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Kreditgenossenschaften, Managementsteuerung und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle

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Breuer, W. Kreditgenossenschaften, Managementsteuerung und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 30(2), 219-249. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.2.219
Breuer, Wolfgang "Kreditgenossenschaften, Managementsteuerung und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 30.2, 1997, 219-249. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.2.219
Breuer, Wolfgang (1997): Kreditgenossenschaften, Managementsteuerung und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 30, iss. 2, 219-249, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.30.2.219

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Kreditgenossenschaften, Managementsteuerung und der Markt für Unternehmenskontrolle

Breuer, Wolfgang

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 30 (1997), Iss. 2 : pp. 219–249

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Wolfgang Breuer, Bonn

References

  1. Aschhoff G./Henningsen, E. (1985): Das deutsche Genossenschaftswesen.  Google Scholar
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  5. Fershtmann, C./Judd, K. L. (1987): Equilibrium Incentives in Oligopoly, American Economic Review, Vol. 77, S. 927 - 940.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Credit Co-operatives, Management Steering and the Market for Corporate Control

The choice of a company's - in this case a bank's - legal form of incorporation may be interpreted as a means for demonstrating in a credible manner that management-steering interventions will either be made or not. Incorporating banks especially in the legal form of a co-operative means deliberately renouncing the use of market forces for corporate control purposes as a method of managementdisciplining, which may give credit co-operatives a net efficiency advantage over banks incorporated as public limited companies (AGs) in the eyes of the respective shareholders. Compared with the management of public limited banks, for instance, the management of credit co-operatives is better able, in the absence of take-over threats, to pursue economic power-building and growth objectives, which may be beneficial, ex post, for the co-operative's shareholders as well because of the shift in market shares between the two forms of credit institutions that is associated with oligopolistic market structures. However, basic to the occurrence of such a positive effect is a sufficiently large volume of the co-operative's transactions with non-members.