Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation
JOURNAL ARTICLE
Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE
Style
Format
Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 24 (1991), Iss. 1 : pp. 85–106
1 Citations (CrossRef)
Additional Information
Article Details
Author Details
Werner Neus, Köln
Peter Nippel, Köln
Cited By
-
Besonderheiten der Finanzierung kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen
Friedrich, Kaufmann,
Credit and Capital Markets - Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30 (1997), Iss. 1 P.140
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.140 [Citations: 0]
References
-
Akerlof, George A. (1970): The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, S. 488 - 500.
Google Scholar -
Albach, Horst (1988): Ertragslage und Kapitalstruktur kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Google Scholar -
Albach, Horst u.a. (1988): Deregulierung des Aktienrechts. Das Drei-Stufen-Modell.
Google Scholar -
Arnold, Wolf gang (1989): Finanzierungsziele. Anforderungen mittelständischer Unternehmungen an Beteiligungskapital.
Google Scholar -
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1985): The Economics of Agency, in: Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, hrsg. von John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, S. 37 - 51.
Google Scholar -
Bamberg, Günter/Spremann, Klaus (1981): Implications of Constant Risk Aversion, in: Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 25. Jg., S. 205 - 224.
Google Scholar -
DeAngelo, Harry /DeAngelo, Linda/Rice, Edward M. (1984): Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 27, S. 367 - 401.
Google Scholar -
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, S. 393 - 414.
Google Scholar -
Franke, Günter (1983): Kapitalmarkt und Separation, in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 53. Jg., S. 239 - 260.
Google Scholar -
Akerlof, George A. (1970): The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, S. 488 – 500.
Google Scholar -
Albach, Horst (1988): Ertragslage und Kapitalstruktur kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.
Google Scholar -
Albach, Horst u.a. (1988): Deregulierung des Aktienrechts. Das Drei-Stufen-Modell.
Google Scholar -
Arnold, Wolf gang (1989): Finanzierungsziele. Anforderungen mittelständischer Unternehmungen an Beteiligungskapital.
Google Scholar -
Arrow, Kenneth J. (1985): The Economics of Agency, in: Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, hrsg. von John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, S. 37 – 51.
Google Scholar -
Bamberg, Günter/Spremann, Klaus (1981): Implications of Constant Risk Aversion, in: Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 25. Jg., S. 205 – 224.
Google Scholar -
DeAngelo, Harry /DeAngelo, Linda/Rice, Edward M. (1984): Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 27, S. 367 – 401.
Google Scholar -
Diamond, Douglas W. (1984): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, S. 393 – 414.
Google Scholar -
Franke, Günter (1983): Kapitalmarkt und Separation, in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 53. Jg., S. 239 – 260.
Google Scholar
Abstract
Volume of Investment and Risk Allocation
It is argued in the course of the equity capital gap discussion that equity capital, where insufficient in amount, impedes investment in risky ventures. This contribution, however, emphasizes not so much the adequacy of amount, but the risk allocation associated with equity capital investment. Where the amount of equity is very large, but the allocation of risks is poor, the risk premium may become so great that the net value of the investment turns negative. In such cases, an investment does not fail over inadequate equity capitalization, but over an inappropriate exploitation of the capital market's willingness to accept risks. It is demonstrated on the basis of a simple model that, in the light of this consideration, the spreading of risks in the form of equity financing has a positive effect on investment acitivity. From that angle, the promotion of equity financing is helpful in the stimulation of risky investments. Where drawbacks of external equity financing are taken into consideration, which result especially from an asymmetrical spread of information, the positive evaluation is overcast by an element of relativity. The model variants as presented here suggest an impairment of just the advantages of equity financing; however, the inclusion of further drawbacks may also mean that equity financing is rejected altogether.