytun to the interior, namely to the Konya region.²⁶ With a critical decision taken in İstanbul in March, the Armenian deportation assumed, from April onward, a new character and was put into practice as a systematic operation in the whole Eastern provinces.²⁷ It was presented as a wartime security measure to remove ‘harmful elements’, i. e. Armenians, from critical localities in the war zone with the declared aim of their relocation to Northern Syrian provinces. However, it soon became clear that from this moment on, the so-called *teheir* was also aimed at destroying the Armenian population as much as possible in this critical region through large-scale massacres.²⁸ In mobilizing and channelling the local administrative bodies under Talaat Bey and the CUP local branches to this mission, the SO of Dr Bahaeddin Şakir emerged as the core apparatus for carrying out the highest level of organized violence and chiefly responsible for the ensuing atrocities.

From July onward, the scope of the deportation was expanded to all the Armenians in the Empire, including the Western provinces, with a seemingly categorical exemption for those in Istanbul and Izmir, though they remained not entirely untouched in practice. From the beginning of 1916, the surviving deportees of over four hundred thousand, who had been packed in the camps of the so-called settlement area (*iskân muntikası*), namely the deserts of the northern Syrian provinces of Aleppo and Der Zor, were also subjected to destruction. Here at this stage, in close cooperation with SO bands and newly appointed local governors, the Directorate for the Settle-

²⁴ *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 237–238.

²⁵ See *Morgenthau*, p. 230–233, 254, 261. Compare *Sarafian et al.*

²⁶ *Akçam*, Ermeni Meselesi Hallolunmuştur. p. 139–144. For Zeytun, see *Kaiser*, Regional Resistance, p. 176 ff.

²⁷ For the importance of Talat Pasha’s telegrams of 24 and 25 April 1915 in this regard, see *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime, p. 185–187; *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 235–237.

²⁸ For the demographic nature of the operation, see particularly *Dündar*, Crime of Numbers; *Dündar*, Kahir Eksriyet. Compare *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime, p. 182–190, and chapter eight in particular; *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 233.

ment of Tribes and Immigrants (*İşkân-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdiriyeti / IAMM*) played the key role. About half of the survivors lost their lives here, in what is generally referred to as the “second phase of the genocide.”²⁹ By 1917, with the exception of a greater portion of the Armenians of Istanbul and İzmir, and a small portion of the Catholic and Protestant Armenians, the Empire’s Armenian subjects were almost completely displaced.³⁰ About half of the displaced population (one contemporary estimate included some 800.000 deaths, if not more) perished.³¹ Although we have no way of knowing the exact numbers, a significant portion of them lost their lives through outright massacres deliberately committed by the operatives and bands of the SO, mainly in Eastern provinces. The destruction of the Ottoman Armenians during the war years, thus, passed into modern historical record as one of the early examples of genocide, i.e. the Armenian Genocide, leaving behind still ongoing discussions in historiography.³² In the following pages, I will attempt to reconstruct and recontextualise one of these disputed issues through the latest findings and debates in the historiography.

An Attempt at Reconstruction – *The Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* (re-activated on 3 August 1914)

The SO that we are examining due to its role during the Armenian genocide was a counterinsurgency organization re-activated by the Central Committee of the CUP on 3 August 1914 upon the outbreak of the World War I and the simultaneous declaration of armed neutrality by the Ottoman Empire.³³ Officially run by a supervisory council or commission within the Ministry of War, the SO was composed of both volunteers’ battalions (*gönüllü müfrezes*) and paramilitary bands, i.e. *çetes*, as well as a number of special operatives carrying out some undercover operations.³⁴ It was thus organized along these two separate lines on the Eastern and Caucasian fronts. The volunteer units were mostly composed of the local populace. The core of the operatives on the other hand consisted mostly of members of the specially selected *fedai* groups of the CUP sent from Istanbul. They were mostly military officers who had experience in paramilitary warfare as ‘*komitacı/komitadji*’ or guerrillas in Ottoman Rumelia and

²⁹ *Kévorkian*, Soykırım’ın İkinci Safhası; *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, Part V. See also Dadrian, Naim-Andonian Documents p. 311–360; *Akçam*, Killing Orders. Compare *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime, p. 272 ff.

³⁰ According to various sources, the Armenian population in the Ottoman Empire before the war was somewhere between 1.700.000 and 2.000.000. See *Mutlu*, p. 3–38; *McCarthy*; *Dündar*, Kahir Ekseriyet. Compare *Saraflan*, Talaat Pasha’s Report.

³¹ The numbers vary between roughly 600.000 and 1.000.000 according to different sources and calculations.

³² *Akçam*, Young Turks’ Crime; *Bloxham*; *Dündar*, Crime of Numbers; *Suny* et al.; *Suny*, History of Armenian Genocide, 2015.

³³ *Tetik*, Teşkilât vol. 1, p. 13, 15. Compare *Saği*, Fiilden isim, p. 74–79.

³⁴ *Saği*, Ottoman Special Organization, p. 123–223

Macedonia before and during the Balkan Wars.³⁵ Their operations included a wide range of activities such as intelligence gathering, sabotaging, propaganda and agitation, as well as provoking the civilian population to rise or pushing them into paramilitary warfare by using all kinds of measures, including terror.³⁶ Secrecy was essential.

Although chaotically organized and shrinking in size, the structure of the SO was maintained until late March 1915, despite certain alterations in the initial designs. The leading cadres of the SO units participated in frontal attacks in actual warfare along with regular army units.³⁷ This continued to be the case even when the remaining militias were gradually incorporated into the regular forces from February 1915 onward.³⁸

Dr Sakir as the Mastermind of Annihilation

Dr Şakir was the head of the SO units in the East and was one of the leading figures of the SO operations in the area until March 1915. Recent research has revealed that, during their initial operation, the SO paramilitaries began committing atrocities against the civilian Armenians, attacking and looting their villages on both sides of the border. These were early examples of their violence, which soon created their counterparts among the Armenians along the border.³⁹ Intensive anti-Armenian propaganda and agitation provoked local Muslims to commit massacres in their localities with each bout accompanied with an escalation of violence. This was particularly the case in the interior of Iran and Azerbaijan, and the main actors behind such activities were again the SO operatives.⁴⁰

³⁵ For the prominent names of the organization from the time of Balkan Wars, see *Ertürk*, p. 27, 75, 98–99, 107. Compare *Hanioğlu*, p. 264–269.

³⁶ *Safi*, Ottoman Special Organization, chapter 2; *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 9–10. Compare *Dadrian/Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 415.

³⁷ This state of affairs of the *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* units continued even after their integration into the regular army units Lieutenant Colonel (August) Stange, who was the commander of these units under the name *Lazistan Müfrezesi*, reported in July 1915 that these units were still of no use, and they could not be taken seriously for any military operations. See *Yalçın*, *Harp Ceridesi* p. 341–42.

³⁸ In the meantime, however, the formation of new bands continued chaotically. *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 373–374. For the periodic amnesties and released prisoners, see *Sever*, p. 318–332.

³⁹ *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1; *Badem*. Also see *Gust*, p. 193, 195. Compare Erickson, *Osmanlılar ve Ermeniler*. p. 236–250. Astonishingly, Erickson categorically leaves aside the topic of *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* in this work, which aims to comprehensively study the issue. His brief mention of the SO in *Erikson Armenian Massacres*, p. 67–75, where discusses the issue along the lines of the old narrative, trying to discredit Dadrian's treatment of German officer Stange's relations with the SO, fails yet again to provide an alternative historical analysis of the issue as a whole.

⁴⁰ For details and examples, see *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 225 ff. *Gust*, p. 217; *Akçam*, *A Shameful Act*, p. 137–147.

Originally trained as a military medical doctor, Dr Şakir was one of the two key leaders of the SO (the other being Dr Nazım) and had long served as one of the founders of the CUP as an armed underground organization from 1906 onward. He had always worked closely with its paramilitary units and *fedais*.⁴¹ As their friends delicately stated, they were experts in matters of “organization” (*teşkilât yapmak*).⁴² While Dr Nazım stayed at the CUP centre in Istanbul from the outset of the re-activation of the SO, Dr Şakir assumed the key position as the leader of the SO in the Eastern provinces immediately after the Ottomans’ declaration of mobilization. He soon became the most influential person in the decision-making processes of the SO operations. As many sources note, he was *the* person behind the decision for *tehcir*.⁴³ Dr Şakir was also the key figure behind all the orchestrated atrocities committed during the deportation in the Eastern provinces as well as their mastermind and actual coordinator.⁴⁴

Arif Cemil, who participated in the SO operations in the Caucasian front until February 1915, and who worked at its central bureau, Arif Cemil⁴⁵ portrayed Dr Şakir as the person who resolutely paved the way to the decision for deportation: “[After April 1915] the SO assumed an entirely different character. [...] Doktor Bahaettin Şâkir Bey decided in Istanbul to no longer handle the issues relating to the external enemies in order to deal with the internal enemies of the country.”⁴⁶ Arif Cemil continues:

“Doktor Bahaettin Şâkir Bey has witnessed many realities during the four-five months that he spent in Erzurum and other parts of the Caucasian front. *The Armenians’ attitude towards Turkey and their support for the Russian army have made him realize that they should be afraid of not only the external enemies but also of the internal foes. [...] By bringing all these to the attention of the Central Committee of the CUP in Istanbul, he was busy negotiating the measures that could save the army from a great danger. [...] These negotiations have, eventually, ended with the introduction of the deportation law [sic].* After a while, when Doktor Bahaettin Şâkir Bey returned to the Caucasian front, the new state of affairs had been fully elucidated.* [italics are mine. OÖ].⁴⁷

We find an interesting detail of Dr Şakir’s activities and negotiations while in Istanbul in the second half of March 1915 in the memoirs of Galip Vardar, whose father was an associate of

⁴¹ Önal/Emiroğlu.

⁴² Dadrian/Akçam, *Tehcir ve Taktik*. For the roles these two played in the decision for *tehcir*, see Vardar, p. 432–433.

⁴³ Yalçın, *Tanıdıklarım*, p. 83:

⁴⁴ From April onwards, Armenians already knew of Dr. Şakir’s centrality in all these developments. Regarding how the process towards 24 April 1915 arrests was experienced by the Istanbul Armenians, and for the rumours that Talat, Nazım and Dr. Şakir were the persons behind the decision for *tehcir*, see Balakian, p. 45–51, 79–80.

⁴⁵ Cemil, p. 239–240.

⁴⁶ Cemil, p. 240, 245–46. For the archival documentation that support Arif Cemil’s statement, see Akçam, *Young Turks’ Crime*, p. 183 ff.

⁴⁷ Arif Cemil probably means the “decision” for *tehcir* since the “law for *tehcir*” came later, on 27 May. Note also that Dr. Şakir had already returned to Erzurum in April. Cemil, p. 246.

Dr Şakir as a guerrilla in Rumelia earlier and fought against *çetes* during World War I. According to him, Dr Şakir visited two of his *fedai* friends in Istanbul and invited them to join him for the new mission:

One day, Bahaeddin Şakir visited two former *fedais* of the CUP, Hüsrev Sami and Sapançalı Hakkı, and said: ‘Come on, we are going to Erzurum. We will deport the Armenians.’ Hüsrev and Hakkı inquired: ‘Ok, but what will happen to their properties? Is there any program for that?’ Bahaeddin replied: ‘What program are you talking of? I have already said we are going to deport the Armenians ... You understand what I mean!’ The two friends rejected the offer.”⁴⁸

Vardar continues: “Sapançalı Hakkı did not participate in many clandestine affairs of the CUP, and thanks to this, he did not end up killed by an Armenian bullet.”

Armenians Perceived as ‘Fifth Column’

Dr Şakir and his associates, the leading operatives of the SO in the field, as early as September 1914, viewed the Armenian subjects of the Ottoman Empire as an internal foe, a fifth column. In their eyes, the Tashnak leaders, who had rejected their offer for cooperation in a guerrilla war against Russia, were the primary target deserving destruction. Such thoughts were fully in line with the “spirit of the time” prevalent among the hardliners of the Ittihadist elite.⁴⁹

Among these hardliners, Dr Mehmed Reşid Bey, the governor of Diyarbakır, even before he had pushed the *tehcir* operation in his province literally to the level of extermination with notorious massacres, had held similar views already in 1913–1914. According to Mehmed Reşid Bey, the Greeks and Armenians were simply microbes to be removed from the body of the country.⁵⁰ In those years, the anti-Greek operations of vengeance were put into practice by the operatives (Dr Reşid included) of the SO of the time with such thoughts in mind.⁵¹ While busy with reorganizing the SO in the regions of Erzurum in September of 1914, Dr Şakir also expressed his opinion on eradicating the leading members of the Tashnak who were in Erzurum for their 8th Congress, as well as the local political elite of the Armenian society. When he informed Istanbul of his views, Süleyman Askeri had to calm him down.⁵²

Yet, he was not the only one who thought this way among the SO operatives. Filibeli Hilmi Bey, the deputy of Dr Şakir in the same region, wrote a telegram to him from the area of Erzincan, saying, “there are as many persons to be destroyed inside

⁴⁸ Vardar, p. 442.

⁴⁹ Haniçoğlu, p. 266–67 the section “Çeteler, Vatansverlik ve Kahramanlar”; Beşikçi, p. 160–161; Compare Gust, p. 81–83, 105.

⁵⁰ Kieser, From Patriotism to Mass Murder, p. 132, 136.

⁵¹ For the wide circulation of the idea and feelings as well as the violence it created, see Ertürk, p. 88, 97–99, 116. Compare Kutay, p. 38–56.

⁵² Tetik, Teşkilât vol. 1, p. 283, 291, 297; Cemil, p. 46–47. For Midhat Şükri Bey’s similar remarks, see Dadrian/Akçam, p. 365.

as those duties to be fulfilled abroad.”⁵³ The CUP’s responsible secretary, who organized paramilitary units in the province of Trabzon, Nail Bey, had similar ideas and thoughts as Dr Şakir and Hilmi.⁵⁴ Another operative of the same region, Tevfik Bey, was more outspoken in September 1914: “I am prepared for any possibilities. Following the Ottomans’ entry in the war, the first thing I want to do is to blind the centipedes (*çiyen*) of the interior, and to rid the body of their harms,” meaning the same, i. e. Armenians.⁵⁵ Rıza Bey, the SO chief and the commander of their units in the Lazistan sanjak along the border, also reiterated Dr Reşid’s jargon for the Armenians: “microbes”.⁵⁶ To recapitulate, the political elite among the SO operatives in the field viewed the Ottoman Armenians as an internal foe, and the idea that they, at least their political leadership at this stage, must be destroyed.

This is important as it clearly shows that whatever the degree of the truth was behind the argument the SO was organized entirely for the external enemies, the SO leadership in the Eastern provinces had already demonized the Armenians as an internal threat in the summer of 1914.⁵⁷ It is equally certain that such an image at this stage primarily related to the local leaderships of the Tashnak and Hınçak parties, and to their militants. As the early massacres of the SO operatives on both sides of the border suggest, and in parallel with the intensification of the war from November onwards, the image expanded dangerously to include also the Armenians civilians. Following the Sarıkamış disaster, such atrocities against civilians assumed a nearly systematic character in these provinces. With the start of the *tehcir* operation in April, the hatred for the Armenians rose to its zenith and played an additional role in the broad participation of local Muslims in the massacres. At this final stage, it was not only the SO and its operatives who actively contributed to the genocide, but the whole CUP. Many local branches also enthusiastically joined in the anti-Armenian propaganda and agitations.⁵⁸ As of spring 1915, the Young Turks in power were openly articulating their perception of the Armenians as a treacherous fifth column.⁵⁹

⁵³ *Cemil*, p. 45–46.

⁵⁴ *Tetik*, Teşkilât vol. 1, p. 303–304.

⁵⁵ *Tetik*, Teşkilât vol. 1, p. 274.

⁵⁶ *Sarısamam*, “p. 499–500.

⁵⁷ Based largely on his interview with Eşref Kuşçubaşı, Philip H. Stoddart in his work mentions the internal security measures as one of the tasks of the SO, and, in this context, notes the prevention of the collaboration with the enemy of the irredentist nationalist groups inside, and thus, their “treachery.” *Stoddart*, p. 66, 72.

⁵⁸ Ahmet Refik also shares one of his observations in Eskişehir in September 1915, and tells that there was a prominent Istanbul MP in the city, giving speeches to an audience of mixed locals, including the non-Muslim subjects, where “he compared the Christian elements of the country to snakes and scorpions among the Turks.” *Refik*, p. 28.

⁵⁹ *Rogan*, p. 160.

Decision for *Tehcir* and Destruction (March 1915)

The SO units that actively fought in the Eastern front until March 1915 were more like regular troops rather than counterinsurgency units and were increasingly drawn into costly frontline combat. Most of them were also ordered to join the Ardahan offensive that quickly turned from victory into a disaster on the eve of the Sarıkamış operation. Dr Şakir as one of the commanders (the other being a veteran of the CUP, the retired Major Rıza Bey in the Lazistan region) of the SO units in the area, actively participating in these exhausting mobile wars, was also a close observer of the course of events as an experienced party commissar.⁶⁰ After initial conversations, probably via telegram, with the Central Committee at some point before 3 March 1915 regarding a decisive measure against the Ottoman Armenians, Dr Şakir eventually left Erzurum for Istanbul around mid-March with the aim to finalize with his friends a radical plan that they had been entertaining for some time.⁶¹ It appears that the justification for such a conclusive action was the alleged all-out “Armenian rising” in the Anatolian provinces, a claim that the whole CUP apparatus had already been propagating about in Istanbul.⁶²

After the finalization of the crucial decision and completion of necessary preparations, Dr Şakir returned to Erzurum in April with a number of leading CUP *fedais* and their elite militia units, i. e. *milis müfrezes*.⁶³ This time he was back in the Eastern provinces to coordinate an operation to destroy the Armenian population together with its political leadership in the region under the guise of deportation.

According to the recent Turkish literature on the issue, the reason behind Dr Şakir’s departure for Istanbul was the complaints laid out by some governors and military commanders concerning the proven inefficiency of the SO units as a military

⁶⁰ For a brief summary of the activities of Dr. Şakir and the SO units in this front, see *Cemil; Yalçın*, Harp Ceridesi; *Tetik*, Teşkilât vol. 1, p. 269–381; *Onuş; Bilgin*. Compare *Shaw*, p. 353–456.

⁶¹ In one of his most recent works as an extension of his inquiry into “Andonian documents,” Taner Akçam convincingly argues for the authenticity of two letters of Dr. Şakir, dated 3 March and 7 April 1915 through a closer examination of his signatures. In these letters, Dr. Şakir informs Cemal Bey, CUP’s Adana delegate (*murahhas*), of the radical decision of the annihilation of the Ottoman Armenians already taken by the CUP and of the authorization of the Ottoman government to put “catastrophic” and “bloody measures” into practice. Akçam also presents Ottoman archival evidence revealing that Cemal Bey was indeed sent later to Aleppo as the CUP delegate, working closely with the director of İAMM, Şükrü Bey, and was tried after the war for the role he played in the atrocities committed against the deported Armenians in this region. See Akçam, Bahaettin Şakir’in Ermenilerin. Compare *Dadrian*, Naim-Andonian Documents, p. 316, 319, 329, 345, 349–350; Akçam, Killing Orders, p. 231–234. For the originals of the letters, see the Armenian edition: *Andonian*, p. 116–117, 144–145.

⁶² *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, p. 238. Refik, p. 27–28, 44; *Gust*, p. 81–96; *Kieser*, Talaat Pasha, p. 230–232, 237–238. Compare Tunçay, p. 58–70; *Cengiz*; Kabacalı, particularly chapter 4.

⁶³ *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, p. 291.

force and the chaos that they caused during combat with Russian forces.⁶⁴ However, this was not the only reason for Dr Şakir's visit to Istanbul. As sources unanimously attest (recall the words of Arif Cemil, Galip Vardar, as well as of Hüseyin Cahit and many others cited in this essay), the fact that he returned from Istanbul so quickly to coordinate the operations leads us to consider that the real motive behind his visit to Istanbul at this critical juncture was directly related to a plan to totally remove the Armenian population from the Eastern provinces.⁶⁵

While he was in Istanbul negotiating with the CUP centre and some members of the government, Filibeli Hilmi, his deputy waiting in the region, wrote to him and asked him openly not to come back at all without an authority to free once more the SO units and operatives whose room for manoeuvre had recently been severely limited by the army commanders in the region. Hilmi was clearly asking for a mandate for the SO to operate in the area independently, as in the "old way," which probably meant carrying out a guerrilla war of destruction as experienced *komitadjis*.⁶⁶ But, given the fact that such an organization was no longer needed in military terms, what was all this about?

It appears that Dr Şakir was successful in his mission and returned with even greater authority for the SO to act in freedom in their new plan of destruction. As understood from the details of the operation and the statements of his close associates in the region, this time he would also exert a greater political authority which allowed him to actively participate in the macro management of the *tehcir* operation. He did this by collaborating with the trusted provincial governors of the CUP such as Tahsin Bey (Erzurum) and Cemal Azmi Bey (Trabzon), while Lieutenant Colonel Halil Bey [Kut], the former head of the SO, and currently the commander of the 5th Expeditionary Force in the area was doing the same with governors Cevdet Bey (Van) and Mustafa Abdülhalik Bey (Bitlis).⁶⁷ In the eyes of the SO operatives, it is highly likely that Dr Şakir was now acting as the chief of the political bureau (*siyasi şube reisi*) of the organization, a kind of party commissar, under whatever tactical guise.⁶⁸

⁶⁴ *Dadrian/Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 238. Tahsin Bey, the governor of Erzurum, who had earlier worked with Dr. Şakir for the former SO in the region, also began sending similar complaints to Istanbul. *Kieser*, *Talaat Pasha*, p. 203, 205.

⁶⁵ In a cable dated 29 August 1915, to provincial governors, Talat Bey states this quite explicitly: "The objective that the government expects to achieve by the expelling of the Armenians from the areas in which they live and their transportation to other appointed areas is to ensure that this community will no longer be able to undertake initiatives and actions against the government, and that they will be brought to a state in which they will be unable to pursue their national aspirations related to the advocating for a[n independent] government of Armenia" [translation by Akçam]. See *Akçam*, *Young Turks' Crime*, p. 134–135.

⁶⁶ "Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa should remain free on its business in all matters. It should cooperate with the army only in military action. Come back to Erzurum only if you can regain in Istanbul this former form (i.e. with freedom of action) for the SO. If you cannot, do not bother to come at all." *Cemil*, p. 238. Compare *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 222–223.

⁶⁷ *Kaiser*, *Kemah Massacres*, *passim*.

⁶⁸ *Stoddart*, p. 71.

Accordingly, with the active contribution of well-known CUP operatives, Dr Şakir would execute this operation decided upon in Istanbul as the new mission with a renewed freedom (i. e. free of the interference of Harbiye) of action in the old way. In practice, this meant that they were now acting as a “non-official” and clandestine criminal organization.⁶⁹ As will be seen below, the Harbiye section of the former SO would continue from this point onward as a newly created bureau of Umur-ı Şarkıye Dairesi (Office of Eastern Affairs, OEA). The rest of the operational body of the SO, on the other hand, continued its existence directly under the empire-wide coordination of the CUP centre and the Internal Ministry of Talaat Bey as the “SO of Destruction,” targeting the Ottoman Armenians primarily, if not exclusively, in the Eastern provinces.

From *Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa* to *Umur-ı Şarkıye Dairesi* (5 April 1915)

On April 5, 1915, coinciding with Dr Şakir’s visit to Istanbul and before his return to Erzurum, the SO was transformed. In addition to some changes in both content and organization, the army section of the SO within the Ministry of War separated from the main body, and continued on its own way with a new name, *Umur-ı Şarkıye Dairesi* (Office for the Affairs of the East, OEA). Ali Başhamba was appointed as its director and the central commission of the former SO, who had worked voluntarily, was disbanded at the end of April.⁷⁰ We have no document at hand to explain the reasons behind this change. According to Polat Safi and Ahmet Tetik, the Ottoman General Staff and the Ministry of War had decided to reorganize the SO with a new focus on external espionage, propaganda and operations instead of continuing its use of irregulars of volunteers and paramilitary bands, which had already proven to be a failure.⁷¹

Thus, the existence of the old formation of SO forces ended in the Eastern front both at the level of command and as operational units.⁷² From this point on with the retention of certain figures, such as Nail Bey and the Governor Cemal Azmi Bey in the Trabzon region, in positions of power, the new SO might be termed ‘the SO of Destruction.’⁷³ Ahmet Avni Pasha, the newly appointed Commander of the mobile “Lazistan ve Havalisi Kumandanlığı” in the province of Trabzon in April 1915, observed that Governor Cemal Azmi Bey administered the deportations from Trabzon in close cooperation with Dr Şakir, and the new SO operatives were at work during this period. Tahsin Bey’s “efforts” to administer the *tehcir* in as orderly a way as possible in his Erzurum province, if this was not a clever cover up, proved fruitless

⁶⁹ *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, p. 291, 294, 298; *Gust*, p. 47, 106. Compare. *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1 p. 246, 252.

⁷⁰ *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 17.

⁷¹ *Safi*, Ottoman Special Organization, p. 242–256, 320.

⁷² *Ibid.*, p. 249; *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 374–375.

⁷³ See *Bilgi*, Ahmed Avni, p. 523–540.

against the actions of radicals like Mahmud Kamil Pasha, the newly appointed Commander of the 3rd Army.⁷⁴

It seems that the operatives of the former SO previously sent abroad for external operations continued to work with the newly created OEA under the Ministry of War. Informed or uninformed of the change, some of them went on to use the old terminology of “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” in their correspondences with the centre, which remained practically the same and at the time had been taken over by the OEA in Istanbul. The interchangeable use of the old and the new terminologies lasted until the end of the OEA on 15 November 1918.⁷⁵ Tetik, and also Safi for that matter, appears to assume that the OEA was the only “legitimate” (i. e. formal) heir to the historic legacy of the SO.⁷⁶ One should not forget, however, that the “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa,” possessing both a tradition and practice of a counterinsurgency organization dedicated to guerrilla warfare, had always been an organization of dual nature, of a mixed character. It had always had operatives from both Ittihadist military and civilian ranks, and having both formal and secretive structures. Seeing only formal (i. e. legitimate) bodies and ignoring the secretive (i. e. illegitimate) body creates a serious blind spot of the kind that historians are expected to avoid.

What we understand now from the works of Tetik and Safi, on the other hand, is that the change that occurred in April in the administration of the SO was not limited only to the change of control, as Taner Akçam assumes. It was indeed more than that, and also included an institutional reorganization that corresponded to a functional and legal separation of the two branches. In other words, still acting as an underground revolutionary organization, the operational centre of the CUP (i. e. the Central Committee) changed the institutional structure of the SO, knowing quite well the future complications of its new missions and its criminal character. As of 5 April, there was a continuity in terms of traditional SO practice at large (Akçam & Kaiser), but a discontinuity in formal institutional terms (Safi & Tetik). Nonetheless, this was certainly a reorganization towards a legal-operational separation.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 246.

⁷⁵ *Stoddart*, p. 69; *Safi*, *The Ottoman Special Organization*, p. 234–239; *Tetik* *Teşkilât* vol. 1, p. 17–19; *Tetik*, *Teşkilât* vol. 2.

⁷⁶ It is not fully unreasonable in this sense and context for Ahmet Tetik to read and present both structures as being identical. However, such a presentation would be only partially true. It explains only a part of the story of the SO, while blurring and obscuring the story of the other, indeed the larger section of the SO, which interests us here. The critical point is that the OEA was only a partial continuation of the former SO, and it neither corresponds to the whole nor represents it thoroughly.

⁷⁷ In his studies, Akçam rightly points out a critical change that occurred after the military failures of the Ottoman forces against Russian advance in the East, including Sarıkamış: the transfer of the control of the SO units from the *Harbiye* of Enver Pasha to the CUP. He continues: “the units were reorganized and assigned to carry out the annihilation of the Armenian convoys.” *Akçam*, *Young Turks’ Crime*, p. 412. Compare *Akçam*, *İnsan Hakları*, p. 261–262. Hilmar Kaiser also emphasizes in one of his most recent works that the SO members indeed acted within the framework of the CUP and, thus, the “SO was just another

“New SO” as a Criminal Organization

As noted already, one reason for the separation of the OEA from the existing SO was the apparent failure of the former SO units to act efficiently as paramilitary militias both in counterinsurgency activities and actual warfare on the Eastern front. They were neither functional nor needed any more. What these CUP functionaries were trying to do was to cover-up the critical decision taken in Istanbul for the radical *tehcir* and *imha* operation. In order to carry out the operation of deportation and destruction, the very tradition and the practice of the *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* as the CUP’s *fedai* organization with prominent operatives and paramilitary units, i. e. the militia organization, was put into action once more as the new SO. This “SO of destruction” was run chiefly by Dr Şakir and his close associates. This was the SO that could now work with the highest degree of freedom and with a power above all administrative local authorities directly in close cooperation with Talaat Pasha’s Ministry of Interior as well as the Central Committee of the CUP. Here, let us recall the blunt request of Filibeli Hilmi from Dr Şakir for such a freedom of action for their SO, outside the control of the military commanders.

This renewed SO operation was put into practice in April working apparently ‘outside’ the Ottoman Ministry of War on legal-institutional ground. Yet, it was operating within their sight, before the very eyes of the Ottoman armies in localities, and, as ordered plainly by Enver Pasha, with their actual support. As we will see below, some military commanders went even beyond the level of support, and personally participated in the destruction. In this context, and under these circumstances, the government’s supposed inability to implement such a radical *tehcir* operation in an orderly manner and its apparent lack of control over the police and gendarmeries, who were charged with protecting the Armenian convoys was merely rhetoric and constituted justification of the massacres.⁷⁸ On the contrary, the reinforcement of local police and gendarmerie by the same problematic human sources, including bandits and criminals released from prisons, that had been used for the formation of SO paramilitary units was, as it appears, an integral part of the operation.⁷⁹ This rhetoric of “despair” and “incompetence,” however, would certainly provide a degree of plausible deniability of the atrocities throughout the operation; this was particularly so for the central command, namely Talaat Bey as the Minister of Interior, as well as the perpetrators themselves.⁸⁰

organizational tool for the CUP’s illegal activities in the killing zone.” See *Kaiser*, *Kemah Massacres*, p. 28.

⁷⁸ For Talât Pasha’s defense and alleged predicaments on these issues, see *Kabacalı*, p. 81–82. Compare *Kutay*, Şehit Sadrazam, p. 1179–80.

⁷⁹ *Safî*, *The Ottoman Special Organization*, p. 180–205. Compare *Gust*, p. 9.

⁸⁰ Indeed, as was the case for others, Dr. Reşit Bey of Diyarbakır also tried to defend himself and justify his atrocities exactly with this very same rhetoric. See *Bilgi*, Dr. Mehmed p. 102 ff. For a reflection of the same discussion in current historiography, see Erickson, *Armenian Relocation*, p. 291–298.

In short, despite the fact that many volunteer militia troops had deserted and some irregulars went back to their former engagement in banditry, the section of the former SO that was composed of *fedais* closely linked to the CUP leadership was quickly transformed into fanatical paramilitaries. In the Eastern provinces, they worked closely with local Kurdish tribal regiments and bands. The operatives, who played a significant role in the *imha* operation, still operated under the name “SO.” They were mobilized both around the notions of religious zeal as well as the “national idea and patriotism,” as Şükrü Hanioglu put it.⁸¹ The man who led them to this mission was, again, Dr Şakir, and he was personally present in the field as the active co-ordinator. Although the former *fedais* Hüsrev Sami and Sapançalı Hakkı declined the offer to join his team, it appears that Dr Şakir had managed in Istanbul to bring together for this mission a good many of the fellow operatives. He brought together elite bands of militants, many linked to the CUP, to the prime area of operation, i.e. the Eastern provinces. Several prominent figures such as the unruly Yakup Cemil were nominally still in the army but employed temporarily in the service of the new SO. Thereafter, they functioned as the units charged with carrying out massacres. As Liman von Sanders, the German General working with the Ottomans during the war, accurately noted: “*tehcir* was entrusted to the worst hands imaginable.”⁸² He was right: these were the worst hands for an orderly deportation. However, considering the core of the mission, his remark needs rephrasing: they were, in fact, the most appropriate hands for the destruction of large swaths of the Armenian population of the empire.

Indeed, this was exactly what was aimed for as, from April onward, they were the ones who were behind the cold-blooded slaughter of the entire political cadres of Armenian organizations in the Eastern provinces; they were the ones who carried out systematic massacres against the civilian Armenians, particularly in the region of Van and Bitlis. From May onward, together with the ones who joined them locally, it was again they who turned into a ‘death march’ the march of Armenian deportation convoys on the routes from Trabzon and Erzurum towards the deserts of Der Zor. Dr Şakir and these militias still portrayed themselves as agents of the SO. They exerted their renewed power more tenaciously as direct agents of the operational body of the CUP Central Committee and Talaat Bey in Istanbul.

One might appropriately argue that the name “Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa” had from this point on returned to its roots in meting out extreme paramilitary violence directed towards the destruction of the Armenians in the Anatolian provinces. It is this “SO of destruction” and its operatives that revived the former SO in the pre-August

⁸¹ Hanioglu, p. 266–267. Compare Atif Bey’s statements during his defense (*Dadrian and Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 425), and of Fuat Balkan’s words: “What we call *komitacılık* is the most extreme (form) of patriotism.” (“Vatanseverliğin en müfritine komitacılık denir!”), *Martı*, p. 10.

⁸² *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 491. Compare Lewy, p. 352. Based on the selected documentation serviced to him by Turkish authorities, Lewy simply reproduces the Turkish official thesis on his polemical and rhetorical discussion of the issue of SO in his book.

1914 content of the *komitadji* type of terror with its extreme practices under the coordination of Dr Şakir.⁸³ This time, their operations were unlawful, illegitimate and immoral. With the mission of destruction assigned to them, the *tehcir* was executed thoroughly as a clandestine criminal operation in areas where this new SO was active. Vehib Pasha, the new Commander of the 3rd Army of the Eastern front from the early months of 1916, referred precisely to this when he discussed the atrocities previously committed in his area of command, i. e. the Eastern provinces:

The massacre and destruction of the Armenians as well as the theft and pillage of their properties were the result of the decisions taken at the Central Committee of the CUP. It was Bahaeddin Şakir Bey that brought the human butchers (*insan kasapları*) to the 3rd Army area, employing and coordinating them through his instructions and orders. All the atrocities and human suffering occurred in the Third Army area stemmed from the hands of Bahaeddin Şakir Bey, and was executed by him. They [Dr Şakir and his associates, OÖ] brought their gangs, and, the others [Talaat Bey's *Dahiliye* through governors? OÖ] provided their sanitary gendarmerie...⁸⁴

It was not a coincidence that the name of Dr Şakir was everywhere, and sources show that he was, along with his automobile and private telegraph machine, often at the centre of the atrocities. Nor is it a pure chance that he disappeared after meetings with governors and commanders within the area of operation. The SO that all available sources refer to as one of the primary perpetrators of the destruction of the Armenians was this SO, which was “reborn from its ashes” with its multitude of bands in the company of local police and gendarmerie. Moreover, by returning to its *İttihadist/komitadji* origins from April 1915 onward, its organizers knew perfectly what they were doing was a mere act of crime.⁸⁵

The CUP, the Government and the *Harbiye*: Institutional Responsibility

It is important to emphasize a point made above. The reorganization of the SO and the ensuing separation corresponded also to a formal split on the basis of the *tehcir* operation. This was the split of the dual structure of the SO, which Arif Cemil and Raymond Kévorkian thought to have existed from the outset: on the one hand, there

⁸³ For a recent work that emphasizes Talat Pasha and his close associates' *komitadji* nature, see *Kieser*; Talaat Pasha, *passim*. Compare Yahya Kemal's similar assessment in *Kemal*, p. 170–176.

⁸⁴ *Dadrian/Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 241. For the full text of Vehib Pasha's written statement, see *Bilgi*, *Ermeni Tehciri*, p. 1–25.

⁸⁵ Ahmed Emin Yalman, a prominent journalist of the period, writes: “In the atrocities committed in the Eastern provinces, there were no control whatsoever, (and) thousands of personally innocent peoples were subjected to heavy atrocities (*tecavüz*) and tortures. (...) Though the unavoidable end awaiting the convoys increasingly worsened due to the impulse of vengeance and greed for looting, the bands (*çetes*) under the name of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* directly pursued the target of destruction (*imha*).” See *Yalman*, p. 401–402. Similar statements of Dr. Reşid, the governor of the province of Diyarbakır, who personally organized the atrocities in his province, are also well known. *Bleda*, p. 75–78.

was the official SO linked to the *Harbiye* (i. e. Enver Pasha), and on the other, there was the unofficial one linked to the *Dahiliye* and the CUP (i. e. Talaat Bey and the Central Committee). The official one, the OEA, allegedly focused only on the external operations and propaganda under the *Harbiye*, employing also several prominent Turkist and Islamist intellectuals and scholars who actively wrote in the journals and magazines published by the Ittihadist Young Turks. These writers included intellectuals such as Yusuf Akçura, Fuad Köprülü and Mehmet Akif.⁸⁶ The unofficial one was the SO reorganized as a CUP-led organization under Dr Şakir, and operated in close collaboration with Talaat Bey and the CUP centre (i. e. Dr Nazım), with the aim of the destruction of the Armenians.

In other words, the *tehcir* and *imha* operation as a whole was in effect the product of this collaboration between the CUP Central Committee and Talaat Bey of the *Dahiliye*. Thus, the “SO çetes” who appear in many sources as such were the main actors of this clandestine operation carried out primarily in the name of the Ittihadist Committee and the Ottoman government (via Talaat Bey and provincial governors who actively collaborated with him).⁸⁷ This is a critical point because the sources appear ambiguous and even contradictory on the question of the official roles and responsibilities of the genocide.

It is apparent that one of the key points that the Central Committee of the CUP, Talaat Bey and Enver Pasha all agreed upon during the negotiations with Dr Şakir in Istanbul was this separation within the SO. As a result, the CUP branch of the SO reorganized itself for the new mission, as Akçam has emphasized. Yet, it would be wrong to leave the responsibility for the atrocities only to the SO paramilitaries and bands. Indeed, this calculated ethnic engineering under the guise of ‘tehcir’ that ended with the near-complete removal and destruction of the Armenian existence in Eastern Anatolia, and gradually expanded over to the rest of the Empire, was the result of a much larger organization. At the centre of this organization was ‘the Committee’, or the CUP at large. The CUP meant the entire ‘homeland’, i. e. the whole Empire, with its widespread organization through numerous local branches. Assuming his revolutionary identity as the man of the CUP, Dr Şakir now undertook the task of the coordination and mobilization of this empire-wide organization in the most critical area of the Eastern provinces. Known for his apparent skill in such organizations, including this kind, Dr Nazım also helped mobilize from the centre the entire CUP local branches towards the destruction of the “internal enemy.”⁸⁸ Thus, CUP branches all over the empire contributed greatly to this criminal

⁸⁶ See *Tetik*, Teşkilât vol. 2, passim. Compare *Kon*, p. 2–8.

⁸⁷ See below for the role of provincial governors.

⁸⁸ In his first letter to Cemal Bey, Dr. Şakir notes on 3 March 1915: “Dr. Nazım Bey writes that ‘with a little sign (*işaret*) of *İttihad ve Terakki*, I can make whole Turkey to be directed into the desired road/path, if [there are? (two words illegible, OÖ) no Armenians.’” *Andonian*, p. 116.

operation not only in this particular region but also in the whole empire.⁸⁹ Though we have a general idea through a number of local cases such as Ankara, Kastamonu, Bursa, Kayseri, and Antep, etc., further studies are needed to get a comprehensive picture of how this was carried out throughout the rest of the empire. Such studies would necessarily address the question of agencies and forms of violence, which also includes the illegal appropriation of Armenian properties.

As for the role of the Ottoman army or *Harbiye* in the genocide,⁹⁰ Enver Pasha sent orders to all military commanders, instructing them to stay, in principle, outside the *tehcir* affairs, but then also asking them to give support to the civilian authorities, if demanded.⁹¹ Talaat Bey did the same by sending similar instructions to governors in provinces, underlining that they should undertake their task independently of the armies in their areas, and ask for their support only if and when necessary. We know that Mahmud Kamil Pasha, commander of the 3rd Army of the Eastern provinces during the *tehcir*, proved to be notorious in supporting the governors of his area of command, which also included the province of Trabzon.⁹² At times, he even put pressure on the governors to swiftly complete the *tehcir* even under most deplorable conditions and at any cost, apparently leaving Tahsin Bey, the Governor of Erzurum, in a state of devastation.⁹³ Cemal Pasha, the Commander of the 4th Army in the Syrian provinces, at times personally resisted certain orders and tried to implement the deportation in his area in as orderly a manner as possible along with certain commanders and governors working with him. However, to say nothing of his other problematic attitude in respect of the conversion and assimilation of Armenian children,⁹⁴ they were eventually forced either to comply with the orders or some military and administrative personnel were removed from their positions.⁹⁵ Some military commanders such as Halil Bey (Kut) and Ali İhsan Bey (Sabis) went further and, with detachments under their command, personally contributed to the destruction.⁹⁶ The intelligence bureau of the Ottoman General Staff, i. e., under Colonel Seyfi (Düzgören) also collaborated with others in macro level planning and the organization of the deportation

⁸⁹ *Dadrian/Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 282, 323; *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, passim. Compare *Kaiser*, Shukru Bey, p. 182.

