Börseneinführungen, Underpricing und die Haftung von Emissionsbanken

Abstract

Initial Public Offerings, Underpricing and Underwriter Liability

Underpricing of initial public offerings may, inter alia, be explained by an informational advantage of certain investors whilst poorly informed investors are subject to a winner’s curse. Such underpricing may be reduced by improving the quality of the information available to poorly informed investors. Underwriter activities aimed at furnishing information and at certification are appropriate to this end as a matter of principle. The banks’ liability for the truthfulness of prospectuses signals to investors that there are incentives to the bank for carrying out this kind of activities. It is demonstrated that this actually reduces underpricing (after litigation costs, where appropriate). A consistent argumentation also shows that unconditional insurance of investors may abolish any kind of underpricing: a solution irreconcilable with the predominant practice-based perceptions.