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Schackmann-Fallis, K., Weiss, M. Post-financial crisis times: Only a short phase of re-intermediation and re-direction to boring banking business models? Regulatory burden, fintech competition and concentration processes. Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, 87(4), 87-117. https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.87.4.87
Schackmann-Fallis, Karl-Peter and Weiss, Mirko "Post-financial crisis times: Only a short phase of re-intermediation and re-direction to boring banking business models? Regulatory burden, fintech competition and concentration processes" Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 87.4, , 87-117. https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.87.4.87
Schackmann-Fallis, Karl-Peter/Weiss, Mirko: Post-financial crisis times: Only a short phase of re-intermediation and re-direction to boring banking business models? Regulatory burden, fintech competition and concentration processes, in: Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, vol. 87, iss. 4, 87-117, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.87.4.87
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Post-financial crisis times: Only a short phase of re-intermediation and re-direction to boring banking business models? Regulatory burden, fintech competition and concentration processes

Schackmann-Fallis, Karl-Peter | Weiss, Mirko

Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung, Vol. 87 (2018), Iss. 4 : pp. 87–117

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Duncker & Humblot
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https://doi.org/10.3790/vjh.87.4.87
Language
German
Pages
31
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Author Details

Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallis, Deutscher Sparkassen- & Giroverband (German Savings Banks Association, DSGV).

  • Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallis, Dr, has been an Executive Member of the Board of the German Savings Banks Association (DSGV) since November 2004, with responsibility for the economics, politics and banking management division. Prior to this, he was Secretary of State for Finance in both Brandenburg and Saxony-Anhalt. After completing his PhD in Economics, he began his career at Germany’s Federal Ministry of Economics. As well as his responsibilities on the Board of the DSGV, Dr Schackmann-Fallis holds a number of other posts, including Chairman of the Supervisory Board of S-Rating GmbH, Managing Director of the Savings Banks Protection Scheme and Member of the Board of Administration as well as of the Risk and Credit Committee of the Landesbank Hessen-Thüringen. Since 2004 he has been a Member of the Advisory Board of the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and since September 2015 a Member of the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC).
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Mirko Weiß, Deutscher Sparkassen- & Giroverband (German Savings Banks Association, DSGV).

  • Mirko Weiß, Dr, studied economics at Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg and Macquarie University Sydney; scholarship holder of the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. 2009 Doctorate (Dr. rer. pol.) at the Faculty of Economics of the Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg (Dissertation: Zur Geldpolitik im Eurowährungsraum – Beschreibung, Auswirkung und Ursachenanalyse von Inflationsunterschieden). Since 2008 advisor at the Deutscher Sparkassenund Giroverband (DSGV) in the field of “Sparkassen Policy, Banking Regulation, Deposit Insurance”. He is also lecturer at the Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg in the economic master programme, a member of the Managerkreises der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and member of the selection committee for the promotion of gifted students at the Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes. Various German and English publications in the fields of structural issues of banking and financial markets, banking regulation, monetary policy and fiscal federalism.
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Cited By

  1. The double bottom line of savings banks and credit cooperatives – Insights into lived practice

    Burgstaller, Johann | Dietl, Katharina | Stötzer, Sandra

    Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, Vol. 74 (2024), Iss. 1 P.17

    https://doi.org/10.1515/zfgg-2024-0002 [Citations: 0]

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    Dietl, Katharina | Pernsteiner, Helmut

    Zeitschrift für das gesamte Genossenschaftswesen, Vol. 72 (2022), Iss. 1 P.64

    https://doi.org/10.1515/zfgg-2022-0004 [Citations: 1]

