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Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen

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  4. Vol. 30, Issue 1
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Schwiete, M., Weigand, J. Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 30(1), 1-34. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.1
Schwiete, Mark and Weigand, Jürgen "Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 30.1, 1997, 1-34. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.1
Schwiete, Mark/Weigand, Jürgen (1997): Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 30, iss. 1, 1-34, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.1
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Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen

Schwiete, Mark | Weigand, Jürgen

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30 (1997), Iss. 1 : pp. 1–34

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Publisher Name
Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.1
Language
Multiple languages
Pages
34

Author Details

Mark Schwiete, Nürnberg

Jürgen Weigand, Nürnberg

Cited By

  1. Financial Structure and Stability

    Evolution of Financial Systems: Convergence Towards Higher or Lower Stability?

    Neuberger, Doris

    2000

    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-57674-4_2 [Citations: 5]

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Abstract

Bank Equity Participations and the Corporate Financial Behaviour of German Firms

The paper discusses the financial behaviour of German stock corporations. Starting from agency theory, which attributes real deviations from Modigliani / Miller’s theorem of the irrelevance of the financial policy to asymmetric information and the existence of agency costs, empirically testable hypotheses are derived for potential determinants of corporate leverage. Special account is taken of fea- tures of the German financial system, such as a bank’s possibility of acquiring equity participations in industrial enterprises. For the sample of German stock corporations the results of regression analysis are significantly different from those reported in the literature for US firms. The financial behaviour of the German sample corporations resembles that of Japanese corporations. The empirical findings indicate that the corporate financial behaviour in bank-oriented financial systems is different from that in market-oriented systems. However, these results are not due to bank participations. Other factors like close long-term bank-firm relationships appear to be more important

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Mark Schwiete/Jürgen Weigand: Bankbeteiligungen und\rdas Verschiddungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen 1
I. Einführung 1
II. Zur Theorie und empirischen Evidenz der Unternehmensfinanzierung 2
1. Irrelevanz der Finanzierungsart und Agency-Theorie 2
2. Die Bedeutung des Finanzsystems 6
3. Mögliche Bestimmungsfaktoren des Verschuldungsgrades 8
a) Rentabilität 8
b) Intangible Investitionen 9
c) Ertragsrisiko 9
d) Unternehmenswachstum 9
e) Unternehmensgröße 10
f) Konzentration von Eigentümern und Gläubigern 11
g) Langfristige Beziehungen 12
h) Bankbeteiligungen 12
i) Das Finanzsystem 15
III. Empirische Untersuchung für deutsche Aktiengesellschaften 1967 - 1984 16
1. Datenbasis und Variablen 16
2. Schätzverfahren 19
3. Empirische Ergebnisse 20
IV. Vergleich mit den Ergebnissen anderer Studien und Ausblick 28
Literatur 31
Zusammenfassung: Bankbeteiligungen und das Verschuldungsverhalten deutscher Unternehmen 33
Summary: Bank Equity Participations and the Corporate Financial Behaviour of German Firms 33
Résumé: Participations bancaires et le comportement d'endettement d'entreprises allemandes 34

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