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Europäische Währungsunion



Richter, R. Europäische Währungsunion. . - institutionenökonomisch gesehen —. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 32(2), 159-191.
Richter, Rudolf "Europäische Währungsunion. - institutionenökonomisch gesehen —. " Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 32.2, 1999, 159-191.
Richter, Rudolf (1999): Europäische Währungsunion, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 32, iss. 2, 159-191, [online]


Europäische Währungsunion

- institutionenökonomisch gesehen —

Richter, Rudolf

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 32 (1999), Iss. 2 : pp. 159–191

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Rudolf Richter, Saarbrücken


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European Monetary Union

Under the Aspect of Institutional Economics

This contribution begins with a brief summary of the situation that existed prior to the decision to set up the European Monetary Union (EMU), i.e. with a description of the problems that confronted the European Monetary System (EMS) set up in 1979 which soon turned out to be in need of repair. It is shown that EMU was neither the only nor the best repair option for the EMS. Thereafter the discussion focuses on problems posed by the 1992 Maastricht Treaty; the main topics of the debate on the euro are briefly presented. This contribution closes with an outlook on the EMU. Two extreme ways of looking at it are presented: an optimistic and a pessimistic one. Both ought to be viewed as fixed points in a continuously developing scenario potentially helping to improve the capability of assessing the EMU development to be expected and of evaluating subsequent results more clearly.