⁹⁰ For two early works on the issue, see *Dadrian*, *Role of the Turkish Military*, p. 257–88.

⁹¹ For the order, see the reference in *Akçam*, *Young Turks' Crime*, p. 187.

⁹² For Mahmud Kamil Pasha's harsh instructions, and support of governors' even harsher measures and atrocious acts as revealed by the case of Dr. Reşid in Diyarbakır region, see *Kaiser*, *Extermination of Armenians*, p. 238–246. Compare *Akçam*, *Young Turks' Crime*, p. 169–170.

⁹³ See *Kaiser*, Tahsin Uzer; *Kaiser*, *Kemah Massacres*.

⁹⁴ *Kurt*, *A Rescuer*, pp. 221–245.

⁹⁵ For Cemal Pasha's stand in this context, see *Kaiser*, *Regional Resistance*, p. 173–218. Compare *Çiçek*, p. 114–141.

⁹⁶ *Sorgun*, p. 204; *Dadrian*, *Türk Kaynaklarında*, p. 60–73. *Kévorkian*, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 333–334.

and destruction.⁹⁷ Finally, the Armenian soldiers recruited for the Ottoman Army, and mostly employed in labour battalions for construction of roads and used in transportation, as well as those Armenians who worked in factories to produce logistical material and clothing for the army were subjected to massacres at different stages of the operation.⁹⁸ All this clearly reveals that the Ottoman armies in the field and the *Harbiye* and the General Staff at the tables in Istanbul collaborated at various levels with the CUP and its SO throughout the operation.⁹⁹

“SO Çetes” or Militia Bands

We know that local Kurdish tribal regiments and bands as well as the Circassian militias, who joined the military operations along the borders in the Eastern front prior to the decision for deportation in April, also participated in the atrocities that took place during the process.¹⁰⁰ Similarly, including the militia bands under the prominent İttihadist *fedais* such as Çerkes Ahmed, Reşid, and Yakub Cemil, there were numerous bands locally formed by the leading members of the CUP local branches, responsible secretaries, and some of the CUP MPs that were also actively involved in the genocide.

The sources particularly emphasize that many of these bands operated either under Dr Şakir’s SO of destruction or they carried out atrocities in close cooperation with it. As understood from locally based analyses such as the works of Raymond Kévorkian and Hilmar Kaiser, majority of them, particularly those in the provinces of Erzurum, Van, Bitlis and Trabzon had already participated in SO operations and, some, even in actual combats from September 1914 onward.¹⁰¹ Various accounts of numerous witnesses and observers pointing to them and the new ones formed specifically for the *tehcir* with this name show the apparent persistence of this deeper structure in terms of its leadership at local level and of the human source employed in these units. Neither did they refrain from presenting themselves in terms of their affiliation with the SO.¹⁰²

⁹⁷ Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 185.

⁹⁸ Ample evidence and records exist on this. For a useful summary, see Akçam, *İnsan Hakları*, p. 282–286; Akçam, *Review Essay*, p. 59–72 ff. Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, p. 311 ff.

⁹⁹ Lieutenant Colonel Stange wrote from Erzurum to his superiors on 23 August 1915: “The deportation and annihilation of the Armenians have been decided upon by the Young Turk Committee in Istanbul, organized well, and carried out by members of the army and the volunteer bands. For this task, members of the Committee have been present here, on the spot of event.” *Gust*, p. 116–117, 412.

¹⁰⁰ Cemil, p. 55 ff.

¹⁰¹ For detailed accounts of these bands, see particularly, Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, *passim*.

¹⁰² Kévorkian, *Armenian Genocide*, *passim*; Dadrian/Akçam, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, *passim*.

It is interesting to note that even Tahsin Bey, the governor of Erzurum, who had previously worked closely with the former SO and its chief Dr Şakir before April, sent his complaints to Talaat Bey already on 15 April, concerning the atrocities that the SO bands were committing against the civilian Armenians. He sent another complaint later, on 28 July 1915, i.e. during the *tehcir*, requesting the halt of such atrocities committed by the “bands that emerged everywhere under the name of *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*.”¹⁰³ This is indeed puzzling since it is hard to believe that he was not aware of the reality behind these atrocities. Here, we are left with the possibilities that either the real mission of Dr Şakir and his new SO was kept secret even from Tahsin Bey, or that he was simply playing the innocent, trying cunningly to leave a paper trail behind in case of a future accusation of his being complicit with the perpetrators of these massacres committed in his province.¹⁰⁴

Let us remember at this point the statement by Rıza Bey as to an apparent “confusion” over the fact that there were indeed “two” SOs.¹⁰⁵ Despite the fact that his two SOs do not correspond to the same time-span (one of them being the already-abolished former SO), his emphasis on the existence of another “organization” (*teşkilat*) is crucial for our discussion. To him, this “other” organization was formed by the mobilization of local elements who were mostly attached to the local police and gendarmerie in the absence of trained personnel to administer the process of deportation in an orderly manner in the provinces, or were illegally used by the local authorities as bands to carry out atrocities. To Rıza Bey, this second organization was also called “*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*,” and these “local affairs” had nothing to do with his SO, the former one. He was right in terms of the fact that the SO that he was an active member of until April 1915 no longer existed as such. However, we now know that what he thinks (or tries to give an impression) was a “confusion” was not the case at all for those people at the centre of the new SO. This was in fact the very reality of the SO of destruction: these local elements were mobilized with wide scale anti-Armenian agitation and employed in *çetes* locally formed mostly by the CUP branches for the destruction, and they worked in coordination with the new SO of Dr Şakir, as well as with the direct knowledge of Talaat Bey, the Minister of Interior.¹⁰⁶ Rıza Bey also

¹⁰³ *Dadrian/Akçam, Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 238. For Tahsin Bey’s crucial accounts concerning Dr. Şakir and his SO in the context of *tehcir*, see *Akçam, Young Turks’ Crime*, p. 415.

¹⁰⁴ I thank Hilmar Kaiser for bringing this latter possibility to my attention. See *Kaiser, Tahsin Uzer*. Kaiser refers to archival documentation that points to Tahsin Bey’s protecting some district governors like Abdülkadir Bey and local figures such as Cafer Bey (Ebulhindili), who personally commanded their bands in massacring the Armenians during the *tehcir* operation. See *Kaiser, Kemah Massacres; Kaiser, A Man for All Regions*. Compare *Kévorkian, Armenian Genocide*, p. 291–294.

¹⁰⁵ See *Dadrian/Akçam, Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 397.

¹⁰⁶ Tahsin Bey made similar remarks concerning the existence of Dr. Şakir’s SO: “Afterward [i.e. after the April changes], there was a different Special Organization that was subject to the orders of Bahaeddin Şakir Bey, which is to say that he would send off telegrams here and there that he would sign “Head of the Special Organization” (...) He was in communication with both the Porte and the Ministry of War. During the period of the deportations (...)”

remained silent on the fact that many of these bands consisted of convicted criminals released from prisons, and deserters of previous volunteer units, with simply some being bandits. Most of these had already been operating within the former SO.

The reappearance here of former SO *çetes* aside, the mobile gendarmerie and the local police with their new compositions were also incorporated in the *tehcir* and destruction operation, which was run jointly by the Internal Ministry, the CUP, and the SO.¹⁰⁷

Official and Civilian Involvement and Complicity

During the operation, through the call for *cihat*, effective anti-Armenian propaganda and agitation for potential pillage and looting,¹⁰⁸ the nation-wide CUP party organization and the new SO of Dr Şakir pushed all their means and power to associate the wide Muslim public and the Kurdish tribal elements in particular with the systematic massacres and destruction of the Armenians. Under such an atmosphere of religious and nationalist zeal and terror, hundreds of such local units of various size assembled temporarily and disbanded afterward did not necessarily act directly as the SO units proper. This applied primarily to the elite militias and certain prominent *fedais* that volunteered specifically as the upper layer of command as Dr Şakir's close associates. Constituting the core functionaries of the SO, some of these were particularly crucial in organizing the tribal units and bands and mobilizing them for the destruction.¹⁰⁹

It is, therefore, imperative to draw attention here to the nature of this new organization. Unlike the former one, it appears that this new SO, i. e. the "SO of destruction" at large had no rigid formal institutional structure and hierarchy, apart from the core units and functionaries referred to above. It operated as an amalgam or a configuration of all parties directed by the leading elite operatives of the SO towards a common goal as a predatory collaboration. All those bands organized by CUP local branches as well as some influential figures of local elite – urban, rural and tribal – were, thus, incorporated into this larger organization of destruction at an operational

Bahaeddin Şakir Bey [had] two cipher machines, so that he could communicate with both the Porte and the Ministry of War." [Translation by Akçam]. See *Akçam*, *Young Turks' Crime*, p. 415. Talat Pasha himself writes: "I opposed to the full implementation of this law (i. e. the Law of Deportation). Gendarmeries were totally, and the police were partially transferred to the service of the army; they were replaced by militias. I knew that, if the deportation was to be undertaken in these ways, it would yield awful consequences." See *Kabacalı*, p. 81. Compare *Kaiser*, Shukru Bey, p. 178; *Gust*, p. 39, 69–70; *Refik*, p. 44–45; *Rogan*, p. 160, 173.

¹⁰⁷ Compare *Hanioğlu*, p. 271. *Erickson*, *Osmanlılar ve Ermeniler*, p. 308.

¹⁰⁸ Hilmar Kaiser mentions the distribution of the plunder in the Kemah district as three shares among the perpetrators, the local authorities and the CUP. *Kaiser*, *Kemah Massacres*, p. 27–28.

¹⁰⁹ For Hilmi Bey's relations with the Balabans in the region of Erzincan and Erzurum, see *Özger*.

level.¹¹⁰ This also reveals the character of the broad participation in the operation of the Muslim public, in some cases, even with the indirect support of the local Jewry.¹¹¹ One of the most crucial aspects of the deportation and destruction operation was, perhaps, this very collaboration, which occurred as comprehensively and discreetly as possible.

Together with his close associates and operatives, Dr Şakir's skilful management of the whole operation through both written coded telegrams and oral instructions, would give an impression that he and, in Tahsin Bey's phrase, "the bands that appeared everywhere under the name of SO" were operating on their own initiative, independently of the Ottoman government or any official institution.¹¹² The truth, however, was that Dr Şakir's interlocutor in the government was Talaat Bey as the Interior Minister. His collaborators in the field were administrative authorities who were appointed by Talaat Bey –sometimes upon Dr Şakir's request– as part of the operation from among those loyal Ittihadists, who were willing to participate in the scheme (like Cevdet Bey, Dr Reşit Bey, Mustafa Abdülhalık Bey, Sabit Bey, Abdülkadir Bey).¹¹³ The same was true for certain military commanders such as Mahmud Kamil Pasha, Ali İhsan Bey and Halil Bey. Some governors who resisted or rejected the destruction were removed from their posts in the areas of operation (such as Celal Bey of Aleppo and Konya, Şükrü Bey of Antep, Mazhar Bey of Ankara). There were even cases of some lower level district governors who resisted or rejected the scheme of destruction in their localities being murdered.¹¹⁴ Dr Şakir's working closely with the governors such as Tahsin Bey in Erzurum from the outset of the *tehcir*, and Cemal Azmi Bey of Trabzon, indicates that he was not only the actual coordinator of the destruction of the Armenians but he was also actively taking part in the organization and planning of the *tehcir* operations in the Eastern provinces.¹¹⁵ Kaiser points

¹¹⁰ For diverse motivations of "ordinary peoples" who were actively involved in the genocide, see the useful work by Kurt, Antep 1915.

¹¹¹ Refik, p. 35. Compare Kieser, Talaat Pasha, p. 180.

¹¹² The policy or tactic of the Committee was to attribute the responsibility to these bands, which were in fact organized and mobilized by the Committee itself, and this was already reported by the German ambassador in Istanbul, Wangenheim, as well as other officials to their Ministries. See Gust, p. 105, 108, 115, 117, 240.

¹¹³ See Kaiser, Regional Resistance, p. 193; Kaiser, Tahsin Uzer; Kaiser, A Man for all Regions; Kurt, Antep 1915, p. 54–55, 93. For the mechanism, see also Akçam, İnsan Hakları, p. 269–278. Compare Balakian, p. 80 ff; Refik, p. 28; Kévorkian, Armenian Genocide, p. 246–247.

¹¹⁴ Akçam, Ermeni Meselesi p. 161–162. Compare Gerçek; Kaiser, Scenes from Angora, p. 141–166.

¹¹⁵ See Kaiser, Kemah Massacres, p. 13, 16; Kaiser, A Man for All Regions. For another reference to Cemal Azmi Bey's direct participation in *tehcir* and destruction through the band under his command (presumably acted in the name of the SO, see Bilgi, Ahmed Avni Paşa p. 532–533.

out that he was doing this as an influential party commissar and a Red Crescent physician.¹¹⁶

It would be wrong to think, however, that Dr Şakir and his new SO were behind most of the atrocities that were committed in Anatolian provinces, transforming the deportation into an act of destruction. I have already emphasized that the primary, if not exclusively, area of operation for the SO was the Eastern provinces and the province of Trabzon. One should also not forget that the CUP centre (i. e. Dr Nazım and Talaat Bey) sent party secretaries, inspectors or commissars to provinces to participate actively in the actual organization of the deportation. In close collaboration with the local CUP branches and the elite, some of them acted as the leaders of their bands, directly involving in the atrocities. One cannot rule out categorically the possibility that some of these party members might have operated not necessarily as organic agents of the SO, but directly as CUP operatives particularly in western provinces. There is no doubt that some did the same in the name of the SO in order to further increase the already great terror generated by their actions on the Muslim populace, thus pushing the latter towards the violence perpetrated. It is highly likely that the same applies to the Syrian and Mosul provinces for the atrocities occurring in the last phase of the destruction from late months of 1915 onwards. Further research is needed to clarify where these diverse agencies collaborated with, and, under what circumstances they merged with the SO, thus, becoming its organic functionaries.

Furthermore, alongside this centrally coordinated structure, we also observe another mechanism or piece of machinery that operated for the most part autonomously in provinces. We know that Cemal Pasha insisted particularly on the initial stages of the *tehcir* operation being carried out in his area of command in as orderly and “civilized” a manner as possible. In many instances neither deportation nor destruction took place entirely under the full control of the centrally coordinated operational structure.¹¹⁷ Yet, this lack of a complete control often meant even more excessive levels of violence, increasing the degree of destruction beyond any limits. Both Kemal Bey of Boğazlıyan district and particularly Dr Reşid Bey of Diyarbakir province were personally engaged in the destruction of the Armenian population of their districts, sometimes uncontrollably exceeding the limits predicted by the centre. Perhaps to the satisfaction of Dr Şakir, and, seemingly at least, pushing the limits of their authority, they turned the whole “tehcir” process into one of complete extermination.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁶ *Kaiser*, *Kemah Massacres*, p. 11–12.

¹¹⁷ See *Kaiser*’s works cited in this study.

¹¹⁸ *Kaiser*, *Extermination of Armenians*. Compare *Akçam*, *Young Turks’ Crime*, p. 208 ff; *Balakian*, *Armenian Golgotha*, p. 135–136, 140; *Bleda*, p. 73–84; *Bilgi*, *Dr. Mehmed*, p. 77–114.

In Lieu of Conclusion

To recapitulate, the present analysis shows that the SO that was reactivated on 3 August 1914 as a counterinsurgency organization, became an instrument of the CUP by the beginning of the deportations of the Armenians in April 1915. It was reorganized for the last time in its known history as the revival of its *komitadji* tradition. Upon the apparent failure of the guerrilla warfare undertaken in the first months of the World War I, the Central Committee of the CUP, the nucleus of “revolutionary organization,” spurred by Dr Şakir, brought back paramilitary violence or *çetecilik* as a core function. As part of this reorganization, the last strategic change was undertaken on 5 April, by splitting the SO into two separate bodies on two different tracks and missions. The official and legitimate one under the Ministry of War of Enver Pasha was named OEA, and it seemingly focused only on external operations. The other, the unlawful and criminal one, which existed only informally and unofficially (like all clandestine criminal organizations of this type), remained entirely in the hands of the Committee, i. e. the CUP. Cooperating organically with, and acting as an agent of the Ottoman government mainly through the Ministry of Interior of Talaat Bey,¹¹⁹ it continued as an undercover operational body with its militias and bands aimed specifically at the destruction of the Armenians under the guise of *tehcir* or deportation.

With the active support of the CUP Central Committee, the SO under Dr Şakir assumed once more a paramilitary character, and carried out the *tehcir* and destruction in absolute freedom, without interference from, but with the support of the Ottoman army. It did so in the ways they knew best, particularly in the Eastern provinces considered as the core historic lands of the Armenians and the territorial heart of the ‘Armenian Question’. Another point to note is that, with the April 1915 changes, the new SO returned to its pre-August 1914 position. As of this date, the SO stopped being, as Safi describes, an “official and covered” component of the Ottoman army fighting against the Russian forces in the Eastern front.¹²⁰ It evolved into an “unlawful and immoral/criminal” organization directed jointly by the CUP and its government towards a task of a criminal nature.¹²¹

The core area of operation of the SO was primarily the Eastern Anatolian provinces of the empire. Now, their central goal was to ‘solve’ the Armenian Question that had recently condensed in these provinces. The principal agents of the operation coordinated by Dr Şakir in person in the field were firstly the provincial governors under

¹¹⁹ *Yalçın*, Tanıdıklarım, p. 49–50. Compare *Kaiser*, Extermination of Armenians, p. 198–211; *Gust*, p. 111–112. As for Talat Bey’s central position in the *tehcir* and destruction, see *Bey*, Felaket Günleri, p. 72; *Birgen*, p. 257–258.

¹²⁰ *Safi*, Üç Tarz-ı Çete, p. 85–105.

¹²¹ As Ahmed Refik notes, in case of a rebellion, the only legitimate action that a government could take would be to “punish only those whose acts against the government are confirmed; but, the Ittihadists wanted to destroy the Armenians, and, by this, getting rid of the question of *Vilâyât-ı Sütte* (i. e. Armenian Question). (...) These *Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* bands carried out the greatest atrocities during the Armenian catastrophe.” *Refik*, p. 27.

the direction of Talaat Bey, and those influential party members such as responsible secretaries, the commissars and the inspectors working directly under the Central Committee of the CUP. Composed mostly of the Kurds, Circassians and Turks, the operational units, the militias, paramilitary bands and locally organized thugs and bandits, mobile gendarmeries, the police, tribal regiments and bands, as well as the ordinary masses were all provoked and oftentimes directly invited to carry out atrocities and massacres through anti-Armenian propaganda, agitation and calls for *cihat*.¹²² In other words, the all-powerful CUP and its government succeeded in making a significant portion of the Muslim population of the empire their partners in the resulting destruction and genocide.¹²³ In this sense, it would not be wrong to see the very participation of the wider public in the atrocities as a calculated part and parcel of the *tehcir* and destruction operation.

At this point, it is hardly a surprise to see those central figures of this amalgam shaped by Dr Şakir and his friends in close coordination with the functionaries of local CUP branches, still referring to themselves as ‘SO’. With the OEA arrangements of 5 April, the greater portion of the responsibility for the destruction can be placed on, naturally, the CUP. It was, after all, the central committee of the CUP, which had militarized itself once again as an underground organization, carrying out highly politicized acts of crime via its militias and bands. As for the so-called notion of ‘resettlement’ so often depicted in Turkish nationalist historiography as the principal aim of the whole *tehcir* operation, when those Armenian survivors who, at death’s door, reached the areas of Aleppo and Zor in the provinces of Syria and Mosul, they were to be systematically subjected to a final destruction in 1916. The principal actors of this last operation were the director of *İşkân-ı Aşâir ve Muhacirîn Müdüriyeti* (Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants / İAMM) Şükrü Bey (Kaya) and his deputy in the Aleppo region, Abdülahad Nuri Bey. Working directly under the Ministry of Interior, and cooperating with the newly appointed governor of Aleppo, Mustafa Abdülhalık Bey, they were there supposedly for the re-settlement of the Armenians, but, instead, functioned as another operational tool of the genocide.¹²⁴

If I am correct in my attempt at re-historicization and re-contextualization of the role of the SO in the Armenian genocide, we should also reconsider in this context the post-genocide Court-Martial trials in Istanbul. In fact, the indictment and ordinance of the trials identified both the problem as well as the perpetrators correctly. With an expected dose of anti-CUP sentiment and bringing to bear documentation and evi-

¹²² *Balakian*, *Armenian Golgotha*, p. 144–45. For an interesting observation and evaluation of the call for *cihat* and the danger that its public perception implied under such conditions, Şakir, p. 103, 106–108.

¹²³ *Dadrian/Akçam*, *Tehcir ve Taktik*, p. 235. Compare *Rogan*, p. 160.

¹²⁴ For the personal perplexity of the German consul of Aleppo during this period, Rössler, who discovered either through Şükrü Bey or Nuri Bey that the actual aim was destruction instead of resettlement, see his letter to Lepsius dated 1921 upon the first publication of Andonian’s book. *Akçam*, *Talat Paşa Telgrafları*, p. 260. Compare *Kaiser*, Shukru Bey, p. 217–219.

dence they gathered from various sources, they insisted on their point. The judges and those taking part in the public debates singled out the Ittihadist mentality, the CUP Central Committee and the CUP government as the prime perpetrators. For these perpetrators, the final solution to the Armenian Question was to dispose of the Armenians. Whatever the political motivations of the judges conducting the trials, as historians, we can now confidently argue that they were right in their conclusions.

However, they had difficulty in understanding certain details as well as the essence of the April changes that we, historians, still have difficulties to decipher. The basic reason for this difficulty, as far as I can assess, was that the OEA continued until 1918 to use simultaneously the terminology of the “*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*” for both the organization (meaning OEA) and its operatives.¹²⁵ The ambiguity over the existence of a SO during the *tehcir* was created purposefully by CUP functionaries both to defend themselves and confuse the judges. It is now clear that the judges were despairingly trying the SO of destruction (post-April SO) and their genocidal activities by reference to the pre-April structure of the former SO and their bands! In short, to the judges of the Court-Martials of 1919–1921, the SO as the prime perpetrator of most of atrocities during the *tehcir* was the same institutional SO that continued uninterrupted from August 1914 to until 1918. I have argued in the present study that this confusion has continued up until the present, and still dominates the scholarly debates that have long come to a deadlock, only furthering the confusion (Figure 1).

Considering the new evidence and re-reading of the sources, I interpret the argument forwarded by some CUP members and the operatives of the former SO that there might have been “two SOs” in a new context. Yes, there were indeed two parallel ‘SOs’ in activity after April 1915, one was the OEA, which seems to have followed a different path and, thus, from a practical point of view, remains outside of our discussion. The other one, on the other hand, *is* the one that directly relates to the issue of genocide. It was this incarnation that was re-organized and re-activated specifically for the destruction of the Armenians in the Eastern provinces. As I hope has been demonstrated clearly thus far, this SO was not an entirely new institutional body. Rather, it was the reorganization of one portion of the former body of the SO, which, after the split of April 1915, remained in the control of the CUP with most of its leading operatives and the well-established practice of militia bands. Having no official and formal institutional body as such, this SO, I conclude, appears to be a predatory organization composed of a number of agencies successfully mobilized for the same goal. The organization carried out the new mission, the destruction of Armenians, through coordinated efforts of Dr Şakir in the field, and Talaat Bey and Dr Nazım Bey in Istanbul, the last two representing respectively the Interior Ministry and the CUP Central Com-

¹²⁵ See *BOA* (Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi). *DH. ŞFR.*, 75/71, for a telegram sent from the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate for General Security to the Governor of Edirne in April 1917, which shows that the term “*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*” was still in use: “*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa* efradı mesârîfi için taleb edilen meblağ derdest-i irsaldır. Fi 7 Nisan sene 1333.” I thank Taner Akçam for providing me with this document. For further examples, see *Safî*, Ottoman Special Organization, p. 236.

mittee (Figure 2). Only in this sense can one speak, with all due caution and informed reservation, of a sort of relationship between the two SOs: they were indeed two separate offshoots of the same historical tradition and practice of the “Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa” at large.

TEHCİR AND TEŞKİLÂT-I MAHSUSA (OLD NARRATIVES)

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa
(30 November 1913)
CUP + Harbiye + Dahiliye
Paramilitary organization
Çete/militia (harassment and terror
on Greeks and Bulgarians)
“Unofficial/unlawful/ clandestine”

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa
(2-3 August 1914 – 1918)
CUP + Harbiye + Dahiliye
Wartime counter-insurgency
organization
Çete/militia (espionage,
agitation and guerilla warfare
against Russia)
“Official and secret”

Variant 1
Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa
(5 April 1915 onwards)
CUP + Dahiliye + Harbiye
Çete/militia “butchers’ troops” as
destruction units (destruction of
Armenians)
“(Official) but unlawful and criminal”

Variant 2
(April 1915 onwards)
Independent and individual acts &
involvements of “(former) members
of Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa”
(Dr Şarkir & his friends, and bandits)
“Unlawful and criminal”

TEHCİR and İMHA (DESTRUCTION)
INSTITUTIONAL
(Direct governmental responsibility)
(Dadrian&Kevorkian&Akçam&Kaiser)

INDIVIDUAL CRIMES
(No institutional responsibility)
(Reformulation of 1919-21 *Divan-ı Harb-i Örfi* Defense: Levy + (Safi&Tetik))

Figure 1

TEHCİR AND TEŞKİLÂT-I MAHSUSA (ALTERNATIVE APPROACH)

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa
(30 November 1913)
CUP + Harbiye + Dahiliye
Paramilitary organization
Çete/militia (harassment/terror on
Greeks and Bulgarians)
“Unofficial/unlawful/ clandestine”

Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa
(2-3 August 1914 – 5 April 1915)
CUP + Dahiliye + Harbiye
Wartime counter-insurgency
organization
Çete/militia (espionage&agitation/gue-
rilla warfare against Russia)
“Official and secret”

Umûr-ı Şarkıye
Dairesi (UŞD) (Safi&Tetik)
(5 April 1915 – 15 November 1918)
Harbiye (Enver Pasha)
Secret Intelligence Service?
“External espionage and
Propaganda” (only?)
“Official and secret”

direct
operation

collaboration

“Teşkilât-ı Mahsusa”
(5 April 1915 onwards)
CUP (Dr. Nazım) + Dahiliye (Talat Bey + his
Governors) + SO units (Dr. Şakir)
Criminal organization
“Unlawful and criminal”

TEHCİR and İMHA (DESTRUCTION)
(Direct Responsibility: CUP +
Government + Harbiye)

Figure 2

Zor District During the Initial Months of the Armenian Genocide

By Hilmar Kaiser

For decades, research on the Armenian Genocide focused on religious fanaticism as a key motivating factor. A second common theme were parallels between the annihilation of Ottoman Armenians and the Shoah. Authors presented the ruling ‘Committee of Union and Progress’ (CUP) as a unified party while the ‘Special Organization’ (*Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa*) appeared as an all-powerful party-controlled armed organization in which physicians played a prominent role. Studies claiming to employ a comparative approach discussing both genocides reinforced this tendency by downplaying structural differences.¹ Such narratives put aside that Armenians had lived for hundreds of years among Muslims or that most survivors did so in Arab Muslim communities. Abductions, assimilation, and rapes received little attention by many studies although they were key elements of the crime.

Recent research on the Armenian Genocide challenged these views. Since 1994, research on Ottoman demographic policies demonstrated that Islam was not a key factor in itself. Officials in the Ottoman Ministry of Interior considered religion, language, social-structure, economic stratification, and the demographic composition of an area while making decisions. The Armenian Genocide formed part of a wider CUP program. The party wanted to create a society dominated by Turkish speaking Sunni Muslims.² The extermination of Armenians provided an avenue for this vision. Armenian assets like real estate, tools, farms, and financial resources financed deportations and the settlement of Muslims and those Non-Muslims deemed suitable for assimilation.³ Case studies showed the genocide was a process that did not follow a blueprint but evolved over time. Successive decisions marked shifts in policy but not in the overall goal.⁴ These decisions were often the result of negotiations between CUP members. Provincial governors often took a role in radicalizing policies. In 2010, a study on the Ottoman Fourth Army region demonstrated that the image of a unified party and military was untenable.⁵ Further research

¹ For one example, see *Dadrian*, Prefiguration.

² *Adanır/Kaiser*, Migration; *Dündar*, Modern Türkiye’nin.

³ *Kaiser*, Armenian Property.

⁴ For an introduction see *Kaiser*, Genocide.

⁵ *Kaiser*, Regional Resistance. For further discussion on Fourth Army resistance see *Çiçek*, War and State Formation; *Kaiser*, Shukru Bey; *Kaiser*, Armenian Deportees; *Kaiser*, Humanitärer Widerstand.

showed that governors and military commanders opposed central government policies and more radical officials as well. At times, opposition by officers, officials, and Muslim citizens took on an organized form. While such opposition could not stop the genocide, it provided a chance for survival for many Armenians.⁶

This study explores the outlined themes in discussing Ottoman deportation policies and the independent district of Zor during the first months of the genocide, which shows significant differences to what happened in the eastern provinces.⁷ The Ottoman deportation program started in May 1915. With few exceptions, the deportees were driven towards the Arabian desert. Zor became a so-called ‘destination area’ where Armenian deportees would supposedly settle down. A year later, in the summer of 1916 the Ottoman authorities massacred practically all Armenians in the district who had survived starvation, violence, and diseases. The atrocities formed the core of groundbreaking work by Raymond Kevorkian on what he defined as the ‘Second Phase’ of the Armenian Genocide.⁸ Since then the 1916 massacres have remained in the focus of research on Zor. The initial deportations to Zor, however, received little attention. Yet a study of this period can provide new insights in the development and goals of the deportation program. It will become apparent that the government abandoned its own guidelines as conditions demanded. Given the lack of planning and coordination at the center, the Armenian Genocide was as much more a product of improvisation than it has been often assumed.

The first Armenians arriving at Zor came from Zeitun, near Marash. In March 1915, Armenian deserters and militants had clashed with Ottoman authorities. The army quickly subdued all resistance but that was not enough. Instead, it viewed the incident as an opportunity to ‘pacify’ the area by displacing Armenians and settling Muslim immigrants. Many men had to walk to Zor while their families departed for Konia province. The operation lacked planning and the authorization of the central authorities.⁹ On 24 April 1915, the Ottoman government started an empire-wide persecution of Armenian leaders. The same day, Minister of Interior Talaat decreed that Armenians from the Cilician littoral, Adana, Sis, Hadjin, and Zeitun had to go to Zor, Urfa, and the desert fringe in Aleppo province.¹⁰ Djemal Pasha in charge of the Fourth Army in Syria complied but called for a better coordination. His officers should manage the expulsions and settlement of Muslims in the emptied places. He was willing to provide provisional financing and assistance by his officers. It was imperative that Armenian families would not face misery. For the purpose, a new administration should be formed at Aleppo. Aleppo province questioned the scheme in pointing

⁶ Kaiser, Extermination.

⁷ Kaiser, Financing: 7–31; Kaiser, Extermination.

⁸ Kévorkian, Sort des déportés.

⁹ Kaiser, Regional Resistance, 176–182; Arkun, Zeytun.

¹⁰ Cumhurbaşkanlık Osmanlı Arşivi, Dahiliye Nezâreti, Şifre Kalemî (hereafter: DH.ŞFR) 52–93, Talaat to Djemal, Apr. 24, 1915; 52–112, DH to Marash, Aleppo, Adana, Apr. 25, 1915.

out that the desert fringe was insecure due to tribal assaults. Moreover, dispersing the Armenians in villages would amplify religious antagonism. At Bab the local population, indeed, attacked Armenians deportees in August 1915. Djemal stressed that all Armenians were compatriots and no harm must come to them because of a political, not military, necessity. Authorities had to provide all necessities to assure the people's well-being. The Ministry of Interior had deported the Armenians because they supposedly might become a danger in the future. Muslims were to settle in the vacated places. The central authorities accepted Djemal's call for coordination and appointed Ahmed Eyub as head of a new Immigrant Directorate at Aleppo. Although the demographic program fell under the authority of the civil authorities, Djemal's guidelines showed that he insisted on the final say. The commander also warned that substantial sums were needed. Critically, he had made it clear that the banishment was not a military necessity but a political program.¹¹

Despite Djemal's orders the deportations from Zeitun to Zor were marked by the murder of men, rapes and abductions albeit on a smaller scale than what became the norm in the eastern provinces. Many died of diseases and exhaustion once their money and supplies had been spent. The authorities provided little if any assistance.¹² Right from the start of deportations it became clear that there was little coordination and hardly any assistance for the deportees. Zor Governor Suad, fluent in English and French, was an educated Arab with years of experience in Egypt. He wondered what to do when he learnt that about 1,000 Armenian households with perhaps 5,000 persons were on their way from Marash to his district. No housing was available throughout the district. For the moment, he requested 2,000 LT for purchasing tents and the construction of huts. Meanwhile Marash Governor Mumtaz reported that he had dispatched 1,563 Armenians to Zor and that another 804 would follow. He, too, lacked funds and there could be no talk of providing for the deportees' well-being. Thus, he suggested to stop the deportations. For his part, Adana Governor Hakki was sending around 1,600 households to Aleppo province but still needed orders from the military. Aleppo Governor Djelal had neither money nor specific information of what was expected of him.¹³

Talaat approved of the 2,000 LT for Zor but the sum could not meet the needs of the increasing number of deportees. 1,400 Armenians had set out from Aintab for Zor. To feed the people, Suad asked for military supplies and, again, more money. Looking for some lasting solution Suad proposed the settlement of Armenians in larger villages along the Euphrates. So far preparations had been made to provide for 250 Ar-

¹¹ *Kaiser*, Regional Resistance, p. 183–184, 186. Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv (AA-PA), Türkei 183/38, A 28019, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, Sept. 3, 1915.

¹² AA-PA, Türkei 183/37, A 23232, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, July 17, 1915; Türkei 183/38, A 24658, Laura Möhring, n. p., n. d., copy enclosure in Schuchardt to AA, Frankfurt, Aug. 20, 1915.

¹³ DH.ŞFR 469–127, Suad to DH, Zor, May 5, 1915; 469–133, Mumtaz to DH, Marash, May 5, 1915; 470–58, Mumtaz to DH, Marash, May 8, 1915; 470–74, Djelal to Talaat, Aleppo, May 9, 1915; 470–115, Hakki to DH, Adana, May 13, 1915.

menian families at Zor city. Smaller villages were usually only seasonal settlements housing semi-nomadic tribes and thus unfit for Armenians. So far, the central authorities had prohibited the creation of new Armenian villages.¹⁴

Suad's call for military supplies might have been discussed before with the army. In a missive to Talaat, Djemal put his views on record. He agreed that all Armenians had to leave the Zeitun area, Hadjin, Dortjol, and Hasanbeili. Moreover, authorities had to detain members of Armenian political parties. Djemal reiterated that any suffering of women and children had to be avoided. The military would provide transport, provisions, and shelter to the Armenian deportee caravans. Pregnant women, sick and invalid persons as well as their caretakers were temporarily exempted. Given Ahmed Eyub's bad track record, Djemal called for new appointments. Aleppo province still lacked funds for provisioning the people. Djemal warned that the goal of the banishment was not to let the people die on the road or treat them like wild animals. The authorities also needed regulations for the protection of the Armenians' rights to their real estate as well as for their settlement.¹⁵ Djelal echoed these statements by pointing out that Aleppo city was filled with poor and sick Armenian families. The people lacked shelter and were hungry. Even consuls of allied and friendly nations were trying to find shelter for the deportees. 95% of the arrivals needed aid at a considerable expense for the government. The province lacked arable land and other resources for a massive settlement program. Djelal warned against the spread of epidemics. Thus, the people had to be sent to other provinces.¹⁶

Professing compliance with his orders, Djelal employed delaying tactics. He opposed the government's deportation policy. On 15 June 1915, he informed his superiors that so far there had been no military necessity to empty any village, including those near the coast. In a private conversation with U.S. Consul Jesse Jackson and American missionary John Merrill he denounced the deportation scheme and expressed his determination to prevent the deportation of the Armenian villages of the Musa Dagh. Djelal could rely on the support First Class Civil Inspector Hamid. Originally, the official had been in charge of an investigation into Djelal's political leanings. He then became the president of the local commission for so-called abandoned Armenian property but, in reality, coordinated deportation affairs. He also personally supported Armenian deportees and cooperated with Armenian relief organizations.¹⁷

Aleppo was a large commercial city where railways lines converged. Thus, it served as a major center for Ottoman armies on the Eastern front, in Iraq, and Palestine. De-

¹⁴ DH.ŞFR 52–257, Talaat to Zor, May 7, 1915; 471–17, [Suad] to DH, Zor, May 15.

¹⁵ DH.ŞFR 471–53, Djemal to Talaat, Jerusalem, May 17, 1915; 471–54, Djemal to Talaat, Jerusalem, May 17, 1915; 471–109, Djemal to DH, Jerusalem, May 18, 1915.

¹⁶ DH.ŞFR 471–112, Djelal to DH, Aleppo, May 19, 1915; 471–133, Djelal to DH, Aleppo, May 20, 1915; 472–31, Djemal to DH, Jerusalem, May 23, 1915; 472–49, Djelal to DH, Aleppo, May 23, 1915.

¹⁷ DH.ŞFR 475–88, Djelal to DH, Aleppo, June 15, 1915; ABC 88, Merrill, Christian-Muslim Relations, 35–36; *Shemmassian*, Humanitarian Intervention, p. 134, 136; *Kaiser*, *Shukru*, 172–174; *Sarafian*, Official Records, 585.

spite its comparably large administrative body and local resources the place was ill-prepared for the Ottoman government's deportation program. To the east, in the undeveloped desert district of Zor, the challenge hit the local authorities with greater magnitude. At Zor, Armenians from Zeitun and other areas kept arriving while Suad struggled for a sustainable solution. Having lost their land and homes, now Armenian farmers needed new land. Still, he had no permission to establish new villages. Armenians priests had begun teaching children. Thus, none of them attended government schools. The governor proposed funding new schools in order to secure instruction in Turkish. As for churches, he feared that the use of bells might create problems with the local Muslim population. Another problem was legalizing travel as otherwise many might try to escape from the region. In short, all details for the creation of viable settlements were lacking. Talaat advised that regulations were forthcoming. For the time being, the authorities should proceed as local conditions required.¹⁸ Suad did obtain permission for those Armenian deportees who engaged in transport to work along the roads between Zor, Aleppo, and Urfa as long as the authorities kept them under close watch. Similarly, the authorities had to censor the Armenian correspondence.¹⁹

On 19 June the Ministry of Interior authorized new Armenian settlements in Urfa and Zor districts. The central authorities also demanded information on the number of Armenians Zor could accommodate and where they might be settled within the district. Ideally, Armenians had to be dispersed among the local population. In case new Armenian villages would be established these had to be at least five hours distant from each other and far from strategic spots. Armenian schools were banned and the children had to attend government schools. All correspondence had to be in Turkish. What appeared to be a measure at easing conditions in Zor was in reality just a preparation for things to come. On 20 June, the government extended the deportation program to Trebizond, Harput, Sivas, and Diarbekir provinces as well as Samsun district. Now the empire's entire Armenian core area was affected and the number of deportees increased dramatically.²⁰ Constantinople was fully aware of the pending crisis at Zor as it monitored deportations. Inquiring with neighboring Urfa district, the central authorities learned that no deportees had been settled at all. Instead, deportees from Zeitun and areas further west had been marched on to Zor.²¹ In view of the incoming wave of deportees, Zor's resources were totally inad-

¹⁸ DH.ŞFR 471–139, Suad to DH, Zor, May 19, 1915; 472–65, Suad to DH, Zor, May 24, 1915; 53–123, Talaat to Zor, May 26, 1915; 472–83, [Suad] to DH, Zor, May 29, 1915; 473–70, Suad to DH, Zor, June 1, 1915.

¹⁹ DH.ŞFR 473–88, Suad to DH, Zor, June 2, 1915; 53–235, Ali Munif to Zor, June 5, 1915; 54–74, Talaat to Zor, June 20, 1915.

²⁰ DH.ŞFR 54–84, Minister to Urfa, Zor, June 21, 1915; 54–87, Minister to Trebizond, Harput, Sivas, Diarbekir, Samsun, June 20, 1915; 54–109, Ali Munif to Mosul, Zor, June 22, 1915; 54–122, Ali Munif to Haidar, Suad, June 23, 1915; 54–261, Talaat to Syria, Aleppo, Mosul, Zor, July 1, 1915.

