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Neyer, U. The Independence of the European Central Bank. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 52(1), 35-68. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.35
Neyer, Ulrike "The Independence of the European Central Bank" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 52.1, 2019, 35-68. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.35
Neyer, Ulrike (2019): The Independence of the European Central Bank, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 52, iss. 1, 35-68, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.35
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The Independence of the European Central Bank

Neyer, Ulrike

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 52 (2019), Iss. 1 : pp. 35–68

2 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.1.35
Language
English
Pages
34
Keywords

Author Details

Prof. Dr. Ulrike Neyer, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf.

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    https://doi.org/10.1515/ordo-2021-0005 [Citations: 0]

  2. Extraordinary Times Require Extraordinary Action: Boosting European Demand by Means of Investment Helicopter Money

    Gries, Thomas | Mitschke, Alexandra

    Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 54 (2021), Iss. 2 P.137

    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.54.2.137 [Citations: 0]

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Abstract

The ECB is formally independent of instructions from any government. During and after the financial crisis and the acute sovereign debt crisis in the euro area, the ECB has used new instruments and has taken on new tasks and responsibilities. This has led to discussions about the independence of the ECB. Against this background, this paper discusses two questions. First, do the new instruments and tasks imply that the independence of the ECB is under threat? Second, is the use of the instruments and the taking on of the new tasks and responsibilities by an independent institution justified in a democracy or is there a relevant democratic deficit? With respect to these two questions the result of this paper is that especially the Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) and the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) have to be judged critically.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Ulrike Neyer: The Independence of the European Central Bank 1
Abstract 1
Zusammenfassung 1
I. Introduction 2
II. Basic Considerations 3
1. Elements of Central Bank Independence 3
2. Justification for the Independence of Central Banks 4
a) Inflation Bias 4
b) The Importance of Central Bank Credibility 6
c) The Distinctiveness of Monetary Policy 7
III. The ECB’s Independence Before the Start of the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis 8
IV. Measures Taken by the ECB During the Financial Crisis 1
1. Unconventional Policy Measures – A Description 1
2. The ECB’s Policy Measures and Central Bank Independence 1
V. Measures Taken by the ECB in the Acute Sovereign Debt Crisis 1
1. Securities Markets Programme (SMP) 1
a) The SMP – A Description 1
b) The SMP and Central Bank Independence 1
2. Outright Monetary Transactions (OMTs) 1
a) The OMTs – A Description 1
b) OMTs and Central Bank Independence 1
VI. Selected Measures of the ECB After the Financial and Acute Sovereign Debt Crisis 1
1. Public Sector Purchase Programme (PSPP) 1
a) The PSPP – A Description 1
b) The PSPP and Central Bank Independence 2
2. Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) 2
a) The SSM – A Description 2
b) The SSM and Central Bank Independence 2
3. Macroprudential Supervision 2
a) Macroprudential Supervision – A Description 2
b) Macroprudential Supervision and Central Bank Independence 2
VII. Conclusions 2
References 3

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