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Neyer, U., Vieten, T. Die neue europäische Bankenaufsicht – eine kritische Würdigung. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 47(2), 341-366. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.47.2.341
Neyer, Ulrike and Vieten, Thomas "Die neue europäische Bankenaufsicht – eine kritische Würdigung" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 47.2, 2014, 341-366. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.47.2.341
Neyer, Ulrike/Vieten, Thomas (2014): Die neue europäische Bankenaufsicht – eine kritische Würdigung, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 47, iss. 2, 341-366, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.47.2.341

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Die neue europäische Bankenaufsicht – eine kritische Würdigung

Neyer, Ulrike | Vieten, Thomas

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 47 (2014), Iss. 2 : pp. 341–366

2 Citations (CrossRef)

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Author Details

Prof. Dr. Ulrike Neyer, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf.

Dr. Thomas Vieten, Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Straße 14, 60431 Frankfurt a. M.

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Abstract

The New European Banking Supervision – a Critical Assessment

In November 2014, the European Central Bank (ECB) will take responsibility for banking supervision in the euro area. This paper outlines the way to this single supervisory mechanism (SSM) and briefly describes the main points of the new SSM-Regulation. Then, the advantages and disadvantages of transferring banking supervision to a European authority in general and to the ECB in particular are discussed. It is argued, that the transfer of banking supervision to the European level has to be considered positively, but that the transfer to the ECB is combined with significant disadvantages, so that this should be only a temporary solution. In the medium term, a separate authority should be responsible for banking supervision.