²¹ DH.ŞFR 54–271, Minister to Mosul, Urfa, July 3, 1915; 478–99, Haidar to DH, July 4, 1915.

equate. Approximately 7,000 deportees could be settled on the banks of the Euphrates and Khabur Rivers. Some were already working for large land owners. Creating new settlements in the desert was impossible due to poor soil and the high cost of provisioning the people. In other words, most of the district was simply unfit for habitation.²²

The reports from Zor had little, if any, effect on the central authorities who kept sending Armenians into the desert. The Ministry of Interior expected the Zor authorities to make sure that Armenians would nowhere exceed ten percent of the Muslim population. In addition, Armenian settlements were banned in a 25-kilometer corridor along the Baghdad railway line which passed through one of the few habitable areas in the north of the district. On 26 June, another 9,500 deportees had arrived at Zor city. 4,000 were placed within the city while 3,000 stayed in villages and small towns. Another 5,000 were on their way. It was hard to obtain precise numbers. Thus, Suad reported also slightly lower figures of between 7,200 and 8,200 deportees at Zor. Seventy Armenians had died when river rafts had sunk. Bedouin and Tchetchen tribesmen had attacked railway construction camps and threatened the transport of military supply. Naturally, the area was unsafe for deportees as well. Suad urgently needed more gendarmes. He also tried to form a local militia but could not even arm fifty men. Now, he hoped that regular troops in transit might help out with improving public security. Given the lack of resources and protection, the district cautiously questioned the deportation program. It was doubtful that the area was fit to serve as a so-called 'destination area.' More importantly, by 7 July the number of deportees had surpassed fifteen percent of the district's registered Muslim population thereby exceeding the critical ten percent limit. Long before Armenian deportees from the newly deported regions could reach Zor, their 'destination areas' had reached its limits.²³ Nevertheless, the Ministry of Interior was unwilling to change course. All it was prepared to do was to assign new settlement areas elsewhere. This did not mean, however, that Zor was permitted to pass on its 'surplus' deportees. The ten percent directive was no longer applicable and the people had to be settled locally. Zor kept filing urgent reports informing on new arrivals from Zeitun. Deportees from Erzerum and Bitlis provinces, about 2,000 people, were approaching Rasulain in the district's north. As always, provisioning was at best doubtful. Assuming that these new arrivals were in transit, the district authorities suggested

²² DH.ŞFR 477–113, Suad to DH, Zor, June 29, 1915.

²³ DH.ŞFR 477–50, Kamil to DH, Zor, June 26, 1915; 477–112, Suad to DH, Zor, June 29, 1915; 477–113, Suad to DH, Zor, June 29, 1915; 477–112, Suad to DH, Zor, June 29, 1915; 478–62, Suad to DH, Zor, July 3, 1915; 54–308, Ali Munif to Zor, July 5, 1915; 54–315, Ali Munif to prov. and dist., July 5, 1915; 479–15, Haidar to DH, Harran, July 7, 1915; 479–22, Kamil to DH, Zor, July 7, 1915; 54–354, Minister to Zor, July 8, 1915; 54/A-24, Minister to Zor, July 18, 1915. AA-PA, Aleppo 1, No. 1405 Sekr., Rössler to Embassy, Aleppo, July 2, 1915.

to dispatch the people further on. Finally, on 12 July 1915 the Ministry of Interior stopped new deportations to Zor.²⁴

The situation in Aleppo was miserable as well. It did not help that Djemal pushed for the deportation of Armenians who had remained near the coast, about 1,950 households, once governor Djelal had been recalled and replaced by Bekir Sami. With Zor full and Aleppo province also reaching the ten percent limit, the Armenians had to be sent to Syria province. The scheme would initially cost 11,000 LT or 1,250,000 USD (2018 value). A fantastic sum given the desolate state of Ottoman finances. Djemal also warned that deportees had been attacked in the Diarbekir region north of Zor.²⁵

On 20 July, the central government ordered an empire-wide count of all Armenians, deported and non-deported. The settlement areas had also to provide detailed assessments.²⁶ Bekir Sami reported that Aleppo had settled 4,413 deportees on the fringes of the desert. About 8,400 were still in the city and awaiting deportation. The authorities estimated that about 100,000 deportees were on the way to the province. A caravan 3,000 Armenian women and children was on its way from Mardin to Zor by way of Rasulain. Bekir Sami warned that it was impossible for the deportees to provide for themselves. Since government provisions would be very costly, he proposed their transfer to bigger cities where they could find employment. At Zor, 14,770 had arrived mostly from Marash district. 3,000 were from Erzerum and Bitlis provinces. About 4,000 had been settled at Zor city and 3,500 in villages. 7,843 were still awaiting settlement. The district authorities warned that they could not settle new arrivals. Evidently, the halt of deportations to Zor was not being followed by Diarbekir province.²⁷

It seems that coordination problems induced the Ministry of Interior to enhance the importance of the small administrative unit at Aleppo. Now the few officials were put in charge of distributing deportees to the various settlement areas. Whatever plans these officials had, the military assumed its supremacy and halted on 29 July deportations from the north to Mosul province to the east of Zor. It redirected the people to Urfa and, once again, to Zor. But that was not all. Abandoning his own demographic ten percent formula, Talaat ordered the re-deportation of those Zeitun Armenians who had reached Konia to Zor.²⁸ At Aleppo, Bekir Sami kept counts of deportees. A caravan of 700 deportees from Sivas and Diarbekir had arrived at Membidj. Perhaps ten men were left among them indicating massacres along the way. More de-

²⁴ DH.ŞFR 54–381, Ali Munif to Zor, July 10, 1915; 479–73, Kamil to DH, Zor, July 10, 1915; 54–413, Ali Munif to prov. and dist., July 12, 1915.

²⁵ DH.ŞFR 477–104, Djemal to Talaat, Aleppo, June 28, 1915; 479–21, Djemal to Talaat, Aleppo, July 7, 1915.

²⁶ DH.ŞFR 54/A-51, Minister to prov. and dist., July 20, 1915; 54/A-58, Ali Munif to Mosul, Zor, July 20, 1915; 54/A-106, Minister to Aleppo, Syria, Urfa, Zor, July 25, 1915.

²⁷ DH.ŞFR 481–37, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, July 26, 1915; 481–48, Kamil to DH, Zor, July 27, 1915; 481–76, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, July 28, 1915; 481–88, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, July 29, 1915.

²⁸ DH.ŞFR 54/A-167, Talaat to Aleppo, July 29, 1915; 54/A-198, Talaat to Diarbekir, Harput, July 31, 1915; 54/A-278, Talaat to Konia, Aug. 5, 1915.

portees continued arriving but the authorities at Aleppo lacked instructions for their transfer to Syria province. Moreover, Bekir Sami wondered how many deportees he could dispatch to Mosul and Zor. He had already asked Urfa to delay dispatches to Aleppo and instead send the Armenians to Mosul and Zor. Urfa district, however, reported that deportations from Urfa towards Mosul were impossible due to lack of water and provisions. As Urfa was in imminent danger of an epidemic, any incoming caravan would be forwarded to Aleppo. The Fourth Army had provided supplies so far but now the district asked for funding from the Ministry of Interior's budget. The district had settled 9,000 deportees in Surudj and Rakka sub-districts. Still, about 1,000 deportees had been left at Urfa city. Of these about 50 to 60 people, or five to six percent, were dying each day. The governor decided to settle Armenians in villages without prior authorization. He also kept sending deportees from Harran to Mosul and from Surudj to Aleppo. Most of the deportees were starving, sick and often naked. For his part, Diarbekir governor Reshid maintained that those caravans he had sent towards Urfa and Aleppo should not be returned as this would endanger the transport of military supplies. He, nevertheless, claimed that he could send other deportees from the north towards Mosul along the very same route. The disputes became more acute on 8 August 1915 when Djemal declared that Syria province could only accommodate deportees from Adana and Aleppo provinces. Thus, caravans coming from further east had to go to Mosul and Zor. Within Aleppo province, the deportation of more than 5,000 Armenian Protestants from Aintab was imminent.²⁹ Thus, the Zor authorities' hopes to solve the problem by passing on deportees to a neighboring region had failed as the authorities in those areas employed the same tactics. Coordination between provincial and central authorities was lacking and at the same no provisions for deportees were available.

The Ministry of Interior had problems keeping track of developments. On 21 August 1915 it ordered a survey of Armenians who had arrived in the so-called destination areas and their condition. In a second order it demanded details on the numerical strength of deportee caravans, their, routing, location, as well as the number of Armenians that were being processed for imminent deportation. The matter had highest priority.³⁰ The Aleppo Directorate for Immigrants reported that 24,338 had come from Adana, Angora, Sivas, Harput, Marash and another 14,162 were deportees from within the province. Of these 23,530 had been dispatched to the so-called destination areas: 20,000 Armenians from Marash district had been sent to Urfa and Zor; 17,520 to Syria, 5,730 had been settled in Aleppo's Membedij, Maarra, and Bab sub-

²⁹ DH.ŞFR 482–36, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 2, 1915; 483–9, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 7, 1915; 483–21, Djemal to DH, Ain Sofar, Aug. 8, 1915; 483–41, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Aug. 9, 1915; 483–64, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 10, 1915; 483–98, Reshid to DH, Diarbekir, Aug. 12, 1915; 483–136, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Aug. 14, 1915; 483–137, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Aug. 14, 1915; 485–47, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 24, 1915; 485–48, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 24, 1915; 485–57, Djemal to DH, Merdjmimjon [?], Aug. 25, 1915; 486–4, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Aug. 29, 1915.

³⁰ DH.ŞFR 55–140, Subhi to Aleppo, Syria, Mosul, Urfa, Zor, Aug. 21, 1915; 55–211, Minister to Syria, Adana, Konia, Angora, Aleppo, Urfa, Zor, Marash, Aug. 25, 1915.

districts. About 14,000 deportees had remained in Aleppo city itself. 14,970 were in transit. Moreover, local authorities were in the process of deporting 15,056 Armenians from the province. These were probably deported Armenians who had remained behind in cities and other places. 1,197 Armenians out of a local population of 5,809 had been deported. Bekir Sami pointed out that the Armenian number of Catholics and Protestants remained within the acceptable limit of five percent of the resident Muslim population.³¹ Interestingly, the figures for Bab, Membidj, and Maarra closely correlated with the data recorded by the Refugee Committee of Aleppo's Armenian Prelacy. Given the cooperation between Hamid and the Refugee Committee, it seems likely that the statistics were drawn up by local Armenian relief staff who unlike Ottoman officials knew Armenian. The local program was a joint effort. Aleppo's German Consul Walter Rössler doubted, however, that the women and children dispersed in Muslim villages stood much a chance of surviving.³²

The prospects were bleak. Bekir Sami pointed out that more than 100,000 deportees were on their way from western regions. By early September 17,000 deportees in transit were staying in smaller towns. More than 20,000 deportees were along the railway line. The daily death toll along the roads within the province stood at 200–300 persons and children stood only a small chance of survival. The authorities could not bury all corpses. As housing and other resources were lacking diseases were spreading and threatened the army. The governor urged to stop deportations to Aleppo. On 9 September, 5,000 deportees, only women and children, from the eastern provinces arrived. More caravans made up of solely women and young girls were on their way to the city. Settling or deporting the helpless people was hardly an option and local Muslim men were unlikely to marry any of them. As Aleppo province could only transfer 3,000 deportees per week, Bekir Sami estimated that it would take at least a year before all deportees in transit would have left. On the other hand, he questioned the order to return deportees to Urfa. He also warned that sending more Armenian 'microbes' to Syria province might create political problems. Giving up his restraint, the governor disqualified the entire deportation program as a confused affair. It was the product of top officials who lacked understanding. The governor demanded clear directions and definitive settlement quotas for all destination areas. At the time, Talaat's former deputy Ali Munif was in Aleppo and submitted his own observations. The top official thought that women and children without a male supporter could still be dispersed in Muslim villages since it was also practiced in other regions. The Fourth Army was drafting all male deportees of military age into labor battalions thereby removing them from the control of the civil authorities. Ali Munif estimated that about 150,000 Armenians from western provinces would arrive

³¹ DH.ŞFR 485–74, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 25, 1915; 485–75, Hamid to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 25, 1915; 486–7, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 29, 1915; 486–9, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Aug. 29, 1915.

³² *Shemmassian*, 149–152. AA-PA, Türkei 183/38, A 24658, Laura Möhring, n. p. n. d., copy enclosure in Schuchardt an AA, Frankfurt, Aug. 20, 1915; Konstantinopel 169, J. No. 3594, Rössler to Embassy, June 12, 1915.

in the province. Syria province, the eastern districts of Aleppo province, and Zor district would each have to house 50,000 people. As for coordinating the deportations, Ali Munif agreed that the Aleppo deportation office could not manage the influx. Thus, the authorities needed to appoint some capable officials. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Interior tried to obtain some current data on the progress of deportations from western provinces. According to the updated numbers Aleppo province had sent 37,702 deportees to Syria by 18 September. Settlement within the province remained comparably limited with 5,700 persons. About 30,000 incoming deportees were about to leave the province. Each day the authorities were sending about 1,000 to Syria and marched off about 500 to 1,000 to Urfa, Zor, and Mosul. Recently recruited reserve gendarmes and other persons had assaulted some caravans and more than 88 offenders were in custody. Thus, no large-scale massacres had occurred and individual crime had remained at a rather low rate.³³

Urfa's statement showed that the district had received more than 30,000 deportees from Sivas, Harput, Diarbekir, and Erzerum provinces. While the authorities had sent the deportees from Marash district to Zor, they had also settled almost 5,000 deportees in Surudj and Rakka sub-districts. 1,200 Armenian women and children had remained in Urfa city in Armenian schools and church facilities because they were too sick and destitute for deportation. 50–60 of them were dying per day. In response, the Ministry of Interior instructed Urfa to send all Armenians who had not been settled as well as those who would arrive later on to Zor and Mosul. More deportee caravans kept arriving. Within days, Urfa was facing an influx of about 45,000 Armenians. The village of Surudj, their destination, had only one bakery and supplies were scarce. It was impossible to send the people along desert routes to Zor or Mosul. Thus, the authorities proposed railway transport to Rasulain for those Mosul bound and Tel Abiad station for those destined for Zor, and others possibly to Aleppo. As usual, funding did not exist.³⁴

Once the Ministry of Interior had allowed further settlement, the Zor authorities expanded their efforts. Given the lack of resources, it often meant that people were distributed without much assistance. By the end of August, 6,400 deportees were Ashara, Abu Kamal and Ana sub-districts. Another 5,000 Armenians had found some sort of housing along the banks of the Euphrates and Khabur rivers close to Der Zor city where large improvised camps had sprung up. The authorities had earmarked the remaining 8,600 deportees for surrounding villages or they would remain in the city. In addition to those 20,000 deportees along the Euphrates and those near Rasulain more Armenians kept arriving. On 1 September, 607 arrived at Zor city from the direction of Mardin and Rasulain. A week later, 43 came from Mardin and Vir-

³³ DH.ŞFR 487–85, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 5, 1915; 488–75, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 9, 1915; 488–80, Ali Munif to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 10, 1915; 56–52, Minister to prov. and dist., Sept. 16, 1915; 489–70, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 18, 1915; 490–13, Bekir Sami to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 20, 1915.

³⁴ DH.ŞFR 486–26, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Aug. 29, 1915; 55/A-146, Minister to Urfa, Sept. 8, 1915; 490–14, Haidar to DH, Urfa, Sept. 20, 1915.

anshehir by the same route. Suad demanded, again, the removal of incapable officials and the employment of three administrators for handling the deportations. More deportees were on their way from Aintab. Zor had to settle these as soon as possible and provide for those that could not be placed permanently. In other words, there was no more space left for settlement however this might have been defined. At the same time, local stocks of grain became an issue since the authorities had not only to provision the deportees. The military expected supplies as well.³⁵

Rasulain

The idea to use the railway line to Rasulain for deportations in addition to its role as a major military supply carrier demonstrated that the myth of a planned Armenian uprising played no role in the planning of the deportations. The small town of Rasulain with its nearby Tchetchen settlements was home to a large construction camp, housing workers who were building the Baghdad Railway. In July 1915 local officials confronted marauders under the control of Diarbekir governor Reshid who had invaded the area. The men were notorious for slaughtering Armenian deportees. At Rasulain they robbed locals and railway workers. When the affair became known, Reshid tried to cover up the story by accusing the local authorities of abetting Armenian militants. Railway engineers, however, confirmed the outrages and Suad went with a security force to the area. In general, the situation at Rasulain was appalling. More than 10,000 deportees, mostly women and children, were camping in a desert area without shelter while temperatures had risen to 43 centigrade. Food was scarce. Gendarmes, local Tchetchens, and Arabs abducted young women and girls. Rape was common. A slave trade had developed. The price of a deportee stood at 0.2 TL. On the initiative of Armenian Catholicos Sahag II and with the permission of Djemal and the Aleppo authorities the Relief Committee at Aleppo dispatched a relief team with funds to Rasulain and Zor. Despite the spread of diseases and lack of relief, the Ministry of Interior banned the mission disregarding explanations by Bekir Sami. For his part, Suad went to Aleppo thereby securing the safe return of the Armenian relief workers. He conferred with Bekir Sami and both men informed the Ministry of Interior on the culpability of the Diarbekir authorities. Suad strongly denounced the outrages against Armenians along the deportation route from Rasulain to Mosul. In a minimal gesture, the central authorities allowed the dispatch of the Aleppo municipal physician to Rasulain. After all, diseases also threatened military supplies and railway construction. The criticism failed, however, to impress Reshid who ridiculed Suad and anyone who showed compassion. In his turn, Suad accused Reshid of inciting officials and especially Tchetchens at Rasulain. He had secured evidence link-

³⁵ DH.ŞFR 485–114, Suad to DH, Zor, Aug. 28, 1915; 55–313, Subhi to prov. and dist., Aug. 29, 1915; 486–109, Suad to DH, Sept. 1, 1915; 55/A-127, Subhi to Zor, Sept. 7, 1915; 488–25, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 8, 1915; 488–26, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 8, 1915; 488–65, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 9, 1915; 488–91, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 11, 1915; 488–137, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 13, 1915.

ing Reshid and his men to the outrages committed by Tchetchen killer squads operating in the northern parts of Zor district. Suad submitted detailed reports and made it clear that a recall of Reshid and other officials would not suffice. The governor and his men had to be executed. But Reshid could rely on the Talaat's support. Thus, Rasulain and the northern fringe of Zor became littered with mass graves. Armenian skeletons and nude corpses of recently raped and murdered women covered fields and were in plain sight of travelers. In early September inquiries about offenders afforded Suad another opportunity to address the crimes committed in Diarbekir province or by staff from that province. At Rasulain he had arrested militiamen and gendarmes from Mardin who had robbed Armenian women. During his absence from Rasulain, Diarbekir security forces had freed the detainees. Nevertheless, the investigation file implicated important people. Suad, once again, urged their punishment but, again, the Ottoman government did not punish Reshid nor his accomplices. On the contrary, it promoted acting Mardin governor Bedri, a chief perpetrator. All Suad could do was to continue filing reports that implicated Diarbekir officials.³⁶

Aside from battling the intruders from Diarbekir and their local allies at Rasulain, Suad addressed the humanitarian crisis. He allowed deportees to leave for Aleppo provided they could afford the rather expensive train tickets. During a visit to Aleppo he briefed U.S. Consul Jesse Jackson on the appalling conditions in his district. The consul held Suad in highest regard. Suad also met with Merrill and told the missionary that he was more than willing to cooperate in relief efforts as long as these were coordinated with him. After all, he had given relief from his private funds. Suad asked the Ministry of Interior remove the Rasulain governor and for urgent funding for sick women, old and invalid people, and children. Families had been destroyed – a euphemism for the murder of the men. Only after insistent requests, the district governor received a meagre 50 LT. When the governor learned that the central authorities were dispatching an inspector to review ongoing deportation efforts and other matters, Suad again pushed for recalls of local administrators. To add weight to his demands, he repeatedly offered his resignation. Talaat chose to ignore the issue and gave only some vague reassurances.³⁷

³⁶ DH.ŞFR 479–74, Kamil to DH, July 10, 1915; ; 54/A-73, Minister to Reshid, July 22, 1915; 54/A-72, Minister to Suad, July 22, 1915; 55/A-84, Minister to prov. and dist., Sept. 5, 1915; 487–103, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 6, 1915; 56–192, Minister to Diarbekir, Sept. 27, 1915; 58–147, Talaat to Diarbekir, Nov. 28, 1915. AA-PA, Türkei 183/38, A 23991, Spieker, Aleppo, July 27, 1915, enclosure in Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, July 27, 1915; A 28019, Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, Sept. 3, 1915. AAA, Antranig Shamigian. For a detailed account see, *Kaiser*, Extermination, 381–9.

³⁷ DH.ŞFR 483–60, Suad to DH, Rasulain, Aug. 10, 1915; 483–65, Suad to DH, Rasulain, Aug. 10, 1915; 484–106, Suad to DH, Zor, Aug. 20, 1915; 55–193, Talaat to Zor Aug. 24, 1915; 485–85, Suad to DH, Zor, Aug. 26, 1915; 486–50, Suad to Ministry of Finance, Zor, Aug. 30, 1915; 486–110, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 1, 1915; 55/A-30, Talaat to Zor, Sept. 2, 1915; 493–72, Suad to DH, Aleppo, Oct. 13, 1915. *Merrill*, Christian-Muslim Relations, 36; *Sarafian*, Official Records, 169, 590.

On September 12, 1915, 222 Armenian women and children from Erzerum, Harput, Sivas had arrived by way of Rasulain. The people were survivors of caravans that had suffered terrible losses. Another 22 persons from Elbistan and Goksun had arrived by boat. Suad proposed a building program to provide some basic housing for each family. Otherwise it was simply impossible to settle thousands of women and children and feed them at the same time. The men who had survived deportations were unable to work as they lacked tools. The farmers needed draught animals and seed to start planting. The central authorities, however, declined support although all local funds had been exhausted. In sum, the prospects for settling four thousand families with about 20,000 individuals were bad. Suad needed 15,000 LT for immediate relief and the proposed measures. Winter would only aggravate the situation unless the government took prompt steps. Finally, the Ministry of Interior transferred 5,000 LT and allowed that Armenian men might be employed in home construction.³⁸

The authorities at Zor probably had little comprehension what lay ahead of them. Suad and his officials worked hard to improve the situation and settle the incoming deportees. At Sabka the population had increased from several hundred to about 7,000. The authorities provided land and stones. Armenians from Zeitun built 100 houses while another 250 were under construction. But most still lived in rented rooms and tents. Some Armenians had opened shops. Food was generally scarce and diseases took an appalling toll. At Rasulain construction was under way as well but the people lacked timber and the houses remained without roofs. At Zor the population had doubled to about 30,000. Most deportees lived in camps on the edge of town. The authorities were overwhelmed. Food was scarce and relief distributions were limited. With few resources two physicians cared for more than 1,000 patients in three local hospitals. 150 to 200 people died per day in the city. The high mortality provided space for new arrivals. Still the authorities tried to maintain public safety and combatted epidemic as far as possible. House construction was under way. Western observers hoped that the deportees could engage in agriculture along the Euphrates or work in trade and crafts. While the measures were totally inadequate, they, nevertheless, showed that the district administration tried to keep the deportees alive and find sustainable long-term solutions.³⁹

In late August 1915, Talaat declared that the ‘Armenian Question’ had ceased to exist, at least for the eastern provinces. Having uprooted the Armenian people, the government faced serious congestion along the railway line from Constantinople to Aleppo. This impacted military supplies and the transfer of deportees to the desert. In response, the Ministry of Interior dispatched Shukru, the director of its “Directorate for the Settlement of Tribes and Immigrants” (*İskan-ı Aşair ve Muhacirin Müdüriyeti*), with the task of re-organizing deportations along the railway and in the so-called

³⁸ DH.ŞFR 488–103, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 11, 1915; 488–116, Suad to DH, Zor, Sept. 12, 1915; 55/A-236, Subhi to Zor, Sept. 13, 1915. *Kévorkian*, Armenian Genocide, 655.

³⁹ AA-PA, Türkei 183/40, A 35047, Wanderung der Armenier nach Der Zor, Aleppo, Nov. 11, 1915, enclosure in Rössler to Bethmann Hollweg, Aleppo, Nov. 16, 1915. AAA, Megurditch Dilloian. *Sarafian*, Official Records, 590.

‘destination areas.’ In addition, Talaat ordered a general survey on how many Armenians had been deported from their homes.⁴⁰

Shukru deplored the lack of security along the deportation route to Aleppo and that military forces were not available for deportation purposes. Still, the Fourth Army was willing to supply provisions for deportees. Those coming in from eastern provinces had usually lost all possessions and were naked. With regard to the Aleppo deportation office, Shukru proposed its re-organization and expansion so that it could assure the implementation of the deportation program. Nevertheless, security and provisioning along the routes to Harran in Urfa district and Zor would remain a problem. Lack of means of transport meant that only women and weak could hope for some sort of transport. He proposed that those deportees who could provide their own transport should be dispatched to Mosul the most distant destination area. Shukru estimated that 100,000 deportees would arrive from the west. Syria had to take 30,000, Mosul, Zor, and Rakka in Urfa district 20,000 each. The authorities would place the remaining 10,000 in the south of Aleppo province. Families of soldiers, widows and children were to be exempted from deportation while the poor would be fed. Onward deportations from Aleppo were halted for a short period.⁴¹

On 1 October, the governors of Aintab, Marash, Urfa, and Zor attended a conference with Shukru at Aleppo. Shukru had drafted a manual for the deportations and assumed the position of an acting general director in charge of executing the program. For the moment, the lack of available transport hampered its implementation. A new Aleppo governor would supervise deportations matter in Aleppo province, Zor, and Urfa assisted by a new incoming deportation director. On 12 October, Shukru informed his superiors that the emptying of Aleppo city and other assembly points of Armenians had started. Under his personal supervision staff would send all Armenian who were not local residents to Karak in the Jordanian desert and eastward to Rakka and Zor. At Zor the authorities kept track of the incoming deportees. By 7 November 5, 1915, 26,543 Armenians were in the district. Of these 12,454 had been sent to surrounding areas. 14,089 were currently at the district center and would be sent to the kazas and nahies. The numbers covered those deportees who were alive at the time of the count. The numbers show that despite the constant influx of deportees over the past two months, the number of deportees in the entire district had hardly increased. In other words, not settlement awaited the newcomers but the staggering death toll among deportees absorbed the deportees and made space for more unfortunates.⁴² Thus, Shukru’s plans were not much more than fiction without reference to realities on the ground as far as the survival of deportees was concerned. And Shukru

⁴⁰ DH.ŞFR 56–57, Talaat to prov. and distr., Sept. 18, 1915; Kaiser, “Angora”, 151–152; Idem, “Shukru”, 188–189.

⁴¹ DH.ŞFR 490–62, Shukru to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 22, 1915; 490–96, Shukru to DH, Aleppo, Sept. 25, 1915.

⁴² DH.ŞFR 492–90, Shukru to DH, Aleppo, Oct. 8, 1915; 493–31, Shukru to DH, Aleppo, Oct. 12, 1915; 493–83, Shukru to DH, Oct. 14, 1915; 493–147, Kamil to DH, Zor, Oct. 17, 1915; 496–57, Kamil to DH, Zor, Nov. 7, 1915. Kaiser, “Shukru”, 191.

knew it. A top provincial official at Aleppo had predicted that all deportees would die as the government lacked resources to settle the people or to provide for them in the newly established concentration camps. In fact, the government had seized the few farming implements the deportees still had. German Consul Rössler described the onward deportation of women and children in drastic words and concluded that the Ottoman government intended the annihilation of the Armenian people. In reality, Shukru's plans were aimed at fast-tracking the deportations into Der Zor and Karak and the Hauran, and second cemetery for deportees, in southern Syria province. The accelerated deportations were a tool intended to increase mortality among deportees despite professions to the contrary.⁴³

Conclusion

The first displaced Armenians arriving in Zor were probably fifteen-year-old Siranoush Danelian and her family. A military detachment escorted her to a comfortable house. Decades later she recalled the pleasant climate, good food, and described Zor as a 'land of milk and honey.' Her brother served locally as a Fourth Army officer and entertained relations with Suad. The family was also connected to militants but that had no negative consequences for them.⁴⁴ Danielian's account demonstrated that Zor had not been an uninhabitable place. Its resources sustained a population. The disaster of the deportees was a product of government policies and not inevitable. Likewise, diseases were not a natural cause of death as such. Officials warned against the danger but the government dismissed the calls and it insisted on its deportation policy. It even frustrated relief efforts, accepting that military supplies lines would be impacted. The argument that deportations were to protect military supplies was anyhow a charade.

The ten percent rule for the settlement areas applied only for a short time to Zor district. It was more a product of strategic visions than of administrative planning. If taken seriously, the rule would have disqualified Zor as a major so-called destination area right. The quota could only work if few of the arrivals survived. By July 1915 Armenians survivors exceeded the set limit. In response, the government issued a temporary halt of deportations to Zor. The decision triggered debates among governors who wanted to rid themselves of Armenians. Zor district remained ultimately on the receiving end of the equation. There was simply no alternative given the lack of transport. The Aleppo deportation office hardly managed affairs locally. This would change with Shukru's mission. By early October, the government had given up on the ten percent rule in Zor for good. Many Armenians died during attacks by tribesmen and other criminals. These atrocities faded, however, when compared with those of

⁴³ AA-PA, Konstantinopel 170, J. No. 5421, Rössler to Embassy, Aleppo, Sept. 18, 1915; Aleppo Pkt. 2 Bd.3, J. No. 2293 Sekr., Hoffmann to Embassy, Aleppo, Oct. 18, 1915. *Kaiser, Armenian Deportees.*

⁴⁴ University of Southern California, Shoah Foundation, Visual History Archive, 53190 Siranoush Danelian.

Reshid and his gang committed under the protection of Talaat. Djemal had ordered the protection of Armenian deportees in the Fourth Army region, including Zor. This limited massacres to a small area adjacent to Diarbekir province. Starvation and diseases took a terrible toll but at a much smaller scale than the CUP's killers would inflict. Meanwhile, the governors of Aleppo and Zor coordinated with Djemal. The military provided some supplies and means of transport. The governors took the settlement scheme seriously although Talaat refused adequate funding. Thus, they welcomed Armenian and western relief efforts. Like Djelal, Suad informed consuls and missionaries. The record also confirms that not all Ottoman governors were informed on the government's genocidal intent nor did they support it. Like Djemal and the Aleppo governors, Suad opposed the killings. He even sought the execution of veteran CUP member and principal perpetrator Reshid and his men.

The events in Zor district during first months of the Armenian Genocide show that Ottoman government measures lacked coordination. Erratic policies were, however, not as dysfunctional as they might appear since they served the destruction of Armenians. The policy was to move people to locations where they would meet their fate like the deserts of Arabia. In the summer of 1915, Talaat and his men focused on emptying the Armenian heartlands and the west of the empire from Armenians. After that, the government paid closer attention to Zor where despite hunger, diseases, and harsh winter conditions Armenians survived in large numbers. Protection from massacre and the relief efforts had made an impact. So Talaat took action. After appointing a new governor, the Ottoman government massacred the Armenians in the summer of 1916. Suad's relief efforts provided temporarily a space for survival. Many Armenian deportees who escaped from Zor owed him a lot. In December, authorities reported that some women and children might remain. All other Armenians they had deported 'elsewhere' but no records were available. Instead their bones can be found today in the desert along the Khabur River.⁴⁵

⁴⁵ DH.ŞFR 539–115, Kamil to DH, Zor, Dec. 11, 1916.

Systematization of Hatred

Dangers of Escalation and Genocidal Violence in Habsburg Warfare, 1914–1918

By *Hannes Leidinger*

If the myth that the development of civilization is governed by a fixed process has long been deconstructed, and if our knowledge of tendencies in ancient times toward the total annihilation of enemy collectives has grown recently, it should nevertheless be stressed again that war and warfare did follow specific rules in both modern and pre-modern times. And although a more precise regulation of the law of war and international law has been achieved, particularly within the last two centuries, it is also the case that what Jörg Baberowski attempted to capture with his concept of ‘spaces of violence’ continues to hold true: there is a kind of violence that crosses all borders and changes everything, creating conditions which allow anything to happen, and under which trust and predictability no longer exist. Violence of this nature, by definition, is the enemy of order.¹

Between these opposing notions of ‘order’ and ‘chaos’, the following reflections are concerned with identifying general dynamics as well as forms of systematization regarding the increase and reduction of violence in Habsburg warfare: its heightened willingness to practice aggression, its approaches to genocidal hatred, but also its attempts to practice moderation and self-control in the First World War.

In this connection, it seems useful to proceed by presenting the outcome of recent research on the area. This will take the form of overview of a multistage model of escalation, divided into ten arguments and serving as a method for a better understanding of the developments at least in the combat, communication, and occupation zones of the Austro-Hungarian forces.

General Developments and the Dual Monarchy

According to Baberowski, the first aspect that has to be considered here concerns the idea of popular sovereignty and ethnic homogeneity, the enhanced integration of certain individuals, that is, of the accepted members of a given state’s population, and the elimination of ‘others’, especially since the process of modernization and democratization that followed the French Revolution. Modernity from this point of view is a

¹ *Baberowski*, p. 101.

multifaceted phenomenon that tends to erode the limits of violence, fostering, as Baberowski puts it, the utopia of cleansing, in order to wipe out the reality of heterogeneity. Deviation from the norm therefore caused exclusion in the first instance and the possible spiritual and ultimately physical destruction of those who did not fit into the homogeneous (national) collective. The British historian Tony Judt drew attention to a similar phenomenon, highlighting the paradox of a rise in anti-semitism in the wake of democratization and above all of democratic nationalism.² For its part, the so-called ‘Jewish question’ mirrored a general intensification of ethnic discord mainly in the Dual Monarchy and above all after the compromise of 1867, as well as in the course of electoral reforms from 1873 to 1907.³

The Mentality of the Habsburg Army and Notably of its Officers

Far from being a threatening product of nineteenth century upheavals, the Danube monarchy, and above all its fighting forces, represented a peculiarity in so far as the army officers stressed the role of the Habsburg troops in 1848, kept up their distinct social rituals and claimed to be answerable to the Kaiser alone. The consequence of this 1848 mentality, described, for instance, by Jonathan Gumz, was the army’s fight to defend its own system against encroachments from civil society – the desire of the armed forces, or at least of its higher command, to quell unrest and to put insubordinate national movements in their place.⁴ This standpoint went hand in hand with the military elite’s anti-liberal or anti-democratic attitudes and social Darwinist arguments in favour of expansionist foreign policy goals, giving rise to an offensive approach in grand strategy and the crushing of internal opposition.⁵

Entanglements of International Tensions and Internal Conflicts, 1903–1914

These tendencies served as a general background for another step towards escalation, which came about at the beginning of the twentieth century, with the setting of the final confrontation course between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, as well as Russia, due to the forced removal of the Obrenović dynasty, the Pig War between Vienna and Belgrade and the Annexation crisis of 1908.⁶

For the Habsburg Empire in particular, as it strove to keep up its international reputation, these ‘foreign affairs’ were closely linked with ethnic struggles within the Danube monarchy. Amid a Europe-wide fear of betrayal, Austria-Hungary was also gripped by a peculiar ‘spy mania’, primarily concerning alleged pro-Russian Ruthenians and Serbians. The famous espionage case of Alfred Redl thus reflected

² Baberowski, p. 90.

³ With regard to anti-Semitism among many others: Boyer; Wistrich.

⁴ Gumz, Resurrection p. 30–34; Dornik, Conrad von Hötzendorf, p. 55–74, 71–72.

⁵ Dornik, Conrad von Hötzendorf, p. 59.

⁶ See also: Gestrich/von Strandmann.

a widespread search for 'traitors' and 'enemy agents', especially in the supposedly spy-infested border regions adjoining the Romanov empire and the Serbian kingdom.⁷

Thus, the 'cold war' between intelligence services before 1914 and the close connection of international tensions to Austro-Hungarian conflicts of nationality resulted in trials for high treason, the compiling of blacklists recording those considered to be disloyal and – based on this – an increase in the number of suspects, mainly in Galicia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, even before the incidents in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914.⁸

The Triggering Event – 28 June 1914

The assassination of the Habsburg heir to the throne and his wife was the triggering event for an abrupt worsening of the situation.⁹ The aftermath of the deed carried out by Princip and his accomplices deed was largely influenced by the highest levels of the monarchy, the kernel of which – made up of senior figures of the press, the church, the army and the bureaucracy in the Foreign Ministry – dominated and directed the discourse of extreme warmongering and rabble-rousing.¹⁰ Not only nationalist sloganeering and demonstrations in Vienna, but also developments in the border regions reflected the heightened intensity of ethnic controversies. In particular, the situation in Galicia and South Slav regions worsened, ending in mass arrests, internments, pogroms and intimations of genocide even before the outbreak of war, while at the same time representatives of the civil and, especially, military authorities were inciting, protecting and even organising anti-Serbian 'manifestations', rallies and riots.¹¹

Radicalization Through the Effects of the (new) War

The Armenian genocide and the Holocaust demonstrate with particular clarity that war is a decisive factor in further radicalization. Yet what was decisive in these events was their specific interweaving of elements: armed conflicts in general and the peculiarities of new warfare, together with all of the resources of modern, industrialized belligerents and the idea of homogeneous (national) collectives, as outlined in section 1 above.¹² The consequences of these entanglements were apparent: the enemy was not merely the enemy army, but the enemy nation. And, to quote historian Michael

⁷ In this connection: *Moritz/Leidinger*.

⁸ *Leidinger*, Case of Alfred Redl p. 35–52, 35–37.

⁹ Cf. *Geppert et al.*

¹⁰ On Austrian press coverage regarding – among things – 'horror stories' concerning the treatment of prisoners of war, see especially *Moritz*, *Schauermärchen*, p. 35–56.

¹¹ *Mitrović*, p. 15.

¹² Cf. *Kramer*, p. 31.

Geyer, it was this growing power of “people’s war” that led to a “long-term process in which war had been “falling, gradually degenerating, breaking through institutional, legal, and moral boundaries that had been set to contain war’s violence and prevent its escalation.”¹³

The methods and opinions of Habsburg army officers clearly related to these aspects, though also reflecting a peculiarity of multicultural societies: the ethnicized mixture of state war and internal national struggle. It is hence no surprise that the “security measures” and waves of arrests in the Austro-Hungarian provinces did not reach their peak until the outbreak of war,¹⁴ at exactly the same moment when the most ardent advocates of a hard line, the chiefs of the intelligence service of the Habsburg fighting force, expected a *levée en masse* among Serbs in the enemy Kingdom as well as within the borders of the own state,¹⁵ but also a strong Russophile flow in the northeast border regions next to the Tsarist empire. Repression of suspected and so-called disloyal elements – supported and sometimes imposed by the Danube monarchy officials – was accompanied by the ongoing national struggles carried out by military means that widened the rift between the various ethnicities locked within cycles of hostility and mutual denunciation, above all Poles, Ruthenians, Hungarians, Germans, Czechs, Croats, Muslims and Serbs.¹⁶

In this connection it should be noted that the subsequent assaults, mass internments and executions, particularly in Galicia and the Balkans, were often excused by Austro-Hungarian military commanders with reference to the blurred boundaries between combatants and non-combatants – the participation of civilians in the military operations of the enemy. Though evidence for such cases is largely lacking, and notwithstanding the frequently employed ‘heat of battle’ argument, there can be no doubt about that the Habsburg army radicalized its warfare through the special orders it issued in advance, that is, before the troops had made contact with the enemy.¹⁷

Military Criminal Law and Command Structures

The Army’s system of regulations, of chains of command and individual operational leeway – mainly for officers – was obviously crucial in the process of escalat-

¹³ Quoted in *Gumz*, Resurrection p. 61.

¹⁴ Mitrović, p. 64.

¹⁵ *Gumz*, Resurrection p. 37.

¹⁶ *K.u.k. 6. Armeekommando; Statthalter in Galizien an Ministerpräsident Graf; K.k. Ministerpräsident*, 5.10.1914; *Bericht Andrian*, 26.7.1915; *Privatschreiben Seiner Exzellenz; Stenographische Protokolle des Abgeordnetenhauses*. Each of these documents were explored and analysed in the course of the research carried out for the following publication: *Leidinger et al.* See especially p. 60–65 and 86–89.

¹⁷ *Leidinger et al.*, p. 68. Important published studies in this regard include: *Überegger*, *Man mache diese Leute* p. 121–136, particularly 128; *Holzer*, *Lächeln der Henker*, p. 115 f. See also: *Überegger*, *Verbrannte Erde*, p. 241–278; *Holzer*, *Die andere Front*; *Holzer*, *Schüsse in Šabac*, p. 71–84.

ing violence. The growing numbers of internees and prisoners¹⁸ were vindicated by laws of warfare, summary justice and martial law respectively, an important aspect if one keeps in mind that more and more territories were coming under military control. But the basis for the escalation was provided even before the beginning of the hostilities. The procedure of protecting ‘military interests’ followed the state of emergency regulations of 1912, the so-called *Dienstbuch J-25a* which was a “milestone on the way to a totalization of war” within the Dual monarchy.¹⁹

Many details in the list of provisions for combat units and stage commands led to widespread violence against civilians. The ‘*Dienstreglement*’ – the army’s code regulations – authorized the extra-legal program of hostage taking, its Section 61 also allowing punitive raids as well as the imposition of martial law the burning down villages. There was also no internal Army discussion of Article 2 of the Hague Conventions, which did permit a population to spontaneously defend itself during an invasion as long as it was fought within the ‘laws and customs of war’. Quite to the contrary, Habsburg officers orientated themselves by the martial law of self-defence to speed up procedures and interrogations even without field courts. This shadowy concept paved the way to summary executions of people, and particularly of perceived civilian combatants, deemed threats to the army’s soldiers.²⁰

Mobile Warfare, Thrusts into Foreign Countries and ‘Toils’ of Occupation Regimes

“Contrary to received wisdom, it was not trench warfare, but the mobile warfare of the first three months which was most destructive of lives,” states Alan Kramer in his 2007 book *Dynamic of Destruction*.²¹ The German atrocities in Belgium,²² and the advances and retreats of fighting forces on the Eastern Front and in the Balkans in 1914/15 were accompanied by mass violence against civilians. Habsburg warfare was thus a vivid example of this process of radicalization²³ which was also exacer-

¹⁸ On the treatment of prisoners of war, refugees, and internees, see: *Leidinger et al.*, 93–143.

