Abstract

This contribution addresses the question of whether and to what extent state liability law has a preventive effect. The question focuses on whether the (mere) existence of claims under state liability law creates an incentive to prevent unlawful actions against citizens. Cases in which an incentive is created for an individual public official (individual preventive effect) are differentiated from those in which an incentive is created for the state as an organisation (organisational preventive effect). Based on an economic analysis of law, the article demonstrates – in abstract terms and detached from concrete bases for claims – that both effects can occur: On the one hand, liability claims can prevent public officials from deliberately making unlawful decisions and as well as increase the diligence and so the probability of a lawful decision. On the other hand, liability claims can influence an organisation in the state sector in such a way that those responsible strive to ensure lawful decisions by means of the improved structuring and scrutiny of the decision-making process.

To establish the specific preventive effect of an individual claim under (German) state liability law, it is necessary to consider its specific structure. The allocation of liability and the possibility of an internal recourse determine whether the preventive effect achieved is (more) an individual or an organisational one. The decisive criteria for the intensity of the preventive effect include the type, extent, degree of collectivisation, and limitations of the liability claim as well as its enforceability. Regardless of the necessary differentiation, it may be concluded that the claims of German state liability law emphasise an organisational preventive effect. While they implement the preventive effect to some extent overall, they do not fully do so. There are viable reasons for this restraint, considering the at times contrary objective of an efficiently acting administration. As a result, as this contribution concludes, from a legal policy perspective, a preventive effect also depends on considering additions and alternatives to state liability law.