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Doping und Wettbewerbsintensität
Dilger, Alexander | Tolsdorf, Frank
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 130 (2010), Iss. 1 : pp. 95–115
4 Citations (CrossRef)
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Alexander Dilger, Westfälische Wilhelms-Universität Münster, Institut für Ökonomische Bildung und Centrum für Management, Scharnhorststraße 100, 48151 Münster.
Frank Tolsdorf, Fakultät für Zahn-, Mund- und Kieferheilkunde, Zahnklinik Private Universität Witten / Herdecke gGmbH, Alfred-Herrhausen-Straße 45, 58448 Witten.
Cited By
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Doping in Teams: A Simple Decision Theoretic Model
Dilger, Alexander
SSRN Electronic Journal , Vol. (2017), Iss.
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3036903 [Citations: 0] -
Sport in Kultur und Gesellschaft
Ökonomische Theorien des Doping-Phänomens
Emrich, Eike | Meyer, Tim | Pierdzioch, Christian2018
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53385-7_7-1 [Citations: 0] -
Sport in Kultur und Gesellschaft
Ökonomische Theorien des Doping-Phänomens
Emrich, Eike | Meyer, Tim | Pierdzioch, Christian2021
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-53407-6_7 [Citations: 0] -
Erfolg(+)reich und verdorben?
Frenger, Monika | Pitsch, Werner | Emrich, EikeSportwissenschaft, Vol. 42 (2012), Iss. 3 P.188
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12662-012-0262-8 [Citations: 10]
Abstract
There are systematic incentives to dope within the structure of sports tournaments. A simple decision theory model demonstrates the nature of these incentives and the circumstances in which they are particularly strong. From this model, some empirically testable hypotheses are derived. The most important one, that greater competition between athletes induces more doping, is corroborated by comparing the competitiveness and number of caught dopers in thirteen different athletic sports. The lack of other significant findings may be explained by the decisive role of competitiveness which is more powerful than all other effects and is also a central element of them.
Received: May 10, 2009
Accepted: November 26, 2009