Menu Expand



Davy, U. Einbürgerung in Deutschland – blinde Flecken in einem Rechtsstaat. Die Verwaltung, 41(1), 31-62.
Davy, Ulrike "Einbürgerung in Deutschland – blinde Flecken in einem Rechtsstaat" Die Verwaltung 41.1, , 31-62.
Davy, Ulrike: Einbürgerung in Deutschland – blinde Flecken in einem Rechtsstaat, in: Die Verwaltung, vol. 41, iss. 1, 31-62, [online]


Einbürgerung in Deutschland – blinde Flecken in einem Rechtsstaat

Davy, Ulrike

Die Verwaltung, Vol. 41 (2008), Iss. 1 : pp. 31–62

3 Citations (CrossRef)

Additional Information

Article Details


Author Details


Cited By

  1. Bildungsverlierer

    Die Wiederkehr des funktionalen Analphabetismus in Zeiten wissensgesellschaftlichen Wandels

    Bittlingmayer, Uwe H. | Drucks, Stephan | Gerdes, Jürgen | Bauer, Ullrich

    2010 [Citations: 6]
  2. Deserving citizenship in Germany and The Netherlands. Citizenship tests in liberal democracies

    van Oers, Ricky

    Ethnicities, Vol. 21 (2021), Iss. 2 P.271 [Citations: 3]
  3. Handbuch Bildungsarmut

    Gesellschaftspoltische Determinanten von Teilhabe am Beispiel des „funktionalen Analphabetismus“

    Drucks, Stephan | Bittlingmayer, Uwe H. | Bauer, Ullrich | Gerdes, Jürgen

    2019 [Citations: 1]


Recent changes to German nationality law introduced the terms ‘actively supporting‘ and ‘demanding‘, which are particularly relevant to new language requirements. The government is willing to provide integration and language courses. In turn, immigrants are expected to learn German and are barred from naturalisation if they fail. This article contends that nationality law and practice do not always correspond to the principles of foreseeability and clarity laid down in the German Constitution. The author gives three examples to make her point. The first example relates to the language requirements as a condition for naturalisation. The exact meaning of these requirements has been in dispute for almost a decade, leaving immigrants in a rather precarious situation. It is unclear whether candidates for citizenship must only be able to conduct a conversation in German or whether they must be able to read and understand a given text or, possibly, produce a text in German. The second example concerns the revocation of citizenship. It is clear that German immigration law generally requires aliens to be truthful when communicating with administrative or judicial authorities. If and when deception is uncovered, citizenship may be revoked. Yet for 20 years, the courts were divided as to whether citizenship could be revoked if German nationality was acquired by some act deception. Finally, in 2006, the Federal Constitutional Court settled the dispute. Revocation was held to be in accordance with the German Constitution, but statutory law left too many questions open. Parliament has not yet acted to clarify the law. The third example deals with refugees. German nationality law generally requires that applicants renounce their former nationality before acquiring German nationality. While a special statutory provision explicitly exempts refugees from this requirement, courts tend to find ways to undermine their privilege. Taken together, these examples indicate that time and again courts use nationality law as an instrument to further a political agenda believed to be of overriding importance.