Endogenous Power and Crises of the Liberal Order
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Endogenous Power and Crises of the Liberal Order
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 139 (2019), Iss. 2–4 : pp. 385–406
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Sturn, Richard, Institute of Public Economics and Schumpeter Centre, University of Graz, Universitätsstr. 15, 8010 Graz, Austria.
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Abstract
The liberal order is conceptualized as an artificial public good of higher order associated with nondiscriminatory provision of first-order public goods such as security and stability of possession. Problems of the liberal order and of liberalism as a political force are explained as a combined result of political challenges endogenously emerging in the economic sphere (including modern phenomena such as incomplete contracts, network externalities, and asymmetries specifically relevant in the digital economy), intertwined with problematic political reactions. There is no robust algorithm for coping with ensuing vicious circles of economic power and shadow politics, due to the intricacies of institutional adaptations required for maintaining the basic architecture of the liberal order under changing circumstances. Conclusions are offered with regard to current challenges of protectionist populism.