Widersprüche in der Geldmengenpolitik der Deutschen Bundesbank
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Widersprüche in der Geldmengenpolitik der Deutschen Bundesbank
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 22 (1989), Iss. 2 : pp. 197–220
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Hermann Ribhegge, Münster
References
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Abstract
Contradictions in the Money Supply Policy of the Deutsche Bundesbank
The present contribution analyzes the obedience to rules and consistency of the Deutsche Bundesbank’s monetary policy. It shows that – through its target ranges – the Deutsche Bundesbank obtains wide scope for discretionary decisionmaking is spite of its announced rule-bound and potentialoriented monetary policy. This contribution also proves that the Bundesbank is well prepared to take account of new theories in its monetary policy announcements, but it is open whether it actually transforms such theories into practical policies. The extent to which ranges defining the development of the central bank money stock help ensure the stability of the value of money depends on market participants’ subjective expectations. On the basis of a rational expectations model, the influence of pay policies and emerging expectations on the effectiveness of monetary policy is analyzed. The stronger the response of the level of employment to changes in real wages, the greater the probability that market participants have their rational expectations guided by the lower limit of the target range announced by the Bundesbank. However, if the responsiveness of the level of employment to high wage demands is deemed to be low and the Bundesbank is expected to abandon its totally restrictive monetary policy course, the probability of an undesired inflationary equilibrium is correspondingly greater.