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Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

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Sell, F., Wiens, M. Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?. Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, 126(4), 605-633. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.605
Sell, Friedrich L. and Wiens, Marcus "Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?" Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch 126.4, 2006, 605-633. https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.605
Sell, Friedrich L./Wiens, Marcus (2006): Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?, in: Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, vol. 126, iss. 4, 605-633, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/schm.126.4.605

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Vertrauen: Substitut oder Komplement zu formellen Institutionen?

Sell, Friedrich L. | Wiens, Marcus

Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 126 (2006), Iss. 4 : pp. 605–633

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Article Details

Sell, Friedrich L.

Wiens, Marcus

Abstract

In this paper, we take trust as a specific, cooperative investment. The trustor is mainly interested in the possibility to rely on the trustee ("reliance"), while the trustee's object is to receive a trustworthy signal ("trust responsiveness"). The value of a trust relationship amounts and equals to not less than the social surplus which it can generate. On the one hand, a social optimal solution is feasible in the case where both parties agree on "liquidated damages" (perfect jurisdiction). Yet, it is also possible, on the other hand, to achieve a second best solution in a non-perfect jurisdiction world when "trust responsiveness" comes into play.