¹⁹ *Dornik*, Conrad von Hötzendorf p. 69.

²⁰ *Gumz*, Habsburg Empire, p. 127–142, 136–139. Cf. *Leidinger*, Kriegsgräuelp. 13–34, particularly p. 25–28. Regarding the international context with special emphasis on (non-) cooperation within jurisprudence: *Segesser*, Katastrophe p. 57–77.

²¹ *Kramer*, p. 34.

²² On a recent controversy in this connection, see *Pöhlmann*.

²³ Oswald Überegger has again contributed to a better understanding of this issue. In his recent article he focused on the type of military confrontation and mobile warfare which was dominant on the Eastern and Balkan Fronts during World War One. His text stresses types of violent military confrontations in which the virulence of the violence can be explained by the situation. In the case of mobile warfare, the majority of such phases of offensive warfare were often accompanied by atrocities and violations of international law and were successful in making breakthroughs. Such acts of violence, which frequently affected civilian populations, often involved cruel war crimes. Cf. *Überegger*, Kampfdynamiken p. 79–101.

bated by the thrust of troops into unknown lands and hostile territories. This applies more or less also to the reactions of fighting units to Galician regions being perceived as strange territories and cultures. Language barriers aggravated the situation: incidents like the killing of alleged Russophile inhabitants of Olszany in the district of Przemyśl occurred because of the inability of Magyar patrols to understand that local people were speaking Ukrainian, not Russian.²⁴

The situation worsened further when the Central Power units conquered former enemy land in Serbia and the western regions of the crumbling Tsarist empire. The brutality of occupation regimes in the Balkans and on the Eastern front manifested itself in the harsh treatment of regional communities, economic exploitation, forced deportations and requisitioning, weapons searches, internments and arrests, executions, punitive actions and guerrilla wars against uprisings and other forms of local resistance.²⁵ In this respect, it has to be stressed that the unleashing of violence was not, or not completely, limited to the opening campaigns in 1914. The occupation of Serbia proved to be a long-term phenomenon of a 'dirty war', in which the boundaries between military and civilian spheres were blurred for the duration of the war. Additionally, against the backdrop of growing criticism of the system, of the threatened collapse and especially of the repercussions of the Russian revolution, the continuation of the bloodshed, the economic exhaustion, war weariness and social unrest resulted in an intense ideologization not least in the eastern occupation zones. Recent publications relevant to the question have come to the following conclusions: the campaigns against insurgents and alleged Bolsheviks in the Ukraine demonstrated a radicalization of German and Austro-Hungarian troops in 1918. Prisoners were no longer taken, even if they numbered in the thousands. And no one appeared to be bothered by this any longer. Instead, military commanders of the Central Powers defended their methods. "For the reasons given," an officer wrote, "I consider the shooting of the prisoners to be not only humane and completely legal but also militarily necessary and correct."²⁶

The Imbalance of Forces

From the outbreak of the war until the last military operations in 1918, such comments reflected a certain imbalance of forces characterizing several armed confrontations in the First World War. Most of these were very closely linked with Habsburg warfare against a perceived weaker enemy mobilizing all available (human) resources and thus tending to wage irregular conflicts. This applied particularly to the Serbian theatre of war. Not by chance were indications of a *levée en masse*, also including female fighters and child soldiers, among the major concerns of Austro-Hungarian officers on the Balkans. Since the nineteenth century, the existence of so-called

²⁴ Leidinger *et al.*, p. 69, 84.

²⁵ Kramer, p. 49.

²⁶ Quoted in Dornik *et al.*, p. 177.

Komitadji-units had increased anxiety regarding partisan activity, fuelling the long-standing controversies over the status of francs-tireurs, irregular military formations during the Franco-Prussian War 1870–71. The Habsburg army started to believe that a key element of enemy strategy was the enlistment of a willing Serbian civilian population into a war of espionage and insurgency. Seen from the Danube monarchy headquarters, these methods were inevitable consequences of the assumed Serbian inferiority. And as a matter of fact, the military counterpart of the Habsburg army seemed to confirm the correctness of Austro-Hungarian attitudes. “Every peasant here carries a rifle or the soldiers dress in peasant clothes,” remarked the commander of the Twenty-Ninth Division, General Josef Schön. And historian Jonathan Gumz added:

Since all Serb soldiers from the third levy and some from the second were expected to provide their own clothing when called up, according to Aleksandar Stojicevic, Schön’s conclusion, although exaggerated, was not surprising.²⁷

The example of the Austro-Hungarian conduct of war thus shows that asymmetric warfare can never be underestimated in the analysis of escalating violence.

Ideas of Superiority

At the same time, the frequently misleading idea of an inferior adversary was further bolstered not only by the assumption of one’s own military strength, but also by the belief in Habsburg cultural superiority. Confronted with devastated regions in the combat, communications and occupation zones, with the alien peoples and traditions in the east and south east, combatants from urban centres and above all from western, often German-speaking provinces tended towards hubris and at times even to colonial prejudice. These (self-) perceptions went hand in hand with

a “discourse about hygiene” in relation to what the occupiers saw as mostly poor and decrepit villages and settlements. It was believed that, “in the East,” they were dealing with less “developed” people, and that the best way to achieve anything with them was by being harsh.²⁸

Heterogeneous Societies

Tendencies towards hubris required a permanent confrontation with the notions of the ‘own’ and the ‘others’. The mental process of separation was facilitated in heterogeneous societies like the Dual monarchy and the regions in which military operations conducted by the Habsburg army. Experts have correctly pointed out that Austro-Hungarian examples of unbounded violence can be found in the Balkans and in the Ukraine, where it was easy to find and to experience the ‘other’ or the ‘foreign’, especially for those who are willing to think that way. It was here where ideal

²⁷ Gumz, Resurrection p. 48.

²⁸ Dornik *et al.*, p. 389.

conditions existed for the genesis and the reinforcement of negative stereotypes and even of racist standpoints.²⁹

Critical and Limiting Closing Remarks

The ten sections above are far from being ten commandments. Each point has to be supplemented and even modified in the course of further or complementary research. At the same time, it is by no means impossible that there are (many) more aspects that contributed to the escalation of violence and the blurring of boundaries between (regular) military units and the civilian population. At any rate, the present considerations, based on a growing number of analyses and publications on the subject, try to classify a variety of historical incidents and cases – resulting in a search for general tendencies or structures and a systematization of phenomena in respect of the unleashing of violence and so-called dirty wars.

Yet beyond this study on aspects of escalation, it is also necessary to stress the existence of opposing, de-escalating trends. For example, recent comparative studies of the occupation regimes in Ukraine during the First and the Second World War have drawn the following conclusion (among others): the existence of feelings of superiority among the occupiers as well as the willingness to impose a harsh regime on the local population do not necessarily mean that German and Austro-Hungarian combatants generally despised the inhabitants of the regions of the ‘East’:

In their private reports, soldiers of the Central Powers frequently wrote of their admiration for the splendid Ukrainian cities. Unlike in 1941, anti-Slavism was not a dominant element, and there was certainly none of the hatred expressed in World War II.³⁰

One can certainly wonder if this also applies to the mixture of stereotypes of the ‘East’, and principally of Russia, in combination with a growing ‘anti-Bolshevism’ after 1917. All in all, it is certainly correct and necessary to differentiate between phenomena of hatred and genocidal violence, particularly with regard to the Holocaust. From this point of view, the Armenian genocide seems to be a tragic exception in the First World War, though comparable ‘dynamics of destruction’ can be found elsewhere. The war crimes of the Habsburg army – and there can be no doubt that it committed war crimes according to the present-day definition of the term – should not be equated with what had happened in the Ottoman Empire or under totalitarian rule and during the National Socialist terror.

The drawing of distinctions is indispensable, not only because of the differing quantities of victims or various techniques of repression. There is also a qualitative difference that cannot be overstated: in spite of a circle of hardliners among the mili-

²⁹ *Leidinger et al.*, p. 22 and 68–70.

³⁰ *Dornik*, p. 389. Peter Lieb, in particular, is still working on this area. Apart from his recent presentations at international conferences, see also in this regard his most recently published studies: *Lieb*.

tary leadership and even among the subordinated officers pleading for harder courses and even more gallows and shootings, the remarks and orders of the Emperor, the government, civilian and also military officials showed no readiness for a ‘total alienation’ of certain parts of the population or a ‘annihilation’ of entire nations within and beyond the empire’s borders. Equally, the principle of educating the ‘inferior’, and ‘less developed’ was at least in keeping with the values of the ‘good father’, the ‘caring emperor’ and his officials. This idol of ‘good patriarchalism’ was not mere propaganda and staging of power; it reflected prevailing notions of Christian compassion and clemency, the fear of a loss of prestige for the monarchy and for its fighting forces, as well as a fear of undermining secular human values and the maintenance of order and the endangered ‘rule of law’.³¹

While there are, however, no grounds for depicting the Habsburg world and its sphere of influence as an idyll (particularly against the backdrop of the ‘seminal catastrophe’ of 1914 to 1918), the prevalence of a mentality favouring the mitigation or prevention of further radicalization should not be completely overlooked. Sources in the Austrian archives, statements of the court and competent authorities show that the escalation of violence cannot be reduced – following Jörg Baberowski – merely to monopolies on the use of force, games of power and counter-power, counterweights and power structures.³² On the contrary, the Austrian experience of the First World War evinces a mindset of de-escalation, a value system that was damaged but remained extant during the process of dehumanization in which the mass killings took place, a mindset that showed its subtle effect, at least in rudimentary form, even before the renewed emergence of pacifist and comparable discourses.³³

³¹ *Leidinger et al.*, p. 145–146, 157.

³² *Baberowski*, p. 147.

³³ See, for instance, statements and instructions of the Hungarian prime minister Count István Tisza and the Emperor Kaiser Franz Joseph himself. Cf. *Telegramm Tisza*; K.k. Ministerpräsidium betreffend Allerhöchstes Befehlsschreiben Cf. *Leidinger et al.*, p. 67 and 145.

**“Our land is small and it’s pressed on all sides.
Not one of us can live here peacefully.”**

**Population Policy in Montenegro from the Long Nineteenth Century
to the End of the First World War**

By *Heiko Brendel*

Introduction

This article discusses the population policy in the Prince-Bishopric, the Principality, and the Kingdom of Montenegro from the mid-nineteenth century to the end of Montenegrin independence due to its ‘Anschluss’¹ to the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in November 1918. It focusses on the years from the Balkan Wars until the end of the First World War. Particular attention will be given to the Austro-Hungarian occupation of Montenegro from January 1916 to November 1918.

The central questions are: Does the First World War, and especially the establishment of the Imperial and Royal Military Governorate-General in Montenegro² by the Austro-Hungarian occupiers, mark a caesura in the Montenegrin population policy, especially a caesura in the Orthodox-Muslim relations and the relations between the South Slavs and Albanians on Montenegrin soil? To answer these questions, each of the following areas will be investigated: the history of the Montenegrin expansion with a focus on the traditional Montenegrin society and socio-economic structures, the emerging Montenegrin nationalism, the state-building efforts by the dynasty Petrović-Njegoš, and finally the relations between ‘Serbs’ (Serbo-Croatian speaking Montenegrins of Orthodox faith) on the one hand, and Slavic Muslims as well as Catholic and Muslim Albanians on the other hand.

Welcomed Liberators

On 11 November 1914, a few days after the Young Turk government of the Ottoman Empire had entered the First World War on the side of the Central Powers, the Ottoman Sultan and Caliph Mehmed V Reşad (1844–1918), proclaimed jihad.³ Three days later, the sheikh ul-islam in Constantinople, Ürgüplü Mustafa Hayri

¹ *Pavlović*, Balkan Anschluss.

² In German: “k. u. k. Militärgeneralgouvernement in Montenegro”.

³ *Hagen*, p. 55–58.

(1867–1921), issued five fatwas to legitimize the jihad. The fifth fatwa stated, in the traditional form of a detailed rhetorical question and a concise answer:

And in this case, if Muslims under the rule of the nations of England, France, Russia, Serbia, Montenegro, and their allies in this current war, fought against the two nations of Austria and Germany, which support the Supreme Islamic Government, and their struggle against these two nations caused harm to the Islamic Caliphate, would they therefore deserve a painful punishment, because it would be a great sin, or not? God the Exalted knows best. Answer: Yes, they deserve it!⁴

The fatwas of 14 November 1914 were translated from the original Ottoman Turkish into the languages of the Muslims in the British, French, and Russian Empires: Arabic, Persian, Urdu, and Central Asian “Turkic”.⁵ They were not translated into Serbo-Croatian or Albanian, though. Thus, the fatwas were predominantly aimed at the British and French overseas colonies and at Russian Central Asia. However, they met little response there.

Whether influenced by the fatwas or not, the Muslims in the former Sandžak of Novi Pazar, in Metohija, and in Albania supported the Central Powers’ efforts. For example, in late 1915, the Muslims of Podgorica gave aid in the form of money, food, and clothes to Austro-Hungarian prisoners of war who were in the hands of the desperate Serbian army, which was retreating through Montenegro to the Albanian coast. And when the pursuer of the retreating Serbian forces, the victorious Habsburg army, followed in early 1916, the invaders were welcomed by the Muslim population as “liberators” and long desired “avengers” against their “Serb oppressors”.⁶ According to Novica Rakočević, the Slavic Muslims expected from the Austro-Hungarians that their territories would be separated from Montenegro and be annexed to Habsburg Bosnia and Herzegovina, while the Albanians hoped that their lands could join independent Albania.⁷

Language, Religion, and Territory in Austro-Hungarian Occupied Montenegro

The Austro-Hungarian military governorate-general in Montenegro had an estimated total population of about 400,000. ‘Old Montenegro’ – the territory of Montenegro after the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 with its minor territorial adjustments in 1880/81 – had about 215,000 inhabitants, while there lived about 185,000 people in “New Montenegro” – the territory annexed by the Kingdom of Montenegro after the Balkan

⁴ *Hagen*, p. 69; translated by author, original emphasis.

⁵ *Peters*, p. 55.

⁶ ÖStA (“Österreichisches Staatsarchiv”) HHStA (“Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv”) PA (“Politisches Archiv”) I, Karton 998, Liasse Krieg 49e, Wochenbericht des MGG/M (“k.u.k. Militärgeneralgouvernement in Montenegro”), 17.3.1916.

⁷ *Rakočević*, Crna Gora u prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 219.

Wars from 1912 to 1913 (see Map 1).⁸ Montenegro was situated in a transitional region between Serbo-Croatian speakers in the North and Albanian speakers in the South, between Christians in the West and South and Muslims in the North and East, between Catholic Christians in the West and Orthodox Christians in the East: three out of four Montenegrins spoke Serbo-Croatian as their first language, the rest mostly Albanian. Almost two third of the population were Orthodox Christians, about one third mostly Sunni Muslims, less than five per cent were Catholic Christians.⁹ The languages and denominations were unevenly distributed over the country: in ‘Old Montenegro’, about ninety per cent were Serbo-Croatian speakers and Orthodox Christians, while in ‘New Montenegro’ less than sixty per cent were Serbo-Croatian speakers and about one third were Orthodox (see Figure 1 and Figure 2).




Figure 1: Religious affiliations in Old Montenegro and New Montenegro (1916, estimations).



Figure 2: Language groups in Old Montenegro and New Montenegro (1916, estimations).

An imperial order of 26 February 1916 – issued shortly before the formal establishment of the Austro-Hungarian military governorate-general in Montenegro – stated that the Austro-Hungarian occupying forces should respect the “national peculiarities”

⁸ The small pieces of land adjacent to Lake Shkodra, which had been annexed in 1913, are regarded as parts of “Old Montenegro” in this article. This corresponds with the contemporary Austro-Hungarian use of the terms “Old Montenegro” and “New Montenegro”.

⁹ All percentages on languages and denominations according to *Kraljevina Jugoslavija Opšta Državna Statistika*. There are no earlier reliable statistics for Montenegro. The Austro-Hungarians only estimated the population during the occupation.

of the Albanians as far as possible. Further, any step that could even “give the impression of Slavization efforts” should be avoided to the greatest extent possible.¹⁰ This order marked an abrupt break in the history of Montenegro – and especially in Montenegro’s population policy. In Montenegro, ‘population policy’ first and foremost meant repression, expulsion, and killing of Muslims and Albanians by the Orthodox and Serbo-Croatian speaking majority. Thus, it can be said the military administration by the Habsburg Empire during the First World War stopped, and – in some respects – even reversed the ‘traditional’ Montenegrin approach to religious and ethnic diversity.

Montenegro’s “Predatory” Socio-Economic Tradition

For centuries, Montenegro was an impoverished and land-locked prince-bishopric under formal Ottoman suzerainty. Its heartland was the mountainous region of the Four Nahijas in the hinterland of Kotor (Italian *Cattaro*). The historical Four Nahijas, encompassing just 1,200 square kilometres, were inhabited by about twenty South Slav tribes and clans of Orthodox faith. Those ‘Serb’ tribes were loyal to the Orthodox prince-bishop of Montenegro who resided in Cetinje, a tiny village in the shadows of an Orthodox monastery.

The Montenegrin tribes in the Four Nahijas and in the Brda practiced transhumance and showed similarities to other tribal societies in the Southern Dinarides, the Herzegovinian tribes to the north and the Albanian mountain tribes to the South: due to high birth rates, these societies produced a continuous surplus of children, which could not be fed from the barren country. Thus, the tribes were always short of resources. This scarcity could either be solved by agricultural and economic development, by acquisition of land, or by seizing booty. The first option failed mainly due to the unfertile karst of Montenegro and obvious economic alternatives; it was further hindered by the unwillingness of the traditional Montenegrin shepherds and tribal warriors to work as farmers. In consequence, only the acquisition of additional pastures and the seizure of booty remained: banditry thus became an essential part of the tribal economy. Not surprisingly, only the professions of the shepherd, the warrior, and the bandit were esteemed in the highlands; the Montenegrin way of life focussed on honour, and the society was strictly patriarchal. The tribes regularly feuded with each other in changing alliances. When plundering the more fertile adjacent lowlands, the tribes indiscriminately looted Muslims and Christians, Albanians

¹⁰ In the original: “SEINER Majestät erscheint es weiter von besonderem Interesse, daß in den von Albanern bewohnten Landschaften des Königreichs Montenegro seitens der Militärverwaltung den nationalen Eigentümlichkeiten dieses Volksstammes im weitest gehenden Maße Rechnung getragen und alles vermieden werde, was den Anschein von Slavisierungsbestrebungen erwecken könnte [...]” (ÖStA, KA (“Kriegsarchiv”), MKSM (“Militärkanzlei Seiner Majestät”) 1916, Karton 1253, Nr. 69–13/23ad, MKSM to AOK, 26.2.1916).

and South Slavs. Michael Palairet has described this culture and socio-economic structure as “predatory”.¹¹

As the Four Nahijas were almost completely surrounded by the Ottoman Empire in the early modern period (the exception being the West, where they bordered Venetian territory around the Bay of Kotor), Ottoman subjects were the main target of the Montenegrin raids, even though the prince-bishop of Cetinje had been formally a liege of the Sultan since the sixteenth century. The raids against the Ottomans stabilized Montenegro’s socio-economic system and became even more important in the eighteenth century, when Venice, Austria, Russia, and the Pope paid the tribes to attack Ottoman towns and garrisons in order to destabilize the Ottoman Empire.¹²

The Emergence of Anti-Muslim Nationalism in Montenegro


In the eighteenth century, a bold vision of a Montenegrin Empire emerged: Prince-Bishop Basil III (Serbo-Croatian *Vasilije*) Petrović-Njegoš (1709–1766) wished to recreate the Principality of Zeta (see Map 1), a late medieval state ruled by the Crnojevići-dynasty with its centre in the North Albanian metropolis Shkodra. Besides the Four Nahijas, this state would cover South Slav as well as Albanian inhabited territories of the Ottoman Empire: the Brda, parts of the Herzegovina, the Zeta plain, the Lower Zeta, and adjacent Northern Albanian tribal areas.¹³ The idea of Montenegrin independence was born – but as an ethnically and religiously diverse empire. A generation later, in the end of the eighteenth century, the Prince-Bishopric of Montenegro began to expand. Prince-Bishop Peter I (Serbo-Croatian *Petar*) Petrović-Njegoš (c1748–1830) annexed the Brda, which was inhabited by mainly Orthodox highland tribes sharing the values of the tribes of the Four Nahijas, though there was a substantial number of converts (Serbo-Croatian *poturice*) to Islam especially in the larger tribes.¹⁴ At the same time, the Habsburg Empire acquired Dalmatia – and thus, for the first time, Montenegro bordered Austrian territory.

¹¹ *Palairet*, The Culture of Economic Stagnation, p. 413–414. Palairet writes: “Hailing from an environment in which an enterprise culture had significantly failed to take root, the upwardly mobile heirs to the Dinaric tradition can be construed as believing that their prosperity, or that of their kin-group, could only be attained by predation upon outsiders.” (*Palairet*, The Culture of Economic Stagnation, p. 430). See also *Palairet*, The Balkan Economies, pp. 147–150, *Boehm*, Mountain Refuge Area Adaptations, *Boehm*, Blood Revenge, *Kaser*, Hirten, Kämpfer, Stammeshelden, *Kaser*, Peoples of the Mountains, *Pavlović*, Who are Montenegrins, pp. 85–86, and *Naumović/Pavković*. Further compare Jovan Cvijić’s (1865–1927) “*type dinarique*” (*Cvijić*, pp. 281–299 and 318–332) as well as *Tomašić*, Personality Development of the Dinaric Warriors, and *Tomašić*, The Structure of Balkan Society.

¹² *Adamir*, p. 109. Palairet, however, emphasizes that in the eighteenth century the Republic of Dubrovnik (Italian *Ragusa*) was the primary target of Montenegrin raiders, who enslaved girls there to sell them to the Ottomans (*Palairet*, The Culture of Economic Stagnation, p. 414).

¹³ *Pavlović*, Balkan Anschluss, p. 49–50.

¹⁴ On the converts, see *Miedlig*.



Map 1: The territorial development of Montenegro from the eighteenth century to the First World War, including some important battles of Montenegrin history. (Own figure)

However, Basil’s imperial vision of a recreation of medieval Zeta vanished in the following years. As early as the reign of Peter I and his nephew and successor Peter II (Serbo-Croatian *Petar*) (1813–1851), the dream of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious Crnojevići-state was replaced both by nationalist and romantic visions of the Montenegrin people as the only true defenders of Christianity – and, even more importantly, the only true defenders of Serbdom. The unity of the Montenegrin tribes of the Four Nahijas and the Brda was sworn by constructing a common ‘eternal enmity’, the Muslims – and thus the Ottoman Turks, the Albanians, and also the converts within the tribes. In this spirit, Peter II, known as ‘Njegoš’, wrote the Montenegrin nation-

al epic ‘The Mountain Wreath’ (Serbo-Croatian *Gorski Vijenac*) in 1845. The core of ‘The Mountain Wreath’ is the religiously motivated struggle of the Montenegrins against the Muslims – culminating in an ahistorical ‘Christmas Day Massacre’ against Montenegrin converts.¹⁵ With this, the nationalist foundation was laid for the future anti-Muslim population policy in an expanding Montenegrin state:

Turkish brothers – may I be forgiven! –
 we have no cause to beat around the bush.
 Our land is small and it’s pressed on all sides.
 Not one of us can live here peacefully,
 what with powers that are jawing for it;
 for both of us there is simply no room!¹⁶

Peter II’s successor Daniel (Serbo-Croatian *Danilo*) Petrović-Njegoš (1826–1860) secularized the Prince-Bishopric in 1852. A period of war and unrest between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire began, and the predatory way of life climaxed: several Montenegrin tribes, especially in the Brda, mainly lived from looting Ottoman villages in the mid-nineteenth century.¹⁷ After the Battle of Grahovac in 1858, Montenegro’s territory was delimited for the first time in its history – and the delimitation almost doubled its area to 4,100 square kilometres (see Map 1 and Figure 3). Fertile, densely populated farmlands with ‘Turkish’ fortresses and villages came under Montenegrin rule. Many Muslim inhabitants of these villages left their homes voluntarily, others were driven out by force by Montenegrin tribal warriors – the first recorded ethnic cleansing in Montenegrin history.¹⁸

The Orthodox, Serbo-Croatian speaking tribal warriors increasingly began to view Montenegro as the Piedmont of a future Orthodox empire in South Eastern Europe.¹⁹ In the envisioned fully sovereign state, a homogenous Serb “warrior caste” would have secured the resources it needed by exercising a kind of feudal hegemony over a servile, multi-ethnic, multi-religious peasantry.²⁰ However, already under the rule of Daniel’s nephew, Prince Nicholas (Serbo-Croatian *Nikola*) (1841–1921), Montenegro’s independentists and expansionists suffered a bitter setback: after the Montenegrin defeat in the Battle of Ostrog in 1862 (see Map 1), Nicholas was forced to recognise the delimitations of 1858 and to confirm Ottoman suzerainty over his principality.²¹

¹⁵ On the controversy on ‘The Mountain Wreath’, see for example *Pavlović*, *The Mountain Wreath*.

¹⁶ From “The Mountain Wreath” (translated by Vasa D. Mihailovich), see http://www.rastko.org.rs/knjizevnost/njegos/njegos-mountain_wreath.html (accessed 8 September 2018).

¹⁷ *Palairet*, *The Culture of Economic Stagnation*, p. 413–414.

¹⁸ *Rakočević*, *Kolašinski kraj*, p. 118–119.

¹⁹ *Pavlović*, *Balkan Anschluss*, p. 50–51.

²⁰ Compare the remarks at *Palairet*, *The Culture of Economic Stagnation*, p. 417.

²¹ On the treaty, see *Hertslet*, p. 1512–1514.




Figure 3: The growth of Montenegro's territory and population from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century.

Nicholas's Muslim Subjects

Up to the Congress of Berlin in 1878, most of Prince Nicholas's subjects were Orthodox South Slavs identifying themselves as Serbs. This changed in the aftermath of the Serbian-Ottoman Wars from 1876 to 1878: the Montenegrin independentists were triumphant the Congress, as the principality gained full sovereignty from the Ottoman Empire. The principality acquired a coastal strip at the Adriatic and more than doubled its territory and population (see Map 1 and Figure 3) – and for the time in its history, the ruler in Cetinje gained substantial areas not inhabited by Orthodox Serbo-Croatian speakers: even after thousands of Muslims had been expelled or had decided freely to emigrate to the Ottoman Empire, up to 15 percent of the new Montenegrin subjects were Slavic Muslims as well as Muslim and Catholic Albanians.²² However, when the Montenegrins lost battles of Novšiće and Murino (see Map 1), in which Albanian insurgents surprisingly defeated the invading forces. Nicholas began new negotiations with the Great Powers and the Ottoman Empire and was compensated with the Albanian harbour city of Ulcinj.²³

On the one hand, the Great Powers granted Nicholas thousands of square kilometres of land and tens of thousands new subjects; at the same time however, they demanded that he should guarantee the rights of the Albanians and Slavic Muslims in the annexed territories: in paragraph 27 of the Treaty of Berlin, the Great Powers obligated Montenegro to not discriminate against its citizens or foreigners on a religious basis and to guarantee the free exercise of religion.²⁴ Prince Nicholas responded by

²² *Palairot*, *The Culture of Economic Stagnation*, p. 395–397.

²³ *Bartl*, *Liga von Prizren*, see also *Bartl*, *Albanien*, p. 96–97.

²⁴ Vertrag zwischen Deutschland, Österreich-Ungarn, Frankreich, Großbritannien, Italien, Russland und der Türkei vom 13.7.1878, Paragraph 27, see https://de.wikisource.org/w/index.php?title=Vertrag_zwischen_Deutschland,_%C3%96sterreich-Ungarn,_Frankreich,_Gro%

granting the Muslims their own religious leader – the Mufti of Montenegro. Nevertheless, the emigration of Muslims from Montenegro, especially of Albanian Muslims, continued – albeit on a much lower scale than in decades before.²⁵

The Great Powers thus effectively succeeded in deterring the Montenegrin majority from carrying out ethnic cleansing in the newly acquired territories – as had actually occurred in the 1850s and 1860s. Albanians and Slavic Muslims continued to constitute a substantial and more or less accepted minority in the Principality of Montenegro. At the end of the nineteenth century, there lived about 12,000 Muslims and 5,000 to 6,000 – mainly Albanian – Catholics under Nicholas's rule (see Figure 4), about ten per cent of the principality's total population.²⁶ For the first time in history, there lived so many non-Orthodox, non-Serbo-Croatian-speakers in Montenegro that they could neither be ignored nor marginalized.




Figure 4: Montenegro's gradual ethnoreligious diversification from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth century.

Yet while the supervision of the Great Powers prevented ethnic cleansing, the non-Orthodox Montenegrins were discriminated against in various other ways by the Serb 'warrior caste'. In an honour-driven, patriarchal society the perhaps most important

C3%9Fbritannien,_Italien,_Ru%C3%9Fland_und_der_T%C3%BCrkei_(Berliner_Vertrag)&oldid=2541648 (accessed 12 December 2018).

²⁵ See *Rakočević*, *Iseljavanje muslimana i razgraničenje Crne Gore*.

²⁶ *Andrijašević*, p. 118.

form of discrimination was the general exclusion of Muslims from serving in the Montenegrin armed forces, which were organized along traditional tribal structures. Muslims had to serve in special unarmed ‘working brigades’, although they were allowed to buy themselves out of the Montenegrin compulsory military service – a privilege Orthodox Montenegrins did not have.²⁷ Another form of discrimination was aimed at Muslim landowners, especially in the fertile Zeta Plain around Podgorica: when ‘emigrating’ from Montenegro, Muslims were often subject to expropriation in favour of Orthodox landowners. Compensation payments that were sometimes paid to the Muslim holders of larger estates were insignificant compared to their true value. The Montenegrin government and local authorities thus managed to swindle the Muslims out of most of the value of their assets.²⁸

The socio-economic stabilization at the expense of the new Muslim subjects was short-lived, as other consequences of the Congress of Berlin became obvious. In particular, the occupation of Hercegovina and Bosnia by Austria-Hungary and the Austro-Hungarian military ‘presence’ in the North Western part of the Sandžak of Novi Pazar²⁹ proved to be a hindrance for the traditional pastoral economy of the tribes of the Four Nahijas and the Brda: several external grazing grounds – most often winter pastures – became unavailable for the transhumance-practicing Montenegrin shepherds when the new borders in the Western Balkans were drawn. And at the same time, opportunities for traditional banditry – since the eighteenth century a central element of the Montenegrin tribal economy – faded away: the opportunities to loot on foreign soil diminished, as the Great Powers obliged the principality to conclude peaceful arrangements with its neighbours – and Prince Nicholas and Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1842–1918) surprisingly became personal friends in the early 1880 s.³⁰ Domestically, banditry was outlawed in Montenegro in the course of the principality’s modernization and bureaucratization. Thus, the overall economic situation of the traditional Orthodox tribes did not improve after the Congress of Berlin – it even worsened.³¹ At the same time, the Orthodox Serb identity of the tribal Montenegrins praised the early modern ‘predatory’ self-image and its strong anti-Muslim, anti-Turkish attitudes. And those concepts became even more deeply rooted by the quickly expanding education system founded by Nicholas in the late nineteenth century.³² As Srđa Pavlović has stated:

Montenegrins of the period saw themselves as fearless warriors and as people who guarded the past glories of Serbdom by being true to their Eastern Orthodox beliefs and by remaining

²⁷ Die serbische und montenegrinische Armee, p. 108–109. Altogether, the Montenegrin army consisted of 52 battalions: 48 armed “Orthodox tribal” battalions plus four unarmed “Muslim” working battalions, see *Rakočević*, The Organization and the Character of the Montenegrin Army, p. 117–118.

²⁸ *Bulajić*, p. 141–143.

²⁹ On the Austro-Hungarian presence in the Sandžak, see *Scheer*.

³⁰ *Özcan*, p. 96–216 (accessed 18th November 2013).

³¹ *Palairat*, The Culture of Economic Stagnation, p. 416.

³² *Pavlović*, Balkan Anschluss, p. 53–59.

within the confines of the patriarchal social organization. They were deeply attached to [...] a world in which the laws of the modern civic society were worthless.³³

The Balkan Wars and the Acquisition of “New Montenegro”

Thus, the gap between the disillusioning Montenegrin socio-economic reality and the heroic Montenegrin self-conception became wider year by year: Orthodox Montenegrins were shepherds without pastures, warriors without war, and bandits without loot. And for the preferred economic alternative – to live as a ‘warrior caste’ from the resources extracted from servile lowland-peasants – Montenegro simply did not have enough fertile land. Nicholas shared this view, which corresponded with the geopolitical zeitgeist. In John Treadway’s words:

For him [Prince Nicholas], additional expansion was synonymous with his country’s economic and political salvation. Like many others, he believed that if Montenegro could become big enough, she would be able to survive in the world of the twentieth century.³⁴

The early twentieth century promised salvation: the Annexation Crisis in 1908 with the end of the Austro-Hungarian military presence in the Sandžak, the Young Turk Revolt, Abdul Hamid II’s forced abdication, the anti-Ottoman Albanian revolts from 1909 to 1912, and finally the Italian-Ottoman War in Libya offered a chance to rescue the Montenegrin ‘predatory’ culture, because war against the ‘eternal’ Ottoman enemy again became a valid option for the first time since the 1870 s. Prince Nicholas seemed to remember Prince-Bishop Basil’s visions, the recreation of the medieval Principality of Zeta, but went much further: he saw himself as the successor of the medieval Serb Czar Stephen Uroš IV Dušan (1308–1355), ruling his Greater Serbian Empire from Prizren. Consequently, Nicholas assumed the title King of Montenegro in 1910. And in 1912, the first shot of the First Balkan War was fired by his son, Prince Petar. Nicholas’s primary war aim was the “liberation” of all “Serbs” still living under the “Turkish yoke”.³⁵ More tangible – and more important for Montenegro’s economic salvation – were his territorial aims: Nicholas wanted to annex Shkodra – the medieval centre of Zeta and in easy striking range – and Prizren – Czar Dušan’s capital in far-away Kosovo.³⁶ The nationalist students in Cetinje sang “Onward, onward, let me see Prizren!”³⁷.

In the war of 1912 and 1913, Montenegrin divisions succeeded in the occupation of parts of the Sandžak and parts of the Kosovo. In various places, the Montenegrins

³³ Pavlović, *Balkan Anschluss*, p. 54.

³⁴ Treadway, p. 7–8.

³⁵ Hall, p. 13.

³⁶ Treadway, p. 76, and Boeckh, p. 33.

³⁷ Durham, p. 181. In Serbo-Croatian: “Onamo, namo... da vidu Prizren! Ta to je moje – doma ću doć’!” (URL: <http://www.njegos.org/onam.htm> (letzter Zugriff am 18.11.2013)).

committed massacres, also forced conversions to the Orthodox faith were reported.³⁸ The actual extent of the incidents is unknown, though, as there are no reliable records.

Despite their successes, the Montenegrin forces failed to accomplish Nicholas's extensive war aims: they did not advance to Prizren and did not conquer Shkodra – and were far from liberating all Serbs under Ottoman rule.³⁹ The disgraceful failure at the siege of Shkodra (see Map 1) – “nothing more than [an] old, neglected, and isolated fortification [...] with limited value against modern siege trains”⁴⁰ – was a particular humiliation for Nicholas, and strengthened his domestic enemies, who supported the creation of Greater Serbia under Serbian – Karađorđević – leadership and thus challenged the rule of the House of Petrović-Njegoš. And after the Montenegrin army finally managed to occupy Shkodra, the Great Powers forced King Nicholas to withdraw his forces from Albanian soil, because they had agreed on the creation of an Albanian nation-state – and voted against Montenegro's claims on Shkodra. Yet even without the annexation of Shkodra and its fertile surroundings, the Kingdom of Montenegro doubled its territory and population – to more than 400.000 inhabitants (see Figure 3). This was the second impressive expansion within less than forty years – and the majority of the subjects in New Montenegro' were Slavic Muslims as well as Muslim and Catholic Albanians.

The formal annexation of the conquered Ottoman territories took place in November 1913 through a proclamation of King Nicholas. Meanwhile, the population of New Montenegro was in serious decline: in his speech, the king guaranteed – echoing the regulations of the Congress of Vienna in 1878 – all his subjects equality before the law and freedom of religion, further guaranteed their personal safety and their property rights, and even promised to build schools and courts in New Montenegro.⁴¹ But reality was different. And indeed, most of Nicholas's new subjects distrusted his promises, many becoming victims of anti-Muslim riots, which were at least tolerated by the Montenegrin authorities. In consequence, thousands of Muslims left New Montenegro. Concerned with the future economic development, many Orthodox also left New Montenegro and emigrated to Serbia. Nicholas's government in Cetinje planned to “colonize” the deserted estates in the Sandžak with Orthodox Montenegrins from the Montenegrin core lands, the Four Nahijas and the Brda. This should not be confused with a stringent and deliberate population policy, though. For example, the government in Cetinje was not willing to fulfil the exorbitant demands of the Orthodox settlers from the tribal areas, so many farms remained abandoned.⁴² The famous British traveller and author Edith Durham (1863–1944), speculated on the Montenegrins after the Balkan Wars:

³⁸ As, for example, described in Durham's doubtlessly albanophile publication, *Durham*, p. 268–269.

³⁹ *Hall*, p. 67.

⁴⁰ *Uyar/Erickson*, p. 235.

⁴¹ *Boeckh*, p. 245–246.

⁴² *Boeckh*, p. 245–246.

The war was over. [...] the Montenegrin people, blood-drunk, lust-drunk, loot-drunk, had reverted to primitive savagery [...] Judging by their talk, they proposed to live in future as a marauding army. Never fond of work, they declared that they had conquered enough people to do the work for them, and looked forward to a life of something like slave-driving.⁴³

Altogether, the situation especially of the Albanians in New Montenegro became desolate. The US-American author Edward Powell (1879–1957) wrote: “[The Albanians] were merely exchanging a Turkish for a Montenegrin yoke [...]”⁴⁴ Albanian insurgents began a desperate guerrilla war to get rid of the Montenegrin ‘occupiers’, perhaps the Orthodox population in general – and to promote the unification of Peja (Serbo-Croatian *Peć*) and Gjakova (Serbo-Croatian *Đakovica*) with the independent Principality of Albania. However, the anti-Montenegrin operations were much less successful than in the battles of Novšiće and Murino a generation earlier. The exodus of Muslims from New Montenegro continued and climaxed in spring 1914, when again thousands of Muslims left the annexed territories.⁴⁵

Under Austro-Hungarian Occupation

No South-East-European slave society – with Orthodox masters and Muslim slaves – came into being in the Kingdom of Montenegro after the Balkan Wars. And not even a temporal socio-economic stabilization, as after the Congress of Berlin, occurred: for Montenegro, the crisis after the Balkan Wars of 1912 and 1913 was continued almost seamlessly by the crisis of the First World War.

The kingdom sided with Serbia and declared war on Austria-Hungary on 5 August 1914 “to defend the Serbian cause”⁴⁶. Two days later, Montenegrin troops crossed the border of Bosnia and Herzegovina and advanced into Austro-Hungarian territory. By the end of October 1914, the surprised defenders managed to drive the Montenegrins out of the Habsburg Empire. On their retreat, the Montenegrins devastated Muslim villages and abducted Muslim dignitaries.⁴⁷ In Spring 1915, Montenegrin troops turned southward, advanced into Northern Albania and occupied Shkodra – the town the Great Powers had denied Montenegro after the Balkan Wars. After the surprising conquest of Shkodra, the Montenegrin army established a “regime of terror” there, which focussed especially on the Catholic Albanians who were said to be austrophile.⁴⁸

After several months without significant combat operations in the region, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria, and Germany attacked and defeated Serbia at the end of 1915.

⁴³ *Durham*, p. 293.

⁴⁴ *Powell*, p. 540.

⁴⁵ *Babić*, p. 311–322.

⁴⁶ *Kircheisen*, p. 17.

⁴⁷ *Bihl*, p. 94; *Schanes*, p. 177.

⁴⁸ Im befreiten Skutari. The Viennese newspaper was doubtless highly biased.

Strong formations of the Austro-Hungarian army – in pursuit of the retreating Serbian forces – entered Montenegro. The country was quickly defeated and occupied in January 1916. Nicholas fled to Italy, his army surrendered, the Slavic Muslims and Albanians welcomed the quickly advancing Austro-Hungarians. After peace talks with a Montenegrin rump government – only representing the traditional ‘warrior caste’ – had failed, the Austro-Hungarians established a military administration, the Imperial and Royal Military Governorate-General in Montenegro.

