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Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order

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Freytag, A., Schnabl, G. Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 50(2), 151-169. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.2.151
Freytag, Andreas and Schnabl, Gunther "Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 50.2, 2017, 151-169. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.2.151
Freytag, Andreas/Schnabl, Gunther (2017): Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 50, iss. 2, 151-169, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.50.2.151

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Monetary Policy Crisis Management as a Threat to Economic Order

Freytag, Andreas | Schnabl, Gunther

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 50 (2017), Iss. 2 : pp. 151–169

9 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Author Details

Andreas Freytag, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena / Stellenbosch University, CESifo Research Network

Gunther Schnabl, University of Leipzig, CESifo Research Network

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  6. Europäische Geldpolitik Und Zombiefizierung (European Monetary Policy and Zombification)

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  8. THE IMPACT OF MONETARY SHOCKS ON INFLATION IN SELECTED WEST ASIAN COUNTRIES

    SAADATMEHR, Masoud

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  9. Die Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion im Lichte der deutschen Währungs- und Wirtschaftsreform des Jahres 1948 (The European Economic and Monetary Union in the Light of the 1948 German Currency and Economic Reform)

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    https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3251401 [Citations: 1]

Abstract

The paper analyses the effects of monetary policy crisis management of the European Central Bank on the economic order of Germany. It is argued that in post-war Europe the German social market economy as designed by Eucken (1952) and Müller-Armack (1966) has been a core element of growth, welfare, social cohesion and political stability in Germany and Europe as a whole. It is shown that the monetary policy rescue measures of the European Central Bank have undermined the constitutive principles of the German social market economy, which has considerably contributed to the erosion of (productivity) growth and welfare in Germany and Europe. As the outcome is crumbling social cohesion and growing political instability, a timely exit from ultra-expansionary monetary policy is postulated.