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Was hätte man sonst machen können? Alternativszenarien zur rot-grünen Einkommensteuerreform

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Bönke, T., Corneo, G. Was hätte man sonst machen können? Alternativszenarien zur rot-grünen Einkommensteuerreform. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 126(4), 489-519. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.489
Bönke, Timm and Corneo, Giacomo "Was hätte man sonst machen können? Alternativszenarien zur rot-grünen Einkommensteuerreform" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 126.4, 2006, 489-519. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.489
Bönke, Timm/Corneo, Giacomo (2006): Was hätte man sonst machen können? Alternativszenarien zur rot-grünen Einkommensteuerreform, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 126, iss. 4, 489-519, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.489

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Was hätte man sonst machen können? Alternativszenarien zur rot-grünen Einkommensteuerreform

Bönke, Timm | Corneo, Giacomo

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 126 (2006), Iss. 4 : pp. 489–519

2 Citations (CrossRef)

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Article Details

Bönke, Timm

Corneo, Giacomo

Cited By

  1. Beurteilung der Verteilungswirkungen der „rot-grünen“ Einkommensteuerpolitik. Eine Frage des Maßstabs

    Maiterth, Ralf | Müller, Heiko

    Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 129 (2009), Iss. 3 P.375

    https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.129.3.375 [Citations: 3]
  2. Distributional and welfare effects of Germany’s year 2000 tax reform: the context of savings and portfolio choice

    Ochmann, Richard

    Empirical Economics, Vol. 51 (2016), Iss. 1 P.93

    https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-015-1003-2 [Citations: 2]

Abstract

We employ a large sample of individual tax returns data to simulate alternatives to the income tax reform introduced in Germany by the governmental coalition of Social Democrats and Greens in 1998. We characterize three reforms that would have been fiscally equivalent to the actual one: a distributionally neutral tax reform, one with a maximal basic allowance, and a flat tax. By comparing the individual tax burdens under each alternative, we simulate majority voting on the tax reform. The actual reform loses against both the distributionally neutral reform and the one with maximal basic allowance; however, it wins against the flat tax. The Condorcet winner turns out to be the reform with maximal basic allowance.