From the beginning, the occupied were included in the administrative structures by the occupiers. On the lowest local level of administration, there served almost only Montenegrin locals. Proportional representation of the ethnic and religious groups was intended by the governor-general, though it was uncertain whether the proportions should be based on language, ethnic affiliation, religion, or complex combinations of those categories.⁴⁹ Quite often, the old elites remained in power. In ethnically and religiously mixed areas – especially in the Sandžak, where Austro-Hungarian troops had been present until 1909 – the military administration favoured Muslims over Orthodox locals.⁵⁰

This led to tensions as several Orthodox dignitaries – who had come to power after the Balkan Wars – were replaced by influential Muslims, who quite often had already been in power under Ottoman rule. But the enthusiasm of the Muslims was also dampened within weeks in early 1916, when they realized that the occupying forces would not tolerate riots against the Orthodox population, or even genocide. Further, the Austro-Hungarians tried to enforce a monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force. Thus, Muslim mayors complained bitterly but in vain about the removal of the guns from their traditional militias. The Austro-Hungarians regarded those ‘pandurs’ as untrustworthy – irrespective of religious and ethnic affiliations, as was made clear by the Austro-Hungarian chief of staff in Montenegro: “Any gun (revolver etc.), that we give in the hands of local elements, will sooner or later be fired upon us; the gullibility will be avenged bitterly.”⁵¹ The disappointment among the Muslims grew, when the Austro-Hungarians began to appoint former Montenegrin army officers – as a matter of course of Orthodox faith – as local spokesmen in some ethnically mixed villages. To deescalate the situation, the governor-general in Cetinje ordered his officers in districts with mixed population on the one hand to focus on the well-being of the Albanian communities, but on the other hand to avoid any partisanship in the conflict between the Orthodox and the Muslims: an obvious contradiction.⁵²

⁴⁹ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 997, Liasse Krieg 49e, Monatsbericht für Juni 1918, 15.7.1918.

⁵⁰ *Rakočević*, Crna Gora u prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 239–240.

⁵¹ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1705, Pol. Nr. 3052: MGG/M, Situationsbericht Plevlje, 20.5.1917.

⁵² ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 998, Liasse Krieg 49e, Wochenbericht des MGG/M, 17.3.1916.

The Austro-Hungarian gendarmerie formations in Montenegro were clearly biased towards the Slavic Muslims in the occupied territory: many soldiers and non-commissioned officers were Slavic Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina, most of them openly favoured their fellow Slavic Muslims and practiced unprovoked brutality against Orthodox Montenegrins.⁵³ But the gendarmerie's bias was not necessarily religiously motivated – there was a strong ethnic as well as social-revolutionary component as well: the gendarmes were also hostile towards Catholic as well as Muslim Albanians. During the 'Vešović-Affair'⁵⁴, for instance, the Orthodox Serb minority in the district of Peja, which had treated the Albanian Muslim majority as second-class-citizens since 1912, was widely spared from internment, though most Albanian 'beys' – members of the wealthy, landowning elite – were interned with "remorseless severity", including male adolescents aged 14 to 18.⁵⁵ After years of Montenegrin despotism, Slavic Muslims in Austro-Hungarian gendarmerie uniforms began to wreak havoc.

The disastrous economic situation in the military governorate-general could only be stabilized by massive imports of food crops from Austria-Hungary, which, while not preventing hunger in Montenegro succeeded in mitigating it at least slightly. However, the desolate nutrition situation in Montenegro became worse from year to year. A particular hardship and provocation for the tribes was the requisition of their livestock. This led to more and more Orthodox Montenegrins remembering the traditional 'predatory way' they had gained the resources to feed their families just a few decades ago: by seizing booty. In many districts inhabited by Orthodox tribes, bandits gathered in the mountains and forests. In early 1918, there were so many predatory bands active in the military governorate-general that the Austro-Hungarian forces and civilian decision-makers feared they would face a full-fledged insurgency.⁵⁶

⁵³ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 998, Liasse Krieg 49e, Otto an Weber, 5.6.1916, Beilage. However, it can be speculated that a high-ranking Orthodox Serb civil servant from Bosnia and Herzegovina was the mastermind behind the oppression of the Orthodox Montenegrins in the military governorate-general. It was said that Ljeskovic, who was district civil commissioner in Kolašin, wanted to kill "miserable Montenegrins" (*Rakočević*, Crna Gora u prvom svjetskom ratu, p. 317). In Milovan Đilas' novel *Montenegro*, Ljeskovic is the archetypical Bosnian Serb loyal to Austria-Hungary, who wants to unite all South Slavs under Habsburg rule (*Đilas*, pp. 105–277). See also *Hetzer*, p. 346–357.

⁵⁴ On 15 June 1916, up to fifty Montenegrin officers and civil servants were supposed to be arrested on the accusation of having planned an armed revolt against the occupiers. Among those officers was General Radomir Vešović (1871–1938), who shot the officer sent to arrest him and fled into the inhospitable mountains of Kolašin. This led to thousands of internments. Vešović was never caught but surrendered after negotiations in late 1917.

⁵⁵ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699 (MGG/M 1917), Pol. Nr. 371: Trollmann (XIX. Korps) an MGG/M, 9.12.1916.

⁵⁶ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, K. 997, Liasse 49e (Stimmung Bevölkerung Montenegro 1918), Monatsbericht für den Januar 1918, and ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, K. 997, Liasse Krieg 49e (Stimmung Bevölkerung Montenegros 1918), Brief Kral an Czernin (26.2.1918).

Religions under Austro-Hungarian Occupation

Formally, Montenegro had guaranteed all his citizens equality before the law and freedom of religion since 1878. Islam had, like Catholicism, the status as an official religion. In practice, Muslims were discriminated against in many ways by the Orthodox Montenegrins. In Austria-Hungary, the Muslim faith was not accepted as an official religion until 1912⁵⁷ – but even before this date, the situation of Muslims in the Habsburg Empire had been much better than in Montenegro.

After Austria-Hungary had occupied the Kingdom of Montenegro, Austro-Hungarian officials soon realized that the majority of the Orthodox as well as Muslim clergy lacked education, with even some clergymen being illiterate. While the Austro-Hungarian military administration did not concern themselves greatly with the problems in the Orthodox Church in Montenegro, it now saw a political opportunity to increase the level of education within the Muslim community. Thus, the general staff expressed its interest in sending educated and politically reliable Muslim clergymen from Bosnia and Herzegovina as imams, counsellors, and muftis to several Montenegrin districts.⁵⁸ The grand mufti (“reis-ul-ulema”) of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Sarajevo proposed reliable theologians. All the candidates were fluent in Serbo-Croatian and Turkish – though not in Albanian – and demanded appropriate payment as Austro-Hungarian officials. Furthermore, the reis-ul-ulema underlined that the clergymen, being civilians, could not be ordered to go to Montenegro, but would be volunteers.⁵⁹ The Austro-Hungarian general staff accepted the terms and ordered the military governorate-general in Montenegro that the clergymen from Sarajevo had to be supported “in every respect.”⁶⁰

The military governorate-general was interested in binding all Muslim clergymen in Montenegro to the administration, so that it could count on their services, especially in matters of religious endowments (‘waqfs’) and Muslim parish registers, but also to convince the Muslim population of the necessity of regular tax-collection – a practice hitherto unknown in New Montenegro. Thus, the imams and muftis were officially enrolled in the civil service of the military administration in Montenegro and treated like Austro-Hungarian civil servants with regard to payment, board and lodging, and travel expenses.⁶¹

⁵⁷ “Gesetz vom 15. Juli 1912, betreffend die Anerkennung der Anhänger des Islam nach hanafitischem Ritus als Religionsgesellschaft”, Reichsgesetzblatt Nr. 159/1912.

⁵⁸ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699, Pol. Nr. 374: AOK an MGG/M, 29.9.1916 und ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1703, Pol. Nr. 1032: MGG/M, 30.6.1917.

⁵⁹ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699, Pol. Nr. 374: Reis-ul-ulema an Landesregierung in Sarajevo, 22.10.1916.

⁶⁰ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699, Pol. Nr. 374: AOK an MGG/M (undated).

⁶¹ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1703, Pol. Nr. 1032: MGG/M, 30.6.1917 and ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1705, Pol. Nr. 3066: MGG/M (Situationsbericht des Kreiskommandos Podgorica) vom 16.5.1917.

While the religious interests of Montenegro's Muslims attracted much official attention, the interests of the Orthodox majority in Montenegro were played down. For example, the Orthodox consistory in Cetinje demanded that the occupiers should vacate the historically important, medieval Orthodox monastery of Visoki Dečani near Peja, which served as a district magazine of the occupying forces. The Austro-Hungarian district commander objected: there were only few Orthodox in the District of Peja, while the profane usage of the monastery was regarded as military necessity.⁶² On another occasion, Gavriilo Dožić (1881 – 1950), the Orthodox bishop of Peja, who was in detention in Ulcinj, asked for permission to return to his see. To avoid problems in Peja, his request was simply ignored by the district command in Bar.⁶³

Justice and Education in Occupied Montenegro

For the first time in Montenegro's history, the military governorate-general established a comprehensive judicial system all over the country. Permanent criminal courts were established at the district commands, and the permanent criminal court of the military governorate-general in Cetinje functioned as the court of appeal for all district courts. Judges were recruited both from military and civil personnel within Habsburg Empire. In addition to Austro-Hungarian military law, the legal basis for the system was pre-occupation Montenegrin law.⁶⁴

Permanent civil courts were also established in the military governorate-general in Montenegro. Here, the local religious traditions were respected. Family and estate law in particular were placed fully in the hands of the three official religious communities.⁶⁵ Thus *qadis* (sharia-judges) were responsible for the civil affairs between Muslim claimants and defendants in civil procedures. Not every *qadi* who had been in place before the Austro-Hungarian occupation was confirmed in his office by the military administration, mostly due to lack of education and sometimes for political reasons.⁶⁶ When problems occurred, the Austro-Hungarians mostly tried to respect the sensitivities of the Montenegrin Muslims – a “gentle course of action,” as Envoy Otto put it. And in general, there is striking evidence of politically motivated, Muslim-friendly justice in occupied Montenegro.⁶⁷

⁶² ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1703, Pol. Nr. 1247: Kreiskommando Ipek an MGG/M vom 30.4.1917.

⁶³ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1712, Pol. Nr. 8072: Kreiskommando Bar, November 1917. On Dožić, see *Radić*, p. 106–112.

⁶⁴ *K. u. k. Militärgeneralgouvernement in Montenegro*.

⁶⁵ *Bartsch*, p. 617.

⁶⁶ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699, Pol. Nr. 277: Kreiskommando Pevlje an MGG/M vom 12.2.1917.

⁶⁷ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1733, Pol. Nr. 3284: Gendarmeriekommando Pevlje an Kreiskommando, 1.2.1918, and ÖStA, KA, MKSM 1918, Karton 1394, Nr. 85–1/49, AOK an MKSM, 8.3.1918.

Neither could education be separated from religion. According to paragraph 65 of the Montenegrin law on elementary schools of 1907, the religious communities were very influential in school matters – in any school board a clergyman of the local parish had to be present.⁶⁸ Thus, in most of Old Montenegro, Orthodox priests were involved in the schools, in some parts of the district of Stari Bar Catholic priests, too – and in the majority of the schools in New Montenegro imams, at least on paper. In most parts of New Montenegro, however the first schools were built under the Austro-Hungarian occupation regime. And even more importantly, the Austro-Hungarians promoted school teaching in Albanian, something that was very much welcomed in the districts of Stari Bar, Podgorica, and Peja – but quite controversial in the ethnically mixed district of Berane. A constant controversy between the Muslims and the military administration was the issue of compulsory school attendance for girls. The Austro-Hungarians reacted reluctantly and promoted voluntariness.⁶⁹ A school inspector reported:

As the main motive of this plea they mention that enforced school attendance by girls would offend their religious feelings. Though that is wrong, the principal reason can be found in their religious fanaticism.⁷⁰

An interesting problem emerged from the ‘*Kultusprotektorat*’, the Habsburg tradition of supporting Catholics in the Ottoman Balkans, especially in Albania, rooted in the early seventeenth century.⁷¹ In the district of Peja, a few hundred Albanian Catholics lived among thousands of Albanian Muslims. In line with the *Kultusprotektorat*, the Austro-Hungarian foreign ministry had funded small Catholic, Albanian language schools there, the schools having been closed by Montenegrin officials at the start of the First World War. With respect to the sensitivities of the Muslim majority, the Austro-Hungarian district command opposed the reopening of the schools in 1916. Unwilling to jeopardize the *Kultusprotektorat*, both the foreign ministry and the general staff took the opposite position. Finally, the two Catholic schools were reopened against the district command’s objections and the will of the majority.⁷²

Emigration and Immigration under Austro-Hungarian Rule

Since 1913, the formal and informal ‘slavicization’ and anti-Muslim attitudes in the Kingdom of Montenegro had prompted thousands of Muslims to leave newly oc-

⁶⁸ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1704, Pol. Nr. 2876: MGG/M an Kreiskommando Podgorica vom 27.5.1917.

⁶⁹ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1712, Pol. Nr. 8244: AOK an MGG/M, 13.10.1917, and ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1708, Pol. Nr. 5202: MGG/M an Kreiskommando Berane vom 8.8.1917.

⁷⁰ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1705, Pol. Nr. 3084: Der k. u. k. albanische Schulinspektor vom 2.5.1917.

⁷¹ *Deusch*, p. 29–36.

⁷² ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1725, Pol. Nr. 47: MdÄ an Otto, 18.12.1917; Kreiskommando Ipek an MGG/M, 28.2.1918; AOK an MGG/M, 14.4.1918.

cupied 'New Montenegro', while Orthodox 'settlers' moved to the later districts of Peja, Berane, and especially Pljevlja in order to 'colonize' these areas. As mentioned above, this demographic trend had reached its peak in spring 1914.⁷³ But it continued after the beginning of the First World War and did not stop when the Austro-Hungarian army occupied Montenegro: Muslims, especially from the district of Pljevlja, still emigrated, while Orthodox 'settlers' from Old Montenegro still wished to move there. The military governorate-general in Cetinje precisely ordered the district commands in New Montenegro to prohibit the settlement of Orthodox Serbs from Old Montenegro in their jurisdictions.⁷⁴ But the continuing Muslim emigration had another cause, too: many Muslim men had fled to the Ottoman Empire after the Balkan Wars and found employment there. After the military triumph of the Central Powers over Serbia and Montenegro in 1915 and 1916, these men had – for the first time since their emigration – the possibility to bring their families safely to their new homes.⁷⁵

A closer examination of the situation in the District of Pljevlja reveals further important differences between the situation from 1913 to 1915 compared to the situation from 1916 to 1918: before the Austro-Hungarian occupation, Muslim emigration occurred indistinctively in the whole district of Pljevlja, while it was a quite selective and geographically differentiated phenomenon from 1916 onwards. Muslims then emigrated especially from the subdistricts of Pljevlja and Boljanići. These mountainous subdistricts had been seriously affected by the Austro-Hungarian and Montenegrin military operations of early 1916. Additionally, the Austro-Hungarian administration was actively involved in the migration processes in New Montenegro: most of the Muslims wishing to emigrate from Pljevlja had fled from the Sandžak into the adjacent Herzegovina after 1912 and had been 'repatriated' – in several cases against their wishes – in June 1916. Those 5,000 repatriated Muslims, counting for more than ten percent of the district's total population, found their houses and fields devastated, while in June it was too late for sowing. Starvation was foreseeable. The district command in Pljevlja stated: "There is no doubt that the decreasing of the Sandžak's Muslim population is in no case in [Austria-Hungary's] military and political interest."⁷⁶

In general, however, the role of religion should not be overestimated, as other interests were also of importance. One example of this is the death of Prince Mirko (1879–1918), son of King Nicholas, in Vienna in March 1918: though the austrophile prince was quite unpopular among most Montenegrins, there were several commemoration ceremonies among the Orthodox of Old Montenegro. Moreover, the district commander of Pljevlja explicitly allowed the commemoration of Mirko – but not

⁷³ See *Babić*, p. 311–322, and *Boeckh*, p. 245–246.

⁷⁴ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1712, Pol. Nr. 8245: MGG/M an Kreiskommandos Plevlje, Ipek, Berane, 6.11.1917.

⁷⁵ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 997, Liasse Krieg 49 e – Stimmung Bevölkerung Montenegros 1917, Halbmonatsbericht der NA d. MGG/M für die 2. Februarhälfte 1917 (28.2.1917).

⁷⁶ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1698, Pol. Nr. 82: Kreiskommando Plevlje an MGG/M vom 28.12.1916.

a single ceremony was held in his jurisdiction. He reported to the governor-general in Cetinje: “Not only the Turkish, but also the Serbian part of the district’s population denies any union with Old Montenegro.”⁷⁷

In mid-1917 a new wave of Muslim emigration began, especially from the districts of Pljevlja and Berane. This was an indicator for worsening relations between the Austro-Hungarian military administration and the Muslim civilians, who faced hunger and starvation like all Montenegrins. But in contrast to the Orthodox, who had expected the worst when the Austro-Hungarians invaded, the Muslims of New Montenegro and especially in the Sandžak had very high expectations. At any rate, the military administration had begun to confiscate agricultural surpluses in autumn 1917, which particularly annoyed the reinstated and highly influential Muslim landlords (*‘aghas’*), who were concerned about their economic welfare and predominance. Further, the military administration for the first exerted pressure to recruit ‘volunteer’ Muslim workers for road construction, which had not happened before – and thus contradicted the occupation practices up to this point.⁷⁸ At the same time, a first Albanian insurgency group with presumably political aims emerged in the Austro-Hungarian military governorate-general in Montenegro. These insurgents systematically killed Orthodox Montenegrins. This ethnic cleansing, being anything but exemplary for the situation in occupied Montenegro, was not suppressed until June 1918, when the group was annihilated by Austro-Hungarian forces. The Slavic Muslim population in the district sided with the Orthodox and expressed its satisfaction with the death of the Albanian insurgents.⁷⁹ At the same time, Austro-Hungarian officials began to arm hundreds of auxiliaries in Montenegro – regardless of their language and religion. It was for the first time in Montenegrin history that the rulers in Cetinje willingly handed firearms to Muslim and Albanians and Slavic Muslims.⁸⁰

In the Albanian district of Peja, too, the situation during the Austro-Hungarian occupation was more complicated than before. Around Gjakova in particular, public security had been dire since 1909 – and improved little when the Austro-Hungarians invaded the region: the Muslims soon realized that the occupation forces would not tolerate unrestrained violence against the Orthodox minority. The Austro-Hungarian authorities, though, seemed to be somewhat uninterested in Muslim bands robbing

⁷⁷ ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1728, Pol. Nr. 2131: Kreiskommando Plevlje an MGG/M, 7.3.1918.

⁷⁸ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 997, Liasse Krieg 49e, Monatsbericht für August 1917, 17.9.1917.

⁷⁹ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 997, Liasse Krieg 49e, Monatsbericht für Juni 1918, 15.7.1918.

⁸⁰ One of the first armed clashes between these auxiliaries and insurgents occurred in winter 1918, see ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, K. 997, Liasse Krieg 49e (Stimmung Bevölkerung Montenegros 1918), Brief Otto an Czernin, 1.3.1918.

and even murdering Orthodox civilians in early 1916.⁸¹ In some cases, Ignaz Trollmann (1860–1919), the Austro-Hungarian corps commander in Shkodra before the establishment of the military governorate-general responsible for the maintenance of order in occupied Montenegro, even excused murders as understandable Albanian “revenge for the violence they had to suffer before”.⁸² Before the Austro-Hungarian occupation in the beginning of 1916, several thousand Albanian Muslims had already fled from Peja and Gjakova to Albania and into the Ottoman Empire. This emigration continued on a smaller scale under Austro-Hungarian administration, but there was a significant remigration of Muslims to Peja, too.⁸³ For the District of Peja, due to a lack of reliable data, it is almost impossible to state if there was a net population loss or gain from 1916 to 1918 as a result of migration.

In general, all Muslims in Montenegro, Slavic as well as Albanian, worried about their future, feared they would once again find themselves under a ‘Serb yoke’ after the end of the war: in the case of an Entente victory, this could have occurred either after the imaginable, though improbable, restoration of King Nicholas’s rule or in a unified South Slav (‘Yugoslav’) state under the Karađorđevići. In the event of Central Powers prevailing, this could have happened in a pseudo-independent, Serb-dominated Montenegro by the grace of Austria-Hungary. Thus, increasing numbers of Muslims wanted to leave the military governorate-general to the Ottoman Empire. The Austro-Hungarian authorities tried to pacify the situation, but the officials were aware of the fact that the fear-driven Muslim emigration could merely be slowed down, but not stopped – as long as there was no plan for Montenegro’s future and an appropriate and coherent population policy on which the Muslims in Montenegro could rely.⁸⁴

Conclusions

Until the end of the occupation, there was no Austro-Hungarian plan for Montenegro’s future at large.⁸⁵ And there was no specific Austro-Hungarian demographic plan or population policy in the military governorate-general in Montenegro. Nevertheless – or precisely because of this– the First World War does mark a crucial caesura in Montenegrin population policy: from the mid nineteenth century to the beginning of the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the Kingdom of Montenegro in January 1916, the population policy of Montenegro’s rulers was shaped by the two traditional options of the Serb ‘warrior caste’ for gaining wealth: when the Orthodox tribes had the

⁸¹ ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 998, Liasse Krieg 49e, Wochenbericht des MGG/M, 17.3.1916.

⁸² ÖStA, KA, NFA, Karton 1699, Pol. Nr. 371: Trollmann an Weber vom 9.12.1916.

⁸³ See correspondence between Kral and Otto, ÖStA, HHStA, PA I, Karton 999, Liasse 49 h.

⁸⁴ Ibid.

⁸⁵ Private archive at Schloss Clam, Austria, Referat “Angliederung Montenegros”, 16.1.1918.

possibility to acquire land or to seize booty, they did so. Times of war or at least an unclear state between peace and war with the Ottoman Empire – as from the late eighteenth century to 1878 or from 1912 onwards – provided great opportunities for self-enrichment at the expense of Muslims. And most often, these raids were accompanied by expulsions, often by murders, and in rare cases even by ethnic cleansings. But none of these crimes were systematic; they were a kind of brutal side effect of the traditional appropriation of Muslim property by the Montenegrin tribal warriors. Social motives – intermingled with nationalist views of ‘eternal enmity’ and superiority – were the dominant cause of the incidents.

When the Austro-Hungarians occupied Montenegro, they disrupted this traditional pattern. The Austro-Hungarian officials, shaped by the plurality of the Habsburg Empire, were obsessed with the linguistic, ethnic, and religious complexity of the military governorate-general in Montenegro and the long-practised Habsburg policy of *divide et impera*. But their efforts to adjust their concepts to Montenegro’s peculiarities failed for several reasons. Especially, the biases of the Austro-Hungarian civil and military elites did not match the specific situation in Montenegro: the Austro-Hungarian decision makers had anti-Serb, pro-Albanian, and also pro-Muslim attitudes. Yet at the same time, they did not share a plan for Montenegro’s future. The result was an imperative of non-discrimination. This was not due to particular sympathies or antipathies or even grandiose thoughts on human equality, but simply reflected practical reasons and the realist assumption that the military governorate-general had to get along with everyone everywhere in occupied Montenegro. This was of military necessity as well as demanded by article 43 of the Hague Conventions:

The authority of the legitimate power having actually passed into the hands of the occupant, the latter shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure, as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country.⁸⁶

Thus the re-establishment and assurance of “public order and safety” in early 1916 – with all its problems and contradictions in detail, which were often driven by the ethnic and religious affiliations of the Austro-Hungarian military and civilian personnel – marked the caesura in the case of the military governorate-general in Montenegro during the First World War: the Austro-Hungarian occupation froze the maelstrom of conflicting demographic interests in Montenegro for almost three years.

After the end of the First World War, Montenegro’s ‘warrior caste’ did not regain the power it had lost in January 1916, and the dynasty of Petrović-Njegoš lost its throne. Pro-Serb Yugoslavists supporting the unification of Montenegro with the newly proclaimed Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes came into power in October 1918 – militarily backed by the Royal Serbian Army, which had ‘liberated’ Montenegro in the name of the Yugoslav cause. In the first Yugoslav state, the Alba-

⁸⁶ Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its annex “Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land”, section III (“On military authority over hostile territory”), article 43 (The Hague, 29 July 1899).

nians of Peja and Gjakova were not victims of Montenegrin arbitrariness anymore, but of systematic Yugoslav demographic plans drafted in faraway Belgrade. The Serb-dominated Yugoslav government tried to “colonize” and “slavicize” Kosovo and Metohija under a state-sponsored program, starting with the “Decree on the Colonization of the Southern Regions of Yugoslavia” as early as in September 1920.⁸⁷ Thus, it could be argued that Albanians as well as Montenegrin independentists were united under a ‘Serb yoke’ in a crude Yugoslav disguise after the end of the First World War.

⁸⁷ *Bokovoy*, 253–254, footnote 17.

War as a Model of Population Movement in the Modern World: The Galician Perspectives in the First World War

By *Serhiy Choliy*

The developments of European modernization during the nineteenth century, especially in the military sphere, had wide-ranging political consequences for the organization of population movement during the First World War. The example of the contested borderland territory of Galicia demonstrates the similarity of approaches by two rival imperial structures – those of the Habsburgs and Romanovs – to the problem of what can be called *population resource management* during wartime. This article examines the goals and actions of Austria-Hungary and Russia in this sphere, and demonstrates new approaches to mass displacements as an important and sometimes crucial technique, which first appeared during World War I.¹

Disparities in economic development in Europe during the second half of nineteenth century resulted in the creation of peripheral and semi-colonial territories. Some, like the new-born Balkan states (Bulgaria, Serbia, Romania), were independent but others formed peripheries inside imperial structures. Two of the best examples of the latter in the European context are the provinces of Galicia and Bosnia in the Habsburg Empire. For independent states, the status of periphery often leads to a loss of influence in international policy and a subsequent decline, mostly connected with the economic domination of leading countries and unfair methods of competition on an international level. Such a situation was also a factor behind another important developmental trend: attempts to modernize peripheral countries, with the aim of ‘overtaking’ leading countries.² The peripheries inside the independent states were the result of their economic processes and the unbalanced development of some territories at the expense of others.³ In such cases, the aim of attempts at modernization was not to diminish the periphery, but to use its resources more effectively, without changing the existing economic balance in the state. Thus, peripheries received modernization and the use of new technologies only in crucial areas that

¹ An earlier version of this text was published in the online journal ‘Percorsi storici’, www.percorsistorici.it, 2014. *Choliy*, War.

² *Brusatti*, p. 18–19; *Feichtinger*; *Janos*, p. 15–16.; *Koessler*, p. 13–20.

³ For Austria-Hungary this was the fast industrial development of so-called *Alpenländer* (modern Austria and Slovenia) and Bohemia, and subsequent existence of agrarian economy in Galicia, Bosnia and most of the Hungarian territories. *Brusatti*, p. 148–149.

were important for state subsistence, such as the military⁴. European conscription was the first step towards full-scale involvement of the population in military affairs, which later resulted in population movement operations. For the Russian Empire, aggressive foreign policy and military action represented a way of solving political problems at the expense of defeated countries, especially Austria-Hungary. The attempts at modernization across different countries produced disparate results. Some succeeded in changing their status and made a breakthrough in economic development, but by 1914, most still found themselves in a period of transition. One of the most significant components of modernization in nineteenth century Europe was compulsory military service, which on the eve of the First World War had been introduced in almost every European country. For societies of European modernity, however, this direction of modernization was often a road to nowhere, merely limiting possibilities for peaceful development.⁵

By 1914, every country in Europe was preparing for a war that would be the first to concentrate mass armies of over one million soldiers. Mobilization plans for the first days of possible war often included even more actions in the civil sphere than in the military.⁶ One of the central features of World War I warfare was the creation of mass armies, the direct result of military modernizations of the mid-nineteenth century. Warfare on a massive scale, with millions of people in the field, resulted in a growth of consumption followed by shortages in all spheres; staffing systems and systems for the distribution of goods quickly became ineffective. World War I thus became the first war in which population became the most important resource, sometimes more necessary than firearms or artillery shells.⁷ As a result, the period of European Modernity demonstrated rapid changes in state government techniques and numerous innovations for the effective organization of defence.

This paper focuses chiefly on the results of unbalanced modernization, especially in the military sphere and describes its consequences for the political arena. A new political means – population displacement and the organized movement of people for the purpose of state security – was actively used for the first time during the war. The Austro-Hungarian territory of Galicia and its population constitute the basis for this research. On the eve of World War I, neighbouring Russia asserted its claim to this territory and during the war the local population was to suffer at the hands of both the Habsburg and the Romanov regimes.

This research draws from two main groups of sources: official records of the bureaucratic apparatus of both Austria-Hungary and Russia; and unofficial information

⁴ *Feichtinger; Janos*, p. 15–16.; *Koessler*, p. 13–20.

⁵ For further reading on the modernization in East Central Europe see: *Berend/Ranki*, p. 43–87; *Choliy*, *Die Modernisierung*, p. 109–122; *Jukes*, p. 11–18; *Simkins/Jukes*, p. 21–36.

⁶ *Berend/Ranki*, p. 43–87; *Dreiszigler*, p. 3–27; *Chambers; Shigalin*.

⁷ *Franek*, p. 980; *Haselsteiner*, p. 87–103; *Gavrilov/Kutuzov*, p. 145–158; *Senjavskaia*, p. 45.

– mostly memoirs of those people who had changed their place of residence during the war. This comparative analysis allows us to see the main approaches of two great European hostile powers to the same issue – how to win the war. In general, it helps us to understand which means were considered as sufficient and appropriate by European leaders during World War I. The findings are all the more significant because they allow us to compare powers that were rivals in this war.

Historical Background: Galicia before World War I

On the eve of World War I, the territory of Galicia was part of the Austrian half of the dualistic Austro-Hungarian Empire, ruled by representatives of the Habsburg dynasty, and officially known as ‘The Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomeria’. From an economic perspective, Galicia was a peripheral territory of Austria-Hungary. There was economic progress only in limited branches of industry, for example in petroleum production. The Galician population mostly consisted of peasants, traditionally employed in agriculture, in a region that was one of the poorest in the Habsburg lands.⁸ Even such ‘locomotives of progress’ as railroads were often built here not for economic, but for strategic reasons.⁹

Several major national and confessional groups, each having different national interests and foreign policy orientations, inhabited Galicia. The diversity of Galician national life influenced the creation of a unique local microcosm of interethnic relations and cohabitation of the three most important national groups: Jews (10–13%), Poles (58.6%), and Ukrainians (40.2%).¹⁰

Poles (mostly Catholics), who inhabited most of the territory of Galicia, especially its Western and Central part, had the biggest influence and formed a clear majority of the population. They held the main governing offices in Galicia, as well as several leading posts in the Empire. From the 1860s on, the central Austrian government used the Polish group in parliament as its ally to achieve internal and external policy goals. In return, Poles were rewarded with greater authority in Galicia for decades to come. Poles thus dominated in Galician political life; the fact that they made up a large proportion of local landowners meant that they could also influence the economic situation of agricultural Galicia.¹¹

The orientations of Polish political parties and groups were quite diverse, but united by one common goal – the rebirth of the eighteenth-century Polish state from the Black Sea to the Baltic Sea (“od morza do morza”). Although they mostly declared loyalty to Vienna, they in fact often played a double or even triple game: some even

⁸ *Himka; Kargol*, p. 33–51; *Komlosy*, p. 135–178.

⁹ *Zhaloba; Nabrdalik*, p. 258–297.

¹⁰ *Dabkowski*, p. 27; *Österreichische Statistik* (1910).

¹¹ *Dziadzio*, p. 25–41.

had very close relations with Russian parties and the Russian intelligence service, acting as a hidden enemy of the Habsburg state.¹²

Ukrainians (mostly Greek Catholic, and also referred to as *Ruthenes* or *Rusyns* in official documents of that time) inhabited the territory of Eastern Galicia. A national minority in Galicia as a whole, in the compact territory in which they resided they formed an overwhelming majority (61.7%). Ukrainians were a mostly peasant people, employed in agriculture and living chiefly in villages and small towns. Their political activity only began to increase in last third of the nineteenth century, simultaneously with the growth of their education level and the self-consciousness of Ukrainians as a separate nation.¹³

After playing an active role in the Austrian revolution of 1848–1849 as a Habsburg ally, Ukrainians lost their political influence during 1870s¹⁴. The Austrian government decided to make deals with the stronger Poles and left Ukrainians without any significant support. This situation resulted in the emergence of two main tendencies among Ukrainian politicians. The first, *Russophiles* (*Muscovophiles*), were oriented towards Russia, recognizing the local Ukrainian population as a part of a greater Russian nation and attempting to popularize this idea¹⁵. Most of Russophiles were Greek Catholic priests of an older generation. A new type of local intelligentsia appeared in the last third of the nineteenth century. These were mostly people who had been educated in civil institutions, whose main political orientation was *Ukrainophile*: that is, involving the recognition of the local Ukrainian populations of Galicia, Bukovina and Transcarpathia as part of a greater Ukrainian nation, divided between Austria-Hungary and Russia.¹⁶

The third biggest national group of Galicia was formed by Jews ('Hebrews'), who were mostly urban residents, with a high percentage of participation in specific professions, such as trade, arts and crafts, etc. Frequently, they also assumed an intermediary function in relations between village and city, peasants and landowners, international trade etc., which made them very important for the economic life of Galicia as a whole. Jews in Austria-Hungary, in contrast to neighbouring countries, were granted rights under the law that were equal to the other national and confessional groups. *De jure* they were equal to any other citizens of the Empire, a policy that

¹² Here and in the following footnotes, for sources from the Ukrainian archival institutions the shortened version of reference is used. Instead of widely used version with the indication of *fond, opys i sprava*, – as in CDIAK (Central'nyj Derzhavnyj Istorychnyj Arhiv Ukrayiny, m. Kyiv) fond x, opys y, sprava z – I use the model CDIAK x.y.z.

Austriacus, p. 1–15; CDIAK 361.1.240, p. 1–2.

¹³ *Karpynec*, p. 12.

¹⁴ *Taylor*, p. 67–72.

¹⁵ *Prilozhenie #2*, p. 9.

¹⁶ *Himka; Kappeler*, p. 33–43; *Lozyns'kyj*, Halychyna, p. 43–46, 53–60.

made Jews loyal to the existing political order. Galician Jews thus took an active part in the political life of the Empire.¹⁷

Disparities in governmental structure and the Ukrainian national movement resulted in the further development of the Polish-Ukrainian national conflict in the political, confessional, economic and other spheres. A number of bloody incidents took place, however: despite the fact that by 1914 both parties had come to an understanding known as the Galician Compromise (*Ausgleich*), mutual distrust was rising. Both Poles and Ukrainians had maximalist and extremist directions in their political environment, striving to reach their goals at the expense of other national groups.¹⁸

Historical Background: The Austro-Hungarian and Russian Claims Before World War I

On the eve of World War I, Austria-Hungary's and Russia's visions of a future world order and state frontiers both included Galicia as a borderland and zone of interest, placing the two empires on a collision course over the territory.

The situation in Galicia was more or less satisfactory for the Habsburgs. Austria-Hungary was united by a complicated system of counterbalances in each province and throughout the Empire as a whole. Franz Josef I tried to keep his Empire a viable union of different nations, often taking advantage of both their antipathies and their mutually beneficial economic ties, and creating strong interdependency among them. The greatest problem of this system during the first decades of the twentieth century was the rise of nationalism and the escalation of national conflicts in several provinces. Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Galicia was not the most significant issue facing the Habsburgs, but in the event of war, each nation would be able to hinder the territorial unity of the Austro-Hungarian state: the Russophile party for its part was likely to greet a separation of those Austro-Hungarian territories inhabited by Ukrainians in the case of possible military conflict. Greek-Catholic priests could also influence the peasant population not to take part in defensive action against the Russian army. Most Russophiles were also suspected of being paid agents and spies of the Russian General Staff.¹⁹

The Ukrainophile party was much more loyal to the Habsburg dynasty, but in the case of war with Russia would also be likely to create problems. On the one hand, Ukrainophiles had been trying to create a separate Ukrainian province as a part of a Habsburg state. Such endeavours were intolerable to the central authority because the creation of such a province would undermine existing priorities in two eastern provinces: Galicia and Bukovina (in the Austrian part of the state) and would also

¹⁷ *Monolattij*, p. 200–209.

¹⁸ *Bartov/Weitz*, p. 8–9; *Wolff*, p. 1–7; *Binder*; *Dziadzio*, p. 25–41; *Taylor*, p. 67–72; *Prusin*, p. 12–35; *Kuzmany*, p. 123–144; *Monolattij*, p. 200–209, 316–318, 329.

¹⁹ *Lozyns'kyj*, *Ukrayinstvo*; *Tryl'ovs'kyj*.

require the separation of Carpatho-Ukraine from Hungary, which in turn would lead to the collapse of the existing state order. On the other hand, the creation of a single large Ukrainian state from parts of Russia and Austria-Hungary, which was a maximal aim for Ukrainophile parties, was even more unlikely, because it would fundamentally threaten the territorial integrity of Habsburg state.²⁰

The political orientation of the Poles differed largely because they were divided between three states in the face of the approaching war: Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Russia. The main goal of the Polish nation in the war was also the creation of separate nation-state. In Galicia, Polish politicians were divided according to their pro- or anti-Russian orientation.

For the Romanov Empire, the war could become a means to solve important internal problems: after the loss of the Russian-Japanese war in 1905 and the revolution of 1905–1907, the country was ruled by a reactionary absolutist system. Rejecting any democratization, the state of Nicolas II was united by a strong autocratic power based on violence and assimilation. Pan-Slavic rhetoric was employed to assert the Russian Empire's commitment to the territorial unification of all Slavic nations under the rule of the Russian tsar. Long before 1914, a massive campaign of solidarity with "Russian brothers" abroad had begun. Galician Ukrainians, who were recognized as a part of the Russian nation, Poles, Czechs, Slovaks, and South Slavs alike were the targets of Russian propaganda and foreign policy.²¹ In Galicia, the Russian authorities and intelligence service maintained strong contacts in both the Polish and Ukrainian political milieus.²²

Russia had several possibilities with regard to the Galician situation. First of all, it was not interested in the territorial integrity of Habsburg state and flirted with local autonomists and separatists. Within the first few days of the war, the Poles even received the promise that they would be granted autonomy.²³ This, however, ran counter to a century-long policy of assimilation of Russian Poles, and seemed to be a tactic of feeding a receptive audience with empty promises.

The Ukrainians of Galicia, especially Ukrainophiles, were recognized as a direct enemy of Russian Pan-Slavism with no right to a separate state or even autonomy. In Russia, Ukrainophiles were labelled as *Masepyntsi* and persecuted for their beliefs.²⁴ Galicia was the territory in which the Ukrainian national movement had the best pos-

²⁰ *Lozynskyj*, *Die Schaffung*.

²¹ *Andrusyshyn*, p. 18; *Rosya*, p. 5; *Schupp*, p. 289–290; *Otchet*, p. 9; *Pogodin*.

²² *Austriacus*, p. 1–15.

²³ *Rosya*, p. 5; *Burchak*, p. 30–37; *Chervonnaja*.

²⁴ *Ivan Mazepa* was a leader (*hetman*) of the Ukrainian autonomous state as a part of Russian Empire in 1687–1708. He entered into an alliance with the enemy of Russia, Swedish King Karl XII, trying to win some broader form of autonomy or even independence for Ukraine. His defeat in 1709 at the battle of Poltava marked the end of end of these attempts. Since then, the term *Masepynets* was used in the Russian Empire to identify Ukrainian separatists.

sibilities for development, threatening Russian ideological campaigns of *Russification* and *Pan-Slavism*.²⁵ The Russian authorities also identified the Jewish national community of Galicia as a hidden enemy. Beginning in the 1880s, anti-Semitism became part of official Russian policy, with the organization of pogroms as one of its integral components.²⁶

Thus, on the eve of World War I, the territory of Galicia was in the zone of intersection of two major powers of the region: Austria-Hungary and Russia. Both had significant internal problems and tried to solve these issues through different means. Austria-Hungary tried to maintain the status quo and had no interest in becoming embroiled in any foreign conflicts, while Russia tried to solve its internal problems by pursuing foreign acquisitions. In the case of Galicia, both regimes were oriented toward a particular section of the local national groups. On the other hand, the foreign policy orientation of these groups was often recognized as a threat to national security by both rival states.

World War I Begins: The Austrian Activities During the First Phase of the War

Although all European countries had prepared themselves for the possibility of war, the events of late summer 1914 still came as a surprise to everyone throughout the continent. The assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and the events that followed it triggered off the war and broke down the existing European order. In keeping with the old Latin proverb said, *si vis pacem – para bellum*, the great powers had been gearing themselves up for military conflict, but in 1914 they were scarcely capable of imagining what the exact character of the future war would be, how long it would last, and which real measures should have been taken to prepare for it. World War I marked the birth of a very new type of warfare for which most European countries were only partially ready.²⁷

One of the most important features of World War I warfare was the creation of mass armies of conscripts, a direct result of the military modernizations of mid-nineteenth century. Massive-scale warfare, with millions of people in the field, resulted in the growth of consumption and subsequent shortages in all spheres, especially where the systems of staffing the distribution of goods were ineffective. Shortages that at first were the result of ineffective or insufficient production – such as a shortfall in ammunition – were a surmountable problem. However, other kinds of shortages, such as a lack of human resources, were due to systemic failure. The absence of a free labour force resulted in so-called “silence” on the fronts and to a greater degree – to the end of World War I in general. World War I was the first war in which large sec-

²⁵ *Andrusyshyn*, p. 18; *Hermajze*, p. 271–354.

²⁶ *Dekel-Chen*, p. 6–7.

