Reforming the Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures in Banking Regulation
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Reforming the Regulatory Treatment of Sovereign Exposures in Banking Regulation
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 53 (2020), Iss. 1 : pp. 81–122
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Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Department of Economics, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf, Germany
Cited By
-
Banking Regulation and Sovereign Default Risk: How Regulation Undermines Rules
Hülsewig, Oliver
Steinbach, Armin
(2024)
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4889238 [Citations: 0]
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Gros, D. (2013): Banking union with a sovereign virus. Intereconomics 48 (2), 93–97.
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Klose, J./Weigert, B. (2014): Sovereign yield spreads during the euro crisis: Fundamental factors versus redenomination risk. International Finance 17 (1), 25–50.
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Lanotte, M./Manzelli, G./Rinaldi, A. M./Taboga, M./Tommasino, P. (2016): Easier said than done? Reforming the prudential treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures. European Economy (1), 73–104.
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Schneider, Y./Steffen, S. (2018): Feasibility check: transition to a new regime for bank sovereign exposure? Study provided at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, European Parliament.
Google Scholar -
Weidmann, J. (2016): Dinner speech at the 6th Frankfurt Finance Summit, Frankfurt Main, May 11th. Available at https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/speeches/dinner-speech-667106. Accessed: 2018-09-03.
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Zettelmeyer, J./Trebesch, C./Gulati, M. (2013): The Greek debt restructuring: An autopsy. Economic Policy 28(75), 513–563.
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Abad, J. (2018): Breaking the feedback loop: Macroprudential regulation of banks’ sovereign exposures. mimeo.
Google Scholar -
Acharya, V. V./Rajan, R. G. (2013): Sovereign debt, government myopia, and the financial sector. The Review of Financial Studies 26 (6), 1526–1560.
Google Scholar -
Acharya, V. V./Steffen, S. (2015): The “greatest” carry trade ever? Understanding eurozone bank risks. Journal of Financial Economics 115 (2), 215–236.
Google Scholar -
Adrian, T./Shin, H. S. (2010): Liquidity and leverage. Journal of Financial Intermediation 19 (3), 418–437.
Google Scholar -
Alesina, A./de Broeck, M./Prati, A./Tabellini, G. (1992): Default risk on government debt in OECD countries. Economic Policy 7 (15), 427–463.
Google Scholar -
Alogoskoufis, S./Langfield, S. (2018): Regulating the doom loop. ESRB Working Paper Series No. 74, European Systemic Risk Board.
Google Scholar -
Andritzky, J./Gadatsch, N./Körner, T./Schäfer, A./Schnabel, I. (2016): Removing privileges for banks’ sovereign exposures – a proposal. European Economy (1), 139–153.
Google Scholar -
Ari, A. (2016): Sovereign risk and bank risk-taking. ECB Working Paper, No. 1894, European Central Bank.
Google Scholar -
Barrios, S./Iversen, P./Lewandowska, M./Setzer, R. (2009): Determinants of intra-euro area government bond spreads during the financial crisis. Economic Papers, No. 388, European Commission.
Google Scholar -
Baum, C. F./Schäfer, D./Stephan, A. (2016): Credit rating agency downgrades and the eurozone sovereign debt crises. Journal of Financial Stability 24, 117–131.
Google Scholar -
Bayer, C./Kim, C./Kriwoluzky, A. (2018): The term structure of redenomination risk. DIW Discussion Papers No. 1740, Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2006): International convergence of capital measurement and capital standards: A revised framework – comprehensive version. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2010): Basel III: A global regulatory framework for more resilient banks and banking systems. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2013): Basel III: The liquidity coverage ratio and liquidity risk monitoring. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2014a): Basel III leverage ratio framework and disclosure requirements. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2014b): Basel III: The net stable funding ratio. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2014c): Supervisory framework for measuring and controlling large exposures. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2017): The regulatory treatment of sovereign exposures. Discussion Paper, Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
BCBS (2018): Basel III monitoring report. Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
Becker, B./Ivashina, V. (2017): Financial repression in the European sovereign debt crisis. Review of Finance 22 (1), 83–115.
Google Scholar -
Bolton, P./Jeanne, O. (2011): Sovereign default risk and bank fragility in financially integrated economies. IMF Economic Review 59 (2), 162–194.
Google Scholar -
Bonner, C. (2016): Preferential regulatory treatment and banks’ demand for government bonds. Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 48 (6), 1195–1221.
Google Scholar -
Broner, F./Erce, A./Martin, A./Ventura, J. (2014): Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Journal of Monetary Economics 61, 114–142.
Google Scholar -
Bundesverfassungsgericht (2016): Constitutional complaints and Organstreit proceedings against the OMT programme of the European Central Bank unsuccessful. Press release No. 34/2016 of 21 June 2016.
Google Scholar -
Buschmann, C./Schmaltz, C. (2017): Sovereign collateral as a trojan horse: Why do we need an LCR+. Journal of Financial Stability 33, 311–330.
