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von Hagen, JHarden, I (2019). Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 52(4), 527-536. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.4.527
von Hagen, Jürgen Harden, Ian J.von Hagen, Jürgen Harden, Ian J. (2019). "Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 52no. 4, 2019 pp. 527-536. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.4.527
von Hagen, JHarden, I (2019). Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 52 (Issue 4), pp 527-536. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.52.4.527

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Budget Processes and Commitment to Fiscal Discipline

von Hagen, Jürgen | Harden, Ian J.

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 52 (2019), Iss. 4 : pp. 527–536

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Article Details

Author Details

Prof. Dr. Jürgen von Hagen, University of Bonn, Institute for International Economic Policy, Lennèstraße 37, D-53113 Bonn

Prof. Dr. Ian J. Harden, University of Sheffield, School of Law, Western Bank, Sheffield S10 2TN, UK

References

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  2. Baron, D. P. (1991): Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control. American Journal of Political Science 35, pp. 57–90.  Google Scholar
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  6. von Hagen, J. and Harden, I. J. (1994): National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance, European Economy, forthcoming.  Google Scholar
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  8. Banks, J. S. (1991): Signaling Games in Political Science (Harwood Academic Publishers, Chur).  Google Scholar
  9. Baron, D. P. (1991): Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs and Procedural Control. American Journal of Political Science 35, pp. 57–90.  Google Scholar
  10. Myerson, R. B.: Negotiation in Games: A Theoretical Overview, Mimeo.  Google Scholar
  11. Olson, M. (1965): The Logic of Collective Action (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA).  Google Scholar
  12. von Hagen, J. (1992): Budgeting Procedures and Fiscal Performance in the EC, Economic Papers 96 (European Commissions, Brussels).  Google Scholar
  13. von Hagen, J. and Harden, I. J. (1994): National Budget Processes and Fiscal Performance, European Economy, forthcoming.  Google Scholar
  14. Wildavsky, A. (1975): Budgeting (Transaction Publishers, Oxford).  Google Scholar

Abstract

We present a framework of investigation into the political economy of the budget process. Our model suggests that institutional rules governing the budget process can be found to limit the importance of fiscal illusion. Empirical evidence supports that proposition. The choice of rules depends on the political environment as well as the dominant source of uncertainty in the budget process.