²⁷ *Bull/Hook, 1914–1916; 1916–1918; Jung/Pavlovic; Shigalin*.

tions of the population became one of the most important resources, sometimes even much more valuable than firearms or artillery shells.²⁸

Mobilization: Everything for the Front

Starting from 1868, the armed forces of Austria-Hungary were manned on the basis of universal conscription. During the 1870s, the Habsburg State created a fully-fledged mobilization system. In the event of war, its actions included regulations for population movements in three main areas: mobilization of men to the army, internment of suspected persons, and transportation of refugees. Austria-Hungary had not taken part in any major military conflict from the 1860s to 1914, but its mobilization system had been upgraded permanently. The border territory of Galicia imposed stricter regulations owing to its vulnerability in case of Russian assault. In the event of war, Galicia's population of eight million people would be utilized for war purposes.

World War I was the first opportunity for most European countries to test conscription in a real-life environment; no prior form of trial conscription or part-time mobilization could compare with the general mobilization of 1914. On the eve of World War I, Austria-Hungary was still facing several problems: lack of funds to arrange the full-scale execution of military law and the rise of nationalism, which partly paralyzed the legislative activity in the Empire. The situation concerning the increase in military funding is representative in this context. Several national groups, especially Czechs, employed obstructionist tactics in parliament and blocked the decision-making process in this field until their national demands were taken into account. Often it was only the personal intervention of the Emperor Franz Joseph I that was effective enough to raise the funding level for the army.²⁹

By way of example, in 1881, 842.000 citizens were liable for military service but only 102.000 were enlisted served in the army, while 594.000 people received draft deferments or were recognized as physically unfit. A certain number of the eligible either evaded conscription or emigrated. This situation was repeated from year to year, and in reality, only one eighth to one tenth of the male population served in the army. This lack of military manpower was a serious threat to the Austro-Hungarian defence system. In addition, not everyone who was enlisted served for three years in the so-called Common Army with full-scale drill. Several categories of enlisted men served for only one or two years, the same as territorial defence soldiers, which were called for exercises for short periods of time.³⁰

²⁸ *Franek*, p. 980; *Haselsteiner*, p. 87–103; *Gavrilov/Kutuzov*, p. 145–158; *Senjavskaja*, p. 45.

²⁹ *Pitreich*, p. 2–3, 18; *Stourzh*, *Ethnic*, p. 67–89; *Stourzh*, *Multinational*, p. 1–23; *Taylor*, p. 219.

³⁰ *Statistisches Jahrbuch*, p. 10–11; *Vooruzhennyja*, p. 2–17; *Shigalin*, p. 35, 50.

Austria-Hungary began to prepare for the next war just after its defeat from Prussia in 1866. On the eve of World War I, the Austrian General Staff entertained three possible war scenarios and different combinations thereof (so-called *Kriegsfälle*): 'B' against Balkan states, especially Serbia, 'I' against Italy and 'R' against Russia. The realities of war demonstrated hostilities against all three rivals, with Russia as the strongest one.³¹

The Austro-Hungarian war preparations were summarized in official documents called mobilization plans. Each of these plans was a list of actions that were to be carried out in the event of war. Of central importance to this process were preparatory activity and fast mobilization. In event of war the mobilization was to be organized as an order of parallel processes for different categories of those citizens eligible for military service. The dualistic form of the Habsburg state and army, together with the relatively low number of reservists who had actually been trained before the outbreak of World War I, led to the need to train a large number of soldiers during the first days of the war.³² In the event of the mobilization the reservists who actually served in the army had to arrive to their garrison within 24 hours. All the others, especially those who had not served, as well as senior reservists, became the *Landsturm* soldiers, who in most cases simply had to register with a local government body and then wait for a summons. Mobilization also applied to horses and the labour force needed for war. For the first weeks of the war, the armies did not yet require many as skilled men as were available, and many of them received temporary leave. *Landsturm* soldiers were later used to substitute war losses after a short drill.³³ During wartime they formed so-called March Battalions – organized masses of troops that were sent to the frontline and then redistributed on their arrival. In this way, the Austrian general staff hoped to use the available human resources as efficiently as possible. By 1916, the Austrian army, due to lack of human resources, had established a special governing body – the Chief of Supplies for the Whole Armed Forces or *Chef des Ersatzwesens für die Gesamte Bewaffnete Macht* (CHdE) – which in 1917–1918 was managed by Baron von Hazai. His main goal was the development of a more effective system of resource-usage in all spheres of life in Austria-Hungary.³⁴ In 1916, it was estimated that 7.8 million people could be used as soldiers for Austria-Hungary, a great number of people for a country with a population of 52 million: the male population of Austria-Hungary numbered 25.8 million, with 10.3 million men in an age range between 17–45 years. As of 1 January 1916, the general losses for the Austro-Hungarian army were estimated to be no less than 4 million. With a monthly contingent of 84.000 men, the Austrian general staff predicted exhaustion of all available human resources by October 1916.³⁵ Only the active processes of manpower redis-

³¹ Österreich-Ungarns, p. 4–6.

³² Hecht, p. 49.

³³ Mobilisierungsinstruktion, p. 6–7, 13–17.

³⁴ KKA, ChdE, 2–1/4, p. 2.

³⁵ Kutschabsky, p. 233–239; Österreichisches Kriegsarchiv, Wien, ChdE-127.

tribution, like the high level of involvement of semi-fit people in the military service, new phases of mobilization, and the subsequent return of prisoners of war (POWs) stabilized the situation. By the end of the war, the general number of those mobilized was estimated at 9 million.³⁶

According to the Polish historian Maciej Krotofil, during the war the territory of Galicia and Bukovina saw 1.383789 people mobilized to the Austrian army, around 15.7% of the civilian population (1910). According to the 1910 census, sexual differentiation on these territories was almost equal: 50% were male and 50% female. Thereafter, no less than 30% of male population was mobilized, notably almost all men in their productive years (age 15–49). An average of 16.6 per thousand of the pre-war population (about 150.000) died in combat.³⁷

Mobilization: To Preserve Law and Order

The second largest form of displacement undertaken during the war by Viennese authorities were civil mobilization actions. Mobilization was a complex process, which required the well-coordinated functioning of different governing bodies. In such circumstances, any kind of social unrest was banned and strictly punished. According to the mobilization instructions, any action had to be carried out under the rule of law. State governing bodies thus had to monitor the different spheres of civil life in order to prevent any drastic changes in their normal functioning. For example, among other measures, the government safeguarded the banking system, secured private property, and protected the civil rights of every citizen.³⁸ At the same time, each civil governing body was essentially obliged to help the military authorities to mobilize as quickly as possible. This position represented an a priori contradiction of the goal of protecting of civil rights and often undermined the latter.

Mobilization instructions included ‘Emergency Ordinances’ (*Ausnahmsverfügungen*), a set of measures for the purpose of securing swift and unproblematic mobilization, including censorship, surveillance, arrests, displacement, internment and the limitation of free movement. Nine districts were created for these actions on the territory of Austria-Hungary, each of which were situated on the borders with suspected enemies – Russia, Italy and Serbia³⁹.

The Emergency Ordinances were introduced during the first weeks of war in Galicia to a maximal degree, with the local Russophile population and pro-Russian propaganda important considerations on the part of the Viennese authorities. Repression directed against the local population, mostly of Ukrainian origin, was justified

³⁶ *Shigalin*, p. 55, 248.

³⁷ *Krotofil*, p. 30; *Österreichische Statistik*; *Winkler*, p. 3–8.

³⁸ CDIAL (Central’nyj Derzhavnyj Istorychnyj Arhiv Ukrayiny, m. L’viv) 146.4.3364, p. 31–46; *Zarządzenia*, p. 1–66; *Stibbe*.

³⁹ CDIAL 146.4.3366, p. 54; *Österreichisches Kriegsarchiv*, KM, Karton #2863, p. 3–6; *Schoeller*, p. 29–33.

with reference to a 'Ukrainian Betrayal' (*'Ukrainischer Verrat'*). Russophiles were suspected of being spies, and mistrust of this kind was soon transferred to all Ukrainians in the Habsburg monarchy, who were often deemed to be a population hostile to Habsburg rule. For the first weeks of war any kinds of activities carried out by Russophiles in Galicia were strictly prohibited. At the same time, the Austrian army, using martial law, sentenced to death and executed many individuals, often simply on the basis of their Russian-like language. The resulting mass hysteria and suspicion led many among the local Galician population to greet the arrival of the Russians. According to post-war studies, 546 people from Galicia and 46 from Bukovina, mostly Greek-Catholic or Orthodox Ukrainians, were sentenced to death as suspected traitors.⁴⁰

One of the most important aspects of the Emergency Ordinances in Galicia was mass internment. This was one of the first cases of internment on such a massive scale, with relocation and settlement in specially constructed camps during the First World War. People who were not sentenced to death, but were suspected of sympathizing with Russia, were not left behind the frontline. The success of the Russian army and its rapid occupation of Galicia provoked the avalanche of arrests and actions, which were often the result of personal antipathy or false denunciation. The arrested were displaced and resettled by trains to the camps, the largest being Thalerhof, Spielberg (Styria), and Theresienstadt (Bohemia). Some interned persons were kept in smaller camps, located in Austria and Hungary.⁴¹

Thalerhof internment camp is infamous as one of the first concentration camps on European territory. Like other camps of this type, it was marked by a high mortality rate, unbearable living conditions, the outrage of local administrations and complete neglect of prisoner's civil rights. The core of those imprisoned in Thalerhof was a group of 867 Russophile clergymen from Galicia who were at first simply left in the field without proper living conditions. Later, when the first barracks were constructed, most of the interned were left without any means of subsistence and support or medical treatment by local civil and military administration: for example, the only remedy used there to fight infectious diseases was quarantine.

It is difficult to calculate the overall number of Galicians interned by Austria-Hungary during World War I, but historians estimate the number ranges from 10.000 to 60.000 people, with the second figure likely to be the most accurate. It should be emphasized that the high mortality rate of the interned during this period was not the goal behind the creation of the camps, but was connected with a lack of experience in the field of organization and supply problems during wartime. Most of the deaths

⁴⁰ *Wendland*, p. 540–550; *Karbulyc'kyj*, p. 638; *Karpync*, p. 63; *Talergofskij*, p. 5; *Cehlyns'kyj*, p. 2–17.

⁴¹ There were simultaneous events of mass hysteria, directed towards "enemy aliens" or traitor suspects, in most European states of the time, such the rise of anti-Semitism in Russia and other countries, *Gatrell*, p. 17; *Talergofskij*, *Vyp.* 2, p. 109–133; *Andrusyshyn*, p. 22; *Stibbe*.

in the camps were caused by infectious diseases. War hysteria and the designation of the interned people as “traitors” and “enemies” were important factors that also led to high mortality in camps like Thalerhof, as the local communities had a negative or indifferent attitude towards interned people. Thalerhof and the other camps of this type in Austria-Hungary existed until 2 July 1917, when they were closed by Emperor Karl I.⁴²

The third form of Austrian state policy of displacement during World War I was the organized resettlement of refugees. For the first days of the war, passport holders from Austria-Hungary who were abroad, as well as citizens who wished to resettle far from the frontline with Russia, were obliged to move along three established evacuation lines: Bolen-Michalowice-Krakow for western Galicia, Tarnograd-Maidan Senyavski-Jaroslav for central Galicia and Volochysk-Pidvolochysk-Tarnopol for eastern Galicia. These citizens first had to be vetted by the local administration and then resettled or interned. A great number of Galician Jews chose to become refugees to avoid possible repression by the Russian occupation administration, which seemed to be anti-Semitic.⁴³

During the autumn of 1914, Galician refugees were placed in specially constructed camps in Carinthia, Bohemia, Moravia, Upper and Lower Austria, as well as in Vienna. The displacement of refugees was followed the same principle as internment, but was relatively better organized and included less violence toward the population.⁴⁴ By the middle of 1915 up to 400.000 refugees from Galicia had been displaced to the west. In total, by the end of the war the number of persons who changed their residence from the eastern provinces to the inner provinces of Austria-Hungary – whether voluntarily or due to coercion – was approximately 1.1 million.⁴⁵

Austrian internal policy during the first year of World War I can be interpreted as a policy of double standards. The population of the Habsburg state, which had equal constitutional rights, was divided by war into two categories: loyal and suspected of disloyalty. The first category remained within a legal framework while suspects were deprived of their rights. Thus, the same policy of displacement worked for each of these categories in quite a different way.

The World War Goes on: The Russian Occupation of Galicia

The occupation of Galicia was one of the most important goals for Russia in World War I. This border territory was important not for economic reasons, but for its strategic and political significance. Galicia was the key to the inner provinces of Hun-

⁴² *Burdyak*, p. 286–289; *Zapolovs'kyj*, p. 43, 190–194; *Kornylovyh*, p. 145–152.

⁴³ CDIAL, 146.4.3366, p. 63–64, 66; KA, KM, Karton #2863, p. 8–9, 13–16, Annex 1-d.

⁴⁴ *Burdyak*, p. 280–292.

⁴⁵ *Holter*, p. 12–15; *Zapolovs'kyj*, p. 43; *Rubinshtejn*, p. 88; *Semaka*, *Provyselenciv*; *Zhytye*, p. 652–654.

gary, a territory that separated Russia from the passes of the Carpathians and was crucial for Austro-Hungarian defence system. Galicia could also serve as a symbol for Russian Pan-Slavic propaganda. Its 'liberation from the Austrian yoke' gave Russia millions of local Ukrainians, who were recognized by St.-Petersburg as Russians.⁴⁶ At the same time, Russian rule in Galicia could also be used for negotiations with the Polish minority of Russia and as a means for encouraging national movements of Slavic nations within Austria-Hungary, with a promise of support from the Russian armed forces. There was one more factor that made occupation of Galicia very important for Russian national security – the activity of Ukrainian separatism there.⁴⁷

Active armed conflict began in Galicia on 23 August 1914. After initial success in their military operations, the Austro-Hungarian army retreated. During the first week of the war, the Russian military superiority on the Eastern front broke the Austrian defence line and was stopped only by the natural barrier of the Carpathian Mountains. On 3 September, the Russian Army entered the capital of Galicia – Lemberg (L'viv). By 16 September, they had occupied almost all of Galicia and Bukovina, blocked the Austrian fortress Przemysl, and entered the territory of Hungary. The war on the eastern front turned into trench warfare until May 1915, when the Austro-Hungarian army regained most of the territory of Galicia.⁴⁸

Pacification: Administration and Security

Russian foreign policy goals were implemented from the first days of the occupation of Galicia: assuming that the occupation would not be a provisional event, the Russian administration immediately began to treat the territory as if it were an integral part of the Russian Empire. The Russian General Staff believed that the war was going to finish in 1915 and that defeat of Austria-Hungary was predetermined. Based on this projection, it seemed obvious that Russia would hold these territories forever.

The Russians created an administrative system in the occupied territories that was identical to any other district in Russia: starting on 25 August 1914, the new administration began a policy of integrating Galicia into the Empire. On that day, the territory of Galicia and Bukovina received the title 'The Military General-Governorship of Galicia' with count Georgij Bobrinski as its direct administrator. The territory of governorship was divided into four provinces: Lemberg, Tarnopol, Czernowitz and Przemysl (due to military operations, the territory of the latter two changed).⁴⁹ To further consolidate their rule, the Russians promoted the emigration of administrative staff from Russia to Galicia. Russian policies in the occupied territories appeared un-

⁴⁶ Burchak, p. 30–37.

⁴⁷ Rosya, p. 5–8, 15.

⁴⁸ *Lein*, p. 387–388; *Materniak*; *Zavoevanie*; *Karpyniec*, p. 54–60.

⁴⁹ CDIAK 361.1.79a, p. 1–48; 361.1.301, p. 51–133; *Prilozhenie #1*, p. 7, 17; *Prilozhenie #2*, p. 1.

compromising and interfered in the domestic affairs of the province. Count Bobrinski and Archbishop Evlogiy began dismantling local educational systems, launched campaigns of forced assimilation ('*russification*'), and interfered in confessional relations, forcibly converting local Greek-Catholics to Russian Orthodoxy. These policies provoked rising dissatisfaction in local administrations – even among those that welcomed the Russians during the summer of 1914.⁵⁰

Determined to control the local population, the Russian administration – as the Austrians had done only a few weeks before – employed a variety of methods, mostly of a carrot and stick nature, even including displacement. During the first days of the war, Russia introduced a number of regulations (*Rasporyazheniya*) concerning foreigners, whereby citizens of Austria-Hungary and Germany, and later of the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria, were interned and resettled to a place of internal exile.⁵¹ Such regulations were also applied to Russian citizens of non-Slavic nationalities, especially ethnic Germans and Jews. At the outbreak of fighting on the Austro-Hungarian-Russian border, this fate also befell Austro-Hungarian citizens who were travelling in Russia. Some lucky individuals left the territory of Russia and evaded internment, as in the case of Ukrainian activist Vasyl Makovskiy, who crossed the border with the assistance of smugglers.⁵² After the occupation, *Rasporyazheniya* regulations were extended to newly acquired territories where reserve soldiers, officers and those fit for military service were subject to internment and resettlement from Galicia or Bukovina. These policies were similar to the other European states during this time period.⁵³

People suspected of supporting Habsburg rule formed the second largest group of those interned in Galicia and moved to Russia.⁵⁴ These suspects were considered enemies of Russia, especially local political leaders and activists who were members of Ukrainophile parties, and were removed from the territory to the inner provinces of Russia. According to reports of the occupational administration, 1.962 people were evicted from the territory of Galicia and 2.364 were resettled closer to the Russian border during the 11 months of the Russian occupation. Jews were not included among these statistics because they were designated as a hostile population and were evacuated either from Galicia or from the frontline. The number of evacuated Jews was approximately 10.000. Those officials of Austrian bureaucratic staff who stayed in Galicia after the occupation also were designated as suspects. Due to temporary problems with the employment of Russian citizens in the occupation appara-

⁵⁰ *Chlamtacz*, p. 10–12, 44–46, 75–95; *Himka*, p. 483–492; Rosya, p. 15; *Prilozhenie #5*, p. 5–12, 19; *Petrovych*, p. 14–18, 25, 54–7, 81, 95.

⁵¹ CDIAK 361.1.1935, p. 3; 1439.1.1602, pp. 7, 10, 15, 109, 111; 1439.1.1756, p. 18, 21, 37, 173, 121, 245, 315; 1599.1.130, p. 19, 71, 104, 106.

According to Pieter Gatrell, no less than 200,000 Germans who lived in Russia were displaced due to such regulations. *Gatrell*, p. 23.

⁵² *Makovs'kyj*, p. 1–50.

⁵³ *Gatrell*, p. 16–17; *Stibbe*.

⁵⁴ CDIAK, 301.1.3310, p. 3.

tus, local officials were allowed to work in their former positions under Russian supervision.⁵⁵

The local population was also obliged to provide hostages, who the Russians deported and used to guarantee public peace in Galicia and as a safety factor for their military operations and troops. According to reports of the occupational administration, hostages numbered almost 700 people. Unfortunately, because there was no organized system behind their arrest, there is no way to confirm the overall number of hostages, but information about their dislocation during the war indicates a much higher quantity. Very often the local administration at the lowest level deported undesirables in the form of hostages or the interned without any registration of these actions. Russians sometimes made no distinction between the categories of interned or resettled in their reports; this is the main reason why the total of 700 people is likely to be unrealistic. The actual number of hostages from Galicia seems to have been twice or even three times higher.

The following data drawn from multiple sources demonstrates a lack of any system in hostage registration, and bribery as an important method of avoiding internment. During the first days of the Russian occupation, there was a request to provide 250 hostages from Lemberg, the capital city of Galicia. As a result of subsequent negotiations and direct corruption, this number decreased to 150. Ultimately, the real number of hostages taken from Lemberg was only 37 people – 15 Jews, 12 Poles and 10 Ukrainians,⁵⁶ who were displaced by Russian authorities to various cities in Russia. Poles and Ukrainians were settled in Kyiv, where no one took care of them and they were left starving and destitute. According to memoirs and archival sources, there were 128 Galician hostages of Polish nationality in Kyiv and 554 Galician hostages of unidentified nationality in Poltava. Jewish hostages were settled in Nizhnyi Novgorod, much farther from the frontline, and there are no exact data about their numbers.⁵⁷ In contrast to official reports, the folk memory among the local population indicates that the quantity of hostages was significant, especially among the Jewish population. Local leaders, including the highest representatives of local clergy, among them Metropolitan Archbishop Andrzej Sheptycki, were deported to Siberia; only the Russian Revolution in 1917 allowed displaced persons to be returned home.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ *Chlamtacz*, p. 109; *Otchet*, p. 17; *Prilozhenie #1*, p. 31–32, 43; *Prilozhenie #5*, p. 5–12, 19.

⁵⁶ *Chlodecki*, p. 1, 9.

⁵⁷ *Chlodecki*, p. 1, 23, 42, 100–103; *Otchet*, p. 17; *Prilozhenie #1*, p. 34.

⁵⁸ CDAVO (Central'nyj Derzhavnyj Arhiv Vyschchyh Orhaniv Vlady Ukrainy), 1792.1.23, p. 341; 2592.1.58, p. 17; *Prus*, p. 49–56.

Painful Retreat: Evacuation and Political Aims

The political agenda of Russians and their political aims often ran counter to the needs of military operations and the occupational administration of Galicia. Harsh actions aimed at serving the security system were reduced for national groups that seemed to be the allies of Russians. Obligatory internment conditions for Austro-Hungarian reservists were cancelled for several national groups: Ukrainians, Czechs, Slovaks, Poles, Serbs and later for Italians and Romanians.⁵⁹ During the first months of the war, the Russian military command organized the release of Austro-Hungarian POWs. Those POWs who came from the occupied Galician territory and showed no hatred of the enemy could be set free, the only condition for their release being that they gave their parole of honour and signed a document declaring their refusal to act against the tsar and the Russian state.⁶⁰ In the first stage, thousands of POWs were set free without any registration, having been identified merely by their spoken language or orthodox confession. Later on, more order was established in this sphere. According to archival sources (the lists of released POWs, *Alfavit vojennoplennykh*), some 4.300 registered POWs were set free.⁶¹

Russia ruled Galicia uninterrupted until May 1915, after which the territory changed hands several times. In May 1915, the united armies of Austria-Hungary and Germany launched an offensive near the town of Gorlice, regaining all of Galicia except its Eastern part around the city of Tarnopol. The Russians returned to Eastern Galicia in the summer 1916 as a result of the so-called Brusilov Offensive, but they occupied only a small part of their previous possession, including regional centres such as Delyatyn, Stanislav, and Halytsch. In June 1917, the Russians launched Kerensky offensive, but its temporary success ended in July 1917 when the Austro-Hungarian army regained Galicia and even occupied several districts of Russian Podolia.

During the retreat, the Russian authorities tried to secure the supporting population, which it recognized as a part of the Russian state.⁶² With the intention of limiting Austro-Hungarian resources for a possible future conflict, Russian strategists ordered the destruction of everything that could be used for war purposes. Thereafter, displacement action on a large scale consisted of voluntary and forced displacement. Those afraid of returning to the Austrian authorities, pro-Russian activists, and those who had no wish to take part in the war, became refugees and were evacuated to Kyiv and then Rostov, or placed in the neighbouring Russian provinces of Podolia or Bessarabia.⁶³

⁵⁹ CDIAK, 363.1.77, p. 1, 27, 99, 305; 1439.1.1602, p. 11, 46, 126, 133, 137; *Nachtigal*, p. 58–59.

⁶⁰ CDIAK, 363.1.23, p. 7, 12, 14, 129–130, 154, 160, 381.

⁶¹ CDIAK, 361.1.224, p. 95, 119; 363.1.77, p. 305; 363.3.15, p. 1–127; *Otchet*, p. 14.

⁶² *Prilozhenie #3*, p. 6.

⁶³ CDIAK, 361.1.478; 361.1.479; 361.1.480; 361.2.11, p. 5, 22, 45, 94–112; *Chlodecki*, p. 1; *Doroshenko*, p. 51, 95.

The forced displacement was intended to limit the available human resources of Austria-Hungary.⁶⁴ There was even an unrealistic project for the total displacement of the Galician Ukrainian population to the territory of the Caucasus and the creation of national autonomy there based on the traditional Ukrainian Cossack mechanism of government.⁶⁵ In early 1915, the local authorities in Galicia received an order to register all men from the ages 18 to 50 who could be used for military service. After military clashes of May 1915, the local authorities had to remove all such men from Galician territory as quickly as possible – as with the enforced removal of cattle and stocks of material assets. For this purpose, there were special trains which departed from Lemberg train station each evening; the transferred persons had to be settled in neighbouring Volhynia. The swiftness of the offensive by the Central Powers and disorganization on the Russian home front thwarted the realization of this project, however.⁶⁶ It is thus difficult to count how many families were resettled; the Russian author Alexandra Bahturina estimates that 18.000 people were evacuated during May 1915. According to the reports of the occupation administration, during the first six days of June 1915 alone, more than 11.000 families received permits to resettle (some 50–55.000 people). There are no exact data in this area, but it does indicate the scale of the operation. In their reports, the Russian authorities indicate that “tens of thousands” were displaced. During May-June 1915, no less than 75.000 people were displaced from Galicia by the Russian authorities. The overall number of refugees and displaced from Galicia to Russia was estimated at 200.000.⁶⁷

Displaced populations soon became a difficult humanitarian problem for the Russian administration for the following years. After the overthrow of the tsarist government and the subsequent revolutions, new administrations and leaders had to deal with the problems of displaced persons.⁶⁸ The situation was so problematic that in 1916 many Galician refugees had to be returned from Russia to that part of Galicia which still was under Russian occupation. Several hundred displaced inhabitants of Galicia even took part in the civil war in Russia that followed.⁶⁹

⁶⁴ *Chlodecki*, p. 1.

⁶⁵ *Lyubchenko*, p. 45–51.

⁶⁶ CDIAK, 361.1.481, p. 9; 361.1.552, p. 1–23, 56–57, 76; *Chlamtacz*, p. 115.

⁶⁷ *Bahturina*, p. 187–188; *Otchet*, p. 46; *Prilozhenie #1*, p. 2, 20, 53; *Prilozhenie #5*, p. 17; *Cehlyns’kyj*, p. 1–17; There are also alternative data indicating that the overall total of refugees from Galicia was several times higher – Peter Gatrell indicates no less than 400.000 refugees from Galicia alone during 1915, *Gatrell*, p. 21.

⁶⁸ Numerous archival sources on the topic could be found in CDAVO: 1792.1.38; 1792.1.119, p. 7, 18–20, 24, 30, 39; 1792.1.120; 1792.1.121; 1792.1.122; 1792.1.123, pp. 32–40, 66, 90–96; 1792.1.124; 1792.1.125, p. 3, 8–14, 62–63, 121, 153; 1792.1.126, p. 11, 44; 1792.1.127; 1792.1.128, p. 5–20, 34, 55, 165, 303; 1792.1.129, p. 10, 178–181, 194–226, 300–394; 1793.1.71; CDIAK, 320.1.1423, p. 70; 320.1.1424, p. 20; 361.1.546, p. 16–17, 36–7; 715.1.1794, p. 70–72; 1439.1.1693, p. 12, 18, 72, 90, 94, 120, 148, 149, 243, 317, 380; 2227.1.77, p. 1.

⁶⁹ CDIAK, 361.1.302, p. 60–71; *Vavryk’*.

Russian rule in Galicia demonstrated that its state-organized population policies were similar to those enacted by the Austrians. Russia acted on its neighbours' territory as it did on its own, using the subject population for its own needs or displacing them to diminish enemy military potential. At the same time, Russian policy in Galicia was a hostage to its foreign orientation and propaganda activities. These factors prevented it from leaving the local population exposed to the threat of occupation by Central Powers and it was burdened by thousands of refugees from Galicia, who were designated as aliens. Part of the enemy's subject population was thus transferred to the position of ally and had to be secured by resettlement.

The General-Government of Galicia ruled until 16 March 1916, when its authority was transferred to Russian military command. Following the Russian retreat, Austria-Hungary re-established its jurisdiction over most of the territory of Galicia, and from mid-1917 itself became an occupying power, capturing more and more of Russian territories. The territory of Galicia was devastated by war, but this did not lead the Austrian administration to cease its mobilization there or to refrain from making up for its war losses by drawing on the local male population. The activities of the Habsburg administration were oriented towards pursuing a much more effective use of manpower, which was crucial for their war effort during World War I.

At the same time, the first year of the war had exerted a profound and lingering impact on the fate of the people who had populated these territories before 1914. Only the fall of the tsarist Empire in 1917, and of its dualistic counterpart in 1918, led to the return of most of the displaced persons. Due to national conflicts and civil wars, this process of return was to last even to 1923.⁷⁰

Conclusions

World War I was a culminating point in the era of European modernity and brought about irreversible consequences for life in most world societies. The arms race of the late nineteenth century and military modernization were the main reasons why populations came to be regarded as a vital resource. During this period, the foreign and internal policies of most European states had become more coordinated and closely associated, influencing the emergence of organized population movements as an important strategy in the war.

The example of Galicia demonstrates the similarity in the main approaches of both the Habsburg and Romanov regimes to the issue of large population masses as a resource during the war. There were few differences in the techniques and means of displacement policy: mobilization, evacuation of friendly refugees, internment of suspects and their isolation in camps or in the interior. Organized displacement thus became one of the victory strategies important to a state's military operations. World War I demonstrated that the displacement of thousands of people could be an

⁷⁰ CDIAK, 361.1.302, p. 60–71; *Leidinger/Moritz*, p. 273.

effective political method on a local and international level, so much so that it was to become a widely used strategy.

Galicia's borderland status created serious problems: a heterogeneous society was divided by imperial regimes into supporters and victims. Almost every man of productive age changed his place of residence during the war. In this situation, the local population became nothing less than a puppet of the state-led violence wielded by two great empires, sacrificed to the aim of victory in World War I. The war in this regard demonstrated how the methods of waging war had diversified during the age of modernity: mass displacement, mobilization of mass armies, and concentration camps were the inventions that characterized this new era, each made possible by technological progress of the nineteenth century. After this time, the otherwise natural phenomenon of population movement became transformed into a standard means employed in state-led war policy. World War I can thus be recognized as a model of population movement in the era of late European modernity.

The Jews and the Bolsheviks

The October Revolution and Escalation of Radical Anti-Semitism in the Polish Lands During the World War I and the First Years of Independent Poland

By *Konrad Zieliński*

The stereotype of ‘Jewish Communism’ (Polish *żydokomuna*) and Judeophobia to a great extent determined Polish-Jewish relations throughout the interwar period, during World War II and even in the post-war years. Yet the beginnings of this perception of Jews in the Polish lands are to be found in the revolutionary years 1905–1906 and above all during the final years of the Great War and the Polish-Bolshevik War. The years 1917–1918 and the first years of independent Poland (till Józef Piłsudski’s coup d’état in May 1926) constitute the focus of this paper.

While it is true that right-wing parties often exaggerated the role of Jews in the development of communism, it is undeniably the case that a relatively high proportion of Jews participated in the world communist movement. Jews made up a significant number of communists in many countries. To quote the Jewish historian, Jaff Schatz: “even though there were not many communists among the Jews, there were many Jews among communists.”¹

Indeed, in November 1917, among the 21 members of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (the Bolsheviks), five were Jewish by ethnicity (Trotsky, Sverdlov, Sokolnikov, Uritski, Zinoviev; moreover, Lev Kamenev’s father was Jewish). It is estimated that in the first Bolshevik Party congresses after the October Revolution, Jews constituted between 15 and 20 percent of the delegates.² After 1917 their percentage decreased, but people of Jewish origin were still noticeable. As we know, the majority of them gave little thought to their origin, like the most famous of them all, Leon Trotsky (Leib Bronstein).³ In his autobiography published in 1930 in Poland (first edition), he wrote: “when the political persecution started, the case of my Jewish ancestry took on new importance. Anti-Semitism gained significance at the same time as Trotskyism.”⁴

¹ Schatz, *Zagadka pokolenia*, p. 11.

² Aronson, p. 297.

³ Gitelman, p. 105–108; Johnson, p. 172–173; Pipes, *A Concise History*, p. 261.

⁴ Trocki, p. 401.

The presence of Jewish communists, often in executive positions, was quite apparent in almost every national section of the Bolshevik Party. This situation also concerned the Polish section of the Party and the so called Polbureau: the Polish Bureau of Agitation and Propaganda at the Party, the most important platform of Polish communists in Russia within the first years after October Revolution. Jews also participated in the structures of communist movement in Poland; their participation in the Communist Party of Poland (KPP, until 1925 known as the Communist Workers' Party of Poland – KPRP), its branches, and its youth organizations, was disproportionately high when compared with Jewish numbers in Poland. In the first years of its existence (the party was established in 1918), Jewish members made up around twenty five percent of the party, while the Jewish population in Poland remained under ten percent of the of the Polish population as a whole. Later on, the percentage of Jews among the members of KPP in various periods oscillated between 17 and 35 percent and was two to three and a half times higher than the total percentage of the number of the Jewish inhabitants of Poland in the interwar years⁵.

Jewish activists, often better educated and more experienced, assumed leadership roles in party organisations across numerous districts and cities. This was scarcely surprising, given their modest backgrounds, as described by Schatz:

The memories of the profound, growing poverty and the class inequalities were typical for the people coming from the poor workers' homes and those of a modest bourgeoisie. The characteristic feature of them and the people coming from the wealthy families was the conviction that one was emancipated from the influence of one's parents and the feeling of humiliation, as well as the belief in the limited perspectives because of the ethnic prejudices and discrimination.⁶

Communist concepts and ideology, and campaigns for equal social rights were especially popular among national minorities, reflecting widespread disaffection with their socio-economic disadvantage as well as with official and unofficial discrimination.

In the final year of the War and the first years of Polish independence, however, amid the accusations of close relations with the Germans and exploitation of the country together with Austrian and German forces during the occupation of the Kingdom of Poland, the question of the so-called *Litvaks* (the Jews who came from Russia to the Kingdom after the wave of pogroms after 1881, and who were allegedly contributing the Russification of the country) gave way to accusations of promoting communism. In reports of the Polish Ministry of Internal Affairs from the spring of 1919 we can read that “the Jews massively avoid conscription; the Soviet agents and the Spartacist groups in Germany are all Jews; under the cover of commercial activities they supported the Bolshevik agitation. All the Jewish organisations, also the cultural

⁵ *Mich*, *Obcy w polskim domu*, p. 39; *Mishkinsky*, p. 61 – 62; *Sacewicz*, p. 391 – 392.

⁶ *Schatz*, *The Generation*, p. 22.

and educational ones, conduct anti-Polish politics.”⁷ The Ministry complained that these organisations were informing the coalition missions and the citizens of the Entente in a biased and partial way about the situation in Poland. The many Jewish newspapers in Poland were described as extremely nationalistic, revolutionary and anti-Polish, overlooking the controversy between “Jewish nationalism” and “Bolshevism”. In other words: “all the Jewish organisations were to be the most dangerous posts of communism”.⁸ According to Ministerial data, among the perpetrators of the political crimes committed in the first months after the end of the war in the territories of the former German occupation there were 159 Jewish communist agitators and 182 Poles; among the people accused of spying, there were 8 Jews and 12 Germans; among the organisers of ‘secret clubs’, there were 6 Jews; among the agitators in the army: 5 Jews and 7 Poles; among the ‘anti-Polish speakers’, there were 12 Jews, and among those convicted of having and disseminating illegal literature and participation in illegal meetings, there were 18 Jews. Jews were also the owners of 16 out of 21 discovered weapons arsenals.⁹

It is difficult to determine the real truth behind each of the accusations, but they were widespread among Polish society. It is worth mentioning that the Catholic Church also contributed to the development of anti-Semitic propaganda, especially as many priests shared the nationalistic and anti-Semitic ideas of National Democracy (ND). One priest who was in Russia in the first years after the revolution, commented: “intelligent and half-intelligent Jews came to Russia from all parts of the world and they picked out a party of mad but educated idiots, gained power and started ruling like in their *kahals*.”¹⁰

Another priest, Kazimierz Lutosławski, who was connected with National Democracy and was one of the main pioneers of scouting in Poland, expressed fiercely anti-Semitic opinions. Polish scouting renounced any connections with Jewish scouting, which was founded by assimilated Jews (the so-called Poles of the Jewish faith). This fact is not shocking when taking into consideration that next to Lutosławski, general Józef Haller was one of the patrons of scouting. Haller’s soldiers would later be remembered with contempt by Jews of their role as accomplices to the pogrom in Lvov in November 1919¹¹. Lutosławski’s brother Wincenty, also a prominent member of ND, wrote in his book “The Bolshevism and Poland” published in Paris:

Nobody can deny that after the British had published “The White Book of Bolshevism”, Jews were among the leaders of a gang of criminals, who had – for a long time – been de-

⁷ Biblioteka Katolickiego Uniwersytetu Lubelskiego (later: BKUL) Archiwum Jana Stekiergo (later: AJS) 576 p. 20–21.

⁸ BKUL AJS 577 p. 53.

⁹ Zieliński, *Stosunki polsko-żydowskie*, p. 411–413.

¹⁰ Archiwum Akt Nowych w Warszawie (later: AAN) Komitet Narodowy Polski w Paryżu (later: KNP) 20729 p. 30.

¹¹ *Ajnenkiel*, p. 46, 89, 319, 378; *Szczepański*, *Spółczesność Polski*, p. 249.

stroying Russia [...] and who had murdered thousands of Poles deported to Russia by the retreating Russian army.¹²

Lutosławski further claimed that influential Jewish organizations in America, such as the Jewish Committee and Zionist Organization of America, were calling for international control to be imposed on Poland, assuming that “Poles are not able to rule by themselves”¹³ and would not provide enough safety to the minorities. He added that such statements were not in the interests of Polish Jews and were made in order to protect Germany against a strong Poland. Here echoes of the so-called Minorities Treaty (Little Versailles Treaty) are evident: Poles claimed that the ulterior motive behind the treaty was to complicate the participation of Poland in the future peace conference, to block the participation of leader of ND Roman Dmowski as a delegate, and to prepare the ground for imposing on Poland, by means of the peace treaty, obligations concerning the protection of the national minorities:¹⁴ the hidden hand of “international Jewry” was, it was alleged, behind all of these demands. Lutosławski in his brochure also highlighted the numerous and difficult living conditions of Polish Jews and their ongoing emancipation from religion. According to him, these phenomena led to the abandonment of morality, with the result that Jews had become particularly prone to Bolshevik propaganda.¹⁵

In his essay “Rome or Moscow”, another other influential ND activist, Stanisław Grabski wrote of “a quick conquering of an enormous Russian empire by a handful of Jewish sectarians.”¹⁶ In the materials of the Polish National Committee in Paris (the Polish representatives before and during the Versailles Conference), which was dominated by ND members, we can find the opinion that “the Jewish main characteristic when it comes to politics, is their belligerency originating from social revolution.”¹⁷ The hostility towards Jews identified with Bolsheviks was strengthened in the Polish territories by news from Belarus concerning attacks on Polish manors perpetrated by rebellious peasants incited by communist agitators.¹⁸ Equally alarmist was the news coming from Ukraine of anarchy in the Kiev Province, the partition of arable lands and the stealing of the livestock in Polish manors and farms.

In fact, identifying the Jews with the revolution was particularly dangerous in the Polish territories. Szymon Askenazy, a historian and a diplomat, then a Polish rep-

¹² Lutosławski, p. 4–5.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁴ In 1919 the Jewish nationalist leaders in Poland welcomed the Treaty with mixed feelings; their disappointment was caused by the failure of the Treaty to recognize the Jews as a national minority, and the fact that the Treaty provided only the protection of individuals, not of a national or corporate entity. *Lerski*, p. 95–116; *Marcus*, p. 299.

¹⁵ Lutosławski, p. 23, 31.

¹⁶ Grabski, p. 141.

¹⁷ AAN KNP 20729 p. 30; AAN KNP 20884 p. 103.

¹⁸ AAN KNP 20731 p. 70; AAN KNP 20838 p. 91. On the situation in the Ober-Ost: *Liulevicius*, p. 210, 249.

representative to the League of Nations, in an interview for an American newspaper said that the common belief that the communist movement was dominated by the Jews was a catalyst of the anti-Semitic mood in Polish society.¹⁹ Opinions in respect of 'Jewish solidarity', hypocrisy and cooperation with 'red' Germans and Russians conspiring against Poland were voiced by the Polish diaspora in the United States, who wanted to justify the anti-Semitic riots and pogroms in the country by pointing to Jewish behaviour and Jews' alleged cooperation with Berlin and Moscow.²⁰

The Jews in the West were aware of the danger posed by the strengthening of the stereotype of 'Jewish-Communism', which they feared might prove to be more dangerous than the stereotype of the 'Jewish banker' exploiting the working class or – more broadly – Christians.²¹ Moshe Mishkinsky highlights a further anxiety:

the former accusations of the Jews from Russia, the Litvaks, of the Russification of the country were replaced by the accusations of supporting Bolshevism, which replaced the Tsarist imperialism. The international aspect of the Jewish question was parallel to the universal character of communism and combining these two elements ideally corresponded with the views about "the international Jewish conspiracy" once raised in the infamous "Protocols of the Wise Men of the Zion."²²

Such accusations gained a new dimension after 1917/1918. The taking of power in Russia by the Bolsheviks won the sympathy of world Jewry for that state, garnering pride in the achievements of the many prominent members of the movement who were of Jewish origin. Pro-Russian and pro-communist sympathies thus coalesced.²³

Indeed, in the attacks and anti-Jewish riots in Polish cities in 1919, accusations of communism were increasingly raised. This development was compounded by the difficult supply situation and the economic crisis, which was itself accompanied by social unrest; added to this was a prevailing uncertainty at the international level (the struggles for borders of the future state were still continuing). In the first months of independence, however the chief reasons behind pogroms were repeated accusations made against Jews, especially in the eastern parts of Galicia, that they had favoured Ukrainians in the Polish-Ukraine conflict (there were, in general, no grounds for this); a desire to take revenge for perceived Jewish cooperation with Germans and Austrians during 1915–1918 (the occupiers had, for instance, used Jewish translators, brokers etc.); and, finally, the fear and resentment triggered by famine and poverty, coupled the impunity with which attacks against Jewish neighbours were met at a time of administrative absence and post-war chaos. In 1920, of all the many accusations, one came to dominate: communism.²⁴

¹⁹ YIVO Institute for Jewish Research in New York (later: YIVO) Herman Bernstein Papers (later: HB) 713 Box 34/755.

