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Küsters, A., Oakes, I. Taming Giants: How Ordoliberal Competition Theory Can Address Power in the Digital Age. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 141(3), 149-188. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.141.3.149
Küsters, Anselm and Oakes, Isabel "Taming Giants: How Ordoliberal Competition Theory Can Address Power in the Digital Age" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 141.3, 2021, 149-188. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.141.3.149
Küsters, Anselm/Oakes, Isabel (2021): Taming Giants: How Ordoliberal Competition Theory Can Address Power in the Digital Age, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 141, iss. 3, 149-188, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.141.3.149
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Taming Giants: How Ordoliberal Competition Theory Can Address Power in the Digital Age

Küsters, Anselm | Oakes, Isabel

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 141 (2021), Iss. 3 : pp. 149–188

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Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.141.3.149
Language
English
Pages
40
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Author Details

Anselm Küsters, Max Planck Institute for Legal History and Legal Theory, Hansaallee 41, 60323 Frankfurt, Germany.

Isabel Oakes, Faculty of History, George Street, Oxford, OX1 2RL, United Kingdom.

Cited By

  1. Ordoliberalism goes China? A comparison of recent developments in EU and chinese competition law considering the digital economy

    Küsters, Anselm

    (2023)

    https://doi.org/10.1007/s10602-023-09407-y [Citations: 0]

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Abstract

In comparing the historical circumstances in which ordoliberalism emerged with the socio-economic and political trends of today, this study identifies parallels that can provide useful insights into tackling current challenges in the digital age. On this basis, the study explores whether ordoliberal concepts like “complete competition,” “interdependence of orders,” and Vitalpolitik, and the lessons from the past that they incorporate, can help reform European competition law for the digital economy. Along with a renewed focus on structural remedies, per se rules and a historical interpretation of European competition norms, ordoliberal theory could contribute to a reformed approach to competition policy that can tame the power of today’s digital giants more effectively.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Taming Giants:How Ordoliberal Competition TheoryCan Address Power in the Digital Age* 1
Abstract 1
1. Introduction: Ordoliberalismand its Lessons from the Past 2
2. Economic Power and the Political Order 4
2.1 Economic and Political Powerat the Time of the Early Ordoliberals 4
2.2 Economic and Political Power in the Digital Age 6
3. Consumer Welfare in Broad Perspective 7
3.1 Welfare at the Time of the Early Ordoliberals 7
3.2 Consumer Welfare in the Digital Age 8
3.3 A Broader Conception of Welfare:Vitalpolitik for the Digital Age 11
4. Framing Competition 14
4.1 Views on Competition at the Timeof the Early Ordoliberals 14
4.2 Views on Competition in the Digital Age 15
5. Goal and Tools of a Modern Ordoliberal Competition Law 17
5.1 Criticism 18
5.2 Goals and Measures ofa Modernized Ordoliberal Competition Law Approach 19
5.3 Why These Reforms Should Be Connectedto Ordoliberal Theory 22
6. Conclusion 24
References 26

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