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Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: Implications of Country-specific Financial Frictions

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Michaelis, J., Palek, J. Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: Implications of Country-specific Financial Frictions. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 49(1), 1-36. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.1.1
Michaelis, Jochen and Palek, Jakob "Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: Implications of Country-specific Financial Frictions" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 49.1, 2016, 1-36. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.1.1
Michaelis, Jochen/Palek, Jakob (2016): Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: Implications of Country-specific Financial Frictions, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 49, iss. 1, 1-36, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.1.1

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Optimal Monetary Policy in a Currency Union: Implications of Country-specific Financial Frictions

Michaelis, Jochen | Palek, Jakob

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 49 (2016), Iss. 1 : pp. 1–36

2 Citations (CrossRef)

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Prof. Dr. Jochen Michaelis, University of Kassel, Department of Economics, Nora-Platiel-Str. 4, D-34127 Kassel, Germany, Tel.: + 49 (0) 561-804-3562, Fax: + 49 (0) 561-804-3083

Dr. Jakob Palek, University of Kassel, Department of Economics, Nora-Platiel-Str. 4, D-34127 Kassel, Germany, Tel.: + 49 (0) 561-804-3085

Cited By

  1. Financial frictions and optimal stabilization policy in a monetary union

    Palek, Jakob | Schwanebeck, Benjamin

    Economic Modelling, Vol. 61 (2017), Iss. P.462

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.024 [Citations: 9]
  2. Optimal monetary and macroprudential policy in a currency union

    Palek, Jakob | Schwanebeck, Benjamin

    Journal of International Money and Finance, Vol. 93 (2019), Iss. P.167

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2019.01.008 [Citations: 8]

Abstract

There is growing empirical evidence that the strength of financial frictions differs across countries. Using the cost channel approach, we show how the introduction of (country-specific) financial frictions alters the optimal monetary responses to union-wide and national non-financial shocks in a New Keynesian model of a two-country monetary union. By causing a cost-push effect on inflation, financial frictions make monetary policy less effective in combating inflation. We show that the optimal response to the decline in effectiveness is a stronger use of the interest-rate instrument. On the other hand, the larger the differential of financial frictions across member states, the less aggressive will the optimal monetary policy be. For almost all parameter constellations, our welfare analysis suggests a clear-cut ranking of policy regimes: commitment outperforms the Taylor rule, the Taylor rule outperforms strict inflation targeting, and strict inflation targeting outperforms discretion.