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Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle

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Sauermann, M. Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle. ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, 70(1), 61-67. https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.61
Sauermann, Martin "Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle" ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship 70.1, 2022, 61-67. https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.61
Sauermann, Martin (2022): Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle, in: ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, vol. 70, iss. 1, 61-67, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/zfke.70.1.61

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Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle

Sauermann, Martin

ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70 (2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 61–67

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Dr. Martin Sauermann, Bundeskartellamt Haus I, Kaiser-Friedrich-Straße 16, 53113 Bonn, Deutschland

References

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Abstract

Killer Acquisitions – Challenges for Merger Control

Killer acquisitions are increasingly viewed critically in academia and politics. Authors describe these takeovers as “shoot-out acquisitions” to eliminate start-ups that could develop into potential rivals, or as “pre-emptive mergers” aimed at preventing disruptive competitors. Therefore, also the coalition agreement of Germany‘s new federal government provides that on the EU level Germany shall advocate an amendment of merger control rules to prevent innovation-inhibiting strategic acquisitions by potential competitors. In the same vein, competition authorities around the globe are looking for ways to prevent anti-competitive takeovers, especially of smaller and new competitors, and take different routes to get there. The article therefore examines the scientific literature on killer acquisitions and how merger control rules are being reformed. In particular, German and EU competition law is being discussed.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Martin Sauermann: Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle 1
Zusammenfassung 1
Abstract 1
I. Einführung 2
Das Phänomen der Killer Acquisitions 2
II. Forschung und Fallbeispiel zu Killer Acquisitions 3
III. Wettbewerbspolitische Reaktionen 5
IV. Schlussbetrachtung und Forschungsbedarf 6
Literatur 6