Menu Expand

Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area?

  1. Journals
  2. Economics, Finance, Business & Management
  3. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital
  4. Vol. 55, Issue 1
  5. pp. 3–34

JOURNAL ARTICLE

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style
Horst, M., Neyer, U. Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area?. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 55(1), 3-34. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.55.1.3
Horst, Maximilian J. and Neyer, Ulrike "Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area?" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 55.1, 2022, 3-34. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.55.1.3
Horst, Maximilian J./Neyer, Ulrike (2022): Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area?, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 55, iss. 1, 3-34, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.55.1.3
Format
Download

Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area?

Horst, Maximilian J. | Neyer, Ulrike

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 55 (2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 3–34

Read Now Download (PDF)

Additional Information

Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.55.1.3
Language
English
Pages
32
Keywords

Author Details

Corresponding Author. Maximilian J. Horst, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Chair of Monetary Economics, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf.

Prof. Dr. Ulrike Neyer, Heinrich Heine University Düsseldorf, Chair of Monetary Economics, Universitätsstraße 1, 40225 Düsseldorf.

References

  1. Alvarez, I./Casavecchia, F./De Luca, M./Duering, A./Eser, F./Helmus, C./Hemous, C./Herrala, N./Jakovicka, J./Lo Russo, M./Pasqualone, F./Rubens, M./Soares, R./Zennaro, F. (2017): The Use of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy Instruments and Operational Framework Since 2012, ECB Occasional Paper, Vol. 188, May 2017.  Google Scholar
  2. Baldo, L./Hallinger, B./Helmus, C./Herrala, N./Martins, D./Mohing, F./Petroulakis, F./Resinek, M./Vergote, O./Usciati, B./Wang, Y. (2017): The Distribution of Excess Liquidity in the Euro Area, ECB Occasional Paper, Vol. 200, November 2017.  Google Scholar
  3. Bank for International Settlements (2003): Payment Systems in the Euro Area, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/paysys/ecbcomp.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  4. Bindseil, U./König, P. J. (2012): TARGET2 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Credit and Capital Markets, Vol. 45(2), 135-174.  Google Scholar
  5. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2016): Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 21. Juni 2016, 2 BvE 13/13, Randnr. 99–102, 109. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/06/rs20160621_2bvr272813.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  6. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2017): Beschluss des Zweiten Senats vom 18. Juli 2017, 2 BvR 859/15, Randnr. 1–137. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2017/07/rs20170718_2bvr085915.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  7. Cœuré, B. (2017): The International Dimension of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp170711.en.html. Speech at the Meeting of the Foreign Exchange Contact Group, 11 July 2017. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  8. Deutsche Bundesbank (2011): The German Balance of Payments in 2010. Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, March 2011, 34–35.  Google Scholar
  9. Deutsche Bundesbank (2012): Stellungnahme vom 21.12.2012 im OMT-Verfahren vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/799684/14bcbdeda81af076aa78e40891f0997a/mL/2012-12-%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%2021-omt-data.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  10. Deutsche Bundesbank (2018): Annual Report 2018. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/779146/28a66617341a428a89608ca281971f3f/mL/2018-annual-report-data.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  11. Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Stellungnahme der Deutschen Bundesbank anlässlich der öffentlichen Anhörung des Finanzausschusses des Deutschen Bundestags am 05.07.2019. https://www.bundesbank.de/de/presse/stellungnahmen/stellungnahme-der-deutschen-bundesbank-anlaesslich-der-oeffentlichen-anhoerung-des-finanzausschusses-des-deutschen-bundestags-am-5-juni-2019-798206. