Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der „incentive“ Struktur einer Politikinstanz; eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch trennende oder nicht trennende Gleichgewichte
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Wirtschaftspolitiken bei asymmetrischer Information als Resultat der „incentive“ Struktur einer Politikinstanz; eine Steuerung der Ökonomie durch trennende oder nicht trennende Gleichgewichte
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 24 (1991), Iss. 3 : pp. 307–318
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Volker Bieta, Bielefeld
References
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Backus, D., Driffill, E.J.: Rational Expectations and Policy Credibility Following a Change in Regime, Review of Economic Studies, 1985.
Google Scholar -
Barro, R.J.: „Reputationin a Model of Monetary Policy with Incomplete Information“, Journal of Monetary Economic 17, 1986.
Google Scholar -
Canzoneri, M.: Monetary Policy Games and the Role of Private Information, American Economic Review, 1985.
Google Scholar -
Fischer, S., Huizinga, J.: „Inflation, Unemployment and Opinion Polls“, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 14 (1982).
Google Scholar -
Frisch, H.: Die Neue Inflationstheorie, Vandenhoeck & Rupprecht, Göttingen 1980.
Google Scholar -
Milgrom, P., Roberts, J.: Limit Pricing and Entry under Incomplete Information: An Equilibrium Analysis, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 2.
Google Scholar -
Tabellini, G.: Centralized Wage Setting and Monetary Policy in a Reputational Model, Pre-Print, 1985, University of California, Los Angeles.
Google Scholar -
Taylor, J.B.: Rational Expectation Models in Macroeconomics, Arrow, H.J., Honkapohja, S. (Hrsg.), Frontiers of Economics, 1985.
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Abstract
Economic Policies with Asymmetric Information as a Result of the ‘Incentive’ Structure of a Policy-Making Body; Economic Guidance by ‘Pooling Equilibria’ or ‘Separating Equilibria’
Game theory methods have increasingly been accepted in economic theory analysis in recent years. Special attention has in this context been paid to the evaluation of economic policies in a Barro-Gordon economy using both simple and repetitive game methods and considering various information structures. Assuming the existence of an asymmetric information structure, the present variant of the Barro-Gordon model shows for a central bank in a game situation and for a centralized private sector to what extent the ‘incentive’ structure of economic policy-making bodies permits the economy to be guided through special types of equilibria in ‘signalling games’.