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Finanzintermediation und Wiederverhandlungen
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 27 (1994), Iss. 2 : pp. 291–309
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Wolfgang Breuer
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Die Marktgängigkeit von Versicherungsverträgen in kapitalmarkttheoretischen Modellen
Breuer, Wolfgang
Zeitschrift für die gesamte Versicherungswissenschaft, Vol. 83 (1994), Iss. 1-2 P.261
https://doi.org/10.1007/BF03188424 [Citations: 2]
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Abstract
Financial Intermediation and Renegotiation
Using the services of a financial intermediary for limiting the number of financial relations to a single one may help to avoid problems that may stem from noncooperative modes of behaviour of capital donors. Diamond proved this in 1984 by identifying the possibility to save control costs through financial intermediation. This contribution shows that similar considerations are applicable in connection with the renegotiation of debts aimed at waivers of claims outstanding within the framework of corporate insolvencies: It is easier to bring such debt renegotiations to a successful conclusion when conducted with a single financial intermediary than with a large number of small capital donors. This may help to avoid, under certain circumstances, corporate liquidations which are inefficient in macroeconomic terms. Owing to diversification effects, financial intermediaries themselves are only exposed to a negligible risk of insolvency and, thus, to a negligible debt renegotiation problem compared with their capital donors; this may mean a net overall economic prosperity increase on account of financial intermediation.