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Diskretionäre Spielräume des Inflation-Targeting

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Nitsch, H. Diskretionäre Spielräume des Inflation-Targeting. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 36(1), 30-51. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.1.30
Nitsch, Harald "Diskretionäre Spielräume des Inflation-Targeting" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 36.1, 2003, 30-51. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.1.30
Nitsch, Harald (2003): Diskretionäre Spielräume des Inflation-Targeting, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 36, iss. 1, 30-51, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.36.1.30

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Diskretionäre Spielräume des Inflation-Targeting

Nitsch, Harald

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 36 (2003), Iss. 1 : pp. 30–51

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Harald Nitsch, Freiburg i. Br.

References

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Abstract

Discretionary Scope of Inflation-targeting

The choice of an inflation model as part of an inflation targeting strategy makes it necessary to weigh the quality of forecasts against the ability of external observers to understand them, as demonstrated by the example of four selected central banks. Mixed strategies may offer an interesting option for combining a simple long-run reference framework with information about short-run monetary policy behaviour. However, to minimise the problems concerning the discretionary choice between the short-run and the long-run model, it would be desirable to apply an integrated modelling of both time horizons.