Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence
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Elevating Competition: Classical Political Economy in Justice Peckham's Jurisprudence
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 137 (2017), Iss. 4 : pp. 331–370
3 Citations (CrossRef)
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Nicola Giocoli, Department of Law, University of Pisa, Via Collegio Ricci 10, 56126 Pisa, Italy.
Cited By
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Neither Populist nor Neoclassical: The Classical Roots of the Competition Principle in American Antitrust Law
Giocoli, Nicola
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https://doi.org/10.1215/00182702-11330101 [Citations: 0] -
Beyond trust: why American classical jurists and economists could not love the corporation
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The European Journal of the History of Economic Thought, Vol. 30 (2023), Iss. 3 P.369
https://doi.org/10.1080/09672567.2023.2190599 [Citations: 0]
Abstract
This paper deals with the famous Lochner v. New York (1905) decision from the perspective of the history of economic thought. In »Lochner« the Supreme Court affirmed freedom of contract as a substantive constitutional right. It is argued that, in writing for the majority, Justice Rufus W. Peckham was heavily influenced by classical political economy. Not, however, in the trivial sense of endorsing pure laissez faire, but in the deeper sense of applying Adam Smith’s recipe for building a “system of natural liberty”, viz., a social order founded on justice, private property, and free competition. My interpretation is validated by looking at the economic content of Peckham’s jurisprudence as a judge in the New York Court of Appeals.