Irrationalitäten und Anomalien als Bestimmungsfaktoren währungspolitischer Entscheidungen

Abstract

Irrationalities and Anomalies as Determinants of Monetary Policy Decisions

Monetary policy cooperation among industrial countries is often deemed to represent a kind of dilemma not unknown to prisoners: Although cooperation would be advantageous for all concerned, the temptation is great that commitments given are not honoured and that a free-rider position is adopted in dealings with others. However, the behavioural assumptions are hardly suitable for describing, if only with a modest degree of accuracy, the nature of international relations. Complete information and von-Neumann-Morgenstern rationality in decision-making rather represent the exception to the rule. Where international politics is interpreted as a problem encountered by small groups in decision-making, the prospects for cooperation present themselves in a much more favourable light. Such an interpretative approach would justify the inclusion into the model of anomalies and irrationalities. There are especially two aspects that deserve attention: the uncertainty associated with the actions of agents on the one hand and the motives and constraints agents accept as guidance for their actions on the other. Where the usefulness of any collaborative scheme is rated higher or lower compared to what it “objectively” is, disregard of the Neumann-Morgenstern rationality cannot be precluded. And where decisions are motivated by factors other than those outside observers would expect, such outside observers may consider this to be an “anomaly”. Both would open up a wide spectrum of conditions and options for action that point to a way out of the dilemma.