Menu Expand

Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation

Cite JOURNAL ARTICLE

Style

Neus, W., Nippel, P. Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 24(1), 85-106. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.1.85
Neus, Werner and Nippel, Peter "Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 24.1, 1991, 85-106. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.1.85
Neus, Werner/Nippel, Peter (1991): Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 24, iss. 1, 85-106, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.24.1.85

Format

Investitionsvolumen und Risikoallokation

Neus, Werner | Nippel, Peter

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 24 (1991), Iss. 1 : pp. 85–106

1 Citations (CrossRef)

Additional Information

Article Details

Author Details

Werner Neus, Köln

Peter Nippel, Köln

Cited By

  1. Besonderheiten der Finanzierung kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen

    Friedrich, Kaufmann,

    Credit and Capital Markets - Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30 (1997), Iss. 1 P.140

    https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.1.140 [Citations: 0]

References

  1. Akerlof, George A. (1970): The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, S. 488 - 500.  Google Scholar
  2. Albach, Horst (1988): Ertragslage und Kapitalstruktur kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Google Scholar
  3. Albach, Horst u.a. (1988): Deregulierung des Aktienrechts. Das Drei-Stufen-Modell.  Google Scholar
  4. Arnold, Wolf gang (1989): Finanzierungsziele. Anforderungen mittelständischer Unternehmungen an Beteiligungskapital.  Google Scholar
  5. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1985): The Economics of Agency, in: Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, hrsg. von John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, S. 37 - 51.  Google Scholar
  6. Bamberg, Günter/Spremann, Klaus (1981): Implications of Constant Risk Aversion, in: Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 25. Jg., S. 205 - 224.  Google Scholar
  7. DeAngelo, Harry /DeAngelo, Linda/Rice, Edward M. (1984): Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 27, S. 367 - 401.  Google Scholar
  8. Diamond, Douglas W. (1984): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, S. 393 - 414.  Google Scholar
  9. Franke, Günter (1983): Kapitalmarkt und Separation, in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 53. Jg., S. 239 - 260.  Google Scholar
  10. Akerlof, George A. (1970): The Market for "Lemons". Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in: Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 84, S. 488 – 500.  Google Scholar
  11. Albach, Horst (1988): Ertragslage und Kapitalstruktur kleiner und mittlerer Unternehmen des verarbeitenden Gewerbes in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.  Google Scholar
  12. Albach, Horst u.a. (1988): Deregulierung des Aktienrechts. Das Drei-Stufen-Modell.  Google Scholar
  13. Arnold, Wolf gang (1989): Finanzierungsziele. Anforderungen mittelständischer Unternehmungen an Beteiligungskapital.  Google Scholar
  14. Arrow, Kenneth J. (1985): The Economics of Agency, in: Principals and Agents: The Structure of Business, hrsg. von John W. Pratt und Richard J. Zeckhauser, S. 37 – 51.  Google Scholar
  15. Bamberg, Günter/Spremann, Klaus (1981): Implications of Constant Risk Aversion, in: Zeitschrift für Operations Research, 25. Jg., S. 205 – 224.  Google Scholar
  16. DeAngelo, Harry /DeAngelo, Linda/Rice, Edward M. (1984): Going Private: Minority Freezeouts and Stockholder Wealth, in: Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. 27, S. 367 – 401.  Google Scholar
  17. Diamond, Douglas W. (1984): Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring, in: Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 51, S. 393 – 414.  Google Scholar
  18. Franke, Günter (1983): Kapitalmarkt und Separation, in: Zeitschrift für Betriebswirtschaft, 53. Jg., S. 239 – 260.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Volume of Investment and Risk Allocation

It is argued in the course of the equity capital gap discussion that equity capital, where insufficient in amount, impedes investment in risky ventures. This contribution, however, emphasizes not so much the adequacy of amount, but the risk allocation associated with equity capital investment. Where the amount of equity is very large, but the allocation of risks is poor, the risk premium may become so great that the net value of the investment turns negative. In such cases, an investment does not fail over inadequate equity capitalization, but over an inappropriate exploitation of the capital market's willingness to accept risks. It is demonstrated on the basis of a simple model that, in the light of this consideration, the spreading of risks in the form of equity financing has a positive effect on investment acitivity. From that angle, the promotion of equity financing is helpful in the stimulation of risky investments. Where drawbacks of external equity financing are taken into consideration, which result especially from an asymmetrical spread of information, the positive evaluation is overcast by an element of relativity. The model variants as presented here suggest an impairment of just the advantages of equity financing; however, the inclusion of further drawbacks may also mean that equity financing is rejected altogether.