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Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence

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Giocoli, N. Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 137(4), 331-370. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.137.4.331
Giocoli, Nicola "Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 137.4, 2017, 331-370. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.137.4.331
Giocoli, Nicola (2017): Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 137, iss. 4, 331-370, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.137.4.331

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Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence

Giocoli, Nicola

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 137 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 331–370

3 Citations (CrossRef)

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Nicola Giocoli, Department of Law, University of Pisa, Via Collegio Ricci 10, 56126 Pisa, Italy.

Cited By

  1. Neither Populist Nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust

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    SSRN Electronic Journal , Vol. (2018), Iss.

    https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3199703 [Citations: 0]
  2. Neither Populist nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust Law

    Giocoli, Nicola

    History of Political Economy, Vol. 56 (2024), Iss. 5 P.805

    https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-11330101 [Citations: 0]
  3. Beyond trust: why American classical jurists and economists could not love the corporation

    Giocoli, Nicola

    The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol. 30 (2023), Iss. 3 P.369

    https://doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2023.2190599 [Citations: 0]

Abstract

This paper deals with the famous Lochner v. New York (1905) decision from the perspective of the history of economic thought. In »Lochner« the Supreme Court affirmed freedom of contract as a substantive constitutional right. It is argued that, in writing for the majority, Justice Rufus W. Peckham was heavily influenced by classical political economy. Not, however, in the trivial sense of endorsing pure laissez faire, but in the deeper sense of applying Adam Smith’s recipe for building a “system of natural liberty”, viz., a social order founded on justice, private property, and free competition. My interpretation is validated by looking at the economic content of Peckham’s jurisprudence as a judge in the New York Court of Appeals.