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Meyer, S (2019). Verpflichtungsklage und Verwaltungsermessen. Die Verwaltung, 52(4), 501-528. https://doi.org/10.3790/verw.52.4.501
Meyer, Stephan (2019). "Verpflichtungsklage und Verwaltungsermessen" Die Verwaltung, vol. 52no. 4, 2019 pp. 501-528. https://doi.org/10.3790/verw.52.4.501
Meyer, S (2019). Verpflichtungsklage und Verwaltungsermessen. Die Verwaltung, Vol. 52 (Issue 4), pp 501-528. https://doi.org/10.3790/verw.52.4.501

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Verpflichtungsklage und Verwaltungsermessen

§ 113 Absatz 5 und § 114 Satz 1 VwGO - Versuch einer Rehabilitation

Meyer, Stephan

Die Verwaltung, Vol. 52 (2019), Iss. 4 : pp. 501–528

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Stephan Meyer, Erfurt/Wildau

Abstract

Enforcement action doctrine has been plagued by considerable controversy from the very beginning. In particular, the term “rejection of the administrative act” in Section 113 Paragraph 5 First Sentence VwGO is deemed incompatible with enforcement action‘s purpose, for the administrative authority’s decision to reject the desired act is not the very matter under judicial review. Rather, the court is required to only determine whether the nonexistence of the desired act is unlawful (and whether plaintiff has a right to the act) - irrespective of any express rejection by an administrative authority. Section 114 First Sentence VwGO precipitates further unease. While allegedly devised to curtail courts’ authority to review exercise of discretion, its wording suggests quite the opposite (“also reviews…” instead of “only reviews…”).

However, legislator’s choice of words should be taken at face value to the extent possible. The article therefore explores a textual interpretation that seeks to better reconcile statutory wording and doctrine.

While the term “rejection” signifies that the continued nonexistence of the desired administrative act has been individuated thru the administrative authority’s decision, the term does nevertheless refer to the continued nonexistence itself, and not to the authority’s rejection of the act. In order to apply this finding to cases where the desired administrative act is at the authority’s discretion, the reason for the unlawfulness of the “rejection” requires specification. Before issuing the administrative act with which the act desired by the claimant is rejected, the authority needs to devise an individual rule on how to exercise discretion in the case at hand. If this individual rule does not conform to the purposes of the statutory provision that grants discretion, then it is void.

The wording of Section 114 First Sentence VwGO (“also reviews…”) clarifies that the court’s authority extends to reviewing validity of the individual rule.

The article concludes with a look at the results’ relevance for action to rescind an administrative act, and for administrative discretion doctrine in general.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Stephan Meyer, Verpflichtungsklage und Verwaltungsermessen 501
§ 113 Absatz 5 und § 114 Satz 1 VwGO – Versuch einer Rehabilitation 501
I. Der Begriff der Ablehnung in § 113 Absatz 5 Satz 1 VwGO 502
1. Ausgangslage 502
2. Regelungsgehalt des ablehnenden Bescheides 503
3. Folge für das Verständnis des Begriffes „Ablehnung” 504
II. Die Rechtswidrigkeit einer ermessensfehlerhaften Ablehnung 505
1. Ausgangslage 505
2. Entstehungsgeschichte des § 114 Satz 1 VwGO 508
3. Zur Rechtsnatur behördlicher Ermessensausübung 501
III. Begründung der Rechtswidrigkeit der Ablehnung und gerichtlicher Prüfungsumfang 501
1. Rechtswidrigkeit 501
2. Prüfungsumfang 501
3. Untätigkeitsklage und § 114 Satz 1 VwGO 502
4. Inkurs: Zeitpunkt des Rechtswidrigwerdens 502
IV. Bedeutung des Ergebnisses für die Anfechtungsklage und für die Dogmatik des Verwaltungsermessens 502
V. Fazit 502
Abstract 502