Sind Steuern und Staatsverschuldung äquivalente Instrumente zur Finanzierung der Staatsausgaben?
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Sind Steuern und Staatsverschuldung äquivalente Instrumente zur Finanzierung der Staatsausgaben?
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 19 (1986), Iss. 2 : pp. 271–291
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Wolfgang Kitterer, Kiel
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Staatsverschuldung als Quelle der Nicht-Neutralität
Michaelis, Jochen
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 22 (1989), Iss. 4 P.453
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.22.4.453 [Citations: 0]
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Abstract
Are Taxes and Public Debt Equivalent Instruments for Financing Government Expenditures?
Ricardo’s equivalence theorem states that public debt has the same macroeconomic effects as the financing of government expenditures via taxes. First it is shown that certain implications of circular flow theory are linked with this theorem and that it involves asset-neutrality and allocation-neutrality. On the basis of the fundamentals of the generation model developed by Barro, allowances for the interests of future generations and also public and private debt as instruments for intertemporal transfer of consumption are examined. The question of whether more efficient intertemporal transfer of consumption is possible with the aid of public debt because private consumption preferences can be allowed for more effectively or because government borrowing is preferable to private debt for cost or competition reasons, is thoroughly ventilated, also in connection with capital market imperfections. A simple empirical test with the help of a consumption function shows that the Ricardian equivalence theorem cannot be confirmed for the Federal Republic of Germany.