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## Hegel's ontology of time from the 1830 *Naturphilosophie*

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to show how Hegel ontologically conceives of time as becoming in the 1830 *Naturphilosophie*, and to interpret the relation between time and subjectivity articulated therein. Our aim is to emphasize how Hegel's concept of time as becoming is comprehensive, which means that time is neither exclusively temporality nor eternity. In *Hegel à Léna* (1934), Alexandre Koyré suggests that Hegel's philosophy is an attempt to comprehend becoming. To this, we add that the *Encyclopedia* is a complete schematic of making sense of what there is insofar as it *becomes* meaningful for us. Since time as becoming is an ontological claim about the nature of being, this implicates a certain notion of subjectivity with respect to being that *becomes* meaningful for us. Being becomes meaningful to us as time, but only because being *is* time, namely both a finite and infinite becoming. While it will not be possible to completely justify this ontology of time as becoming with respect to the entirety of Hegel's *Encyclopedia* herein, we will argue that the account of time Hegel provides in the *Naturphilosophie* provides a *raison d'être* both for conceptualizing time as becoming and for connecting it with a certain notion of subjectivity on ontological grounds. What this paper achieves, then, is evidence that time, for Hegel, is more than merely a concept employed for the measure of motion. When we pursue time ontologically, then time is recognizable as a concept of primal systematic significance. Through Hegel's conceptualization of time in terms of becoming, and his connection of it with subjectivity, this significance begins to manifest itself quite explicitly.

Hegel's *Naturphilosophie* is about the systematic comprehension of the concept of nature, which is the being of the Idea determined as externality. As such, the concept of nature is the result of thought having thought about being. In the addition to § 244, which bridges the Logic and Nature volumes of the *Encyclopedia*, we read: "We have now returned to the Concept of the Idea with which we began. At the same time this return to the beginning is an advance. What we began with was being, abstract being, while now we have the *Idea* as *being*; and this *Idea* that *is*, is *Nature* (§ 244Z)."<sup>1</sup> Initially

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<sup>1</sup> G. W. F. Hegel, *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften*, in *Werke in zwanzig Bänden*, Frankfurt am Main 1970. Translation of *The Encyclopedia Logic* by