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Inhaberkontrollierte Unternehmen: Robust durch die letzte Dekade

Immenkötter, Philipp | Lehmann, Kai

ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70 (2022), Iss. 1: pp. 51–60

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Dr. Philipp Immenkötter, Flossbach von Storch Research Institute, Ottoplatz 1, 50679 Köln, Deutschland.

  • Dr. Philipp Immenkötter ist Senior Research Analyst am Flossbach von Storch Research Institute in Köln und Dozent an der Universität zu Köln. Seine Forschungsschwerpunkte umfassen Kapitalmärkte, Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance und Inflation.
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Dr. Kai Lehmann, Flossbach von Storch AG, Ottoplatz 1, 50679 Köln, Deutschland

  • Dr. Kai Lehmann ist Senior Research Analyst im Investment Management der Flossbach von Storch AG. Zudem ist er Lehrbeauftragter an der Technischen Hochschule Köln.
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References

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Abstract

Profitability, low financial risk, and efficient capital allocation are the distinctive characteristics of owner-controlled companies. In the last decade, they have generated an annual excess return of 3.2 % compared to a peer group of listed companies. The reasons for this beneficial development are to be found in the strategic vision and motivation of the owners, which favour a long-term and economically sustainable strategy and outweigh the disadvantages of power concentration and family ties.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Philipp Immenkötter / Kai Lehmann: Inhaberkontrollierte Unternehmen: Robust durch die letzte Dekade 1
Zusammenfassung 1
Abstract 1
I. Hintergrund und Erkenntnisgewinn 2
II. Datenbasis 3
III. Profitabilität: Margen und Kapitalrenditen 3
IV. Solvenz: Gearing, Zinsdeckung, Pensionslasten 5
V. Kapitalmarktperformance 7
VI. Fazit 8
Literatur 9