Google Scholar -
CGFS (2011): The impact of sovereign credit risk on bank funding conditions. CGFS Papers, No. 43, Bank for International Settlements.
Google Scholar -
Chari, V. V./Dovis, A./Kehoe. P. J. (2014): On the optimality of financial repression. mimeo.
Google Scholar -
Court of Justice of the European Union (2018): The ECS’s PSPP programme for the purchase of government bonds on secondary markets does not infringe EU law. Press release No. 192/18 of 11 December 2018.
Google Scholar -
Damodaran, A. (2010): Into the abyss: What if nothing is risk free? mimeo.
Google Scholar -
Das, U. S./Papaioannou, M. G./Trebesch, C. (2012): Sovereign debt restructurings 1950–2010: Literature survey, data, and stylized facts. IMF Working Paper, No. WP/12/203, International Monetary Fund.
Google Scholar -
De Marco, F./Macchiavelli, M. (2016): The political origin of home bias: The case of Europe. Finance and Economics Discussion Series, No. 2016-060, Federal Reserve System.
Google Scholar -
Di Cesare, A./Grande, A./Manna, M./Taboga, M. (2012): Recent estimates of sovereign risk premia for euro-area countries. Occasional Paper, No. 128, Banca D’Italia.
Google Scholar -
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Google Scholar -
ECB (2010): ECB announces change in eligibility of debt instruments issued or guaranteed by the Greek government. Available at https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/pr/date/2010/html/pr100503.en.html. Press Release, Accessed: 2018-12-18.
Google Scholar -
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Google Scholar -
Gennaioli, N./Martin, A./Rossi, S. (2014): Sovereign default, domestic banks, and financial institutions. The Journal of Finance 69 (2), 819–866.
Google Scholar -
German Council of Economic Experts (2015): Economic policy: Focus on future viability. Annual Report 2015/2016.
Google Scholar -
Gros, D. (2013): Banking union with a sovereign virus. Intereconomics 48 (2), 93–97.
Google Scholar -
Klose, J./Weigert, B. (2014): Sovereign yield spreads during the euro crisis: Fundamental factors versus redenomination risk. International Finance 17 (1), 25–50.
Google Scholar -
Lanotte, M./Manzelli, G./Rinaldi, A. M./Taboga, M./Tommasino, P. (2016): Easier said than done? Reforming the prudential treatment of banks’ sovereign exposures. European Economy (1), 73–104.
Google Scholar -
Lenarcic, A./Mevis, D./Siklós, D. (2016): Tackling sovereign risk in European banks. Discussion Paper Series, No. 1, European Stability Mechanism.
Google Scholar -
Matthes, D./Rocholl, J. (2017): Breaking the doom loop: The euro zone basket. ESMP White Paper, No. WP-17-01, ESMT European School of Management and Technology.
Google Scholar -
Neyer, U./Sterzel, A. (2017): Capital requirements for government bonds – Implications for bank behaviour and financial stability. DICE Discussion Paper, No. 275, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.
Google Scholar -
Neyer, U./Sterzel, A. (2018): Preferential treatment of government bonds in liquidity regulation – Implications for bank behaviour and financial stability. DICE Discussion Paper, No. 301, Heinrich-Heine-Universität Düsseldorf.
Google Scholar -
Pepino, S. (2015): Sovereign risk and financial crisis: The international political economy of the eurozone. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
Google Scholar -
Reinhart, C. M./Rogoff, K. S. (2010): This time is different: Eight centuries of financial folly. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Google Scholar -
Schneider, Y./Steffen, S. (2018): Feasibility check: transition to a new regime for bank sovereign exposure? Study provided at the request of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee, European Parliament.
Google Scholar -
Weidmann, J. (2016): Dinner speech at the 6th Frankfurt Finance Summit, Frankfurt Main, May 11th. Available at https://www.bundesbank.de/en/press/speeches/dinner-speech-667106. Accessed: 2018-09-03.
Google Scholar -
Zettelmeyer, J./Trebesch, C./Gulati, M. (2013): The Greek debt restructuring: An autopsy. Economic Policy 28(75), 513–563.
Google Scholar
Abstract
The European sovereign debt crisis has shown the tight linkage between sovereign and bank balance sheets. In the aftermath of the crisis, several reforms have been discussed in order to mitigate the sovereign-bank nexus. These reforms include the abolishment of preferential government bond treatment in banking regulation. This paper gives a detailed overview of literature and data which are closely related to the existing preferential sovereign bond treatment in bank regulation and highlights the need for reforms especially in the euro area. Against this background, the following three regulatory reforms are described and discussed: (i) positive risk weights for government bonds in bank capital regulation, (ii) sovereign exposure limits, and (iii) haircuts for government bonds in bank liquidity regulation. The discussion focusses on the effects of these reforms for bank behaviour and financial stability.