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Svindland, E. Konjunkturtheoretische Implikationen der Hypothese rationaler Erwartungen. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 16(3), 331-350. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.16.3.331
Svindland, Eirik "Konjunkturtheoretische Implikationen der Hypothese rationaler Erwartungen" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 16.3, 1983, 331-350. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.16.3.331
Svindland, Eirik (1983): Konjunkturtheoretische Implikationen der Hypothese rationaler Erwartungen, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 16, iss. 3, 331-350, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.16.3.331

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Konjunkturtheoretische Implikationen der Hypothese rationaler Erwartungen

Svindland, Eirik

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 16 (1983), Iss. 3 : pp. 331–350

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Svindland, Eirik

References

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  29. Friedman, Benjamin (1979): Optimal Expectations and the Extreme Information Assumptions of “Rational Expectations” Macromodels, Journal of Monetary Economics 5, S. 23-41.  Google Scholar
  30. Friedman, Milton (1961): The Lag in Effects of Monetary Policy, Journal of Political Economy 69, S. 447 - 466.  Google Scholar
  31. Grossman, Sanford J. und Joseph E. Stiglitz (1976): Informations and Competitive Price Systems, American Economic Review 66 (Mai 1976), S. 246 - 253.  Google Scholar
  32. Grunberg, E. und F. Modigliani (1954): The Predictability of Social Events, Journal of Political Economy 62, S. 465 - 478.  Google Scholar
  33. Hayek, Friedrich A. (1945): The Use of Knowledge in Society, American Economic Review 35, Nr. 4 (September 1945), S. 519 - 530.  Google Scholar
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  37. Lucas, Robert E. (1972b): Expectations and the Neutrality of Money, Journal of Economic Theory 4 (April 1972), S. 103 - 124. -- Lucas, Robert E. und Thomas Sargent (Hrsg., 1981): Rational Expectations and Econometric Practice, Minneapolis. - Mises, Ludwig von (1949): Human Action: A Treatiseon Economics, New Haven.  Google Scholar
  38. Muth, J.F. (1961): Rational Expectations and the Theory of Price Movements, Econometrica 29 (Juli 1961), S. 315 - 335.  Google Scholar
  39. Okun, Arthur M. (1980): Rational-Expectations-with-Misperceptions as a Theory of the Business Cycle, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 12, Nr. 4, Teil 2 (November 1980), S. 817 - 825.  Google Scholar
  40. Pigou, A. C. (1927): Industrial Fluctuations, London (2. Aufl. 1929).  Google Scholar
  41. Sargent, Thomas J. (1976): A Classical Macroeconomic Model for the United States, Journal of Political Economy 84 (April 1976), S. 207 - 238.  Google Scholar
  42. Sargent, Thomas J. und Neil Wallace (1973): Rational Expectations and the Dynamics of Hyperinflation, International Economic Review 14, S. 328 - 350.  Google Scholar
  43. Svindland, E. (1979): Elementare Probleme der Analyse der Geldmengenpolitik bei rationalen Erwartungen, Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 3/1979, S. 217 - 232.  Google Scholar
  44. Tobin, James (1980): Asset Accumulation and Economic Activity (= Yrjo Jahnsson Lectures), Oxford.  Google Scholar

Abstract

Implications of the “Rational Expectations” Hypothesis with Respect to Business Cycle Theory

The development of the theory of temporary equilibrium has taken a special direction during the recent decade. Nowadays, expectations are interpreted in the same way as decisions to result from rational economic evaluation of information. In the extreme case the market participants have all the relevant infomation. Then global macroeconomic policy has no significant systematic impact on employment given certain patterns of behaviour. This demonstration by Lucas, Sargent, et al. has attracted great attention. There are, however, alternative and equally plausible patterns of behaviour. They imply that macroeconomic policy is relevant to the explanation and, therefore, to the control of economic development. The renaissance of business cycle theory is an important by-product of this discussion about a wellinformed rational formation of expectations. The reason is this: if the market participants were well-informed they would make decisions such as to avoid losses during recessions; in other words, their dispositions would eliminate the business cycle. Given the fact that pronounced business cycles have not disappeared, we either have to abolish the hypothesis of well-informed rational expectations or to accept the supplementary hypothesis that the cycles result from externally caused and, therefore, unpredictable shocks to the system. The first case excludes the “new classical” argument about economic policy mentioned above and consequently is not maintained by the dominating modern neoclassical theory. The second case, however, leads to a conceptional problem too: the more pronounced the cycles are the larger would have to be the causing shocks as well asthe market participants’ distrustin their capabilities of forecasting due to bad experience. In sum, the shock-hypothesis also leads to scepticism with respect to the assertion that the theory and policy of business cycles has to be based on the assumption of well-informed rational expectations