²⁰ *Radzik*, p. 24; *Różański*, p. 124–132.

²¹ YIVO HB 713 Box 32/761. See also: *Rosenstock*, p. 98, 110–111; *Szajkowski*, p. 210.

²² *Mishkinsky*, p. 66.

²³ *Mich*, *Obcy w polskim domu*, p. 39.

²⁴ *Zieliński*, *The Anti-Semitic Riots*, p. 87–94.

On 5 April 1919, during the opening stage of the Polish-Bolshevik War, a massacre of 35 Jewish residents of the city of Pińsk took place at the hands of Polish troops: a mass execution by the Polish Army of Jews who had been arrested while conducting an illegal meeting. The Polish commanding officer ordered the summary execution of the meeting's participants without trial.²⁵ According to the General Staff of the Polish Army, in the winter of 1919, the communists were leading sabotage operations, attempting to destabilize the situation in the country and undermine war preparations. In many contemporary reports we can read that "the Jews are playing a major role in communist agitation."²⁶

The Polish-Soviet War, also called the War of 1920, and in the Soviet and Russian historiography the Polish War, appears to have been a strong catalyst in the outbreak of anti-Semitic sentiments and activities. The latter were comparable to a wave of pogroms which had occurred in the Polish lands in the autumn of 1918. Among the Jews themselves, three attitudes towards the increasing Polish-Bolshevik conflict predominated. Firstly, there was an active support for the new authorities and participation in revolutionary committees, the so-called *revkoms* (the local administrative units created by the Red Army and the Polish communists during the Kiev Red Army's counteroffensive). The second could be called an attitude of 'perseverance' or of trying to 'make it through' the present events. The third consisted in solidarity with Poland.²⁷ This behavioural scheme is partially validated in official reports discussing the attitudes among people published in the summer of 1920. Not taken into consideration by the authors of the reports, however, was a significant number of Jews who had not developed a clear attitude towards the Polish state and, being both deeply religious and active participants in the free-market economy, were sympathetic to anti-Bolshevism and anti-communism.²⁸

Nevertheless, the moderate Jewish support for the Bolsheviks, together with stereotypical opinions as to the close ties of Jews with communism was sufficient to determine the attitudes of majority of Poles. Several acts of terror and war crimes were perpetrated by the Polish Army, especially the Ukrainian formations under Petliura in 1919 and 1920.²⁹ Amid anti-Semitic hysteria and anti-Jewish propaganda, from August to September 1920, several thousand Jewish soldiers and officers were held captive in a detention camp in Jabłonna near Warsaw. The reason for their incarceration may have been trivial (they were believed to be potential collaborators with the enemy), but the great suffering of the internees, among whom there were many volunteers, was a chilling illustration of the position of Jewish citizens within the new Polish state. Jabłonna, which was liquidated after a few weeks following pressure from Jewish politicians and public protests (mainly members of the Polish Socialist

²⁵ Lewandowski, p. 50–70.

²⁶ Zieliński, *The Anti-Semitic Riots*, p. 92.

²⁷ Szczepański, *Spółeczność żydowska*, p. 235–236.

²⁸ Gontarek, p. 63–64.

²⁹ Abramson, p. 109–140; Budnitskii, p. 217.

Party – PPS), became a shameful stain on the Jewish-Polish relations,³⁰ symbolizing the bankruptcy of the idea of assimilation and integration as a political program.

Some Jewish youth did, in fact, want to join the Red Army and the Soviet administration whose attraction for young Jews should not be surprising: as mentioned above, communist ideas, and slogans championing equal social rights found receptive audiences in ethnically and nationally diverse milieus. In most cases, however, the common ground was the experience of, and resistance to, socio-economic discrimination. In the case of the Jewish minority, this discrimination was closely associated with official and unofficial discrimination, prevailing prejudice within Polish society, and also with the desire of the youth to emancipate themselves from the influences of their orthodox, conservative parents. No doubt, some of those who decided to join the new authorities were driven by ideological motives. These members participated in the revolution of 1905, and were active in the Polish, Russian, German, or Jewish social-democratic parties. By 1919 they were creating revolutionary workers' committees (councils of delegates) in the Polish lands. On the other hand, many of them, not only Jews, saw in their membership an occasion to improve their material and social status and to feel safer. One of the Jewish citizens of Mińsk Mazowiecki remarked that willingness to join a local *revkom* was expressed by poor people with no education, e. g. shepherds or cinema doormen. In general, however, the most common Jewish attitude during this war was perseverance.³¹ Contrary to the stereotype, few Jews were openly in favour of the Bolsheviks. The richer and the orthodox were strongly supportive of the Polish side, but the majority of Jews simply wanted to wait out the conflict and above all survive.

Despite this, the emissaries of the Provisional Polish Revolutionary Committee (TKRP) – a puppet Polish government agenda which ruled – or rather tried to rule – in the ethnically Polish lands taken by the Red Army in the summer of 1920 – were perceived as “Bolsheviks who were skilfully led by a Jew.”³² The stereotype of *żydokomuna* (‘Judeo-communism’) was a stock feature of Polish propaganda posters in which a Bolshevik officer was depicted as a Jew, and the Red Star rendered to resemble the Star of David. Thus, in a popular perception “a Jew equals a Bolshevik.”³³

The Russian military authorities made this stereotype better known, however. Local *revkoms* had numerous Red Army soldiers – Polish, Russian and Jewish communists who had just come from Russia. Russian speakers were in high demand, and the majority of such people were of Jewish origins. It was difficult for the communists fill newly created administrative posts in the face of the hostility of a majority of

³⁰ Rudnicki, p. 49–59.

³¹ Stelmaszczyk, p. 345–346.

³² Wasilewski, p. 7.

³³ Leinwand, p. 62–63.

Poles.³⁴ Karol Radek, a prominent member of the Bolshevik party, having spent a short time in Siedlce noted that there were no candidates for work in *revkoms*, except among Jews. Feliks Kon, an exiled member of the PPS, complained that many committees were filled by “the Jews, shop assistants.”³⁵ Although there were very few Jews among the members of the *revkoms* in villages, cities and towns, new authorities were supported by the railway workers, the wider proletariat and – above all – the local Jewish youth. The majority of Poles in general did not want to use the Russian language and cooperate with the Moscow government – regardless of whether this meant the tsar or the Soviet leadership. Yet many awkward situations arose, even from the point of view of the Polish communists. For example, a group of Jewish activists in Białystok working in key posts in the department of education organized a separate Polish section of the department before the arrival of members of the Provisional Committee (TKRP) – indicating that they considered Poles a minority and that the Russian language would be the first and official language. Ultimately, the strong intervention of Kon, one of the leaders of the Provisional Committee and a respected social democrat of Jewish ancestry, put a stop to the move.³⁶

Jews were quite ‘visible’ in the formation of local militias, too. Given their education and experience they were also recruited to the economic and financial departments of the newly founded communist administration. Even with already hated communist character of a new authority, seeing Jews assume leadership roles was something relatively new and not acceptable for many Poles – who balked at the very thought of a despised, ‘dirty Jew’ as a high official or a town president.

Announcements published by the Red Army in Polish or Yiddish were also a source of controversy. This was a cause of discontent among Poles because they believed that only those decrees which concerned the Jews ought to be published in Yiddish. Similarly, some Jewish activists were against having the same folk kitchens for the Polish and Jewish children because the kosher code was not respected there.³⁷ Jewish workers’ parties, whose activists did not care about observing the kosher rules by their members, were aware that an open protest against breaking religious prohibitions would be likely to bring more supporters to the party. These and many other matters reveal lingering Polish-Jewish antagonisms, despite a declared willingness to cooperate and the many slogans calling for a system that would abolish all prejudice. The Polish and Jewish communists tried to find common ground, but were unable to overcome past grudges that lingered between them.

The chaos of the Bolsheviks’ retreat, the negative memories of their brief rule and generally hostile attitudes of the people led to acts of terror and violence. Soldiers and peasants wielding scythes and pitchforks, among whom there were many young peo-

³⁴ *Samuś*, p. 149–150; *Szczepański*, *Spółczesność Polski*, p. 328–329, 387–388; *Trembicka*, p. 182.

³⁵ *Kostiuszko*, p. 17, 25.

³⁶ *Szczepański*, *Spółczesność Polski*, p. 321.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

ple and women, chased the escaping Red Army soldiers, leading to the capture of not only Red Army fighters, but also of any people who were suspected of cooperating with communists – which in most cases meant Jews. Jewish guilt was taken for granted by local people and Polish soldiers alike. Jewish social organizations and associations were closed, and their activists imprisoned. There were so many causes of anti-Jewish behaviour and acts of violence that Jewish MPs in the Polish parliament intervened.³⁸ The actions of the Polish Army reverberated throughout the worldwide press. The attacks and arrests were not always aimed at punishing the guilty for cooperating with the enemy: often they were simply a result of anti-Semitic prejudices and stereotypes, whereby all Jews bore a collective responsibility, and were thus deserving of the massive violence which would be brought upon them.³⁹

The Polish-Bolshevik War doubtless strengthened the myth of *żydokomuna*. This stereotype was present throughout the whole interwar period, resulting in, among other things, marked animosity towards the Jewish refugees and repatriates from Russia. The Treaty of Riga ending the Polish-Bolshevik War was signed in March 1922. After this date, from April 1922, Polish citizens and people applying for residency in Poland would be able to choose the so-called option for Polish, Russian or Ukrainian citizenship. In case of Polish citizenship, the condition was the issuing and acceptance of a declaration by a proper consular official. However, in Eastern voivodeships, which were not only close to the Russian border but also marked by diverse structures of nationality in which people of non-Polish ethnic backgrounds were in the majority, the authorities were sensitive to particular kinds of people. For this reason, commonly used statutory regulations were supplemented with short-term decrees, which were often more restrictive and were used on a long-term basis.⁴⁰

Other factor at play were a rarely objective judgment of the situation and the attitude of the Polish officials, who often tried to exploit the absence of documentation presented by or concerning an applicant. This was employed as a tactic to make it harder for applicants to gain the right of residency in Poland or to obtain Polish citizenship, creating a predicament for those the applicants who were at risk of deportation. One of the conditions that the Polish authorities insisted on concerning people who were trying to stay in Poland was financial security. This policy was reasonable, and Poland was not the only country to impose strict conditions in its immigration policy or to made it more difficult for either immigrants or emigrants to enter or leave the country in the face of a major economic crisis. The real problem, however, was that the relevant standards could be ‘modified’ on the basis of various criteria. Immigration policy was implemented not by means of specific decrees but rather in informal ways. And for this reason, Jews were unable to prove that they were of adequate financial means, even in the cases of those with jobs that provided a good

³⁸ Rudnicki, p. 47–59.

³⁹ Gontarek, p. 84.

⁴⁰ Zieliński, Population Displacement, p. 105.

source of income; this was sometimes the experience Ukrainians, too, but only rarely did this phenomenon affect Poles and Catholics.⁴¹

Many Jews, especially refugees, found it difficult to cope with being unable to trade from door to door, which was banned in independent Poland: as was explained in a circular of Ministry of Foreign Affairs from January 1925, this kind of trade was “banned because it poses a threat for local merchants and it is also a reason for spying.”⁴² Indeed, given the mobility of the Jews, prevailing anti-Semitism in Poland, and the economic conditions in the country, Jews often became the targets of accusations of spying, with Jews being watched by the police even in the absence of any grounds for suspicion.

The restrictive regulations concerned Jews who came from Soviet Russia/the USSR as well as those who never left Poland (some were not able to prove their right of residency in Poland due to a lack of adequate documents authenticating their having lived in the Polish territories before 1914), with the result that they were not able to meet all the conditions for being granted Polish citizenship. The reason for this policy was often economic, but this was not the rule – the right to stay was denied to wealthy people as well. As documentation from the voivodship offices shows, those who were eager to invest in Poland, and thus to create jobs, were also regarded as undesirable. This disproportionately affected Jews and was characteristic of a general internal policy of the Polish government, which was averse to bolstering “a nationally foreign element.”⁴³ Fear of Bolshevik agitation and spying by Jews who were considered communists seems sometimes to have been a convenient pretext for pursuing policies of ethnic exclusion. Jews from Russia in particular were perceived as pioneers of communism and were especially unwelcome.

Poles did not want to welcome Jewish immigrants from Russia, but also reluctantly recognized Polish citizenship among those who had the right to it on the basis of place of birth or living. However, steps were taken to abolish the right for a permanent stay even for those who had lived in Poland their whole lives or had never left the country. The issues surrounding the return to Poland of refugees and repatriates were regulated in the early 1930s; however, the status of some, and of their citizenship, was not resolved until the beginning of war in 1939.

It is also worth mentioning the attitude of the main political parties in Poland towards the status of Jews before Józef Piłsudski seized power in 1926. From 1922 until the Piłsudski-led coup d'état, the majority of cabinets were formed by the National Democrats and the right wing of the peasant movement.

National Democracy, as the most important and most influential right-wing Polish political party, was traditionally hostile to Jews. Antisemitism, one of the traditional characteristics of the National Democrats, became a perfect means for pursuing po-

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 110–114.

⁴² *Ibid.*, p. 113.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, p. 116–118.

litical battles and creating an impact on Polish society. Before 1914, in declarations and programs of ND and its branches we can read about “a cancer in the living body of the Polish nation.” Antisemitic persecution was present at the time of the election and the assassination of Gabriel Narutowicz, the first president of independent Poland, whose election was enabled by the votes of the national minorities. National Democracy also campaigned for a Jewish quota for university admissions and announced the nationalization of trade and industry in Poland. Left-wing circles were attacked because they either consciously or unconsciously supported worldwide or the Polish Jewry. Jewish ‘scheming’ was sought behind every action against National Democracy. The so-called *endeks* claimed that there was a conflict between European and Christian civilization and Semitic civilization.⁴⁴

Linking Jews with communism had an impact on the attitude of the peasant movement, which was generally affected by the Jewish matter only on rare occasions. Originating from the belief that the implementation of the communists’ program would mean a liquidation of the countryside as well as of peasants as a social group, the peasant movement’s attitude towards communists was decidedly negative, with very few exceptions among the radical peasant parties. In particular, the movement criticized the domination of Jews in trade, craft and industry.⁴⁵ After the war, hostility towards Jews became even more intense: one of the leaders of the movement, Wincenty Witos (president of the Polish Peasant Party ‘Piast’ and prime minister in the years of 1920–1921, 1923, 1926) stated that “if the people had many reasons for disliking the Jews, after the war the hostility was much stronger.”⁴⁶ The peasantry found zealous followers in the Catholic Church hierarchy, who also supported the co-operatives in the villages, calling for “an effective fight with the lack of morality in the trade, to stop fraud and exploitation of the people.”⁴⁷

In the Polish Christian Democratic Party, smaller and less influential than above-mentioned parties, the idea of “stemming and pushing away the Jews” dominated. They called for a fight against the “Jewish flood” and “the Jewish conspiracy”, advocating a program that could be summarized in the slogan ‘fewer rights, more duties’. Other conservatives saw a solution to the problem in the assimilation of Jews: Jews were not considered a nation, and they should become Poles of the Jewish faith. At this stage, however no one anticipated any rights for Jewish people as a whole, but only for the assimilators.⁴⁸ According to the Christian Democrats and small conservative parties, all public positions, not to mention those of the President or members of government, should be guaranteed for Poles and Catholics only.

Polish socialists tried to take into consideration the socio-political processes that had taken place with Jewish society in the Polish lands, which included emancipa-

⁴⁴ *Lerski*, p. 95–116; *Maj*, p. 50–51; *Radomski*, p. 96–97.

⁴⁵ *Jachymek*, p. 44–45.

⁴⁶ *Wynot*, p. 40–41.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 40.

⁴⁸ *Mich*, Problem mniejszości narodowych, p. 84–85.

tion and modernization. In general, socialists from the Polish Socialist Party denied all Jewish proposals of national autonomy, but they also highlighted the necessity of achieving equal rights for all citizens no matter what their religion or nationality was. Although some groups among Polish socialists were in favour of Jewish national-cultural autonomy, the attitude of the party towards the Jewish proposals was generally consistent. It is worth remembering that the PPS originated from numerous supporters of Józef Piłsudski, who, in the interwar period, included people of Jewish origin.⁴⁹ A number of issues had an impact on this state of affairs: hostility towards the National Democracy, tolerance towards the Jews, and the criticism of antisemitism. Piłsudski's political camp, in general, was also in favour of seeing the Jews as a religious group, not a national one; some of its members recognized a 'Poles of the Jewish faith' as a separate socio-religious category. In May 1926, however, a majority within Jewish political circles and in the Jewish population in Poland welcomed Piłsudski's coup d'état. From that time, Piłsudski and his supporters would commence with the implementation of their political ideas concerning the national minorities, including the Jewish one.

To sum up: during the war and at the beginning of independence, hostility to the Jewish population in the Polish lands increased. The revolutionary workers' and other revolutionary movements, social unrest, the demands for cultural and national autonomy raised by some Jewish parties, and the international situation were the main catalysts in the dissemination of the stereotype of 'Jewish-Communism' and in the worsening of Polish-Jewish relations. In the inter-war period, the main areas of conflict concerned economic matters, but especially after the Polish-Bolshevik War, accusations against the Jews of propagating communism became a widespread and common phenomenon and the most important driving force of antisemitism in Poland.

⁴⁹ Śliwa, p. 273–274.

The Soviet Policy of De-cossackization During the Russian Civil War (1919)

By *Peter Holquist*

By means of [de-cossackization] we hoped to render the Don healthy, to make it, if not Soviet, then at least submissive and obedient to Soviet power ... Sooner or later we will have to exterminate, simply physically destroy the Cossacks, or at least the vast majority of them

I. Reingol'd, 6 July 1919

The volume is titled “The First World War as a Caesura? – Demographic Concepts, Population Policy, and Genocide in the Late Ottoman, Russian, and Habsburg Spheres”; and my own article complicates this framework. First, to be sure: prior to 1918, there had been demographic concepts and population policy in the Russian empire (there had not been genocide, although one might debate the case of the 1916 Steppe Uprising).¹ The case of the Soviet government’s embrace – and subsequent retreat from – a targeted and explicit policy of excision by execution and expulsion was, I believe, a watershed. But it was a policy seeking not to *nationalize* the borderlands, but rather to “exterminate” [*ucmpeбumb*] a specific *socio-economic* rather than a *national* or *ethnic* category.

I want to open with a key question for this era, a period I have elsewhere described as a “continuum” of crisis: the way in which different forms of violence overlapped in this period, in ways that distinguished it from earlier and later epochs of violence. It seems to me that what distinguishes this period is that three distinct vectors or forms of violence overlapped: the more conventional forms of military violence during wartime (although I would insist that the model of “standard warfare”—violence by standing armies of sovereign states against one another—was often the exception rather than the rule);² the violence associated with the implosion of empire and the subsequent unsuccessful and successful attempts at Reconquista; and finally, revolutionary violence and the violence of civil wars. Each of these three forms of violence had its own dynamics – but they also interacted and bled into one another, in the collapsing Russian empire and throughout Europe and Eurasia.

¹ For a volume arguing for 1915 as a watershed in violence throughout Europe, see: *Horne*, On the 1916 Turkestan Revolt, see: *Happel*; *Chokobaeva et al.*

² E. g., *Lohr*, Nationalizing; *Gerwarth*, War in Peace.

In 2003, I published an article in *Kritika* examining Russia's "epoch of violence," which I dated then as 1905–1921.³ In an excellent, wide-ranging review essay on American studies of Russia in the First World War, Olga Bol'shakova perceptively noted that my *Kritika* article in fact expanded the chronological boundaries which I had used in my book.⁴ In *Making War, Forging Revolution*, I had written of a "continuum of crisis" spanning from 1914 to 1921. In "Violent Russia," I had extended this continuum back before the start of the Great War in 1914, back to the First Russian Revolution of 1905. I remain convinced that it is useful to begin a study of Russia's epoch of violence with the revolutionary violence of 1905–1907, since so much of the violence to follow saw the intertwining of what we might call routine 'military' violence with the violence of revolution and civil conflict and the violence of imperial rule and resistance to it. This approach thus provides a productive frame for thinking about a number of works, which have appeared on a continuum of war and revolution in Central Asia across the revolutionary divide.⁵

And this observation is equally true for how the war metastasized into forms of civil war and domestic strife.⁶ Indeed, one strand in the recent literature on Germany's First World War has suggested that the rupture point for German politics and society was not the war itself – the years 1914–1918 – so much as the civil strife which followed it. Thomas Weber wrote an impressive book of Adolph Hitler and his military service in the First World War.⁷ One of his major conclusions was that it was not so much the First World War as a generic horror that transformed Hitler's worldview, as the revolution and civil strife which followed it. In this he followed a somewhat earlier literature, largely neglected today, on Germany in the immediate aftermath of the First World War and the Freikorps moment. One exception was Vejas Liulevicius's *Warland*, a study of *Oberost*, the military utopia established by Hindenburg and Ludendorff in the occupied areas of Byelorussia and the Baltic. Liulevicius in that work speaks of a shift in how Germans perceived this land, from a more benign Herderian sense of *Land und Leute* to a more muscular and technocratic sense of *Volk und Raum*. The final phase for Liulevicius was (in the title to two chapters) "The Freikorps Madness" and "The Triumph of *Raum*."⁸ Robert Gerwarth for Europe, and Jonathan Smele for the space of the Russian empire, have both argued for the catalytic feature of postwar conflict.⁹

³ Holquist, *Violent Russia*, p. 627–52; see also, Holquist, *Making War*.

⁴ Bolshakova, p. 26–35, here at p. 30, reviewing Holquist, *Making War*.

⁵ Khalid, *Politics*; Khalid, *Making Uzbekistan*; Brower; Buttino, *Rivoluzione*; Buttino, *Central Asia*; Happel.

⁶ Gerwarth, *Vanquished*; Sanborn, *Imperial Apocalypse*. See also on this point: Roshwald; on occupation as a revolutionary experience, see Von Hagen; and also Lohr *et al.*

⁷ Weber.

⁸ Liulevicius.

⁹ Gerwarth, *Vanquished*; Smele.

The excellent thematic for this volume raises several conceptual considerations. I raise these as framing questions to think with, rather than posing impossibly definitive answers. First: when we speak of “*the* First World War as Caesura,” what do we mean by *the* First World War? Do we mean the war as a general *event* (1914–1918)? Or rather, do we mean certain *processes* at play in the course of the war: the war aims dynamic; total mobilization; the tactical deployment of irredentism? domestic politics and the growing prominence of the trope of the internal enemy?

And if one steps back somewhat from the question of the “First World War as Caesura”: does identifying the war as the font of these processes lead us to neglect other processes *independent of the war* – the rise of popular sovereignty as a principle of political legitimacy, the development and deployment of the social sciences – as dynamics in their own right? For Russia, this latter question is particularly acute. It emerges most baldly as the question of whether the dynamics of the revolution and civil wars are solely an outcome of the First World War, or rather these dynamics result from the intertwining of wartime dynamics with *other, independent* processes which were unfolding prior to, and independent of, the war. Put bluntly: in focusing on the *war* as the source of the dynamics of the violence, revolution, and civil wars, we risk overlooking the role of pre-war and esp. revolutionary dynamics that were unrelated to the war proper.¹⁰ We would do well to remember that no other major European society had suffered a collapse so close to the war such as that of 1905–1907 in Russia. And these fissures surely shaped the course of events during the war and again after February 1917. Witness, for instance, the labour unrest and strike movements which metastasized after 1915 in Kostroma and Ivanovo provinces. These emerged not from wartime pressures alone, but rather represented the re-activation of earlier, pre-war labour dynamics, well described by an earlier literature.¹¹ Equally, those studies which point to the First World War as the most important cause of the 1917 Russian Revolution have tended to overlook the dynamics of rural unrest in European Russia, one of the fundamental drivers of the 1917 revolutionary dynamic. Contrast this approach with some of the more interesting recent discussions of the unfolding of the 1917 Revolution, by Aaron Retish and Sarah Badcock.¹² If one adapts an expansive time frame, one stretching back before 1914, one can map the unrest of both urban and rural unrest 1902, 1905–1907, and 1912–1914 onto the later geography of the Russian Revolution and civil wars. And it is a telling juxtaposition. In a similar fashion, the Revolution of 1905–1907 saw the activation of ethnic violence in the Baltic provinces, the Caucasus, and Polish industrial regions

¹⁰ For my thoughts on these issues, see *Holquist, Russian Revolution*, p. 179–92; and also *Holquist, Featured review*, p. 600–603. For scholarship discussing how the war influenced or caused the revolution, see among a vast literature: *Holquist, Making War*; *Sanborn*; *Buldakov and Leont'eva*; and for the most strongly drawn argument that it was the war which produced the Revolution, *Sanborn/Lohr*, p. 703–709.

¹¹ *Haimson/Brian; Mandel*.

¹² *Retish; Badcock*. See the earlier path-breaking work of Orlando Figes: *Figes, Peasant Russia*.

that would re-emerge after 1917. And indeed, the administrative responses to this unrest was also an important pre-war feature of Russian political life. Large portions of the Russian empire after 1905 remained under some form of extraordinary legislation.

It is important to stress the medium- and long-term revolutionary dynamics in Russia. To be sure, these catalytically interacted with the wartime dynamics. We should recall, however, that in the polity that emerged from the collapse and implosion of the Russian empire, a Marxist revolutionary state defeated a whole string of movements championing nationalism, not least the anti-Soviet forces fighting for “Russia, united and indivisible.” Instead, a movement seeking a worldwide socialist revolution triumphed.¹³

This Russian situation leads one to reflect on the question of how ‘*belle*’, in fact, was the ‘*belle époque*’?¹⁴ It seems clear that there was a fundamentally different state of play entering 1914 in different polities and societies. From the presentations and discussions in this volume, it seems that the Russian empire and the Ottoman Empire seem to be more alike than either is to the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

This volume brought several key to the foreground. Hannes Leidinger’s presentation raised the question of when and where we witness a *moderation* of the dynamics of violence. Why and when do we see a retreat or retrenchment from radical measures? Here the question is whether there was an irreversible process of what one might term ‘cumulative radicalization’ or the ‘barbarization of warfare’. The account in this chapter on decossackization suggests that processes could be and were reined in: the Soviet state retreated from its policy of ‘high decossackization’ (extermination), to administrative and demographic decossackization, and finally to a renunciation of the policy. There were earlier examples of this dynamic in the Russian case. In 1915, the Russian imperial government, in the aftermath of charges of treachery during a late 1914 Ottoman advance, went far along the path of planning to expel all Russian-subject Muslims from Kars and Batum provinces for alleged disloyalty. Ultimately, however, over the course of 1915 the Russian government, due both to bureaucratic and legislative dynamics, scaled back this plan and ultimately decided not to pursue it.¹⁵ Equally, the conduct of the Russian army in the first occupation of Austrian Galicia and Bukovina (1914–1915) was truly harsh, with targeted anti-Semitic policies and large-scale expulsions. The second occupation (1916–1917) witnessed a much different and much more moderate occupation regime.

Several of our conference contributions addressed the role of political and bureaucratic structures in making possible “demographic concepts, population policy, genocide” (Oktay Özel, Hilmar Kaiser, Talha Çiçek). In the Russian case, during the First World War Russian imperial officials had *dreamed* and even *planned* expansive dem-

¹³ A good general treatment of this story is found in *Mazower*.

¹⁴ One work which raised this question early on was *Arendt*.

¹⁵ See *Von Hagen*; and also *Holquist*, *Role of Personality*, p. 52–73.

ographic engineering. But it was nearly always constrained by some form of deliberative politics, politics of notables, or representative politics. In the Soviet state, as this contribution shows, the Communist Party operated as an orchestrating institution which was able to override routine administrative and political counter-currents and resistance. There may be some productive comparison here to the role of the Committee of Union and Progress operating behind or within the state.

One final point on the story below. A striking feature is the Soviet state's perverse attention to legality. While decreeing a policy of "merciless mass terror," the Communist Central Committee equally insisted that it was to be conducted through military-revolutionary tribunals.

In his analysis of the French Revolution, Karl Marx had noted that Napoleon "*perfected the Terror by substituting permanent war for permanent revolution.*"¹⁶ Emerging out of the First World War, the Russian Revolution inverted this equation. Instead of permanent war substituting for permanent revolution, in the collapsing Russian empire, *total revolution* came to substitute for *total war*. Committed to the cause of the Revolution as an ongoing project, the Bolshevik party-state extended total war practices from their original goal of waging war against external enemies to a new, more all-encompassing, open-ended goal: the forging of a revolutionary society. The Revolution thus provided a new matrix for practices that were emerging out of the First World War. In the same text, however, Marx also observed that "Ideas carry out nothing at all. In order to carry out ideas men are needed who can exert practical force."¹⁷ Bolshevik ideology structured Soviet state violence. But it was sustained by hostilities and resentments fostered in the late imperial period and exacerbated over the course of 1917. And the revolutionary crises following 1905 were not least of these. The ordeal of the Civil War itself – chaos, devastation, hunger, want – embedded this violence into Soviet society.¹⁸ The party dictated terror; but it was carried out because it seemed to address many people's real-life experience.

Decossackization: 'Liquidating' the Cossackry

By late 1918, the Bolshevik Party had come to dominate the organs of Soviet power at the national and local levels. Precisely at this time, Soviet power reconquered much of the Don Territory, a region dominated by the Cossack estate. In the spring and summer of 1918, the German Army and Cossack insurgencies had driven out Soviet power, and the anti-Soviet regional Cossack government, the All-Great Don Host (AGDH) kept the Red Army at bay for most of autumn 1918. By early 1919, however, revolution in Germany and defeat in the West had removed the German Army from this region. The AGDH's Don Army, composed of forcibly conscripted Cossacks serving under often condescending and arbitrary officers, was

¹⁶ Marx, p. 123 (emphasis in original).

¹⁷ Marx, p. 119.

¹⁸ Holquist, *Violent Russia*, ch. 4 and conclusion.

in a state of near disintegration.¹⁹ The combination of a revitalized Red Army, on the one hand, and mutinies within the Don Army, on the other, brought much of the Don Territory under Soviet control. Particularly significant was the mutiny of several Cossack regiments in the Don Army in early January 1919. These units abandoned the front and returned to their communities in the Upper Don district, right on the front between the Don Army and the Red Army. By allowing Soviet power to occupy large portions of the Don Territory, these Cossack regiments ironically provided the Communist Party with an opportunity to practice “de-Cossackization.”

‘De-cossackization’ was not a new *term* in 1919. It had been employed prior to and during 1917 in both the national and local press to mean eliminating the Cossack estate *as a judicial entity* and levelling Cossack privileges to those enjoyed by other citizens.²⁰ Early in 1917, the Provisional Government had abolished all social restrictions predicated on religion, nationality, and estate. Upon taking power, the Soviet regime repeated this abolition, and proclaimed that henceforth all were to be known by one name: citizens of the Russian Republic.²¹ From 1917, the Soviet state had decreed that Cossacks ceased to exist as a judicial estate. If Cossacks continued to exist, it must either be as an economic or social group. The fundamental departure in the 1919 ‘decossackization’ policy was that it was designed not to abolish a judicial estate or remove an economic class, but rather to eliminate the Cossacks as an entire socio-economic group.²²

Cossack collective behaviour certainly reinforced Soviet prejudices, but Bolshevik policies were not simply a response to some counterrevolutionary Cossack monolith. While some Soviet reports noted Cossack hostility to Soviet power, many others contain frequent mention of Cossacks welcoming Soviet power.²³ While more Cossacks served in the anti-Soviet Don Army (more because they were forcibly conscripted than out of any freely given social support), one-fifth of all Cossacks under arms – a not insignificant number – served with the Red Army.²⁴ In point of fact, Cossacks participated disproportionately in the ranks of *both* sides. Well through April 1919, Soviet officials continued to pass along news that “there are thirty thousand Cossacks fighting like lions in the Red Army.”²⁵

In the face of such reports, several factors coalesced to cause the Soviet state to view Cossacks as a counterrevolutionary monolith. Many Cossacks served in the Red

¹⁹ *Kakurin*, 1: 151–154, cartogram no. 5.

²⁰ *McNeal*, p. 220, 256; *Saval’ev*, p. 76.

²¹ *Browder/Kerensky*, 1: p. 210–211; *Bunyan/Fisher*, p. 279–280.

²² For other treatments, see: *Bernshtam*, p. 252–357; *Genis*, p. 42–55.

²³ GARF (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi federatsii, Moscow), f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 20; RGVA (Rossiiski gosudarstvennyi voenno arkhiv, Moscow), f. 100, op. 2, d. 11, ll. 144–145; *ibid.*, d. 78, ll. 78, 83; *ibid.*, d. 106, l. 9.

²⁴ *Venkov*, p. 62–63; *Dedov*, pp. 50–52, 106; RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 165, l. 42.

²⁵ GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 123; similarly, RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 106, l. 119; RGVA, f. 193, op. 2, d. 144, ll. 1–2.



Circled: Approximate area of Don Territory [Territory of the Don Cossack Host]

Army, but they also comprised a significant percentage of those serving in armies opposed to the Soviet state. The indisputable fact that many Cossacks were bearing arms against the Revolution, willingly or not, then played into a set of mutually reinforcing stereotypes. The anti-Soviet Cossack leadership held a romanticized and paternalistic image of Cossacks as Russia's paladins of order and statehood, loyal but in need of political tutelage. This image had led the leaders of various anti-Soviet movements to seek out Cossack regions as their base of operations. To realize this idealized image of a 'Cossack Vendée', they then forcibly conscripted Cossacks to serve a cause portrayed to Cossacks as their own.

This anti-Soviet image of Cossacks as instinctive counterrevolutionaries reinforced existing Soviet views. Many in the revolutionary movement had long been conditioned to think of Cossacks as lackeys of the Imperial regime. A crude form of Marxist class analysis buttressed this view with references to Cossacks' supposed land wealth. (In point of fact, as the Soviet state was to learn, this schematic socio-economic portrayal of 'poor peasants' and 'land-wealthy' Cossacks proved to poorly correspond to actual socio-economic relations.) In Soviet usage, 'Cossacks' by late 1918 came to mean only those serving in the anti-Soviet Don Army, while Cossacks serving the Soviet cause became generic 'Red Army men.'²⁶ In June 1918 Stalin had already argued that it was futile to look to the Cossacks, as "our base in the Don Territory is the non-native peasants."²⁷

Both sides, then, had come to see Cossacks as an undifferentiated whole. Ominously, Red and White tended to reify juridical categories and economic attributes into entirely discrete 'populations'. The emergence of this 'population politics', as it was termed at the time, was an essential precondition for de-cossackization. In the late imperial period, a discipline termed 'military statistics' had disaggregated the population into 'elements' according to their purported political reliability. It had informed the tsarist regime's analyses of its own population from the mid-nineteenth century, and served as the guidelines for anti-insurgency measures in the imperial borderlands.²⁸ The First World War, however, marked the watershed when the imperial state moved to the massive translation of these projections of the population into actual policies. From the very first days of the war, Russian imperial authorities oversaw the compulsory deportation of up to one million of their own subjects from the western provinces and Caucasian borderlands.²⁹

Implementing 'population politics' in the form of deportations, and drawing upon colonial precedents to do so, was no Russian anomaly during the First World War. The imperial regime had employed such measures in its colonial peripheries. During the war, other European states employed measures like deportations and concentration camps against foreign foes and, to a degree, against their own national minorities. In the Russian empire total war and then civil conflict – and the concomitant collapse of empire – extended these measures throughout entire polity, where they were employed by Red and White alike. In 1918, the anti-Soviet Don Government passed a decree legally sanctioning the deportation of individuals who opposed its political agenda. The Kuban Cossack Rada went so far as to debate measures to expel all non-Cossacks. One delegate suggested instead that it would be better simply

²⁶ E. g., RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 20, l. 1; *ibid.*, d. 11, l. 182.

²⁷ *Kvashokin et al.*, p. 42; *Stalin*, p. 124–128.

²⁸ *Rich*, p. 621–39; *Holquist*, *To Count*, p. 111–144.

²⁹ *Holquist*, *To Count*; *Lohr*, *Nationalizing*.

to kill off all non-Cossacks.³⁰ Bolshevism's penchant to anchor all analyses in socio-economic conditions inclined it to such models; its Manicheism predisposed its adherents to pursue their ruthless implementation.

Both Red and White envisioned the Don Territory as inhabited by two distinct populations: the impoverished peasant *khokhly* (a derogatory term for Ukrainians) and the well-off, ethnically Russian Cossacks.³¹ Here too Imperial military statistics had led the way. The 1908 military-statistical overview of the Don Territory effectively conflated ethnic and estate categories, counterpoising ethnically Russian Cossacks to ethnically Ukrainian non-Cossacks, although the overlap was less than precise in both cases.³² Thus, the category of "Cossack" was no longer merely one of many judicial or categories imposed upon a group of people. Instead it described a 'population' or 'element' that was irreducibly 'Cossack.' As Soviet forces advanced into the Don in early February 1919, the commander in chief of all Soviet forces penned an article entitled "The Struggle Against the Don", in which he described the entire Don region as the arch-foe of the Soviet Republic, whose Cossack population had a psychology similar to "certain representatives of the zoological world."³³

Soviet officials constructed a socio-economic typology of an impoverished peasant and outlander (as peasants not native to the Don Territory were known) population, oppressed by a wealthy and counterrevolutionary Cossackry. Such a paradigm resonated powerfully, but did not correspond to actual economic relations. Soviet officials (and subsequent historical studies) have myopically focused on aggregate amount of allotment land held by each group, to the exclusion of private landholding and land rental.³⁴ Cossacks undoubtedly had far more allotment land. But peasants and many outlanders, more involved in market agriculture, engaged in extensive land rental, and employed more hired laborers and used advanced agricultural equipment to a far greater degree than Cossacks.³⁵ Among 'impoverished' outlanders aligning themselves with Soviet power in early 1918 were men like Iakov Skliarov, who held nearly 240 acres of hayfields and 108 acres of sowings, eight horses, and a home val-

³⁰ *Figes*, *People's Tragedy*, p. 570; *Sbornik zakonov priniatykh Bol'shim voiskovym krugom Vseveilikogo voiska Donskogo chetvertogo sozyva, v pervuiu sessiiu, 15-e avgusta po 20-e sentiabria 1918 Novocherkassk 1918*, p. 51–52.

³¹ Don government's usage: GARO (Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv rossiiskoi oblasti, Rostov), f. 856, op. 1, d. 15, l. 127; *ibid.*, d. 76, l. 133; RGVA, f. 39456, op. 1, d. 60, l. 64. Red Army usage: RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 162, ll. 25, 53; *ibid.*, d. 106, l. 144; RGVA, f. 193, op. 2, d. 117, ll. 92–93.

³² *Lobachevskii*, p. 309–317.

³³ *Bor'ba s Donom, Izvestiia narodnogo*, February 2, 4, 6, 8, 1919. On this article, see *Venkov* p. 67–68.

³⁴ This schematic representation of social relations almost entirely dominates the historiography: see *Chamberlin*, 1: p. 277; *Kenez*, p. 38–39.

³⁵ GARF, f. 1258, op. 1, d. 81, ll. 139, 143; *Trudy mestnykh* vol. 50, p. 295; *Iablokov*, p. 36–37; *Otchet voiskovogo nakaznogo*, p. 43.

ued at 25,000 rubles. He and others like him served in the ranks of the Red Army.³⁶ Red Army commanders themselves noted that while many peasants volunteered, far from all were impoverished. Ivan M. Mukhoperets, who raised peasant detachments in the dark days of 1918, later recalled:

The masses did not follow us because of our political line. Rather, it was an elemental movement, a struggle based on the hostility between the Cossackry and the peasantry, [and] we succeeded in organizing the peasants without being too picky about their class status. We had [peasant] soldiers who had over 500 acres, but they fought valiantly for us.³⁷

The estate stereotype favoured by the Cossack leadership itself was predicated on the preconception that all outlanders must inevitably be ‘Bolsheviks’, driving many peasants, regardless of economic status, into the Red Army. In this way, both the Soviet and Don government stereotypes of social support converged, reinforcing one another.

