Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?
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Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?
Sell, Friedrich L. | Wiens, Marcus
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 126 (2006), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–633
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Sell, Friedrich L.
Wiens, Marcus
Abstract
In this paper, we take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the possibility to rely on the trustee ("reliance"), while the trustee's object is to receive a trustworthy signal ("trust responsiveness"). The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. On the one hand, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages" (perfect jurisdiction). Yet, it is also possible, on the other hand, to achieve a second best solution in a non-perfect jurisdiction world when "trust responsiveness" comes into play.