Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle

Sauermann, Martin

doi:10.3790/zfke.70.1.61

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Sauermann, M. Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle. ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, 70(1), 61-67. https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.61

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Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle

Sauermann, Martin

ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70 (2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 61–67

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Article Details

Publisher Name: Duncker & Humblot
DOI: https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.61
Language: German
Pages: 7

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Individual: € 24.00 (incl. local VAT if applicable)

Author Details

Dr. Martin Sauermann, Bundeskartellamt Haus I, Kaiser-Friedrich-Straße 16, 53113 Bonn, Deutschland

References

Argentesi, E., Buccirossi, P., Calvano, E., Duso, T., Marrazzo, A. und Nava, S. (2019): „Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment“, CESifo Working Paper No. 7985. Google Scholar
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, June 2019. Google Scholar
Bundeskartellamt (2017): Innovationen – Herausforderungen für die Kartellrechtspraxis. Google Scholar
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Digital Competition Expert Panel (2019): „Unlocking digital competition“, HM Treasury Report. Google Scholar
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Schumpeter, J. A. (1942): „Capitalism, socialism and democracy“, Harpers & Bro, New York. Google Scholar
Europäische Kommission (2019): Competition policy for the digital era. Google Scholar
Europäische Kommission (2021): Communication from the Commission – Commission Guidance on the application of the referral mechanism set out in Article 22 of the Merger Regulation to certain categories of cases. Google Scholar
Gautier, A. und Lamesch, J. (2020): Mergers in the Digital Economy, in: Information Economics and Policy. Google Scholar
Holmström, M., Padilla, J., Stitzing, R. und Sääskilahti, P. (2019): Killer Acquisitions? The Debate on Merger Control for Digital Markets, in: Killer Acquisitions? The Debate on Merger Control for Digital Markets by Mats Holmström, Jorge Padilla, Robin Stitzing, Pekka Sääskilahti: SSRN, aufgerufen am 14.1.2022. Google Scholar
Lécuyer, T. (2020): Digital conglomerates and killer acquisitions – A discussion of the competitive effects of start-up acquisitions by digital platforms, in: Concurrences N°1–2020 I Law & Economics, S. 42–50. Google Scholar
OECD (2020): Start-ups, Killer Acquisitions and Merger Control, www.oecd.org/daf/competition/start-ups-killer-acquisitions-and-merger-control-2020.pdf, aufgerufen am 14.1.2022. Google Scholar
Parker, G., Petropoulos, G. und Van Alstyne, M. (2021): Platform mergers and antitrust, in: Industrial and Corporate Change, Vol. 30, S. 1307–1336. Google Scholar
Schumpeter, J. A. (1942): „Capitalism, socialism and democracy“, Harpers & Bro, New York. Google Scholar
Argentesi, E., Buccirossi, P., Calvano, E., Duso, T., Marrazzo, A. und Nava, S. (2019): „Merger Policy in Digital Markets: An Ex-Post Assessment“, CESifo Working Paper No. 7985. Google Scholar
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission, Digital Platforms Inquiry: Final Report, June 2019. Google Scholar
Bundeskartellamt (2017): Innovationen – Herausforderungen für die Kartellrechtspraxis. Google Scholar
Cunningham, C., Ederer, F. und Ma, S. (2021): Killer Acquisitions, in: Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 129, No. 3, March 2021, S. 649–702. Google Scholar
Digital Competition Expert Panel (2019): „Unlocking digital competition“, HM Treasury Report. Google Scholar
Europäische Kommission (2016): Competition Policy Brief – EU merger control and innovation. Google Scholar
Europäische Kommission (2017): CASE M.7932 – Dow/DuPont, Entscheidung vom 27.3.2017. Google Scholar

Abstract

Killer Acquisitions – Challenges for Merger Control

Killer acquisitions are increasingly viewed critically in academia and politics. Authors describe these takeovers as “shoot-out acquisitions” to eliminate start-ups that could develop into potential rivals, or as “pre-emptive mergers” aimed at preventing disruptive competitors. Therefore, also the coalition agreement of Germany‘s new federal government provides that on the EU level Germany shall advocate an amendment of merger control rules to prevent innovation-inhibiting strategic acquisitions by potential competitors. In the same vein, competition authorities around the globe are looking for ways to prevent anti-competitive takeovers, especially of smaller and new competitors, and take different routes to get there. The article therefore examines the scientific literature on killer acquisitions and how merger control rules are being reformed. In particular, German and EU competition law is being discussed.

Section Title	Page	Action	Price
Martin Sauermann: Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle	1
Zusammenfassung	1
Abstract	1
I. Einführung	2
Das Phänomen der Killer Acquisitions	2
II. Forschung und Fallbeispiel zu Killer Acquisitions	3
III. Wettbewerbspolitische Reaktionen	5
IV. Schlussbetrachtung und Forschungsbedarf	6
Literatur	6