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Durchleitungsexternalitäten der gemeinsamen Netznutzung in der Trinkwasserversorgung

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Rüttgers, C., Schwarz, C. Durchleitungsexternalitäten der gemeinsamen Netznutzung in der Trinkwasserversorgung. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 130(1), 71-94. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.130.1.71
Rüttgers, Christian and Schwarz, Christian "Durchleitungsexternalitäten der gemeinsamen Netznutzung in der Trinkwasserversorgung" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 130.1, 2010, 71-94. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.130.1.71
Rüttgers, Christian/Schwarz, Christian (2010): Durchleitungsexternalitäten der gemeinsamen Netznutzung in der Trinkwasserversorgung, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 130, iss. 1, 71-94, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.130.1.71

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Durchleitungsexternalitäten der gemeinsamen Netznutzung in der Trinkwasserversorgung

Rüttgers, Christian | Schwarz, Christian

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 130 (2010), Iss. 1 : pp. 71–94

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Author Details

Christian Rüttgers, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management, Lotharstraße 65, 47057 Duisburg.

Christian Schwarz, Universität Duisburg-Essen, Mercator School of Management, Lotharstraße 65, 47057 Duisburg.

Cited By

  1. Limited time commitment: Does competition for providing scarce products always improve the supplies?

    Kogan, Konstantin

    European Journal of Operational Research, Vol. 288 (2021), Iss. 2 P.408

    https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.05.052 [Citations: 4]

Abstract

This paper highlights the following unique characteristic of the piped water market: Consider two firms that supply different water qualities into the same net. The mixed water quality of both firms defines the fixed costs of the net. These costs decrease with a higher water quality. Our model uses monopoly and Cournot duopoly to examine the effects of increasing competition in the water market with common carriage. We show under the assumptions of our model that increasing competition decreases prices, lowers the water quality and increases welfare surplus. Nevertheless, a decrease in the water quality does not imply that deregulation of the water market is impossible. Even if the water quality is held exogenously constant increasing competition leads to an increase in welfare.

Received: August 20, 2008

Accepted: May 15, 2009