Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle
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Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle
ZfKE – Zeitschrift für KMU und Entrepreneurship, Vol. 70(2022), Iss. 1 : pp. 61–67
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Dr. Martin Sauermann, Bundeskartellamt Haus I, Kaiser-Friedrich-Straße 16, 53113 Bonn, Deutschland
- Martin Sauermann ist Volkswirt und Berichterstatter beim Bundeskartellamt, dem er seit 2012 angehört. Von 2020 bis 2022 wirkte er als abgeordneter nationaler Sachverständiger in der Generaldirektion Wettbewerb (GD COMP) der Europäischen Kommission. Er verfügt über umfangreiche Expertise in der deutschen und europäischen Fusionskontrolle, hat an einer Reihe hochkarätiger Fusions- und Kartellfälle mitgewirkt und ist Mitautor der Leitlinien des Bundeskartellamts zur Transaktionswertschwelle. Darüber hinaus war er Co-Vorsitzender des Ökonomen-Netzwerks des Bundeskartellamts. Vor seinem Eintritt ins Bundeskartellamt war Martin Sauermann in der Solarbranche, in der Wissenschaft und bei PricewaterhouseCoopers mit den Schwerpunkten Unternehmensstrategie, M&A, Banking und Finance tätig.
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Abstract
Killer Acquisitions - challenges for fusion control
Killer acquisitions are increasingly viewed critically in academia and politics. Authors describe these takeovers as “shoot-out acquisitions” to eliminate start-ups that could develop into potential rivals, or as “pre-emptive mergers” aimed at preventing disruptive competitors. Therefore, also the coalition agreement of Germany‘s new federal government provides that on the EU level Germany shall advocate an amendment of merger control rules to prevent innovation-inhibiting strategic acquisitions by potential competitors. In the same vein, competition authorities around the globe are looking for ways to prevent anti-competitive takeovers, especially of smaller and new competitors, and take different routes to get there. The article therefore examines the scientific literature on killer acquisitions and how merger control rules are being reformed. In particular, German and EU competition law is being discussed.
Table of Contents
| Section Title | Page | Action | Price |
|---|---|---|---|
| Martin Sauermann: Killer Acquisitions – Herausforderungen für die Fusionskontrolle | 1 | ||
| Zusammenfassung | 1 | ||
| Abstract | 1 | ||
| I. Einführung | 2 | ||
| Das Phänomen der Killer Acquisitions | 2 | ||
| II. Forschung und Fallbeispiel zu Killer Acquisitions | 3 | ||
| III. Wettbewerbspolitische Reaktionen | 5 | ||
| IV. Schlussbetrachtung und Forschungsbedarf | 6 | ||
| Literatur | 6 |