Effizienz im Umweltverwaltungsrecht – zur Rolle ökonomischer Analysen des Umweltrechts

Abstract

Efficiency in Environmental Administrative Law – on the Role of Law and Environmental Economics

With respect to economic theory there is a demand for more “efficient” law, especially when it comes to environmental law. The“law and economics” strand of research, however, remains (at least under this rubric) strongly influenced by civil law issues. Against this background, the question arises to what extent the methods and arguments usually applied in the economic analysis of civil law can be transferred to public law.

So far, environmental administrative law has not been the subject of a cohesive economic theory, but rather of multiple approaches (here referred to as “economic analyses”) that are rapidly becoming more differentiated. These are applied rather selectively and are often only potential economic analyses because they are suitable and relevant for environmental law but have not yet really been activated in this respect. A full-scale transfer of legal economic concepts from the economic analysis of civil law is certainly not possible. Precisely because of the recognition of this fact, intensive and intensifying efforts have been made in environmental economics for about 50 years to develop an adapted methodological casuistry for (public) environmental issues. These adaptations affect both the understanding of efficiency, the institutions analyzed, as well as the challenges of uncertainty and contextual assurance. The result may not yet be fully convincing as “Law and Environmental Economics”, but a methodological approach to the object of knowledge and its particularities in environmental law cannot be denied. In this regard, “economic analysis” seems to be fruitful and expandable for environmental law without further ado, but in an adapted and specific form. For example, the objection that judicial efficiency control of the administration (and the legislature) is institutionally impossible and materially undesirable (e. g., with respect to the separation of powers) must give way to more differentiated considerations.