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Gros, D. Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 45(4), 489-499. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.489
Gros, Daniel "Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 45.4, 2012, 489-499. https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.489
Gros, Daniel (2012): Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 45, iss. 4, 489-499, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/kuk.45.4.489

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Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System

Gros, Daniel

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 45 (2012), Iss. 4 : pp. 489–499

7 Citations (CrossRef)

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Prof. Dr. Daniel Gros, The Centre for European Policy Studies CEPS, 1 Place du Congrès, B-1000 Brussels.

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Abstract

Principles of a Two-Tier European Deposit (Re-)Insurance System

There is general agreement that banking supervision and resolution have to be organised at the same level. It is often argued, however, that there is no need to tackle deposit insurance because it is politically too sensitive.

This note proposes to apply the principles of subsidiarity and re-insurance to deposit insurance: Existing national deposit guarantee schemes (DGSs) would continue to operate much as before (with only minimal standards set by an EU directive), but they would be required to take out re-insurance against risks that would be too large to be covered by them. A European Reinsurance Fund (EReIF) would provide this reinsurance financed by premia paid by the national DGSs, just as any reinsurance company does in the private sector. The European Fund would pay out only in case of large losses. This ’deductible" would provide the national authorities with the proper incentives, but the reinsurance cover would stabilize depositor confidence even in the case of large shocks.

It will of course take time to build up the funding for such a reinsurance fund. This approach is thus not meant to deal with legacy problems from the current crisis. (G21, G28, G32)