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Abstract

Zusammenfassung: Die Analyse beleuchtet die Aspekte diversifizierter Marktstrukturen sowie regional ausgerichteter Geschäftsmodelle als vorteilhaft für Finanzstabilität. Heterogenität schützt vor gleichgerichtetem Marktverhalten. Regionale Kreditinstitute können das Problem asymmetrischer Informationen besser überwinden, insbesondere bei der Kreditvergabe an KMU. Darüber hinaus sind weitere gesellschaftspolitische Aspekte in die Bewertung einzubeziehen: finanzielle Einbindung, Präsenz in ländlichen Gebieten und der Abbau regionaler Disparitäten. Die umfangreiche Regulierung und Europäisierung der Aufsicht – bislang unter Vernachlässigung von Unterschieden im Risikoprofil und Institutsgrößen – erzwang jedoch eine höhere Mindestinstitutsgröße, was zu einem umfassenden Fusionstrend führte, der insbesondere kleinere und regional ausgerichtete Kreditinstitute negativ traf. Es scheint daher, dass der Prozess der Re-Intermediation und Wiederausrichtung des Bankgeschäfts auf einlagenbasierte Kreditvergabe, der nach der Finanzmarktkrise zu beobachten war, nur kurz währte. In Bezug auf jüngere Entwicklungen argumentieren wir, dass FinTech-Anwendungen vorhandene Bank- und Finanzdienstleistungen ergänzen, aber nicht ersetzen werden. Wir warnen jedoch vor bestehenden Regelungslücken und Möglichkeiten regulatorischer Arbitrage für FinTech-Anwendungen und BigTech-Ansätze

Summary: The analysis highlights the aspects of diversified market structures and of local, low-distance banking as advantageous for financial stability. Heterogeneity protects from uniform market behaviour. Local banking can better overcome the problem of asymmetric information, particular in SME lending. Moreover, connections to other socio-political aspects must be factored into the assessment: financial inclusion, presence in rural areas, and depletion of regional disparities. The vast regulation and Europeanisation of supervision, however,—so far neglecting differences in risk profiles and bank sizes—have imposed a higher minimum business size, which led to an extensive merger trend, especially negatively affecting smaller and regionally focussed credit institutions. So it seems that the process of re-intermediation and re-directing banking business back to deposit-based lending, taken place in the aftermath of the financial crisis, was of short length only. Regarding recent developments, we argue that FinTech applications are expected to complement, not to replace, existing banking and financial services. However, we warn against existing regulatory loopholes and regulatory arbitrage for FinTech applications and BigTech approaches.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Karl-Peter Schackmann-Fallis and Mirko Weiss: Post-financial crisis times: Only a short phase of re-intermediationand re-direction to boring banking business models? Regulatory burden, fintech competition and concentration processes 1
Summary 1
Zusammenfassung 1
Introduction: Prospects of a comeback of intermediation and “Boring Banking” in the light of recent regulation and financial innovations 2
1 Disintermediation: Consequences of doing without traditionalbanking services 4
1.1 How disintermediation was to overcome banking risks—and failed 4
1.2 Disintermediation and the crisis 5
1.3 Credit intermediation: Reduction of information asymmetry and moral hazard 6
2 Banking market structure: SME lending, regional disparity andsocial infrastructure 7
2.1 Local banking: First-hand, nonstandard information and regional resources 7
2.2 Lending policy of foreign banks during the crisis 9
2.3 Local banking: reduction of regional disparity, provision of infrastructure and structure of real economy 1
3 Regional elements in Germany’s banking market 1
3.1 Public-law credit institutions and the idea of a financial services network 1
3.2 Preference of long-term borrowing 1
3.3 Profitability of “boring” business models 1
4 Fintechs: Business strategies and the need for regulatory action 1
4.1 Fintechs and digitalization in the financial market 1
4.2 Impact on incumbent competitors and intermediation ties 1
4.3 Prudential treatment of fintechs 1
Adherence to the principle of same risk, same rules 1
Crowdfunding: Questionable leapfrog strategy 1
Need for transparency in brokering processes/information privacy/addressing cyber risks 1
In-depth analysis of risks to financial stability 2
Exemption from fees distorts competition 2
Cryptocurrencies: Prone to laundering, speculative and bad for the economy 2
5 Conclusion and economic policy implications 2
References 2

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