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  12. Deutsche Bundesbank (2020a): Balance of Payments. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/external-sector/balance-of-payments/balance-of-payments-776588. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  13. Deutsche Bundesbank (2020b): TARGET2 – Balance. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/payment-systems/target2/target2-balance/target2-balance-626782. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  14. Deutsche Bundesbank (2021a): Coronavirus Crisis Pushes TARGET2 Balance Above One Trillion Euros. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/topics/coronavirus-crisis-pushes-target2-balance-above-1-trillion-840812. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  15. Deutsche Bundesbank (2021b): The Two-Tier System for Reserve Remuneration and its Impact on Banks and Financial Markets, Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, January 2021, 59–79.  Google Scholar
  16. Draghi, M. (2017): Letter to Mr Marco Valli and Mr Marco Zanni – Members of the European Parliament, Frankfurt a.M., 18 January 2017. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/170120letter_valli_zanni_1.en.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  17. Eisenschmidt, J./Kedan, D./Schmitz, M./Adalid, R./Papsdorf, P. (2017): The Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Programme and TARGET Balances, ECB Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 196, September 2017.  Google Scholar
  18. European Central Bank (2001): TARGET Annual Report. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., May 2001.  Google Scholar
  19. European Central Bank (2004): Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB – Rules of Procedure. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., 2004.  Google Scholar
  20. European Central Bank (2012): Guideline of the European Central Bank of 5 December 2012 on a Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). Official Journal of the European Union.  Google Scholar
  21. European Central Bank (2016): Convergence Report, June 2016. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/conrep/cr201606.de.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  22. European Central Bank (2019): ECB Introduces Two-Tier System for Remunerating Excess Liquidity Holdings. Press Release, 12 September 2019.  Google Scholar
  23. European Central Bank (2020a): Asset Purchase Programmes. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  24. European Central Bank (2020b): Balance of Payments and International Investment Position. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/balance_of_payments/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  25. European Central Bank (2020c): Monetary Policy Decisions. Press Release, 10 December 2020.  Google Scholar
  26. European Central Bank (2020d): Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  27. European Central Bank (2021): TARGET Annual Report. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., May 2021.  Google Scholar
  28. Federal Reserve System (2021): Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 2021.  Google Scholar
  29. Fuest, C./Sinn, H. W. (2018a): Target-Risiken ohne Austritte, ifo Schnelldienst, Vol. 71(24), 15–25.  Google Scholar
  30. Fuest, C./Sinn, H. W. (2018b): Target Risks Without Euro Exits, CESifo Forum, Vol. 19(4), 36–45.  Google Scholar
  31. German Council of Economic Experts (2018): Annual Report 2018/19 – Setting the Right Course for Economic Policy. https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/gutachten/jg201819/Chapter_4.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  32. Hellwig, M. (2018): Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? Zur deutschen Diskussion über die Europäische Währungsunion, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 19(4), 345–382.  Google Scholar
  33. Hellwig, M./Schnabel, I. (2019a): Do Target Balances Create Risks for Taxpayers? Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 99(8), 553–561.  Google Scholar
  34. Hellwig, M./Schnabel, I. (2019b): Target Balances, Current Account Balances, Money Creation, Banks and Capital Markets, Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 99(9), 632–640.  Google Scholar
  35. Homburg, S. (2019): Targetsalden sind nicht empörend, sondern gefährlich, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 98–102.  Google Scholar
