Wechselkursstabilisierung durch internationale geldpolitische Kooperation
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Wechselkursstabilisierung durch internationale geldpolitische Kooperation
Kritische Anmerkungen zum McKinnon-Vorschlag
Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 19 (1986), Iss. 4 : pp. 569–582
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Jürgen Schiemann, Hamburg
References
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Abstract
Stabilising Exchange Rates via International Monetary Cooperation. Critical remarks on the McKinnon proposal
In his „International Standard for Monetary Stabilization“ McKinnon proposes a non-inflationary stabilisation of the exchange rates participating in a fixedexchange- rate system with target zones (USA, Japan and Germany) by means of controlling the world money supply. Via coordinated and unsterilised exchange market interventions and symmetrical monetary effects McKinnon hopes that with a purely externally oriented money supply policy the differences in interest rate levels will provide the impulse needed for the stabilisation of exchange rates. Numerous critical objections indicate that such a fixed-exchange-rate system is not particulary recommendable. As can be shown, in the event of a renunciation of monetary autonomy neither the unrealistic functional and intervention conditions nor the institutional provision of this system with practicable sanctionary mechanisms are able to bring about non-inflationary fixed exchange rates. Furthermore, the McKinnon system is incompatible with the exchange rate and intervention mechanism of the European Monetary System (EMS).