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Edelmann, R., Milde, H., Weimerskirch, P. Agency-Beziehungen und Kontrakt-Design: Problem, Lösung, Beispiel. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 31(1), 1-27.
Edelmann, Ralf; Milde, Hellmuth and Weimerskirch, Pierre "Agency-Beziehungen und Kontrakt-Design: Problem, Lösung, Beispiel" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 31.1, 1998, 1-27.
Edelmann, Ralf/Milde, Hellmuth/Weimerskirch, Pierre (1998): Agency-Beziehungen und Kontrakt-Design: Problem, Lösung, Beispiel, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 31, iss. 1, 1-27, [online]


Agency-Beziehungen und Kontrakt-Design: Problem, Lösung, Beispiel

Edelmann, Ralf | Milde, Hellmuth | Weimerskirch, Pierre

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 31 (1998), Iss. 1 : pp. 1–27

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Ralf Edelmann, Trier und Wiesbaden

Hellmuth Milde, Trier und Wiesbaden

Pierre Weimerskirch, Trier und Wiesbaden


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Agency Relations and the Design of Contracts

In the paper we study the design of contracts in a simple principal-agent relationship. More precisely, we are concerned with issues relating to the control of the behavior of well informed agents by the less informed principals. Adopting the standard assumptions we show and explain the first order conditions in different informational settings. We strongly emphasize the meaning of the monotone likelihood ratio property for the solution. This property strengthens the assumption of the first order stochastic dominance. Finally we give a simplified application example.