  36. Horst, M. J./Neyer, U. (2019): The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Bank Loan Supply and Monetary Policy Implementation in the Euro Area, Review of Economics, Vol. 70(3), 229–265.  Google Scholar
  37. Horst, M. J./Neyer, U./Stempel, D. (2020): Asymmetric Macroeconomic Effects of QE-Induced Increases in Excess Reserves in a Monetary Union, DICE Discussion Paper No. 346.  Google Scholar
  38. Siekmann, H. (2017): Die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University Frankfurt, Working Paper Series No. 120.  Google Scholar
  39. Sinn, H.-W. (2018): Fast 1.000 Milliarden Target-Forderungen der Bundesbank: Was steckt dahinter? ifo Schnelldienst, Vol. 71(14), 26–37.  Google Scholar
  40. Sinn, H.-W. (2019a): Der Streit um die Targetsalden, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(3), 170–217.  Google Scholar
  41. Sinn, H.-W. (2019b): Der Streit um die Targetsalden – Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel “Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?”, ifo Working Papers No. 316, 1–100.  Google Scholar
  42. Sinn, H.-W. (2020): The Economics of Target Balances – From Lehman to Corona, Springer Nature.  Google Scholar
  43. Sinn, H.-W./Wollmershäuser, T. (2012): Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 19(4), 468–508.  Google Scholar
  44. Spahn, P. (2019): Targetsalden und die Vollendung der Währungsunion, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 103–106.  Google Scholar
  45. van Suntum, U. (2019): Targetsalden und andere Risiken in der Europäischen Währungsunion. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 107–114.  Google Scholar
  46. Alvarez, I./Casavecchia, F./De Luca, M./Duering, A./Eser, F./Helmus, C./Hemous, C./Herrala, N./Jakovicka, J./Lo Russo, M./Pasqualone, F./Rubens, M./Soares, R./Zennaro, F. (2017): The Use of the Eurosystem’s Monetary Policy Instruments and Operational Framework Since 2012, ECB Occasional Paper, Vol. 188, May 2017.  Google Scholar
  47. Baldo, L./Hallinger, B./Helmus, C./Herrala, N./Martins, D./Mohing, F./Petroulakis, F./Resinek, M./Vergote, O./Usciati, B./Wang, Y. (2017): The Distribution of Excess Liquidity in the Euro Area, ECB Occasional Paper, Vol. 200, November 2017.  Google Scholar
  48. Bank for International Settlements (2003): Payment Systems in the Euro Area, https://www.bis.org/cpmi/paysys/ecbcomp.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  49. Bindseil, U./König, P. J. (2012): TARGET2 and the European Sovereign Debt Crisis, Credit and Capital Markets, Vol. 45(2), 135-174.  Google Scholar
  50. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2016): Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 21. Juni 2016, 2 BvE 13/13, Randnr. 99–102, 109. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2016/06/rs20160621_2bvr272813.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  51. Bundesverfassungsgericht (2017): Beschluss des Zweiten Senats vom 18. Juli 2017, 2 BvR 859/15, Randnr. 1–137. https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Entscheidungen/DE/2017/07/rs20170718_2bvr085915.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  52. Cœuré, B. (2017): The International Dimension of the ECB’s Asset Purchase Programme. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2017/html/ecb.sp170711.en.html. Speech at the Meeting of the Foreign Exchange Contact Group, 11 July 2017. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  53. Deutsche Bundesbank (2011): The German Balance of Payments in 2010. Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, March 2011, 34–35.  Google Scholar
  54. Deutsche Bundesbank (2012): Stellungnahme vom 21.12.2012 im OMT-Verfahren vor dem Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 BvR 1390. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/799684/14bcbdeda81af076aa78e40891f0997a/mL/2012-12-%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%20%2021-omt-data.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  55. Deutsche Bundesbank (2018): Annual Report 2018. https://www.bundesbank.de/resource/blob/779146/28a66617341a428a89608ca281971f3f/mL/2018-annual-report-data.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  56. Deutsche Bundesbank (2019): Stellungnahme der Deutschen Bundesbank anlässlich der öffentlichen Anhörung des Finanzausschusses des Deutschen Bundestags am 05.07.2019. https://www.bundesbank.de/de/presse/stellungnahmen/stellungnahme-der-deutschen-bundesbank-anlaesslich-der-oeffentlichen-anhoerung-des-finanzausschusses-des-deutschen-bundestags-am-5-juni-2019-798206. