May There be a Legal Obligation to Engage in Principled Disobedience?
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Style
Format
May There be a Legal Obligation to Engage in Principled Disobedience?
Jahrbuch Recht und Ethik, Vol. 31(2023), Iss. 1 : pp. 75–92
Additional Information
Article Details
Pricing
Author Details
Stefano Bertea
Abstract
May There be a Legal Obligation to Engage in Principled Disobedience?
With this text I would like to contribute to the debate about the status and the legitimacy of principal disobedience in a democratic society. After the introduction of this term, I argue for the fact that principles of disobedience can be presented not only as a moral and political attitude, but also as a legal obligation. As a result, I represent that we can not only violate the law against the law without necessarily violating our legal obligations, but also that legal obligations can even prescribe fundamental disobedience. With this framework of the problem of principal broken law, the discussion is expanded to include a new position, according to which we can not only have a moral justification to disregard the law, but also a legal obligation to break the law for fundamental reasons.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Stefano Bertea: May There be a Legal Obligation to Engage in Principled Disobedience? | 75 | ||
| I. Introduction | 75 | ||
| 1. The Idea of Principled Disobedience | 76 | ||
| 2. Paradigm-oriented Approach | 77 | ||
| 3. Wide Understanding of Ethics | 78 | ||
| II. Introducing the Revisionary Kantian Account | 80 | ||
| III. Principled Disobedience as a Requirement of Law | 81 | ||
| IV. Family Resemblances and Conceptual Affinities | 86 | ||
| V. Conclusion | 90 | ||
| Zusammenfassung | 92 |