The stereotypes of centrally appointed Soviet officials like Stalin reinforced the views of local peasants who had suffered at the hands of Cossack insurgents. What had previously been social antagonism between peasants and Cossacks was now expressed as political conflict. One local Soviet activist warned his superiors in late summer of 1918 that even those Cossacks “ostensibly dedicated to Soviet power” in fact were counterrevolutionaries. “In a word,” he claimed, “the Cossack element is *unreliable*.”³⁸ (Note the use of the term “element” to describe the Cossack population.) According to this view, Cossacks were innately counterrevolutionary. Even those “ostensibly dedicated” to Soviet power were “unreliable.” Acting on this view, non-Cossacks serving in the Red Army sometimes rebuffed Cossacks seeking to cross the lines and volunteer. Forced to return to their *stanitsas* [Cossack communities], these Cossacks then had little choice but to join ‘their’ Don Army.³⁹

Peasants, of course, had long wished to settle accounts with Cossacks, but now they could paint them as ‘counterrevolutionaries’ to the new revolutionary regime. In June 1918, peasants spoke of merely “cutting off the Cossacks’ trouser stripes,” that is, abolishing all cultural and juridical features distinguishing Cossacks from the rest of the population.⁴⁰ (Cossacks all wore a distinguishing trouser stripe, with a specific colour for each Cossack host; Don Cossacks wore a red one.) By late September 1918, in conditions of civil war, some peasants had begun to speak instead of physical extermination. Soviet officials reported that peasants had responded to the anti-Soviet Cossack government’s calls for the total “extermination” of non-natives living on the Don with their own demand for “total extermination”

³⁶ GARO, f. 46, op. 1, d. 4154, l. 6; *ibid.*, d. 4156, l. 136; *ibid.*, d. 4174, ll. 1–2.

³⁷ TsDNIRO (Tsentral’nyi dokumentsatsionnyi novyeishei istorii rostovskoi oblasti, Rostov), f. 4, op. 1, d. 65, l. 436.

³⁸ GARF, f. 393, op. 2, d. 30, l. 52 (emphasis in original); also, RGVA, f. 1304, op. 1, d. 489, l. 171

³⁹ GARO, f. 856, op. 1, d. 15, l. 106; p. 203–204.


⁴⁰ GARF, f. 1235, op. 81, d. 2, l. 197b.

nation” of Cossacks. By December 1918, Leon Trotsky proclaimed that Soviet power was issuing a

final warning to you, Cossacks! The crimes of Krasnov [leader of the anti-Soviet AGDH] have hardened the hearts of the workers and peasants. Hatred for Krasnov often extends to the Cossacks in general. More and more often we hear the voices of the workers and peasants, saying: ‘we must exterminate all Cossacks, then peace and calm will come to South Russia!’⁴¹

By January 1919, when the Soviet government officially declared a policy of ‘de-cossackization’ it had become a truism among Soviet supporters at both the local and national level that “the Cossack population” was counterrevolutionary and ripe for some form of elimination.

Views of Cossacks as inveterate counterrevolutionaries were an essential precondition for de-cossackization. The Soviet state’s institutional endorsement for acting upon such views made decossackization possible as policy. Subordinate organs certainly had little compunction about using violence. But it was the Soviet central organs that created the environment for ‘excesses’, both through its official sanction of violence and by establishing a command system responsible only for carrying out orders from above.



Structures

The role of central directives can be measured by contrasting Soviet policy on the Don before and after the circular decreeing de-cossackization as official policy. On January 24, 1919 the Organizational Bureau (Orgburo) of the Bolshevik Party Central Committee issued a circular setting forth a new central policy. Until late January

⁴¹ Trotsky, p. 490; earlier usage cited in Venkov, Donskoe kazachestvo, p. 54.

1919, the Red Army's Southern Front, with assistance from the Communist Party's Don Bureau, implemented Soviet policy in the Don Territory. As the Red Army advanced into the Don Territory, the Southern Front had issued its own January 22, 1919 "Instruction to political commissars on the organization of authority in territories liberated from the Krasnovite yoke."⁴² This directive was much more discriminating in its application of terror than the Central Committee circular was to be. The "Instruction" pointedly directed that

Mass terror in the occupied territories is entirely undesirable and intolerable, playing into the hands of Krasnovite fear-mongering and complicating our position. Terror is to be employed against only the leading actors of the White guard camp, [while] suspicious and unreliable elements are subject to arrest and dispatch to [the towns of] Borisoglebsk or Balashov.

The Southern Front thus limited terror only to those who had demonstrated their counterrevolutionary nature through the commission of actual counterrevolutionary acts. This distinction was further elaborated in the Southern Front's "Instructions to khutor and village commissars."⁴³ While ordering the arrest of all those who "took an active part in the struggle against Soviet power" (officers, priests, and atamans), it distinguished between such activists and mere conscripts. As long as they were not guilty of any atrocities while in Krasnov's army, Cossack conscripts who had returned to their homes were to be treated like all other citizens. (Recall, after all, that Soviet power entered the Don in January 1919 because Cossack units had mutinied against the AGDH command and opened the front to the Red Army.)

The distinguishing feature of 1919 de-cossackization was its use of indiscriminate terror against all Cossacks as such, irrespective of how they had acted previously. This policy resulted directly from a January 24 circular issued by the Communist Party's Orgburo. The measures contained in this circular constituted "high de-cossackization", pursued from early February through mid-March 1919. As the Red Army advanced into Cossack regions, Sergei Syrtsov – a member of the Communist Party's Don Bureau – suggested to his party superiors that they formulate a policy toward Cossack regions now coming under Soviet control.⁴⁴ Syrtsov had grown up in Rostov and graduated from a Rostov commercial school. He was thus not a Cossack, but from the region's leading industrial centre. After graduating, he went to Saint Petersburg in 1912 to continue his studies. The following year, at the age of 20, he joined the Bolshevik party and was soon exiled to Siberia. With the February Revolution, he returned to the Don as the region's leading Bolshevik at the ripe age of 24. From late 1918 he served as chairman of the Don Party Bureau, where he consistently pressed for the most radical form of de-cossackization. For much of 1919 the Central Committee endorsed his views, over strong opposition from other members of the

⁴² RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 94, l. 51.

⁴³ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 51, l. 250.

⁴⁴ GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 320; RGASPI (Rossiiski gosudarstvennyi arkhiv sotsial'no-politicheskoi istorii), f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 85.

Don Bureau (notably A. A. Frenkel) as well as from the Southern Front's Revolutionary Military Council (most prominently, Georgii Sokol'nikov).

By early 1919, however, the members of the Central Committee did not need Syrtsov to convince them that the Cossackry was congenitally counterrevolutionary. Ironically, the purpose for issuing the de-cossackization circular was the Red Army's rapid advance into Cossack regions, an advance the Central Committee knew full well was the result of Cossack units opening the front to the Red Army. The Orgburo's January 24 circular reads:⁴⁵

Recent events on various fronts in the Cossack regions—our advance to the heart of Cossack settlements and demoralization among the Cossack forces—compel us to give directions to party officials on the nature of their work in establishing and consolidating Soviet power in the specified regions. Considering the experience of a year of civil war against the Cossackry, we must recognize the only proper means to be a merciless struggle with the entire Cossack elite by means of their total extermination [*putem pogolovnogo ikh istrebleniia*]. No compromises, no halfway measures are permissible. Therefore it is necessary:

1) To conduct *mass terror* [emphasis in original] against wealthy Cossacks, exterminating them totally; to conduct merciless mass terror against all those Cossacks who participated, directly or indirectly, in the struggle against Soviet power. Toward the middle Cossackry it is necessary to take all steps that guarantee no further attempts on its part to rise against Soviet power.

2) To confiscate grain and compel storage of all surpluses at designated points, both in terms of grain and all other agricultural goods.

3) To take all measures for helping the poor who are arriving to settle [and] organizing resettlement where possible.

4) To level the non-local outlanders with the Cossacks in land and all other concerns.

5) To conduct total disarmament, executing anyone who is found with weapons after the date of [the weapons'] surrender.

6) To issue weapons only to reliable elements from among the outlanders.

7) To leave armed detachments in Cossack stanitsas until the establishment of total order.

8) All commissars appointed to this or that Cossack settlement are urged to demonstrate maximum firmness and implement the present instructions without deviation.

The CC orders that the directive to the People's Commissariat of Land to work out, in short order, practical measures for the massive resettlement of the poor to Cossack lands through relevant Soviet institutions.

The Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party.

This circular differed significantly from the Southern Front's "Instruction," issued only two days previously. First, the Central Committee envisioned the area coming under the control of the Red Army as "Cossack regions" rather than "territories liberated from the Krasnovite yoke." Correspondingly, it portrayed the struggle as one against the entire Cossackry rather than the activist core of the Krasnovite

⁴⁵ *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 6, p. 177–178.

army. Secondly, it ordered a policy of mass terror, a policy that only two days before the Southern Front had described as “undesirable and intolerable.” Thirdly, instead of trying to win over the middle Cossackry, as the regime was trying to do at the time with the middle peasants in the rest of Russia, the Orgburo commanded that the middle Cossackry be restrained through the use of preventative terror. Finally, the circular significantly expanded the parameters of mass terror. Since the entire Cossack elite was presumed to be irreparably counterrevolutionary, it was slated for “total extermination.” But while the Southern Front’s “Instruction” had spared those who had been forcibly conscripted, the Orgburo circular called for “merciless, mass terror” against those who took a “direct or indirect” part in the struggle against Soviet power. Considering the anti-Soviet Don Army’s compulsory universal mobilizations, at times covering all Cossack males between the ages of eighteen to fifty, the entire male Cossack population which had remained on the Don could be said to have “indirectly” participated in counterrevolution – and thus according to the circular was to be subject to “merciless, mass terror.”

Prior to receiving the circular, the Southern Front had initiated its own policies. Then, on February 4, the Southern Front’s Revolutionary Military Council [RMC] received the Orgburo circular, which it dutifully distributed down the chain of command. In its own cover letter to the circular, the Southern Front RMC tried to frame the new directive in more moderate form. Whereas the circular itself called for “maximum firmness” with “no deviations,” the Southern Front directed officials to operate with the “requisite tact and caution” in the interests of furthering class differentiation among the Cossackry.⁴⁶

However much it might introduce various interpolations, the Southern Front nevertheless had to carry out the essential points of the Orgburo directive. On February 5, only one day after it first received the circular, the Southern Front’s RMC issued Order no. 171 on the formation of revolutionary tribunals, followed the next day by Order no. 178 on district revolutionary committees. These two decrees were the essential tools for implementing high de-cossackization. Then, on February 7, the Southern Front RMC issued its own instructions on how the Orgburo’s circular was to be applied.⁴⁷ During a later policy review of de-cossackization’s failure, some party officials sought to blame the RMC’s instructions, rather than the Orgburo’s circular, for any and all excesses.⁴⁸ Yet the Southern Front RMC’s instructions did not add anything substantial to the Orgburo circular, but rather communicated ways for implementing it. The RMC described the categories of the population who were subject to “immediate execution”: all AGDH officials; all officers of the Don Army; anyone who actively supported the counterrevolution; and, “all wealthy Cossacks with-

⁴⁶ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 235, l. 6; also RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 47.

⁴⁷ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 42, l. 31; RGVA, f. 193, op. 2, d. 144, l. 63. There are two variants of the Southern Front’s “Instructions”: see Hoover Institution Archive, Bykadorov Collection, Folder “Prikazy,” “Instruktsiia,” which is more moderate; and *Danilov*, p. 145–146, which is less discriminating.

⁴⁸ GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 320.

out exception.” But, relative to the Orgburo circular, the instructions introduced a note of restraint. “However, terror against these groups,” it directed, “and especially against the middle Cossackry, should not be the sole method in our struggle for strengthening the Soviet regime.” Contrary to the later accusations that it was the Southern Front’s instructions that were overly broad, rather than the Orgburo decree itself, the Southern Front still limited the application of terror only to those who had actively opposed Soviet power. Khutor atamans were to be subject to terror only if “they actively supported Krasnov’s policies.”

Terror was not some unstructured, indiscriminate slaughter, nor was it a spontaneous, terrible retribution by peasants for past Cossack abuses. Terror was policy, organized, sanctioned, and conducted by officially established institutions. Acting on the Orgburo circular and operating in close contact with the Central Committee, the Southern Front quickly established an entire network of tribunals to carry out the prescribed mass terror. Regimental tribunals, composed of the occupying unit’s commissar and two other party members, were to be established in every *stanitsa* occupied by Soviet forces.⁴⁹ These tribunals were to operate along a unit’s path of advance and at all points where it happened to quarter. Their sentences were not subject to review. Within two weeks, the Southern Front was receiving reports that its regimental tribunals were “overloaded with work.”⁵⁰

Despite its subsequent protests to the contrary, the Soviet leadership was fully aware of the tribunals’ activities. Through both the army and party chain of command, central authorities diligently supervised local tribunals’ activities. Indeed, central authorities regularly pressed these tribunals to be even more “energetic.” In Khoper and Upper Don districts, military superiors became dissatisfied with the pace and severity of “regular” divisional revolutionary tribunals, even though these were showing no compunction about executing people. In their place army commanders established “extraordinary revolutionary tribunals” (*sic!*) to review sentences already handed out and to handle all new cases.⁵¹ Such “extraordinary tribunals” indeed proved to be significantly firmer. For the thirty-one individuals brought before it, the “regular” Khoper district revolutionary tribunal had handed down two death sentences. Its successor, the “extraordinary” tribunal, reviewed the sentences already handed out and upgraded the sentences of ten more people to execution. Over the next two weeks the “extraordinary tribunal” tried 142 defendants, sentencing 93 to death (90 for the rather elastic category of “counterrevolution”). It acquitted a mere seventeen. Over a one-month period in March 1919, the Khoper extraordinary revolutionary tribunal handed down a total of 226 death sentences.⁵² In Morozov and Ust’-Medveditsa districts, army-level revolutionary military councils pressed local

⁴⁹ *Obichkin et al.*, vol. 6: p. 482 [henceforth: *Perepiska TsK*]; formalized the following day in RMC Order no. 171 (RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 42, l. 31).

⁵⁰ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 106, l. 20; *ibid.*, d. 162, ll. 24–25.

⁵¹ *Venkov*, p. 78–80; *Kudinov*, no. 79, p. 8–9; *Kudinov* no. 80, p. 8.

⁵² RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 146, ll. 16–19; also *Donskie vedomosti*, June 3 and 15, 1919.

officials to be more “energetic.” The Ninth Army revolutionary military council reproached the Ust’-Medveditsa district revolutionary committee for its unfamiliarity with the measure of employing hostages from the civilian population “for purposes of expediency.”⁵³ Pressure for more “energetic” prosecution, tellingly, came not from the military *per se* (it was the army’s divisional revolutionary tribunals that had proven insufficiently “energetic”), but emanated directly from the RMCs of the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth armies – organs appointed by and answering to central party and state organs in Moscow.

To be sure, local officials charged with carrying out de-cossackization interpreted it in the broadest possible terms. Subsequent official reviews of the policy excoriated the brutality and poor quality of personnel staffing local organs. The commissar in Slashchevskaia *stanitsa*, one policy review reported, had declared that he intended “to drive Cossacks to their grave,” a sentiment shared by some Kholer officials.⁵⁴ But central organs had insisted upon their prerogative to appoint these individuals, and had insistently refused the possibility of elected authority. Even more fundamentally, central authorities set the parameters for acceptable behaviour. By explicit directives and tacit sanction of local organs’ policies, they signalled the limits of appropriate behaviour.⁵⁵

It is difficult to determine the total number of victims of de-cossackization on the Don, as the insurgents and later the AGDH used the executions for propagandistic purposes. In the Upper Don region, the number of victims was between three and five hundred. The number would certainly been higher had not an anti-Soviet rebellion broken out when it did.⁵⁶ In some regions—Kholer district, Kotel’nikov, Tsimlianskaia – revolutionary tribunals executed hundreds of people.⁵⁷ In others – Milleroovo, Berezhovskaia, Mitiakinskaia, Semikarakovskaia, Velikokniazheskaia, Skurishchevskaia – tribunals executed only a handful.⁵⁸ In all, this highly orchestrated Soviet policy of social engineering by excision accounted for perhaps ten to twelve thousand victims throughout the Don Territory. (This figure was out of a total population of perhaps 3.5 million and a Cossack population of perhaps 1.7 million. It should be noted, though, that de-cossackization took place mainly in the Don Territory’s north-

⁵³ RGASPI, f. 554, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 5–6, 18; also GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, ll. 172–173.

⁵⁴ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 146, l. 30; GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, ll. 311–312.

⁵⁵ For this argument regarding the Wehrmacht’s conduct in the East, see *Bartov*.

⁵⁶ *Kudinov*, no. 80, p. 8; *Venkov*, p. 80–81. Lists of individual victims compiled by the insurgents immediately after the uprising (GARF, f. 1258, op. 2, d. 66, ll. 2–4) provide much more modest figures (twelve in Veshenskaia, twenty-four in Migulinskaia) than reports of hundreds found in later agitational broadsheets.

⁵⁷ White intelligence estimated over 1000 executions in Kotel’nikov and 700 in Tsimlianskaia (GARF, f. 452, op. 1, d. 32, ll. 18–21; *ibid.*, d. 19, l. 4).

⁵⁸ These figures from both Soviet and anti-Soviet sources: RGVA, f. 192, op. 2, d. 197, l. 13; RGASPI, f. 554, op. 1, d. 1, l. 67; *Donskie vedomosti*, June 24, 1919; *Priazovskii kraj*, June 25, 1919; *Sever Dona*, July 17, 1919.

ern districts, which the Red Army had occupied, and thus was much more concentrated there.)

While terror was the most conspicuous point of the Orgburo circular, high de-cossackization encompassed an entire complex of other measures to render Cossacks harmless to the Soviet Republic. Identifying the Don Territory with the particularistic and counterrevolutionary Cossackry, the Soviet leadership refused to grant it any form of administrative recognition analogous to that of other provinces. Instead, Soviet authorities worked to erase the Don Territory from the map altogether. Throughout January the Don Party Bureau repeatedly requested it be granted direct administration over the Don Territory, a proposal supported by the Red Army's Southern Front.⁵⁹ Neither the Southern Front nor the Don Bureau yet knew of the Orgburo's January 24 circular on de-cossackization, received by the Southern Front only on February 4. Hence they obviously were not expecting the Central Committee's curt response to their petitions, which came on January 29 and insisted that control be concentrated in the hands of the Southern Front's RMC, with the added injunction that "there is to be no Don Executive Committee and no Don Government."⁶⁰ When the Don Bureau pressed its requests for a civilian administrative organ for the Don, the Orgburo again reiterated that the Don was to be granted no independent administrative existence.⁶¹

While local party officials continued to press for some civilian or party organ, they simultaneously lobbied for the elimination of all forms of distinct Cossack administration in the Don Territory. When the Don Bureau petitioned for a territorial executive committee, it argued that such an organ was necessary "to plan for the dismemberment of the Don Territory and to prepare for the creation of new administrative entities which correspond to the economic and political needs of the moment."⁶² A program of population management drove this administrative reorganization. For much of 1919, the Soviet state planned to append portions of Tsaritsyn Province and the Donets basin, along with their populations, to the Don Territory. The explicit goal was "to dilute" the Don's Cossack presence through the introduction of a more reliable "element," workers and poor peasants. Indeed, the policy was intended, noted one proposal, "to tear the counterrevolution's flesh apart," in the hope that the Cossackry would entirely "dissolve."⁶³

The colonization program foreseen in the Orgburo's circular was yet another prong in the Soviet state's program of social engineering. Colonization was expressly intended to "dilute" the Cossack "element" by "the widespread removal of Cossacks"

⁵⁹ RGVA, f. 100, op. 2, d. 43, ll. 6–7; *ibid.*, d. 51, l. 57; *Perepiska TsK*, 6: p. 190–195; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 4, d. 36, ll. 52–53.

⁶⁰ *Perepiska TsK*, 6: p. 34, 36.

⁶¹ *Perepiska TsK*, 6: p. 48, 77–78, 287–88, 481–82; *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 7, p. 148, 155; RGASPI, f. 554, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 71–76.

⁶² *Perepiska TsK*, 6: p. 77–78, p. 287–288; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 66.

⁶³ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 4, d. 36, l. 53; similarly, RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 35, l. 56

on the one hand, and by the introduction of “peasant elements from Central Russia” on the other.⁶⁴ These settlers were not to be “sprinkled individually among the Cossack population,” but were to be settled in compact groups.⁶⁵

The Don Bureau aggressively pursued the Territory’s dismemberment, even over the objections of the Southern Front. At the Eighth Party Congress in March 1919, the Don Bureau argued for administrative restructuring so as to dilute the Cossack presence. The Southern Front’s RMC, however, believed that the military situation made such plans premature.⁶⁶ The Don Bureau remained insistent. In April, it again petitioned the Soviet government to dismember the Territory. Yet again, the Southern Front’s RMC protested the planned dismemberment, prompting the Don Bureau to dispatch Syrtsov, its most fervent proponent of de-cossackization, to Moscow to argue its case. Syrtsov pressed the case for dismemberment in his letter to the Central Committee on April 21, laying out plans to dilute the Cossack presence to thirty percent by detaching areas of the Don Territory to surrounding provinces.⁶⁷ The Southern Front’s RMC fired off yet another protest, charging that the situation in general, and the Cossack uprising that had been prompted by these policies in particular, did not permit the break-up of existing administrative structures.⁶⁸ This opposition by the Southern Front managed to delay the Territory’s dismemberment until the Soviet retreat in mid-1919, making further discussion moot.

However, the Bolshevik state did not pursue an ongoing and open-ended program of genocide against the Cossacks.⁶⁹ Over the spring and summer of 1919, Soviet central authorities staged a gradual retreat from its original policy of “high decossackization.”⁷⁰ In March 1919 a wide-scale uprising erupted in the Don’s northern districts – the same ones which had opened the front to the Red Army in January of that same year. Holding its own until June, this rebellion – variously termed the Veshenskaia or Upper Don uprising – then linked up with the resurgent Don Army to re-occupy most of the Don. The rebellion’s tenaciousness and its growing successes caused the Soviet regime to re-evaluate its policies toward the Cossacks. The party abandoned de-cossackization as physical extermination and replaced it with a policy of eliminating Cossacks as a socio-economic class. Revolutionary tribunals did not cease their ac-

⁶⁴ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 164; similarly, RGVA, f. 192, op. 2, d. 197, l. 53; *Danilov*, p. 146.

⁶⁵ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 35, l. 61; also GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 320.

⁶⁶ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 4, d. 36, ll. 53–54.

⁶⁷ RGASPI, f. 554, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 80, 83; portions of Syrtsov’s report are found in *Perepiska TsK*, 7: p. 261–262.

⁶⁸ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 35, l. 15.

⁶⁹ As is asserted by *Bernshtam*, p. 318; *Losev*, p. 317. Losev places responsibility for the “Cossack genocide” upon the Jews. For a scrupulous refutation of this canard, see *Kozlov*, no. 6, p. 64–71 and no. 7 p. 43–47, here at 6: p. 65–66.

⁷⁰ Cf. the analogous retreat by the Russian imperial government from its aggressive anti-semitic policy in the first occupation of Galicia and Bukovina in 1915 to a more moderate policy during the second occupation in 1916–1917.

tivities, but their scope was sharply circumscribed. While it continued to prescribe merciless retribution for those who raised arms against the Revolution, Soviet power no longer called for the elimination of Cossacks *as Cossacks*. The policy shifted from punishing Cossacks for who they *were* to punishing them for what they had *done*.

The Don Bureau had never made peace with the Centre's total ban on a territorial-level administrative organ. The Southern Front did not favour the ban either. It did, however, insist on retaining control over all work in the Territory, testifying not only to its reluctance to surrender authority but also to its distrust of the Don Bureau, and specifically Syrtsov. As a result of their joint prodding, the Centre finally relented somewhat. It remained opposed to the formation of a regular, provincial-level organ, either an executive or revolutionary committee. Instead it established a "Civil Administration of the Southern Front's Revolutionary Military Council", an organ with the same name and functions as the imperial government's institution for administering territories occupied during wartime. During the First World War, such organs had ruled portions of occupied Galicia and Armenia.⁷¹ (Some anti-Soviet armies in the civil wars likewise looked to this precedent for administering regions under their control.)⁷² These imperial organs had suffered from a lack of coordination between military and civilian branches, crippling their effectiveness. For the Soviet "Civil Administration," the Bolshevik Party conveniently, if unintentionally, served as the coordinating link between the military and civilian authorities. The Southern Front retained overall control of the region, but the new organ directly oversaw civilian administration. The Don Bureau, while disappointed at the continued dominance of the Southern Front, acceded to the Civil Administration's formation in the interests of military expediency.⁷³

In the second week of March, the Veshenskaia uprising broke out against Soviet power and soon encompassed most of the Upper Don district. This was precisely the region which only a month and a half earlier had thrown open the front to the Red Army, the act which had prompted Soviet officials to review their policy on the Don and issue their decossackization circular. The Southern Front, which had long opposed the Don Bureau's more extreme policies, invoked the uprising as an argument for a more restrained approach to the region. As member of the Southern Front's RMC, Sokol'nikov presented a report to the Central Committee arguing that it was impossible to carry out the Orgburo's de-cossackization circular. He proposed instead to utilize the different socio-economic profiles of the Don Territory's the northern and southern districts to foster socio-economic differentiation "without

⁷¹ *Polozhenie o polevom* articles 11, 647; *Polozhenie o polevom upravlenii voisk v voennoe vremia*, St. Petersburg 1914. FN72; RGIA, f. 1276, op. 10, d. 895, ll. 76–80. For military administration of Galicia, see *Bakhturina*; for Armenia see RGVIA, f. 13227, op. 2, d. 149, ll. 1–20.

⁷² Smolin, p. 129, 174, 177.

⁷³ RGVA, f. 192, op. 1, d. 66, l. 13; GARO, f. 3441, op. 1, d. 66a, l. 16; RGASPI, f. 17, op. 4, d. 36, l. 53.

our unnecessary interference.” (Generally, the southern districts were wealthier and thus perceived to be more conservative). The March 15 meeting of the Orgburo decided to place the issue of the circular’s annulment before the entire Central Committee. The following day the Central Committee endorsed Sokol’nikov’s analysis, passing a resolution that called for an end to “actions against the Cossackry.”⁷⁴

Syrtsov forwarded news of the Central Committee’s change in policy to local authorities on March 25:

Immediately inform all responsible party and Soviet leaders of your region that the CC has reviewed its directive and directs party workers to cease the implementation of mass terror. Take absolutely no measures that might complicate relations and lead to an uprising. Economic measures – especially requisitions – should be pursued with the utmost caution and circumspection... Removing individual counterrevolutionaries who are harmful is of course necessary. The Veshenskaia uprising should of course be suppressed with all decisiveness and mercilessness, but repressions ought not to be extended indiscriminately to stanitsas that have not rebelled. It is of course necessary to employ more severity toward the southern Cossackry, but not to excess.⁷⁵

While the document is no model of humanitarianism, it nevertheless represents a major shift from “high de-cossackization.” Terror was still the order of the day – but now only for those who had engaged in counterrevolutionary *acts*. The Cossackry in its entirety was no longer the target. Nor was the Cossackry seen as some monolithic, counterrevolutionary bloc. The putative economic differentiation between Cossacks in the northern and southern districts was now invoked, and would continue to be invoked in the future, to explain Cossacks’ counterrevolutionary tendencies.⁷⁶ Cossacks were no longer assumed simply to be congenital counterrevolutionaries; now class reasons had to be advanced to explain their behaviour.

Two weeks later, another more sweeping decree further dismantled the legal structures underpinning “high de-cossackization.” On April 5, the Southern Front issued an order annulling almost all previous orders directed specifically against Cossacks, particularly order no. 171 on revolutionary tribunals. At this time the Southern Front also cancelled its own February 7 “Instructions” to the January 24 Orgburo circular, which itself had already been annulled three weeks before. The order directed an overall change in Soviet policy on the Don:

In place of all previous instructions concerning general policy for the Don Territory, the Southern Front’s RMC orders the following be observed: suppress attempts at uprising in the rear in the most merciless manner, while simultaneously not resorting to mass terror toward peaceful regions, persecuting only active counterrevolutionaries.⁷⁷

⁷⁴ *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 8, p. 161, 163–164.

⁷⁵ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 35, l. 7.

⁷⁶ *Perepiska TsK*, 7: p. 260; RGVA, f. 192, op. 2, d. 197, l. 55.

⁷⁷ *Perepiska TsK*, 7: p. 508–509. There the order is erroneously dated April 7, its date of receipt by the CC: see RGVA, f. 192, op. 1, d. 66, l. 9.

The shift in views on the Cossackry, visible in Syrtsov's earlier directive, is evident here as well. Not the Cossackry in its entirety, only "active counterrevolutionaries" and those engaged in the Upper Don insurgency were now to be subject to terror.⁷⁸

Yet, while forced to abjure the more extreme variant of decossackization, many party officials retained their belief in its fundamental correctness. Syrtsov, for instance, placed all responsibility for its failure not on the policy itself, but on the Southern Front's inability or unwillingness to carry it out. (Indeed, the Don Bureau continued to protest through the summer of 1919 against the Southern Front's attempts to come to some "accommodation with the Cossacks.")⁷⁹ The Don Bureau's continued intransigence, spear-headed by Syrtsov, was evident in its April 8 "Resolution on policy toward the Cossacks." Issued only three days after the Southern Front had cancelled the essential decrees of "high de-cossackization," the Don Bureau's policy statement opens with a proclamation that "the existence of the Don Cossackry stands before proletarian power as a constant threat of counterrevolutionary rebellion." The Cossack threat therefore

makes vital the question of the complete, immediate, and decisive destruction of the Cossackry as a specific cultural [*bytovoi*] and economic group, the destruction of its economic foundations, the physical elimination of the Cossack bureaucrats and officers (indeed, of the entire counterrevolutionary Cossack elite), the dispersal and neutralization of the rank-and-file Cossackry, and the formal liquidation of the Cossackry.

While conceding that terror should be employed only as a "justified retribution" for counterrevolutionary actions, the resolution argued for the confiscation of land from Cossacks and the imposition of "contributions" and special taxes. Its primary recommendation, however, was for the Soviet state to pursue a policy of massive resettlement "of peasant elements from Central Russia" to the Don, a program that had already been proposed in the Orgburo circular and restated in the Southern Front's "instructions" to it.⁸⁰

Clearly, Syrtsov's view of Cossacks and the measures necessary to neutralize them had changed little. His hard-line approach caused a split within even the Don Bureau. While four members led by Syrtsov supported the resolution's firm line, two others (led by Frenkel) accused the majority of failing to adopt the Centre's new, less extreme policy.⁸¹ Syrtsov took his case to the Central Committee, traveling personally to Moscow and submitting a lengthy policy proposal there on April 21. In his proposal he argued for the dismemberment of the Don Territory and proposed that the regime rely only on the peasantry in pursuing the Cossackry's elimination.⁸²

⁷⁸ Subsequent accounts of de-cossackization erroneously conflate these later measures against insurgents together with the earlier and much broader de-cossackization measures.)

⁷⁹ *Danilov*, p. 221–222.

⁸⁰ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, ll. 163–164; *Danilov*, p. 145–46.

⁸¹ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 115.

⁸² RGASPI, f. 17, op. 6, d. 83, ll. 1–10; edited version found in *Perepiska TsK*, 7: 259–271. The editors of the *Perepiska TsK* erroneously ascribe the report to the Don Bureau,

The Don Bureau's continued insistence on hard-line measures, together with its charge that the Army was to blame for de-cossackization's failure, brought it into conflict with the Southern Front's RMC. On behalf of the Southern Front, Sokol'nikov exchanged recriminations by telegraph with the Don Bureau. The Southern Front, aware that Syrtsov was traveling to meet the Central Committee, sent a telegram of its own. In it Sokol'nikov ridiculed the Don Bureau's charge that de-cossackization had failed because the army had failed to implement it. As proof he cited figures confirming the "broad implementation" of the directive in the area currently seized by the Upper Don rebellion. He then went on to charge that the Don Bureau had "not changed its policy at all, which entirely corresponds to its view that the original directive had simply not been given a chance to work."⁸³ Syrtsov's trip to Moscow, however, paid dividends. The Central Committee gave its approval to the Don Bureau's "Resolution on the Cossackry." Over the continued objections of the Southern Front and a minority of the Don Bureau, the Orgburo endorsed Syrtsov's plan for a coordinated colonization program and entertained plans for the immediate dismemberment of the Don province.⁸⁴

Following Syrtsov's advice, on April 24 the Council of People's Commissars decreed that "the starving urban and rural proletariat" should be resettled in the Don Territory, and ordered the Commissariat of Agriculture to supervise the resettlement of peasants from six northern provinces to "the former Don Territory." The following month, as the first parties of settlers were about to arrive, the Southern Front ordered that military and civilian institutions should use all means at their disposal to further the program.⁸⁵ By May the first parties of settlers began arriving on the Don, where they were directed to the Kotel'nikovo and Millerovo regions. At this very time, however, the Red Army began a slow retreat from the Don Territory. Fearing retribution, the settlers began refusing the land slated for them. Several months later, a White newspaper article did not so much condemn the settlers as find them pathetic. Uninformed as to their final point of destination, they had been scattered along the railway line. When local farmers, racing to harvest their fields, attempted to employ them, they found the settlers entirely incompetent at the type of fieldwork required in southern regions.⁸⁶

Like the Southern Front's "Civilian Administration," the Soviet colonization program for the Don extended pre-existing state practices. The imperial state's Ministry of Agriculture had pursued its own resettlement program. Sergei Chirkin, the leading official in the tsarist Ministry of Agriculture's Resettlement Bureau, continued his

whereas it was actually titled "Syrtsov's report." Syrtsov simultaneously presented the Don Bureau's "Resolution": RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, l. 170.

⁸³ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 35, l. 13; RGASPI, f. 554, op. 1, d. 1, ll. 83, 85, 87.

⁸⁴ *Danilov*, p. 187–188.

⁸⁵ RGVA, f. 192, op. 2, d. 197, l. 53; RGASPI f. 17, op. 109, d. 77, l. 158 ob.; *ibid.*, op. 65, d. 35, ll. 60–61.

⁸⁶ *Donskie vedomosti*, September 27, 1919; also, GARF, f. 1235, op. 82, d. 15, l. 320.

duties under the Soviets.⁸⁷ Tsarist military officials also had extensively theorized about colonization programs. They implemented them too, largely in the Empire's colonial peripheries of the Caucasus and Central Asia. In the course of 1914–1917, the imperial regime had extended these measures to wide swaths of the front, deporting populations deemed “unreliable.” In the aftermath of the widespread 1916 uprising in Central Asia, tsarist military authorities drafted a systematic colonization and deportation program for the region. Only the February Revolution had prevented its realization. Nor was Russia alone in pursuing such measures. German and Austro-Hungarian forces employed analogous measures, particularly in their operations in the East.⁸⁸

With the civil wars, combatants now extended these techniques, perfected in colonial spaces and widely expanded during the First World War, to the entire political space of the empire. The anti-Soviet AGDH engaged in sporadic expulsions from individual communities, and some officials discussed expelling non-Cossacks altogether. Yet Bolshevik ideology, emphasizing the endemic and ongoing nature of class war, raised these measures from the realm of military practice to one of standing state policy. Bolshevik officials such as Syrtsov did not envision de-cossackization measures as the outgrowth of military operations, but rather as a central and continuing goal of Soviet power, to be pursued in war or peace. In early July I. I. Reingol'd, a member of the Don Revolutionary Committee formed in early May to replace the “Civilian Administration”, wrote a report for the Central Committee entitled “On the Issue of Our ‘Cossack Policy’ on the Don.” Reingol'd proposed the formation of a civilian Don Soviet government and criticized the tactless behaviour of revolutionary committees over the past six months. Nevertheless, de-cossackization itself had not been a mistake:

by means of [decossackization] we hoped to make the Don healthy, to make it, if not Soviet, then at least submissive and obedient to Soviet power . . . Indisputably, our doctrinal view that Cossacks are an element alien to Communism and to the Soviet idea was correct. Sooner or later we will have to exterminate, simply physically destroy the Cossacks, or at least the vast majority of them, but for this we will need enormous tact and huge caution . . . Only under the banner of a Soviet Don Government will we be able to conduct Red Terror against the Cossack counterrevolution, by means of arms, propaganda, and an agrarian-resettlement policy.⁸⁹

Reingol'd was no lone fanatic. In an analysis entitled “Why We Suffered a Defeat on the Southern Front”, written in early August 1919, Iosif Khodorovskii, a member of the Southern Front's RMC, postulated that “we must once and for all recognize that we are conducting a struggle not for the Cossackry, but against the Cossackry, [that]

⁸⁷ *Naumov*, p. 379–380; see also *Sunderland*, ch. 5; and *Holquist*, In accord with State Interests, p. 151–79.

⁸⁸ *Holquist*, To Count; *Lohr*, Russian Army, p. 404–419.

⁸⁹ *Kvashokin*, Bol'shevistkoe rukovodstvo, p. 107–110.

before us stands the task of the Don's complete conquest and extinction [*zamiranie*]." This analysis was circulated, among others, to Lenin and Trotsky.⁹⁰

Even de-cossackization's critics within the party were not opposed to its violence and terror. They argued that the policy had simply failed to target the appropriate group. While on the Don Bureau, Frenkel had vainly fought Syrtsov's excesses in de-cossackization. During a review of the failed policy in July 1919, he wrote the Central Committee that "the struggle between estates, between the Cossackry and the peasantry (outlanders), should, in my view, be conducted within the parameters of class struggle and not degenerate into an amorphous zoological struggle." Valentin Trifonov, a plenipotentiary dispatched from Moscow, similarly condemned the policy not because it was violent, but because the violence had been deployed in a "non-Marxist" fashion.⁹¹

It is here that the role of the official state endorsement for particular policies becomes evident. The Bolshevik Party's culture of centralism created an ethos in which official policy overrode the reservations of individual party members or even entire structures, such as the Southern Front RMC. Not a few officials in key positions (Frenkel, Trifonov, and especially Sokol'nikov) had opposed the portrayal of all Cossacks as inveterate counterrevolutionaries. The Southern Front had vigorously protested the Don Bureau's continuing enthusiasm for de-Cossackization. Their views made little difference once the Orgburo issued its de-cossackization circular in January. Conversely, many (such as Syrtsov, Khodorovskii, and Reingol'd) retained their distrust of each and every Cossack even after the renunciation of high de-cossackization. But once the Centre had introduced a more discriminating approach in March, they were no longer able to translate their more extreme views into policy.

Adrian Lyttelton has noted how the First World War marked a watershed in Italian political life. "Before [the First World War]," he writes, "political violence was either associated with 'protest,' or with repression by state organs; its deliberate, large-scale use by a party to further political aims, was something which most prewar politicians, even revolutionaries, did not seriously contemplate." Fascism exemplified this transformation in Italian political culture. But, argues Lyttelton, the emergence of fascism was "the most important but not the only manifestation" in the "general growth of violence in postwar Italy." Richard Bessel observes similarly for Germany that "the violence in German politics after 1918 was both qualitatively and quantitatively different." Domestic politics after the war were not peacetime politics: they were instead a form of "latent civil war."⁹²

In Russia, as in Italy and Germany, the war experience alone did not cause this shift; revolution was a necessary component. Russia had been at war since 1914,

⁹⁰ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 109, d. 44, ll. 135–141ob., citations at 140ob.–141.

⁹¹ RGASPI, f. 17, op. 65, d. 34, ll. 115, 85–89.

⁹² Lyttelton, p. 259, 271; Bessel, p. 261. In general, see Holquist, *Violent Russia*; Gerwarth, *War in Peace*; Gerwarth, *Vanquished*.

but only in the aftermath of 1917 did violence become a regular and constitutive feature of everyday political life for most spaces of the Russian empire. While the Bolsheviks employed violence more instrumentally and more consciously than their competitors, it had become an enduring feature of the post-1917 Russian political landscape. Bolshevik violence took place within this broader tectonic shift in Russian – indeed European – political culture. If war and revolution were the crucial components, the experience of civil war provided the necessary catalyst. These policies did not result from the abstract unfolding of ideology or from the exigencies of civil war. The practices of the governing and the governed crystallized in a concrete experience of civil war. Utopian dreams fused with an experience of want, fear, devastation, and brutalization.⁹³ It was not simply Bolshevik measures that summoned forth violence from the Soviet state's opponents. To see Bolshevik measures as the cause of their opponents' violence is to miss this larger tectonic shift.⁹⁴ Red political violence did not cause White violence, or vice versa. Rather, they were twin strands, inextricably intertwined, emerging out of the 1914–1921 maelstrom of war, revolution, and civil wars.

De-cossackization therefore was not simply a policy pursued during civil war. In discussing de-cossackization, party officials were quite explicit about its goals: not just to conquer the region, but to make the region once and for all Soviet and socialist. The officials of the anti-Soviet AGDH never articulated such an overarching agenda for their violence; they never had an institution so total as the Bolshevik Party to plan and to carry it out. It was therefore not the use of this or that practice – deportations, executions, military courts – that distinguished the Bolshevik regime, but rather the ends that those practices were to serve. What distinguished the Bolsheviks was the extent to which they turned tools originally intended for total war to the new ends of revolutionary politics, both during the civil wars but especially after their end. During the extended period of war, revolution, and civil wars the Bolshevik regime's reliance on particular practices remained at the outer reaches of comparison with other states. With the end of Europe's crisis period, this quantitative difference in Bolshevik violence became a qualitative difference. After 1921, the Bolshevik regime's continued use of wartime measures to pursue its revolutionary project fundamentally set it apart from most other European states.

⁹³ *Raleigh*, chapter 4 and conclusion.

⁹⁴ *Nolte*, *Das Vergehen*; *Nolte*, *Der europäische Bürgerkrieg*; *Pipes*, p. 240–281.

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