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  57. Deutsche Bundesbank (2020a): Balance of Payments. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/statistics/external-sector/balance-of-payments/balance-of-payments-776588. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  58. Deutsche Bundesbank (2020b): TARGET2 – Balance. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/payment-systems/target2/target2-balance/target2-balance-626782. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  59. Deutsche Bundesbank (2021a): Coronavirus Crisis Pushes TARGET2 Balance Above One Trillion Euros. https://www.bundesbank.de/en/tasks/topics/coronavirus-crisis-pushes-target2-balance-above-1-trillion-840812. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  60. Deutsche Bundesbank (2021b): The Two-Tier System for Reserve Remuneration and its Impact on Banks and Financial Markets, Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, January 2021, 59–79.  Google Scholar
  61. Draghi, M. (2017): Letter to Mr Marco Valli and Mr Marco Zanni – Members of the European Parliament, Frankfurt a.M., 18 January 2017. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/170120letter_valli_zanni_1.en.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  62. Eisenschmidt, J./Kedan, D./Schmitz, M./Adalid, R./Papsdorf, P. (2017): The Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Programme and TARGET Balances, ECB Occasional Paper Series, Vol. 196, September 2017.  Google Scholar
  63. European Central Bank (2001): TARGET Annual Report. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., May 2001.  Google Scholar
  64. European Central Bank (2004): Statute of the ESCB and of the ECB – Rules of Procedure. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., 2004.  Google Scholar
  65. European Central Bank (2012): Guideline of the European Central Bank of 5 December 2012 on a Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). Official Journal of the European Union.  Google Scholar
  66. European Central Bank (2016): Convergence Report, June 2016. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/conrep/cr201606.de.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  67. European Central Bank (2019): ECB Introduces Two-Tier System for Remunerating Excess Liquidity Holdings. Press Release, 12 September 2019.  Google Scholar
  68. European Central Bank (2020a): Asset Purchase Programmes. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omt/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  69. European Central Bank (2020b): Balance of Payments and International Investment Position. https://www.ecb.europa.eu/stats/balance_of_payments_and_external/balance_of_payments/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  70. European Central Bank (2020c): Monetary Policy Decisions. Press Release, 10 December 2020.  Google Scholar
  71. European Central Bank (2020d): Pandemic Emergency Purchase Programme (PEPP). https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/pepp/html/index.en.html. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  72. European Central Bank (2021): TARGET Annual Report. European Central Bank, Frankfurt a.M., May 2021.  Google Scholar
  73. Federal Reserve System (2021): Financial Accounting Manual for Federal Reserve Banks. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, July 2021.  Google Scholar
  74. Fuest, C./Sinn, H. W. (2018a): Target-Risiken ohne Austritte, ifo Schnelldienst, Vol. 71(24), 15–25.  Google Scholar
  75. Fuest, C./Sinn, H. W. (2018b): Target Risks Without Euro Exits, CESifo Forum, Vol. 19(4), 36–45.  Google Scholar
  76. German Council of Economic Experts (2018): Annual Report 2018/19 – Setting the Right Course for Economic Policy. https://www.sachverstaendigenrat-wirtschaft.de/fileadmin/dateiablage/gutachten/jg201819/Chapter_4.pdf. [Online; accessed 02-December-2021].  Google Scholar
  77. Hellwig, M. (2018): Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle? Zur deutschen Diskussion über die Europäische Währungsunion, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 19(4), 345–382.  Google Scholar
  78. Hellwig, M./Schnabel, I. (2019a): Do Target Balances Create Risks for Taxpayers? Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 99(8), 553–561.  Google Scholar
  79. Hellwig, M./Schnabel, I. (2019b): Target Balances, Current Account Balances, Money Creation, Banks and Capital Markets, Wirtschaftsdienst, Vol. 99(9), 632–640.  Google Scholar
