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Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheiten „vergessen“?

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Rudolph, B. Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheiten „vergessen“?. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 15(3), 317-340. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.15.3.317
Rudolph, Bernd "Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheiten „vergessen“?" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 15.3, 1982, 317-340. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.15.3.317
Rudolph, Bernd (1982): Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheiten „vergessen“?, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 15, iss. 3, 317-340, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.15.3.317

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Können die Banken ihre Kreditsicherheiten „vergessen“?

Rudolph, Bernd

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 15 (1982), Iss. 3 : pp. 317–340

1 Citations (CrossRef)

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Rudolph, Bernd

Cited By

  1. Euronotes und Euro Commercial Paper als Finanzinnovationen

    Die Analyse der den Euronote-Fazilitäten und ECP Programmen immanten Risiken

    Klaus, Michael

    1988

    https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-13434-3_7 [Citations: 0]

Abstract

Can the Banks “Forget” their Credit Collaterals?

In their well-known paper “Imperfect Information, Uncertainty and Credit Rationing”, Jaffee and Russell have shown that on a credit and loan market where lenders have only imperfect information concerning repayment of their loans the amount advanced to a borrower at a given interest rate is smaller than the amount sought at that interest rate (credit rationing). Jaffee and Russell arrive at this conclusion by introducing for the borrower certain costs of insolvency, which are taken into account in their model as an exogenously given, constant amount. Building up on this credit rationing approach, this article examines how a rise in the costs of insolvency of the borrower by the furnishing of collateral affects the credit offer of the bank. It is found that the increased costs of insolvency for the borrower by furnishing collateral reduces the uncertainty of the bank with respect to repayment; ceteris paribus, therefore, the bank will be able to grant more credit at the same interest rate to a borrower who provides collateral than to one who does not provide such collateral. This result shows, however, that the banks cannot “forget” their credit collaterals