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Warum gibt es Kreditsicherheiten?
Bigus, Jochen | Langer, Thomas | Schiereck, Dirk
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 38 (2005), Iss. 4 : pp. 573–617
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Jochen Bigus, Osnabrück
Thomas Langer, Münster
Dirk Schiereck, Oestrich-Winkel
Cited By
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Kapitalerhaltung durch Solvenztests
Ausschüttungsbemessung nach US-amerikanischem Recht
2008
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-8349-8033-5_5 [Citations: 0]
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Abstract
Why there is Collateral?
This paper surveys theoretical models addressing this question. The literature emphasizes two benefits of collateral. First, collateral allows a borrower to signal quality thus mitigating the problem of adverse selection. Second, collateral serves to mitigate moral hazard by the borrower. The models mainly look at external collateral, that is, secured private assets. However, loans are also often secured by the firm's assets. This internal collateral is less useful to mitigate problems of adverse selection or borrower's moral hazard. Rather, it seems to mitigate conflicts of interest between different creditors. So far, there are only a few papers on this issue. There is another issue that has hardly been explored yet: What is the role of collateral if we weaken the assumption of strict rationality?