JOURNAL ARTICLE
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Die unabhängige Justiz — eine vernachlässigte Determinante zur Erklärung der Zentralbankunabhängigkeit?
Journal of Contextual Economics – Schmollers Jahrbuch, Vol. 122 (2002), Iss. 2 : pp. 207–225
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Voigt, Stefan
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Economic growth and judicial independence: cross-country evidence using a new set of indicators
Feld, Lars P.
Voigt, Stefan
European Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 19 (2003), Iss. 3 P.497
https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(03)00017-X [Citations: 324]
Abstract
The correlation between monetary stability and central bank independence (cbi) has often been dealt with over the last couple of years. It is argued here that the structural working conditions of the independent judiciary display great similarity with those of independent central banks that has hitherto been largely neglected. It is further argued that an explanatory deficit of the cbi literature can be reduced if the independence of the judiciary is incorporated as an additional explanatory variable. It is eventually argued that the de facto independence of both central bank and judiciary does not only depend on formal but also on informal institutions.