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Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik

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  4. Vol. 11, Issue 3
  5. pp. 379–398

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Läufer, N. Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 11(3), 379-398. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.11.3.379
Läufer, Nikolaus K. A. "Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 11.3, 1978, 379-398. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.11.3.379
Läufer, Nikolaus K. A. (1978): Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 11, iss. 3, 379-398, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.11.3.379
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Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik

Läufer, Nikolaus K. A.

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 11 (1978), Iss. 3 : pp. 379–398

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Duncker & Humblot
DOI
https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.11.3.379
Language
Multiple languages
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20

Läufer, Nikolaus K. A.

References

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Abstract

Uncertainty, Friedman’s Rule and Optimal Stabilization Policy

A broad version of Friedman’s rule is incorporated systematically in the Tinbergen-Theil-Brainard approach to optimal stabilization policy: Not long lags, but very high parameter uncertainty is needed in order than an optimal stabilization policy decision rule in accordance with control theory can agree with or come very close to the Friedman rule. Uncertainty in the theory and hitherto still largely neglected learning processes of economic entities force the already existing parameter uncertainty up to such extreme heighs that Friedman’s rule can be accepted as directly optimal under control theory or, on econometric grounds, as the best among the unavoidably suboptimal decision rules.

Table of Contents

Section Title Page Action Price
Nikolaus K. A. Läufer: Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel\rund optimale Stabilisierungspolitik 379
I. Der Tinbergen-Theil-Brainard-Ansatz der optimalen Wirtschaftspolitik 379
1. Ziele, Instrumente und Strukturvorstellungen des Stabilisierungspolitikers 379
2. Ein einfaches Modell der Stabilisierungspolitik 379
3. Zwei Arten von Unsicherheit 380
4. Erwarteter Nutzen, Reaktionsfunktionen und Entscheidungsregeln einer optimalen Stabilisierungspolitik 381
5. Eine graphische Darstellung des Politikoptimums 383
II. Erweiterungen des einfachen Politikmodells 383
1. System- und Policy-Lags 383
2. Die Entscheidungsregel im erweiterten Politikmodell 384
III. Die Friedmansche Regel 385
1. Die Begründung durch hohe Parameterunsicherheit 385
2. Die Begründung durch hohe Kosten der Instrumentenvariation 387
3. Die Begründung durch Lernprozesse 387
a) Natural-Rate-Hypothese und der Übergang zu rationalen Erwartungen 387
b) Vergebliche Hoffnungen auf die Übergangsperiode 389
c) Vergebliche Hoffnungen auf Preisstarrheiten durch langfristige Verträge 391
4. Die Begründung als second-best-Lösung 393
5. Die Begründung durch das Arrowsche Abstimmungsparadoxon 394
Schlußbemerkung 394
Literaturverzeichnis 395
Zusammenfassung: Unsicherheit, Friedmansche Regel und optimale Stabilisierungspolitik 397
Summary: Uncertainty, Friedman's Rule and Optimal Stabilization Policy 397
Résumé: Incertitude, principe de Friedman et politique optimale de stabilisation 397

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