Der Parlamentsvorbehalt in der Corona-Krise
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Der Parlamentsvorbehalt in der Corona-Krise
Exekutive Eingriffsbefugnisse und Staatshaftung
Die Verwaltung, Vol. 53 (2020), Iss. 4 : pp. 469–500
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PD Dr. Armin von Weschpfennig, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Fachbereich Rechtswissenschaft, Lehrstuhl Prof. Dr. Dr. Wolfgang Durner LL.M., Adenauerallee 44, 53113 Bonn
Cited By
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Democracy after Covid
The Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights in the Coronavirus Pandemic in Germany
Kahl, Wolfgang
Poulou, Konstantina-Antigoni
2022
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-13901-7_8 [Citations: 0]
Abstract
Crises are not only a test for society, they also pose a challenge to the legal order. This is revealed by the worldwide handling of the Coronavirus SARS-CoV-2 and the COVID-19 disease with a clarity that until recently probably nobody thought possible. Even in liberal democratic states, far-reaching restrictions on personal freedoms have been imposed, including lockdowns. In addition to questions of proportionality, the scope of the parliamentary prerogative in the Corona crisis has been under discussion in Germany since March 2020. Contrary to some voices in legal literature, even serious encroachments on fundamental rights can be justified, at least temporarily, by executive orders based on the general clause under infection control law and its cursory clarifications. Though, as the duration and complexity of crisis management increases, so too does the constitutional exigency for fundamental decisions by the legislature. The question of parliamentary prerogative also arises in the discussion about compensation payments, for example, for closure of businesses and other establishments during the lockdown. Since special provisions of infection control law often do not apply, some advocate a recourse to unwritten state liability law. However, this law is only geared to selective compensation and does not usually provide a legal basis for state liability in the Corona crisis. Here, too, the legislature must make improvements, if encroachments on fundamental rights – namely on the freedom of property – are no longer deemed proportionate without financial compensation. When assessing proportionality, however, the numerous aid programs must be taken into account.
Table of Contents
Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
---|---|---|---|
Armin von Weschpfennig: Der Parlamentsvorbehalt in der Corona-Krise. Exekutive Eingriffsbefugnisse und Staatshaftung | 469 | ||
Exekutive Eingriffsbefugnisse und Staatshaftung | 469 | ||
I. Erosion der Rechtsordnung in der Corona-Krise? | 469 | ||
II. Freiheitseinschränkungen zur Pandemiebekämpfung in Deutschland | 471 | ||
III. Grundrechtseingriffe und Gesetzesvorbehalt | 472 | ||
1. Das Infektionsschutzgesetz als Grundlage für die Corona-Verordnungen | 474 | ||
2. Zur Reichweite des Gesetzesvorbehalts bei den Corona-Verordnungen – die notwendige Regelungsdichte | 477 | ||
3. Exkurs: Zustimmungsverordnung de lege ferenda? | 470 | ||
4. Zwischenfazit | 470 | ||
IV. Staatshaftung und Grenzen des Richterrechts | 470 | ||
1. Spezialgesetzliche Haftungsinstitute | 470 | ||
2. Enteignender und enteignungsgleicher Eingriff | 470 | ||
3. Regelungspflicht des Gesetzgebers? | 471 | ||
V. Fazit – Chancen und Gefahren durch die Kompetenzordnung in der Krise | 471 | ||
Abstract | 471 |