  80. Homburg, S. (2019): Targetsalden sind nicht empörend, sondern gefährlich, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 98–102.  Google Scholar
  81. Horst, M. J./Neyer, U. (2019): The Impact of Quantitative Easing on Bank Loan Supply and Monetary Policy Implementation in the Euro Area, Review of Economics, Vol. 70(3), 229–265.  Google Scholar
  82. Horst, M. J./Neyer, U./Stempel, D. (2020): Asymmetric Macroeconomic Effects of QE-Induced Increases in Excess Reserves in a Monetary Union, DICE Discussion Paper No. 346.  Google Scholar
  83. Siekmann, H. (2017): Die Einstandspflicht der Bundesrepublik Deutschland für die Deutsche Bundesbank und die Europäische Zentralbank, Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University Frankfurt, Working Paper Series No. 120.  Google Scholar
  84. Sinn, H.-W. (2018): Fast 1.000 Milliarden Target-Forderungen der Bundesbank: Was steckt dahinter? ifo Schnelldienst, Vol. 71(14), 26–37.  Google Scholar
  85. Sinn, H.-W. (2019a): Der Streit um die Targetsalden, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(3), 170–217.  Google Scholar
  86. Sinn, H.-W. (2019b): Der Streit um die Targetsalden – Kommentar zu Martin Hellwigs Artikel “Target-Falle oder Empörungsfalle?”, ifo Working Papers No. 316, 1–100.  Google Scholar
  87. Sinn, H.-W. (2020): The Economics of Target Balances – From Lehman to Corona, Springer Nature.  Google Scholar
  88. Sinn, H.-W./Wollmershäuser, T. (2012): Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility, International Tax and Public Finance, Vol. 19(4), 468–508.  Google Scholar
  89. Spahn, P. (2019): Targetsalden und die Vollendung der Währungsunion, Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 103–106.  Google Scholar
  90. van Suntum, U. (2019): Targetsalden und andere Risiken in der Europäischen Währungsunion. Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik, Vol. 20(2), 107–114.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Large increases in TARGET2 balances in the euro area since 2008 have led to concern and debate about the appropriate interpretation and policy reaction – in particular in TARGET2 creditor countries such as Germany. Against this background, we examine the main drivers of the increases and asymmetries in TARGET2 balances that have emerged in the context of the financial and sovereign debt crises as well as in the context of the Eurosystem’s implementation of quantitative easing (QE) and the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, this paper analyzes the potential risks for euro area member states in the case of (i) the unchanged continuity of the monetary union, (ii) the withdrawal of a member state with (large) TARGET2 liabilities, and (iii) the break-up of the whole monetary union. Depending on the outcome of exit negotiations and the operational handling, there can be direct risks in the form of default losses of TARGET2 balances and indirect risks in the form of threat potentials if TARGET2 debtor countries pretend to plan to leave the euro area. Based on this, we discuss adaption options for the TARGET2 payment system and consider an exit from the ECB’s accommodative monetary policy in order to scale back the high amount of excess liquidity in the euro area banking sector which is the prerequisite for the emergence of TARGET2 balances.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Maximilian J. Horst / Ulrike Neyer: Do Large TARGET2 Balances Bear Risks for the Euro Area? 1
Abstract 1
I. Introduction 1
II. A Technical Note on the TARGET2 Payment System and the Emergence of TARGET2 Balances 4
1. Institutional Aspects of TARGET and TARGET2 4
2. TARGET2 Balances 5
3. TARGET2 Balances as Actual Claims and Liabilities 9
III. Development and Interpretation of TARGET2 Balances 9
1. TARGET2 Balances and the Balance of Payments 1
2. TARGET2 Balances in “Normal Times” 1
3. TARGET2 Balances in the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises 1
4. TARGET2 Balances and the Eurosystem’s Asset Purchase Program (APP) 1
5. TARGET2 Balances in the COVID-19 Pandemic 1
IV. Potential Risks of Large TARGET2 Imbalances – Three Scenarios 1
1. Unchanged Continuity of the Monetary Union 2
2. Withdrawal of a Euro Area Member State 2
3. Dissolution of the Monetary Union 2
4. Solution Approaches 2
V. Summary 2
References 3

Contact

Duncker & Humblot GmbH Carl-Heinrich-Becker-Weg 9 12165 Berlin, Deutschland T: +49 30 790006-0

Quick Navigation

2024 Duncker & Humblot GmbH

Powered by CloudPublish

We use cookies to ensure that you get the best experience on our website. Learn more about how we use cookies.