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Körner, T., Müller, O., Paul, S., Schmidt, C. Supervisory Board Qualification of German Banks: Legal Standards and Survey Evidence. Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, 49(2), 299-342. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.2.299
Körner, Tobias; Müller, Oliver; Paul, Stephan and Schmidt, Christoph M. "Supervisory Board Qualification of German Banks: Legal Standards and Survey Evidence" Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital 49.2, 2016, 299-342. https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.2.299
Körner, Tobias/Müller, Oliver/Paul, Stephan/Schmidt, Christoph M. (2016): Supervisory Board Qualification of German Banks: Legal Standards and Survey Evidence, in: Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, vol. 49, iss. 2, 299-342, [online] https://doi.org/10.3790/ccm.49.2.299

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Supervisory Board Qualification of German Banks: Legal Standards and Survey Evidence

Körner, Tobias | Müller, Oliver | Paul, Stephan | Schmidt, Christoph M.

Credit and Capital Markets – Kredit und Kapital, Vol. 49 (2016), Iss. 2 : pp. 299–342

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Article Details

Author Details

Tobias Körner, RGS Econ and Staff of German Council of Economic Experts, Gustav-Stresemann-Ring 11, 65189 Wiesbaden

Oliver Müller, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780 Bochum

Stephan Paul, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universitätsstraße 150, 44780 Bochum

Christoph M. Schmidt, RWI, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, German Council of Economic Experts, IZA Bonn, and CEPR London, Hohenzollernstraße 1–3, 45128 Essen

Abstract

Improving the regulation of banks has been at the centre of economic policy actions since the outbreak of the global financial crisis. One of the many and conceptually very different measures proposed is to improve the corporate governance of banks by setting qualification standards for banks" non-executive directors. To explore the rationale of such a regulation implemented in Germany, we conducted a detailed survey among supervisory board members of German banks covering their educational background, professional status and experience, as well as non-occupation related activities. We document that general education among supervisory board members is high, but very few board members can rely on a professional background in banking and finance. This is especially true for chairpersons. A higher share of professionals among board members primarily reflects the presence of employee representatives. The majority of board members reports leadership experience, chairpersons more often than ordinary members. Some of these findings strongly depend on the bank"s legal form, its size and business model, suggesting that both market forces and institutional characteristics of banking markets are important determinants of the qualification level of non-executive directors.