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New Evidence on Ownership Structures in Germany
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 34 (2001), Iss. 2 : pp. 257–292
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F. Jens Köke, Mannheim
References
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Abstract
This study documents the ownership structures of large listed and non-listed German manufacturing firms as an important element of corporate governance. We find that shares are concentrated in the hands of few large shareholders. This limits agency problems resulting from a separation of ownership and control. Also, pyramid structures and cross-ownership exist but are not as widespread as commonly assumed. However, mostly the largest shareholder is another non-financial enterprise giving rise to a different kind of agency problem. But significant variation in the corporate ownership structures suggest that there is an active market for large share stakes which could act as a control device. (JEL G 32)