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Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen



Gröschel, U. Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 20(3), 358-377.
Gröschel, Ulrich "Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 20.3, 1987, 358-377.
Gröschel, Ulrich (1987): Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 20, iss. 3, 358-377, [online]


Auswahl- und Kontrollprobleme bei Venture-Finanzierungen

Gröschel, Ulrich

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 20 (1987), Iss. 3 : pp. 358–377

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Ulrich Gröschel, Bonn

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Selection and Control Problems in Venture Financing

Financing young ventures as distinct from established successful ones presupposes a much more comprehensive assessment of their overall entrepreneurial and managerial concepts. Innovative projects often require risk assessments credit institutions are unable to make since they do not have the necessary analyzing potential and know how. Divergent information of investors and capital donors on the proposed investments’ earnings capacity and risks in the venture area may result in the rationing of funds – either through or independent of the price. The eventual form of fund rationing depends on the risk pattern in the market for venture financing. By contrast, capital donors’ risk aversion plays an only minor role in the limitation of venture financing. I£ both the investor and the capital donor is informed equally well, all investments are financed and implemented at terms adequate to the risks involved, although the financier is strongly risk-opposed. After the decision to finance a venture has been taken, the capital donor must ensure that the venture actually develops as provided for upon the conclusion of the contract and does not become riskier from his point of view. Collaterals to secure loans young ventures can, as a rule, not provide as necessary. Capital donors, in order to avoid financing business concepts running counter to their interests, require ample information and far-reaching approval rights assigned to them under the financing contracts they sign. Also, such contracts must limit incentives to behave in ways detrimental from their points of view as much as possible. Contracts of this nature are, as a rule, concluded in the case of capital investments. Equity capital has proved to be a useful venture-financing instrument in those cases in which capital donors must take account of decisions subsequently taken by investors to their detriment, but in which adequate collaterals cannot be provided.